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2025 DAILYLAW 34082 (CHH)

DIRECTOR v. P. HEMSUNDER

WA/569/2025 · 2025-08-04

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

body2025

Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:38637-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 569 of 2025 Director Survey of India, Mukut Nagar, Idgahbhata, Near Water Tank, P.S. Amarpara, Raipur, Distt. Raipur (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus P. Hemsunder S/o P. Lachhaiya Aged About 50 Years R/o Behind Ravishankar Shukla University, P.S. Saraswati Nagar, Raipur, Distt. Raipur (C.G.) ...Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Deputy Solicitor General. For Respondent : Mr. J.K. Gupta, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 05 .08.2025 1. Heard Mr. Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General for the appellant as well as Mr. J.K. Gupta, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent, on I.A. No. 2 of 2025, which is an application for condonation of delay. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.08.05 18:15:55 +0530 2 2. Considering the grounds mentioned in I.A. No. 2 of 2025, the application is allowed. Delay of 37 days in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. 3. The present intra Court appeal has been filed by the appellant against the order dated 11.04.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPL No. 57 of 2014 (P. Hemsunder vs. Director Survey of India), whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner herein. 4. The Learned Deputy Solicitor General submits that the appellant, Director, Chhattisgarh GDC, Survey of India, Raipur, was previously part of the erstwhile Central Circle, Survey of India, Jabalpur, under the Ministry of Science & Technology, Government of India. He further submits that the appellant, from time to time, engaged workers on a daily wage basis depending on the necessity and requirements at the relevant times. It is further contended by the Learned Deputy Solicitor General that the respondent was engaged as a Mali (gardener) on a daily wage basis for approximately 1 to 2 hours per week, at the rate of Rs. 8/- per day, and rendered services from the year 1982 to 2003. Subsequently, he was paid wages ranging between Rs. 300/- to Rs. 400/- per month. The respondent was never appointed through the Employment Exchange and his engagement was purely on a daily wage basis. It is pertinent to note that he was never treated as a regular employee. The appellant assigned work to the respondent as and when required, which is evident from the attendance sheets, payment registers, and other relevant records. 5. The Learned Deputy Solicitor General further submits that although 3 the respondent worked intermittently between 1982 and 2003, he did not complete 240 days of work in any given year during that period. Aggrieved by the termination of his services, the respondent approached the Learned Labour Court. Upon consideration, the Labour Court, in its order dated 10.07.2013, found that the respondent was appointed on a daily wage basis and did not satisfy the statutory criteria for regular appointment. The Court specifically noted that since the respondent had not worked for 240 days in any year, his disengagement did not constitute illegal retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly, the Court held that the respondent was a daily wage employee and not entitled to the benefits of a regular worker. 6. Aggrieved by the order dated 10.07.2013 passed by the Learned Labour Court, the respondent filed a writ petition, WPL No. 57 of 2014, before this Court. The Learned Single Judge, vide order dated 11.04.2025, allowed the said petition. Thereafter, the appellant filed a review petition, REVP No. 139 of 2025, seeking review and recall of the order dated 11.04.2025. However, the said review petition was dismissed in chamber. It was also contended that the nature of the respondent’s work was seasonal and intermittent, and his engagement was purely temporary—typically for 1 to 2 hours, with payments made weekly or monthly, only when required. The Learned Deputy Solicitor General further submits that there was no sanctioned post of Mali in the appellant’s office, and hence, the respondent had no legal entitlement to regularization of service. Since the respondent was never appointed on a regular basis, the question of retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act does not arise. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge 4 erred in directing the appellant to make a lump sum payment of Rs.5,00,000/- to the respondent, which formed the basis for setting aside the impugned orders. The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the respondent’s engagement was purely on a daily wage basis and only for limited durations. The learned Single Judge ought to have considered that for the respondent to be considered a casual labourer eligible for benefits, he must have rendered continuous service of at least one year, meaning at least 240 days of work. As this condition was not fulfilled, the impugned order dated 11.04.2025 is legally unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the learned Single Judge, after duly considering all relevant aspects of the matter, has rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner. Therefore, no interference with the impugned order is warranted. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and materials available on record. 9. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Director, Fisheries Terminal Department v. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 47, and specifically referred to paragraphs 15 and 16, which read as under: “15. The respondent claims that he was employed in the year 1985 as a watchman and that his services were retrenched in the year 1991. He asserts that 5 during the period between 1985 and 1991, he worked for more than 240 days. The burden of proof lies upon the respondent to establish that he had worked for 240 days in the twelve months preceding his alleged retrenchment. The legal position on this issue is now well settled. 16. This Court in R.M. Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer has observed: (SCC p. 116. para 17) “17. ... However, applying general principles and upon reading the aforesaid judgments, we find that this Court has consistently held that the burden of proof is on the claimant to demonstrate that he worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only when the workman enters the witness box and adduces cogent oral and documentary evidence. In cases involving termination of daily-waged workers, there may be no letters of appointment or termination, nor any receipts or proof of payment. In such cases, the workman may call upon the employer to produce the nominal muster roll, the appointment or termination letter (if any), the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of an adverse inference would thereafter depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” 6 10. In the present case, it is evident that: (i) the respondent/writ petitioner filed a specific application before the learned Labour Court seeking a direction to the appellant to produce the muster roll, attendance register, and other relevant documents; (ii) a direction was duly issued by the learned Labour Court to the appellant to produce the same; and (iii) the appellant/department failed to comply with the said direction and, instead, admitted that the said documents were not available. 11. In view of the aforesaid factual matrix and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda (supra), the learned Labour Court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the appellant for non-production of the documents referred to above and ought to have passed an appropriate order in favour of the respondent/writ petitioner. 12. Consequently, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner and set aside the award dated 12.08.2013. However, considering that the respondent/writ petitioner was 50 years old in the year 2005, it is reasonable to presume that he has since crossed the age of superannuation. Accordingly, instead of directing reinstatement and payment of back wages, the appellant has been directed to pay a lump sum amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the respondent/writ petitioner within a period of 90 days from the date of the order, i.e., 11.04.2025. 13. Upon a comprehensive consideration of the pleadings in the writ appeal, the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, and the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge while allowing the 7 writ petition, we are of the considered view that no illegality, procedural irregularity, or jurisdictional error has been committed by the learned Single Judge so as to warrant interference by this Court in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 14. Accordingly, the present writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan