Serial No. 112 Regular Cause List IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR CRM(M) 803/2025 CrlM (2031/2025) NAZIR AHMAD MALLA AND ORS. …Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s). Through: Mr. Bhat Fayaz, Adv. Ms Nighat Amin, Adv. Vs. UNION TERRITORY THROUGH POLICE STATION BANDIPORA AND ANR. ...Respondent(s). Through: Mr. Furqan Sofi, GA for R. 1 None for R. 2 CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE ORDER 17.02.2026 1. Case FIR No. 141/2020 came to be registered with the Police Station Bandipora under Sections 307,354(b), 341,382,324,34IPC pursuant to the complaint filed by the respondent No. 2 with the said Police Station, the investigation wherein culminated into the filing of the final report/charge- sheet presently pending disposal in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bandipora (hereinafter referred as the Trial Court for short). 2. The petitioners/accused through the medium of the instant petition filed in terms of provisions of Section 528 BNSS have sought the quashment of the final report/challan presented in the case concerned and pending trial before the learned trial court on the grounds inter alia that same is the outcome of false and frivolous complaint filed on account of animosity to wreck vengeance. 3. During the proceedings of the instant petition and as on 09.02.2026, the petitioners/Accused as well as the respondent No. 2/Complainant appeared before the Court and submitted that they being neighbours have amicably settled the dispute that had led to the registration of the impugned case FIR and the consequent charge-sheet arising out of the same and presently pending before the ld. Trial Court. 4. The statements of the petitioners/Accused (Joint) as well as of the respondent No. 2/complainant stand already recorded on 10.02.2026 pursuant to the order of this Court dated 09.02.2026 in attestation of the fact of their mutual settlement. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners/Accused submitted that the private parties i.e. the petitioners/Accused and the respondent No. 2/Complainant being close neighbors have already settled the dispute amicably that had led to the registration of the impugned case FIR who have also executed a compromise deed as well as affidavit to that effect. That the said parties are now living cordially and the quashment of the impugned case FIR along with the consequent charge-sheet pending before the ld. Trial Court is likely to facilitate their cordial relation as good neighbors and shall meet the ends of justice. 6. Per contra, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/State that the quashment of the FIR in question and of the consequent final report/challan presently pending disposal in the trial court would amount to miscarriage of justice by encouraging criminals. He further submitted that compromise in offences which are non-compoundable under law cannot be allowed, being highly against the criminal justice system. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that it shall meet in the ends of justice in case the FIR bearing No. 141/2020 of Police Station, Bandipora, as well as the subsequent charge- sheet emanating therefrom and presently pending disposal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bandipora is quashed, as the same shall facilitate the cordial relation between the petitioners, being close relatives. 8. Although this Court is of the opinion that an FIR cannot be generally and in routine manner allowed to be quashed in exercise of the powers under Section 528 of BNSS corresponding to Section 482 of the Code on the main ground that the parties have settled their controversy that had become the cause of occurrence, yet exceptional ground appears to be made out in the opinion of the Court in the facts and the circumstances of the case, for invoking its extraordinary powers under Section 528 of BNSS to quash the FIR in question along with the consequent charge report which is reported to be pending disposal before the competent trial court, having regard to the close relation between the contesting parties and their having already settled their disputes amicably with the intervention of their elders. 9. The provisions of Section 359 of the BNSS corresponding to Section 320 of the Code do not restrict but limit and circumvent the powers of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS corresponding to Section 482 of the Code regarding quashment of FIR’s and criminal proceedings for the sake of the society at large which is real beneficiary of the criminal justice delivery system. 10. This Court in its opinion feels fortified with an authoritative judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court cited as “Gopal Kumar B. Nar Vs. CBI (2014) 5 SCC 800” in which it has been held that “though quashment of non- compoundable offence under Section 482 Cr.P.C, following a settlement between the parties would not amount to circumvention of Section 320, but such power has to be exercised with care and caution and would depend on facts of each case.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors vs State of Gujarat and Anr. (2017) 9 SCC 641” has considered the aspect of the invocation of the inherent powers by the High Courts under Section 528 of the BNSS corresponding to Section 482 of the Code and was pleased to lay down some broad governing principles for invocation of such power of the High Courts. The relevant portions of the judgment are reproduced as under for the sake of convenience: “Section 482 is prefaced with an overriding provision. The statute saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a superior court, to make such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; or (ii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following propositions : (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power; (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated; (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute; (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance. 12. It is also needful to reproduce the relevant portion of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Kapil Gupta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr 2022 15 SCC 44” on an appeal, impugning the judgment and order dated 28.09.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi thereby dismissing the criminal petition, which was filed for quashing the criminal proceedings, as under: (i) In present case, consent given by respondent No. 2 for putting an end to proceeding was voluntary and without any coercion and duress. Respondent No. 2, in order to live in peace, wants to bring an end to criminal proceedings. (ii) Though court should be slow in quashing proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved. High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such offences or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving for offence charged with. (iii) Court has also to take into consideration as to whether settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their mutual relationship. (iv) It is also relevant to consider as to what is the stage of proceedings. If application (for quashing proceedings) is made at belated stage wherein evidence has been led and matter is at stage of arguments or judgment, Court should be slow to exercise power to quash proceedings. However, if such application is made at initial stage before commencement of trial, said factor will weight with Court in exercising its power. (v) In present case, facts and circumstances are peculiar. Respondent 2 is young lady of 23 years. She feels that going through trial in one case, where she is complainant, and in other case, wherein she is accused, would rob prime of her youth. She feels that if she is made to face trial rather than getting any relief, she would be faced with agony of undergoing trial. (vi) In both aforesaid cases, though charge-sheets have been filed, charges are yet to be framed and as such, trial has not yet commenced. It is further to be noted that since Respondent 2 herself is not supporting prosecution case, even if criminal trial is permitted to go ahead, it will end in nothing else than acquittal. If request of parties is denied, it will be amounting to only adding one more criminal case already overburdened criminal courts. (vii) In that view of the matter, though in heinous or serious crime like rape, Court should not normally exercise powers of quashing proceedings, in peculiar facts and circumstances of present case and in order to give succor to respondent 2 so that she is saved from further agony of facing two criminal trials, one as victim and one as accused, present is a fit case wherein extraordinary powers of Supreme Court be exercised to quash criminal proceedings. (viii) In that view of the matter, proceedings in criminal cases arising out of both aforesaid FIR’s are quashed and set aside. 13. This Court in its opinion also feels fortified with the authoritative judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court cited as “Gyan Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and “Narender Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466”, the relevant paras of which are reproduced as hereunder for the sake of convenience: “Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303” 61. “In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings.” “Narender Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466” 29. “In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution; 29.2 When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure :(i) ends of justice, or(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3 Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.” 14. Having regard to the amicable settlement of the dispute between the private respondent No. 2/complainant and the petitioners 1 to 3/accused, the continuance of the criminal proceedings sought to be quashed appears to be a futile exercise, for just completing the procedure for recording an order of acquittal. In its opinion, this Court is fortified with the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in, (i) Satesh Nehra V/S Delhi Administration 1996 (III) Crimes 85 SC; (ii) Madan Mohan Abott Vs. State of Punjab AIR 2008 SC 1969’ and (iii) Jugdish Chananan and ors Vs. State of Haryana and anr. AIR 2008 SC 1968. Relevant Paras of the referred judgments deserve a needful mention as under: “Satesh Nehra V/S Delhi Adminstration 1996 (III) Crimes 85 SC.” “But when the judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case, ending in conviction, the valuable time of the court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion at a future date. Most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of work load. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain, that the trial would be only an exercise in futility or sheer wastage of time, it is advisable to truncate or swap the proceedings.” “(ii) Madan Mohan Abott Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC 1969” “In disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature the court should ordinarily accept the terms of compromise even in criminal proceedings keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution in a luxury, which the courts, grossly overburdened as they cannot afford and that the time so save can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation.” “(iii) Jugdish Chananan and ors Vs. State of Haryana and anr AIR 2008 SC 1968” “In the light of the compromise it is unlikely that the prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the dispute is a purely personal one and no public policy is involved in the transaction that had been entered into between the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore, would be a futile exercise we accordingly allow the appeal and quash FIR 83/12.3.2001 P/S City Sonapat and on subsequent proceedings.” 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court has permitted the compounding of the offences even at the appellate stage having regard to the mutual settlement between the contesting parties and the nature of the offences involved in the proceedings being personal in nature “[Mulukri Sira Prassad Vs. State of Andra Pradesh 2001 (4) SC 254, Khursheed and Anr. Vs. State of UP and anr. 2007 and Ab. Sattar Vs. State of M.P AIR 1981 SC 1775].” 16. Allowing the complainant/victim and the accused in a criminal proceeding at any stage of investigation, trial or appeal to seek quashment of the proceedings or the compounding of the offences even in cases where commission of non-compoundable offences of personal nature not involving public/social aspect is alleged, on the basis of amicable settlement, is not likely to prove detrimental to the scope and object of the provisions of Section 359 of the BNSS corresponding to Section 320 of the Code. Such an approach is likely to put an end to some further apprehended litigation of both civil and criminal nature and to allow the parties to have a peaceful and cordial relation, besides saving the precious time of the Criminal Courts being already grossly over-burdened as the continuance of such criminal proceedings is likely to prove a futile exercise only for the purpose of completing the procedure for recording an order of acquittal at the end. Provisions of Section 320 of the Code corresponding to Section 359 of the BNSS do not restrict but only limit the powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS so that the extraordinary powers are used only in exceptional circumstances to meet the ends of justice. Provisions of Section 482 of the Code (528 of BNSS) have an overriding affect and are not to be read as subject to the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of BNSS. The criminal proceedings, involving heinous offences of antisocial nature or offences under special penal statutes do not qualify for being quashed/compounded in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code (528 BNSS). 17. Criminal litigation between near relatives/neighbors or co-sharers more often originates from the civil/matrimonial disputes and as such directing the quashment of proceedings by invoking the inherent powers under the Code/BNSS, in such matters of personal nature not involving the commission of any heinous offence is likely to meet the ends of justice. 18. For the forgoing discussion, the instant petition is allowed and the impugned case FIR bearing No. 141/2020 of Police Station, Bandipora as also the consequent final report/challan titled “State through Hilal Ahmad Wani vs Irshad Ahmad Malla & Ors”, pending trial in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bandipora are quashed. 19. Disposed of. (MOHD YOUSUF WANI) JUDGE SRINAGAR 17.02.2026 “Sakeena-PS”