- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF APRIL, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO. 457 OF 2024 BETWEEN: 1. M/S. SJR PRIME CORPORATION PRIVATE LIMITED A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT: THE HUB, SY. NO. 8/2, GROUND FLOOR, SARJAPUR ROAD, AMBALIPURA VILLAGE, BENGALURU-560 103. REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, MR. R. TEJUS REDDY 2. M/S. THE PAVILION A REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP FIRM, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO. 1, SJR PRIMUS, 7TH FLOOR, 7TH BLOCK, INDUSTRIAL LAYOUT, KORAMANGALA, BENGALURU – 560 095. REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, MR. R. TEJUS REDDY …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. AJESH KUMAR S.,ADVOCATE) Digitally signed by PRAJWAL A Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 AND: 1. SRI P. SHUBAKAR S/O PAPPANA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, RESIDING AT: DEVARABISANAHALLI VILLAGE, VARTHUR HOBLI, BANGALORE EAST TALUK, BANGALORE-560 087. 2. SAI SRUSHTI DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT: NO. 402, PRAGATI ENCLAVE, PRAGATI NAGAR, SRINAGAR COLONY, HYDERABAD. ALSO HAVING ITS OFFICE AT: NO. 3287, 3RD FLOOR, 12TH MAIN, II STAGE, INDIRA NAGAR, BANGALORE – 560 038. REPRESENTED BY: ITS DIRECTOR AND AUTHORISED SIGNATORY, MR. SREENADHA REDDY NAYANI 3. M/S. TENETFIRST BUSINESS PARKS PRIVATE LIMITED A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT: NO. 111/30, 7TH CROSS, 5TH BLOCK, RAJAJI NAGAR, - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 BANGALORE – 560 010. REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR AND AUTHORISED SIGNATORY, MR. VARUN JAIN …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. VINAYAKA B., ADVOCATE FOR C/R1; SRI. SKANDA ARUN KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R2; V/O DTD: 06.03.2025 NOTICE TO R3 IS DISPENSED WITH) THIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 13(1A) OF THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015, PRAYING TO ISSUE A SUITABLE DIRECTION OR ORDER TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 18.09.2024 PASSED IN COM. O.S NO. 660/2022 BY THE COURT OF LXXXVI ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, COMMERCIAL COURTS AT BENGALURU (CCH. 87) AT ANNEXURE-A ON THE APPLICATION FILED UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE APPELLANTS HEREIN UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 AT ANNEXURE- H AND REFER THE PARTIES TO ARBITRATION IN TERMS OF CLAUSE 23 OF THE LEASE DEED DATED 20.07.2017 AND ETC. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO) The challenge in this appeal is to an order dated 18.09.2024 passed by the LXXXVI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-87), whereby the learned Sessions judge has dismissed the application filed by the appellants, who were defendant Nos.2 and 3 in Com.O.S.No.660/2024 filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act of 1996). 2. The aforesaid suit was filed by respondent No.1 herein against the appellants and respondent Nos.2 and 3, who are defendant Nos.1 and 2 before the Trial Court. It is noted that on 22.05.2022, suit summons were issued to all the defendants. On 30.09.2022, respondent No.1 filed a memo furnishing fresh addresses of appellant No.1 and sought issuance of fresh summons. On 18.10.2022, respondent No.1 filed an application under Order V Rule 20 of CPC seeking permission to effect service through paper publication against the appellants herein. 3. On 28.11.2022, pursuant to the paper publication, the appellants and respondent No.2 were served. On non - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 appearance of the appellants, they and defendant No.1 i.e., respondent No.2 were placed ex-parte. Suffice to state on 03.07.2023, the appellants filed application under Order IX Rule 7 of the CPC and also an application seeking setting aside of ex-parte proceedings dated 28.11.2022, as no valid service was effected on them. 4. On 04.08.2023, the application under Order IX Rule 7 of the CPC filed by the appellants was allowed. They were permitted to file their written statement. The suit was listed on 13.09.2023 and 26.09.2023, when further time was granted to the appellants to file the written statement, subject to payment of cost of Rs.10,000/-. On the next date of hearing i.e., 07.10.2023, instead of filing the written statement, the appellants filed an application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996, which came to be dismissed by the impugned order. 5. The application was filed primarily by relying upon Clause-23, which is a Dispute Resolution Clause in the lease deed dated 20.07.2017. The learned Sessions Judge also noted that, appellant No.2 had entered into a supplementary agreement dated 10.08.2017 with respondent No.1 for enhancement of the rent. - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 6. The case of the appellants was that the parties need to be referred to the Arbitration based on Clause-23. The case of respondent No.1 herein was by relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. vs. Som Datt Builders Ltd., reported in (2009) 7 SCC 696, to state that there is no express arbitration Clause in the supplementary agreement and the arbitration Clause in the lease deed cannot be read into the supplementary agreement. 7. The learned Sessions Judge, while rejecting the application filed by the appellants, has stated in paragraph No.11 onwards as under: “11. I have carefully gone through the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the said case there was an arbitration clause in the construction agreement entered into between the employer and contractor. The contractor subsequently entered into an agreement with a sub contractor. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-16 of its judgment has made a clear distinction between reference to another document in a contract and incorporation of another document in a contract, by reference'. In the first case, the parties intend to adopt only specific portions or - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 part of the referred document for the purpose of contract. In the second case, the parties intend to incorporate the referred document in entirety into the contract. In the present case, in the supplemental agreement the defendant No.3 has accepted to pay additional rent of Rs.11/- in addition to the existing rent of Rs.39/-. The rest of the clauses in the principal agreement have been adopted in its entirety. Therefore, at this stage, the agreements shall be considered as one document and it can be safely conclude that there was an arbitral agreement subsisting between the plaintiff and defendants. 12. The defendant No.2 and 3 in their written arguments have inter alia stated that even non signatory to the arbitral agreement can also be a party to the arbitral proceedings as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India (P) Ltd. and another reported in (2024) 4 SCC 1. They contended that the dispute between the parties is arbitrable one as held by by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation reported in (2021)2 SCC 1. The relief sought for by the plaintiff can also be granted by the arbitral tribunal as held in Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 Regency Mahavir Properties reported in (2021) 4 SCC 786. 13. Obsolutely, there is no quarrel with respect to the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel for defendant No.2 & 3 with respect to subsistence of arbitral agreement and arbitrability of the dispute. 14. The next question is that, whether the defendant No.3 and 5 were diligent in filing of the application under section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act within the time stipulated in the said provision of law. The plaintiff filed the present suit on 22.04.2022 seeking certain reliefs against the defendants especially against defendant No.3. After exhausting the normal and conventional mode of service of process to the defendants, the plaintiff being unable to serve the summons to the defendants, with the leave of that court published suit summons in a daily newspaper. The matter was posted on 28.11.2022 for the appearance of the defendants. On that day, the defendants No.1 to 4 were not appeared and therefore, this court placed them exparte. After the evidence was being recorded and when the matter was set-the defendant No.1 alone appeared before the court and filed written statement. Subsequently the defendant No.2 and 3 were also appeared before coun with a request to set aside the order placing - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 them exparte. This court generously allowed their application and permitted them to file written statement. Since they did not file written statement within the period extended by the court, this court has imposed on them a cost of Rs.10,000/-. The defendant No.2 and 3 neither paid the cost nor filed the written statement. 15. Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act mandates that the application shall be filed not later then the 'date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute'. Order VIII of CPC mandates that the defendants shall file written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons. In commercial courts, the outer limit for filing written statement is 120 days (30 days). The said period was elapsed by the time, the defendants filed application under Section 8 of Arbitration Conciliation Act. If a party to the arbitration agreement applies to the court not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of dispute the court shall refer the parties to the arbitration. The defendant No.2 and 3 have not filed their first statement on substance within the statutory time specified in order VIII of CPC and therefore, after elapse of the said statutory time they can not insist the - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 court to refer the parties to the arbitration. In other words, the limitation to file an application under Sec.8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act is within 120 days from the date of service of summons or before filing of the Written Statement whichever is earlier. In the present case from the date of publication of summons in the news paper 120 days were already over by the time the application was filed. Therefore, on meaningful reading of Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the court finds that the defendant No.2 and 3 are not diligent in filing the application under Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act within the time stipulated said provision and have impliedly waived off their right to file application under Sec.8 of Arbitration and conciliation Act. 16. In this case the plaintiff has already led his oral and documentary evidence. Commercial courts have been established to resolve the commercial disputes in the expeditious manner. Although two years have been elapsed from the date of filing of the suit, the issues are not yet settled. Therefore, the present application is liable to be rejected. Point No.2: 17. For the foregoing reasons, the court proceed to pass the following; - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 ORDER The application filed by the defendant No.2 &3 under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is hereby rejected.” 8. It may be relevant to state here that, in paragraph 11, the learned Sessions Judge concluded that both the agreements i.e., lease deed and the supplementary agreement are to be considered as one document and thereby, it can be safely concluded that, there is an arbitration agreement subsisting between the plaintiff and the defendants, the parties herein. 9. He also relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Cox and Kings Ltd. vs. SAP India (P) Ltd. and another, reported as (2024) 4 SCC 1, and Vidya Drolia vs. Durga Trading Corporation, reported as (2020) 2 SCC 1. 10. Suffice to state that, the above finding of the learned Sessions Judge has not been challenged by respondent No.1 in a higher forum. In fact, we find that in Paragraph No.13, there is a positive finding of the Trial Court that, there is - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 no quarrel with respect to the case set up by the appellants herein with respect to the subsistence of the arbitral agreement and arbitrability of the dispute. 11. The other question which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge was, whether the appellants herein were diligent in filing the application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996. 12. The learned Sessions Judge has primarily relied on the fact that the summons in the suit deemed to have been effected on the appellants on the date of publication and as such, the time to file the written statement would start running from that date, and with the outer limit of 120 days for filing the written statement having elapsed, the application filed under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 after 120 days would reveal that, the appellants were not diligent in filing the application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996. In the other words, he held that, the appellants have impliedly waived off their right to file the application under section 8 of the Act of 1996. 13. Mr.Ajesh learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that, the learned Sessions Judge while setting aside the ex-parte order in the application under Order - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 IX Rule 7 of CPC on 04.08.2023, apart from setting aside the ex-parte order, had also granted time to the appellants to file their written statement and posted the suit for hearing on 22.08.2023. 14. According to him, on 22.08.2023, as the learned Sessions Judge was on leave the date in the suit was fixed as 13.09.2023. On that date, further time as prayed by the appellants to file their written statement which was granted by imposing a cost of Rs.10,000/- by fixing the date as 26.09.2023. Even on 26.09.2023, further time was granted to file written statement by 07.10.2023. He submits that on 07.10.2023, the appellants, instead of filing the written statement had filed application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996. 15. According to him, in that sense, the application under Section 8 was filed before the expiry of the time for filing the written statement. He also submits that, the application filed under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 was filed much before the expiry of the outer limit of 120 days in filing the written statement. He also contest the findings given by the learned Sessions Judge that the time to file the written statement - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 started running from the date of publication of the notice in the news paper as clearly erroneous and overlooking the fact that, the time had actually started running against the appellants only on 04.08.2023, when time was granted by the learned Sessions Judge, to file written statement. 16. According to him, if the facts are seen from the aforesaid perspective, the filing of the Section 8 application being within the time, the appellants were diligent in filing the application under section 8 of the Act of 1996, and as such, the finding of the learned Sessions Judge is clearly perverse. It is his submission that, in view of the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge on the existence of the arbitration Clause, the learned Sessions Judge should have allowed the application under Section 8 leaving the parties to seek reference of the dispute to the Arbitration. 17. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1, who is the plaintiff before the learned Sessions Judge would justify the impugned order by stating that, the publication having been effected before 28.11.2022 and the written statement was filed much after the expiry of 120 days, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 case of SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited vs. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and Others, reported as (2019) 12 SCC 210, the right of the appellants’ to file the written statement stood forfeited and as such, the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on 04.08.2023, granting further time to the appellants to file written statement on or before 13.09.2023 was clearly erroneous. That apart, it is his submission that, if the order dated 04.08.2023 was not a valid order, the time having expired, the appellants could not have filed the application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 and the law being well settled in terms of the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of SSIPL Lifestyle Private Limited vs. Vama Apparels (India) Private Limited and Another, reported as 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1667, any application under Section 8 filed after the expiry of 120 days, should be construed to mean that the party was not diligent in pursuing the Arbitration remedy. 18. That apart, it is his submission that, as the order of ex-parte has been set aside, the appellants are required to cross-examine the plaintiff/respondent No.1 to the extent the prayers as sought by the plaintiff in the suit cannot be granted - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 and this Court shall not interfere with the impugned order and shall allow the plaintiff/respondent No.1 to continue with the remedy which he has availed, before the learned Sessions Judge. 19 Mr. Skanda Arun Kumar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 states that, the present appeal is primarily directed against respondent No.1, who is the plaintiff before the learned Sessions Judge, and as such, he has nothing to say on the impugned order. ANALYSIS 20. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, insofar as the submission made by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that, the learned Sessions Judge is justified in holding that the right to file the written statement had commenced on the date of the publication of the notice in the news paper before 28.11.2022 and the written statement having not been filed within 120 days, the right of the appellants to file written statement stood forfeited, and as such, the filing of the application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 much thereafter, surely suggest that the appellants were - 17 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 not diligent, is not appealing for the simple reason that, such a conclusion is by overlooking an intervening fact i.e., passing of the order by the learned Sessions Judge on the application filed by the appellants under Order IX Rule 7 of CPC, which application having been allowed, whereby the learned Sessions Judge granted time to the appellants to file written statement and also gave further time on 13.09.2023 and also on 26.09.2023, by making it clear to file the same by 07.10.2023 and on 07.10.2023, instead of filing a written statement, the appellants have filed application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 and also the fact that, respondent No.1 has not challenged the order dated 04.08.2023, we are of the view the finding that the appellants were not diligent in pursuing the remedy available under Section 8 of the act of 1996 is clearly erroneous and perverse. It is not a case, where the application was filed after the expiry of the period granted by the learned Sessions Judge. The appellants were granted time to file the written statement by 07.10.2023. The appellants instead of filing the written statement had filed the application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996, which surely suggest the same was before the expiry of the time to file written statement. - 18 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 21. Having said that we note that, a plea was taken on the applicability of the arbitration Clause in the lease deed qua some of the parties in the suit, as can be seen in paragraph No.11, of the impugned order. Be it noted, the learned Sessions Judge has held that, there is no quarrel with respect to the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel for defendant Nos.2 and 3 i.e., the appellants herein with respect to the subsistence of an arbitration agreement and arbitrability of the dispute between the parties herein. Such a conclusion has not been challenged by respondent No.1 in any higher forum. 22. If that be so, the conclusion to that extent having been accepted by the respondent No.1, the objection on Section 8 application insofar as that the arbitration Clause will not bind the parties to the suit, cannot be accepted. 23. Insofar as the judgment relied upon the learned counsel for respondent No.1 in the case of SSIPL Lifestyle Pvt. Ltd., (supra) is concerned, we have seen the facts of the case, wherein two suits were filed out of an agreement dated 22.04.2016 entered between the parties. The arrangement as per the said agreement was that, the plaintiff-SSIPL would - 19 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 supply to defendants- Vama various products for sale from the Vama Departmental Store situated at Mumbai. 24. In any case, the agreement contained an arbitration Clause-31. The Clause-32 refers to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Mumbai. Summons were issued in the suits on 15.03.2018 and on 16.05.2018, time was given for filing of the written statement. On 17.05.2018, insolvency proceedings had commenced against defendant No.1 before the NCLT which were finally closed on 08.10.2019. 25. The defendant-Vama Apparels (Supra) filed two applications under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 in each of the suits. The objection of the plaintiff-SSIPL (supra), on those applications was that no arbitrable dispute exist between the parties as the period of limitation for filing of the Section 8 applications had expired. According to the plaintiff, the criteria for invoking Section 8 has not been fulfilled. 26. The applications were initially not accompanied by any application for condonation of delay. It is only when SSIPL (supra) raised an objection, that the applications for condonation of delay in filing and re-filing have been filed. It was further argued that the applications are belated in view of - 20 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 the amended provisions which has come into effect from 23.10.2015. It was stated that, as per the provisions, the Section 8 applications had to be filed “not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute”. The use of the word ‘date’ in effect means that the time period available for filing Section 8 applications has to be read with the time period for filing of the written statement expires. It means, even a Section 8 application cannot be filed, after the expiry of time to file written statement. 27. The reasoning given by the Court in this regard can be seen from paragraph Nos.29, 30 and 33 of the judgment, which we reproduce: “29. As per the above findings of the Supreme Court, though the Court found that there was no time limit fixed for filing an application under Section 8, there was an obligation to move such an application “at the earliest”. Under the unamended provision, if parties were contesting supplemental proceedings or were in talks of settlement etc., a Section 8 application could be moved anytime before the filing of the written statement. While in the unamended provision, the emphasis was on filing of the first - 21 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 statement on the substance of the dispute, now the emphasis is on the date of submitting the first statement. Under the unamended Act, the same was a period and that too an unascertained period, it is not so under the amended Act. 30. The amendment also has to be viewed in the background of the various legislative amendments which have been brought about in the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) as also the Commercial Courts Act. In the CPC, for civil suits, an outer limit of 90 days has been fixed for filing of the written statement which is condonable in terms of the principles laid down in Krishan Radhu (supra) and Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India [SC Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 496 and 570 of 2002, Decided On : 2nd of August, 2005]. However, in commercial suits, the outer limit of 120 days for filing of the written statement has been held to be mandatory in SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 1638 of 2019 arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 103/2019, Decided On : 12.02.2019) Xx xx xx xx xx - 22 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 33. In the present case, the Defendants were served on April 23, 2018. Vide order dated 16th May, 2018, the Joint Registrar granted time to file the written statement which they did not do and on 13th July, 2018, the following order was passed: “CS/COMM 735/2018 Defendants failed to file written statement. Opportunity closed. It is submitted by learned counsel for plaintiff that he is going to file some relevant documents regarding insolvency proceeding against D-1. Let same be filed. Matter be put up before Hon'ble Court for further directions on 16.8.18.” 28. Suffice to state that, the said judgment shall not be applicable to the facts of the case, which we have noted above, and also in view of our findings in paragraph No.15. This we say so for the reason that the defendants therein had not filed the application before the expiry of 120 days, which is the period available to the defendants to file a written statement, whereas in the case in hand, instead of filing the written - 23 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 statement within the time granted, on 07.10.2023 itself the application was filed. Hence, in that sense, the judgment is distinguishable. 29. In view of the above conclusion, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is liable to be set aside. It is ordered accordingly. 30. The application filed by the appellants under Section 8 of the Act of 1996, is allowed. The parties shall be at liberty to seek arbitration in accordance with lease deed dated 20.07.2017 read with supplementary agreement dated 10.08.2017. 31. At this stage, Mr.Vinayaka B., learned counsel for respondent No.1 states that, he is agreeable for appointment of an Arbitrator. Mr.Ajesh Kumar S., learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr.Skanda Arun Kumar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for respondent No.1. The counsel for the appellants and respondent Nos.1 and 2 state that an Arbitrator be appointed. - 24 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 32. At this stage, Mr.Vinayaka B., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 suggested the name of Justice A.V.Chandrashekar, a former Judge of this Court, be appointed as the Arbitrator. Mr.Ajesh Kumar S., and Mr.Skanda Arun Kumar, are agreeable to the suggestion made by Mr.Vinayaka B. 33. Accordingly, we appoint Justice A.V.Chandrashekar, a former Judge of this Court, as the sole Arbitrator, who shall adjudicate the disputes between the parties in terms of the lease deed and supplementary agreement. The learned Arbitrator shall give declaration in accordance with Section 12 of the Act of 1996. 34. At this stage, learned counsel for the parties also state that, insofar as the fee of the learned Arbitrator is concerned, the same shall be decided by the learned Arbitrator in consultation with the parties. 35. In view of the above order, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 seeks refund of the Court fee. Noting the request made, liberty shall be with the respondent No.1 to file an appropriate application for refund of the Court fee before the - 25 - NC: 2025:KHC:17233-DB COMAP No. 457 of 2024 learned Sessions Judge, for his consideration and decision in accordance with law. 36. The appeal is disposed of. 37. Pending IAs if any, stands disposed of. Sd/- (V KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE Sd/- (T.M.NADAF) JUDGE SMC List No.: 1 Sl No.: 13