JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 20.06.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. ( learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 26.12.2012 and order of sentence dated 28.12.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. (3), Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ) and Sections 184 , 185 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act). It was asserted that on 28th October 2003 at about 7:15 PM, the informant, Madan Lal (PW1), was going towards Dina Nath (since deceased), who was collecting the grit stones in front of his house. A Maruti car bearing registration number HP-23-0437 came to the spot at a high speed from Ghumarwin and hit Dinanath towards the wrong side of the road. Dinanath was trapped under the vehicle and was dragged for a distance of about 5–6 feet. The driver identified himself as Vinod Kumar Dogra (the accused). Dinanath succumbed to his injuries on the spot. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. ASI Mulk Raj (PW-6) recorded the statement (Ext.PW-1/A) of informed Madan Lal (PW-1), which was sent to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-6/A) was registered. Balwant Singh (PW7) took the photographs of the spot (Ext. PW7/A to Ext. PW-7/E). HC Mulkh Raj prepared the site plan (Ext. PW6/C). He conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared the inquest report (Ext. PW6/D). Dr Anil Kumar (PW8) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased and found that the deceased, Dinanath, had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. The cause of death was haemothorax leading to cardiopulmonary shock. He issued the post-mortem report (Ext. PW8/A). ASI Mulkh Raj seized the vehicle bearing registration no. HP-23-0437, Registration Certificate, insurance certificate, and driving license vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). The cause of death was haemothorax leading to cardiopulmonary shock. He issued the post-mortem report (Ext. PW8/A). ASI Mulkh Raj seized the vehicle bearing registration no. HP-23-0437, Registration Certificate, insurance certificate, and driving license vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). HHC Dev Raj (PW-5) conducted the mechanical examination of the car and found that there were no mechanical defects in the vehicle, which could have led to the accident. He issued a report (Ext.PW-5/A). ASI Mulkh Raj arrested the accused, who was medically examined. It was found that the accused was intoxicated. MLC (Ext. PA) was issued. The blood sample of the accused was preserved and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Junga and the report of analysis (Ext. PB) was issued stating that the accused had 202.1 mg per cent alcohol in his blood and 63.3 mg per cent alcohol in his urine. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC and Sections 185 and 196 of the M.V. Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Madan Lal (PW-1) is an eyewitness. Thakur Dass (PW-2) did not support the prosecution’s case. Pawan Kumar Gautam(PW-3) and Dinesh Kumar (PW-4) reached the spot after the accident, and the dead body was taken out in their presence. Dev Raj (PW-5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. ASI Mulkh Raj (PW-6) investigated the matter. Balwant Singh (PW-7) took the photographs. Dr Anil Kumar (PW8) conducted the post-mortem examination of Dinanath. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that the car was parked on the downhill. It was hit by a buffalo and started moving. He was not driving the vehicle. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony proved that a Maruti car hit Dinanath and dragged him for 5 to 6 feet. He also identified the accused as the Driver of the car. Dinesh Kumar (PW4)corroborated the informant’s version. He was not driving the vehicle. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony proved that a Maruti car hit Dinanath and dragged him for 5 to 6 feet. He also identified the accused as the Driver of the car. Dinesh Kumar (PW4)corroborated the informant’s version. The defence version that the vehicle was parked and a buffalo hit it, causing it to move, was not proved by any reliable evidence. Dinanath died in the accident. Minor contractions in the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses were not sufficient to discard them. The MLC of the accused showed that he was intoxicated. The report of the analysis showed that the accused had alcohol in his blood exceeding 30 mg percent. He had an insurance certificate which was valid up to 02.05.2002. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable and under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC and sections 185 and 196 of M.V. Act, and sentenced him as under: Sections Sentences 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of Rs.1, 000/-, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for ten days. 304-A of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of Rs.5, 000/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month. 185 of the M.V. Act The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of Rs.1, 000/-, and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days. 196 of the M.V. Act The accused was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1, 000/-, and in default of the payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days. It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the car at the time of the accident. Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the car at the time of the accident. The car was taken towards the extreme right-hand side of the road contrary to the Rules of Road Regulations, 1989. The site plan (Ext.PW-6/C) showed skid marks up to 25 feet, suggesting that the car could not be stopped immediately after the accident. The car was on the unmetalled portion of the road for which no explanation was provided. The defence version that a parked car was hit by a buffalo was not probable. The accused had 202.1 mg % alcohol in his blood, much in excess of the statutory limit of 30 mg per hundred ml. The insurance of the vehicle was valid till 2ndMay 2002; the accident occurred on 28th October 2003. He was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Court. No interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material placed before them. Learned Courts below relied upon the statement of Madan Lal (PW1), but he had reached the spot after the accident. The car was parked on a slope, and it rolled down on its own, crushing Dinanath under it. This demolished the prosecution’s case that the negligence of the accused led to the accident. Many shops existed near the place of the accident, but no independent person was examined. No damage was noticed on the front portion of the car, which made the prosecution’s case suspect. The contradictions in the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses made them doubtful. The benefit of the Probation of Offender Act was not granted to the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior counsel assisted by M/s Shwetima Dogra and Sidarth learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior counsel assisted by M/s Shwetima Dogra and Sidarth learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused was driving the car at the relevant time. The medical officer was not examined to prove the MLC of the accused, and there was no evidence to connect the analysed sample to the accused. The report of analysis was improbable because the quantity of alcohol cannot exceed 100 mg %. The defence version was highly probable. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not granted to the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the prosecution witnesses categorically stated that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed towards the wrong side of the road. The learned Appellate Court had also found that the accused was driving the car towards the right side of the road, which led to the accident. The accused admitted the MLC, and he cannot raise any grievance regarding it. He was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned Courts below. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10.Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14.The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12.This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13.Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. …” 13.Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16.It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. Madan Lal (PW1) stated that Maruti came from Dangar towards the wrong side of the road and hit Dinanath. The car dragged Dinanath for 5-6 feet and stopped on a heap of gravel and sand. The Driver identified himself as Vinod Kumar, who was present in the court. The accident occurred due to his negligence. He stated in his cross-examination that his house was located at a distance of 5 km from the place of the accident. It was dark at the time of the accident. The accident had occurred before his arrival on the spot. The name of Vinod Dogra was disclosed by the people. He admitted that the accident occurred on a national highway and many vehicles were moving on the road. He had not seen the accused driving the vehicle, and he could not tell whose negligence led to the accident. 19. Madan Lal (PW1) stated that the driver identified himself as Vinod Dogra, who was present in the Court. This was not suggested to be incorrect in the cross-examination, which means that this part of his testimony is accepted to be correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the cross-examination, the same cannot be challenged during the arguments. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra , (2021) 11 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4, and it was held at page 34: “58. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra , (2021) 11 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4, and it was held at page 34: “58. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or forfeiture ( Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is required to be cross-examined to bring forth inconsistencies and discrepancies, and to prove the untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18:50 hrs; therefore, it was required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be arrested around 19:00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the arrest form (Ex. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2-9-2014 at 14:30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station, Kalamna. The time, i.e. 17, 10 hrs mentioned in Column 2, appears to be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station, Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak since the kidnapper was wearing a red colour t-shirt which was given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9- 2014. Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the arrest, such the argument that the accused was arrested on 1-9-2014 at 18:50 hrs is not tenable. 59. The House of Lords, in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the arrest, such the argument that the accused was arrested on 1-9-2014 at 18:50 hrs is not tenable. 59. The House of Lords, in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell, held that it is absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness if not speaking the truth on a particular point, direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as under: “Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessive cross-examination of witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue, but it seems to me that cross-examination of a witness which errs in the direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to leave him without cross- examination, and afterwards, to suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling.” 60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion, held as under: “My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to.” 61. This Court, in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh[State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], quoted from Browne v.Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) to hold that in the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. This Court held as under: (State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp.566-67, para 13) “13. It may be noted here that part of the statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. It may be noted here that part of the statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross- examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a witness to be questioned: (1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.” 62. This Court, in a judgment reported Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC 288 : (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 268, laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 294-95, paras 15-16) “15. Moreover, there was no effective cross- examination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed. PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to the factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross- examination is a matter of substance, not of procedure. One is required to put one's own version in the cross-examination of the opponent. The effect of non-cross-examination is that the statement of the witness has not been disputed. The effect of not cross-examining the witnesses has been considered by this Court in Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906 . This Court repelled a submission on the ground that the same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested before the courts below. A party is required to put his version to the witness. If no such questions are put, the Court would presume that the witness account has been accepted as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. A party is required to put his version to the witness. If no such questions are put, the Court would presume that the witness account has been accepted as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1957 SCC OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440. 16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag 60, it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings not challenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by another party must be accepted as fully established. The High Court of Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR 1961 Cal 359 has laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court, Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949 SCC OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83] has laid down that when attestation is not specifically challenged and the witness is not cross-examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the document was attested. If the other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra, 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683 has laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the system of administration of justice allows of cross-examination of opposite party's witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.” 20. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly concluded that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 21. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.” 20. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly concluded that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 21. It was submitted that Madan Lal (PW-1) stated in his cross-examination that he could not tell whose negligence led to the accident, and this statement disproves the prosecution’s case. This submission will not help the prosecution. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 22. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 23. Therefore, the statement of Madan Lal (PW1) that he could not say whose negligence led to the accident will not disprove the prosecution’s case. 24. It was submitted that Madan Lal (PW1) reached the spot after the incident, and his testimony cannot be used to conclude the negligence of the accused. This submission will not help the accused. Therefore, the statement of Madan Lal (PW1) that he could not say whose negligence led to the accident will not disprove the prosecution’s case. 24. It was submitted that Madan Lal (PW1) reached the spot after the incident, and his testimony cannot be used to conclude the negligence of the accused. This submission will not help the accused. This witness specifically stated that the car was being driven towards the right side of the road, which could have been seen by any person, even if he had arrived on the spot after the accident. This is duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext. PW6/C) wherein the car is shown towards the right side of the road on the unmetalled portion at a distance of 5 feet from the metalled portion. The total width of the metalled road is shown to be 22 feet, and the width of the unmetalled portion of the road towards the right side is 16 feet. The photograph (Ext. PW-7/E) also shows the car on the unmetalled portion of the road. Thus, it was duly proved that the car was being driven towards the right side of the road on its unmetalled portion, and the admission made by Madan Lal (PW1) that he had reached the spot after the accident will not discredit his testimony. 25. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. Therefore, the car was being driven towards the right side of the road in violation of Rule 2. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 26. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 27. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 28. In the present case, the site plan (Ext.PW-6/C) shows 25-foot skid marks and the vehicle towards the right side of the road. Hence, the accused was rightly held negligent. 29. Thakur Dass (PW 2) admitted in his cross- examination that the Maruti car was parked on a slope. Two bulls had a fight, and they hit the car. The car moved, and Dinanath was crushed under the car. There was no negligence on the part of the accused. It was submitted that his cross- examination made the defence version highly probable. This submission cannot be accepted. He had specifically stated in his examination-in-chief that the accident did not occur in his presence. Therefore, his testimony in the cross- examination regarding the accident cannot be accepted, and the defence cannot derive any advantage from it. 30. No other witness accepted the defence version that the accident occurred when the bull had hit the car. Pawan Kumar Gautam(PW3) stated that he had not seen the accident. Dinesh Kumar (PW4) stated that he saw Dina Nath under the tyres of the car.He denied, for want of knowledge, that the bull had hit the car, causing it to move. Mulkh Raj (PW6) stated that he had not found in the investigation that the bull had hit the car, causing it to move. Therefore, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not prove the defence version that the car moved after it was hit by a bull. 31. Mulkh Raj (PW6) stated that he had not found in the investigation that the bull had hit the car, causing it to move. Therefore, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not prove the defence version that the car moved after it was hit by a bull. 31. The accused stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC that the car was parked on a slope. A bull hit the car, causing it to move. He did not produce any evidence to prove this fact. The accused did not lead any evidence and relied upon the statement recorded under of Cr.P.C. to prove his defence. It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries , (2022) 15 SCC 689 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the presumption and mere denial in his statement under of Cr.P.C is not sufficient. It was observed at page 700: “20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence available under Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded under of the Code is not substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration." (Emphasis supplied)” 32. Therefore, the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was not a legally admissible evidence, and the accused cannot derive any advantage from it. 33. Madan Lal (PW1), Thakur Dass (PW2), Pawan Kumar Gautam (PW3), Dinesh Kumar (PW4) and Mulk Raj (PW6) stated that Dinanath was crushed under the tyres of the Maruti car. This is corroborated by the photograph (Ext.PW7/B).Dr. Anil Kumar (PW8) conducted the post- mortem examination of Dinanath and found that he had suffered multiple injuries, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He admitted in his cross- examination that the injuries could have been caused in a fall from a height, but that is an alternative possibility and will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. 34. He admitted in his cross- examination that the injuries could have been caused in a fall from a height, but that is an alternative possibility and will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. 34. Thus, it was proved that the accused was driving the car bearing registration no HP-23-0437 on a public highway in a negligent manner, which caused the death of Dinanath. Hence, he was rightly convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC . 35. The learned counsel for the accused admitted the MLC of the accused vide his statement dated 31.10.2012. Section 294 of CrPC provides that a document admitted by the accused does not require formal proof and can be read in evidence. It reads as under: “294. No formal proof of certain documents.—(1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document. (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government. (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed: Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.” 36. It was laid down by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Akhtar v. State of Uttaranchal , (2009) 13 SCC 722 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1223 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 725 that a post mortem report admitted by the accused can be read in evidence. It was observed at page 727: “21.It has been argued that non-examination of the medical officers concerned is fatal for the prosecution. However, there is no denial of the fact that the defence admitted the genuineness of the injury reports and the post-mortem examination reports before the trial court. So the genuineness and authenticity of the documents stands proved and shall be treated as valid evidence under Section 294 CrPC. However, there is no denial of the fact that the defence admitted the genuineness of the injury reports and the post-mortem examination reports before the trial court. So the genuineness and authenticity of the documents stands proved and shall be treated as valid evidence under Section 294 CrPC. It is a settled position of law that if the genuineness of any document filed by a party is not disputed by the opposite party, it can be read as substantive evidence under sub-section (3) of CrPC. Accordingly, the post-mortem report, if its genuineness is not disputed by the opposite party, the said post-mortem report can be read as substantive evidence to prove the correctness of its contents without the doctor concerned being examined.” 37. This position was reiterated in Shyam Narayan Ram v. State of U.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2988 wherein it was observed: “15.A bare reading of the aforesaid provision, in particular, sub-section (3), provides that where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed. That is to say that if the authors of such documents do not enter the witness box to prove their signatures, the said documents could still be read in evidence. Further, under the proviso, the Court has the jurisdiction in its discretion to require such signature to be proved. In the present case, the documents filed by the investigating agency were all public documents duly signed by public servants in their respective capacities, either as Investigating Officer or the doctor conducting the autopsy or other police officials preparing the memo of recoveries, etc. As such, the Trial Court had rightly relied upon the same and exhibited them in view of the specific repeated stand taken by the defence in admitting the genuineness of the said documents. Insofar as the police papers which had been signed by private persons like the informant, the same had been duly proved.” 38. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana , (2016) 15 SCC 485 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 683 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1242that the admission can be made by counsel for the defence by making an endorsement. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana , (2016) 15 SCC 485 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 683 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1242that the admission can be made by counsel for the defence by making an endorsement. It was observed at page 489: “14.In view of the definition of “document” in the Evidence Act, and the law laid down by this Court, as discussed above, we hold that the compact disc is also a document. It is not necessary for the court to obtain admission or denial on a document under sub-section(1) of Section 294 CrPC personally from the accused or complainant, or the witness. The endorsement of admission or denial made by the counsel for defence, on the document filed by the prosecution or on the application/report with which the same is filed, is sufficient compliance with CrPC. Similarly, on a document filed by the defence, endorsement of admission or denial by the Public Prosecutor is sufficient, and the defence will have to prove the document if not admitted by the prosecution. In case it is admitted, it need not be formally proved, and can be read in evidence. In a complaint case, such an endorsement can be made by the counsel for the complainant in respect of a document filed by the defence. 39. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly read the MLC in the evidence. 40. MLC (Ext. PA) reads that the breath of the accused smelled of alcohol, and pupils were slightly dilated. The patient had consumed alcohol. The blood and urine samples were preserved. The blood and urine samples were sent to FSL for examination, and as per the report of analysis (Ex. PB) the blood contained 202.1 mg per cent and the urine contained 63.3 mg per cent alcohol. Section 185 of MV Act provides that no person will drive a motor vehicle having excess of 30 mg per cent alcohol in his blood. In the present case, the accused was driving the car having 202.1 mg per cent alcohol in his blood, which is much more than the quantity specified in of the MV Act, and the learned Courts below had rightly convicted him under of the MV Act. 41. In the present case, the accused was driving the car having 202.1 mg per cent alcohol in his blood, which is much more than the quantity specified in of the MV Act, and the learned Courts below had rightly convicted him under of the MV Act. 41. It was submitted that the report of analysis was incorrect as a person cannot have more than 100 mg per cent alcohol in their blood. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The effect of alcohol has been mentioned in Lyon's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology 11th Edition (2012) Delhi Law Houseat page 620: “In different countries, the prescribed limit for permissible blood alcohol is as follows: Country Value (mg%) India 30 USA 100 Australia 40 Terminologies used in the medico-legal context: The following terminologies are employed in medico-legal cases. Their exact meaning should be understood. Sober — blood alcohol concentration of less than 10 mg% Drinking — blood alcohol concentration of 20- 70 mg% Under the influence of alcohol — blood alcohol concentration of 80-100 mg% Drunk or intoxicated — blood alcohol concentration of 150-300 mg% Coma and death — blood alcohol concentration in excess of 400 mg%.’ 42. Thus, it is permissible for a person to have alcohol more than 100 mg% in the alcohol, and there is no infirmity in the report of the FSL. 43. The police seized the insurance of the vehicle, which was valid till 2nd May 2002, whereas the accident had occurred on 28th October 2003; thus, the accused failed to produce a valid insurance on the date of the accident. Section 146 of the MV Act provides that no person shall drive any motor vehicle unless there is a policy in force as per the MV Act. Section 196 of the MV Act punishes a person who drives a vehicle in contravention of of the MV Act. In the present case, the accused was driving a Maruti car without a valid insurance certificate, and he was rightly convicted of committing an offence punishable under of the MV Act. 44. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused, and the learned Courts below failed to consider this aspect. This submission will not help the accused. 44. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused, and the learned Courts below failed to consider this aspect. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 , 304-A of IPC . It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavyduty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 45. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: - 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 46. It was held in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi , (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, that the legislature should revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304A of the IPC . It was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC . We say so with immense anguish.” 47. Thus, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused. 48. Learned Trial Court awarded the maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. Considering that a precious life was lost because of the negligence of the accused, the sentence of two years is not excessive, and no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court. 49. No other point was urged. 50. In view of the above, the present revision petition fails and it is dismissed and so also the pending miscellenous application(s), if any. 51. The records of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of this judgment for the information