JUDGMENT : Sushil Kukreja, Judge The instant appeal is maintained by the appellant/ Oriental Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as “the appellant”), under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short “the Act”), against the award dated 01.08.2013, passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in MAC Petition No.85-MAC/2 of 2009, with a prayer to set aside/modify the impugned award. 2. Succinctly, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the petitioners (respondents No.1 to 4 herein) filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act, whereby they sought compensation to the tune of Rs.20,70,000/- on account of death of Shri Rajneesh Kumar, who was husband of petitioner/ respondent No.1 and son of petitioner/respondent No.2 and father of petitioners/respondents No.3 and 4. It was averred by the petitioners that on 25.07.2009, Rajneesh Kumar (deceased) was going on his motorcycle bearing registration No.HP-18A-4833 to his home from Paonta Sahib and when he reached at place Dhaulakaun at about 8:30 AM, one tipper bearing registration No.HP17A-8334, being driven by respondent No.1 rashly and negligently, came on the wrong side and hit against his motorcycle, as a result of which, he suffered fatal injuries and died on the way to PGI, Chandigarh. 3. As per the petitioners, at the time of his death, the deceased was 33 years old and he was working as an Accountant in Sirmaur Milk Products at village Makkarwala and was drawing salary of Rs.10,000/- per month. He was also earning a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per annum from the agriculture. The offending vehicle was owned by one Ravi Dutt Sharma (respondent No.6 herein) and it was insured with National Insurance Company (appellant herein). It was also averred that the deceased used to look-after and maintain his family and he was the only earning member in the family. Hence, the petitioners sought compensation to the tune of Rs.20,70,000/-. 4. The driver and owner of the offending vehicle (respondents No.5 & 6 herein) in their reply to the claim petition raised preliminary objections regarding maintainability and non-jonder of necessary parties. On merits, it has been averred that the accident was caused by the deceased himself, who could not control his motorcycle and fell down on the road. They further averred that no accident had taken place by with their vehicle. 5. On merits, it has been averred that the accident was caused by the deceased himself, who could not control his motorcycle and fell down on the road. They further averred that no accident had taken place by with their vehicle. 5. In the reply filed by respondent No.3/ National Insurance Company, preliminary objections were taken regarding maintainability, driver of the truck was not having a valid and effective driving licence, the truck was being driven in contravention of terms and conditions of insurance policy. On merits, it was averred that the deceased himself was responsible for this accident and that the driver of the offending vehicle was not possessing a valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident and the offending vehicle was being plied in contravention of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. It was also averred that the instant petition was filed in collusion with respondents No.1 and 2, thus, the insurance company was not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioners. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Tribunal below framed the following issues on 08.07.2011:- “1. Whether Rajneesh died in motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by respondent No.1 on 25.07.2009 at 8:30 AM at village Dhaulakuan, as alleged? OPP 2. In case issue No.1 is determined in affirmative, to what amount of compensation the petitioners are entitled to and from whom? OPP 3. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OPR-1 & 2 4. Whether the accident was caused due to negligence of deceased himself being unable to control motor cycle, as alleged? OPR-3 5. Whether the respondent NO.1- driver of the offending vehicle did not possess a valid and effective driving licence to drive the vehicle, as alleged? OPR-3 6. Whether the petition is the result of collusion between the petitioners and respondents No.1 and 1, as alleged? OPR-3 7. Whether the vehicle in question was being plied in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, as alleged? OPR-3 8. Relief.” After parties led their evidence, the claim petition was allowed and the petitioners were granted compensation to the tune of Rs.11,85,000/- alongwith interest, which was to be paid by the insurance company (appellant herein). 7. Whether the vehicle in question was being plied in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, as alleged? OPR-3 8. Relief.” After parties led their evidence, the claim petition was allowed and the petitioners were granted compensation to the tune of Rs.11,85,000/- alongwith interest, which was to be paid by the insurance company (appellant herein). 7. Feeling aggrieved/dissatisfied, the appellant/ insurance company preferred the instant appeal against award dated 01.08.2013 passed by the learned Tribunal below, with a prayer to set-aside/modify the impugned award. 8. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 4 and learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.6 and also carefully examined the entire record. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company has firstly contended that the Tribunal below had fallen into error by fastening the liability on the insurance company despite the fact that the learned Tribunal has given a clear-cut finding that the driving licence possessed by the driver was fake, yet the liability was fastened upon the insurance company. 10. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.6 supported the award passed by the learned Tribunal below and contended that the liability cannot be fastened on the owner (respondent No.6) of the vehicle as before engaging the driver, he had seen his driving licence and had also seen him driving the vehicles of others. He further contended that the owner was not expected to verify the licence from the licence issuing authority as to whether the driving licence possessed by the driver was fake or not. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the case laws i.e. Hind Samachar Ltd. (Delhi Unit) Versus National Insurance Company Ltd. & ors., Civil Appeal Nos.12442-12446 of 2024, decided on October 8, 2025, Nirmala Kothari Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited , (2020) 4 SCC 49 , Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Rajaram and others (2018) 8 SCC 799 . 11. From the perusal of the record, it is clear that the owner of the vehicle in question has placed on record photocopy of driving licence No.12613/M103 dated 19.12.2003 (Mark-R), purported to have been issued by Licensing Authority, Mathura in favour of respondent No.1- Sabir Ali to drive Motorcycle and LMV. This licence was also endorsed for driving HTV w.e.f 20.06.2005 and was renewed w.e.f. 20.6.2008 to 19.06.2011. This licence was also endorsed for driving HTV w.e.f 20.06.2005 and was renewed w.e.f. 20.6.2008 to 19.06.2011. The appellant/insurance company had produced verification report, Ext. RY, issued by the Licencing Authority, Mathura, wherein it has been mentioned that the aforesaid driving licence had been issued in favour of one Viren Singh Yadav and not in favour of Sabir Ali. However,neither the owner nor the driver of the offending vehicle had led any evidence to prove that the verification report Ext. RY, issued by the Licensing Authority, Mathura was not correct. Moreover, the driver i.e. respondent No.5 herein had also not stepped into witness-box to depose that his driving licence (Mark-R) was a genuine licence and the verification report produced by the appellant/ insurance company was not correct. Since the driving license Mark-R was proved to be a fake license as such it has been proved on record that at the time of accident, the driver of the offending vehicle was not possessing a valid and effective driving license. 12. Now the next question, which arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the insurance company can be held liable when it has been proved on record that the driving license (Mark-R) was proved to be a fake license. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments has held that the insurance company cannot absolve its liability unless it is established that the insured was guilty of breach of the policy conditions. The insurer must prove that the insured was guilty of breach of policy condition, i.e., he was aware and had knowledge of the fact that the driver engaged by him to drive the vehicle did not possess a valid and effective driving licence and despite having this knowledge and despite such awareness, he had allowed such a driver to drive the vehicle. 13. In Hind Samachar Ltd. (Delhi Unit) Versus National Insurance Company Ltd. & ors., Civil Appeal Nos.12442-12446 of 2024, decided on October 8, 2025 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that even if the licence is fake, the insurance company is liable to pay compensation, if it fails to prove that the insured had deliberately committed breach in entrusting the vehicle to a driver who had a fake licence. The Insurance Company must establish that the breach was on the part of the insured as the owner of a vehicle employing a driver can only look at the licence produced by the person seeking employment and is not expected to verify from the licence issuing authority whether the licence is fake or not. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced as under:- “7. Lehru (supra) was a case in which though an allegation of the driving licence produced being fake was raised, the same was not proved before the Tribunal. The trite law was noticed that even if the licence is fake, the insurance company is liable to pay compensation, if they fail to prove that the insured had deliberately committed breach in entrusting the vehicle to a driver who had a fake licence. New India Assurance Co. v. Kamla wherein despite finding breach, the insurer was directed to pay compensation to the third parties, but, enabled recovery from the insured was noticed. It was categorically held that whether the insured would be protected by such an order was left open to be considered on the facts of each case. It was held in Lehru and Ors.(supra) that: - “18……we are thus in agreement with what is laid down in the aforementioned cases viz. that in order to avoid liability it is not sufficient to show that the person driving at the time of accident was not duly licensed. The Insurance Company must establish that the breach was on the part of the insured.” 12. We do not find any substance in the argument of the respondent-insurer that a collusion can be validly inferred since the driving licence was produced by the owner. In fact, the owner of the truck is not an individual and is a company, as we see from the cause title. Undisputedly, even if the tort-feasor is the driver, the liability for any negligence of the driver rests on the owner of the vehicle, vicariously. There can be no suspicion raised merely because the owner had produced the driving licence before Court. It only indicates that the owner had been diligent enough to procure the driving licence from the driver and produce it before the Tribunal, so as to validly raise a case for indemnification by the insurer. 16. There can be no suspicion raised merely because the owner had produced the driving licence before Court. It only indicates that the owner had been diligent enough to procure the driving licence from the driver and produce it before the Tribunal, so as to validly raise a case for indemnification by the insurer. 16. As has been noticed in Geeta Devi (supra) there is no pleading or substantiation of due diligence having not been employed at the time of entrustment. R1W1 was the Advertising In-charge of the appellant who produced the licence before the Court as Exhibit R1W1/1. The certificate issued by the RTO Gurdaspur was also marked as R1 which we referred to from the additional documents. In cross examination, there was only a bland suggestion made to the witness that the Directors of R2 knew that R1 possessed only a fake driving licence. There were no questions put to the witness, who was examined on behalf of the owner, as to the actual entrustment of the vehicle or whether R1 was employed regularly or temporarily and when such employment commenced, which are crucial insofar as proving or disproving due diligence by the owner at the time of engagement of the driver and the entrustment of the vehicle. As has been rightly held by the precedents above noticed, the owner of a vehicle employing a driver can only look at the licence produced by the person seeking employment and is not expected to verify from the licence issuing authority whether the licence is fake or not.” 14. In Nirmala Kothari’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while hiring a driver the employer is expected to verify if the driver has a driving licence. If the driver produces a licence which on the face of it looks genuine, the employer is not expected to further investigate into the authenticity of the licence unless there is cause to believe otherwise. The relevant paras of the judgment read as under:- “10. While the insurer can certainly take the defence that the licence of the driver of the car at the time of accident was invalid/fake however the onus of proving that the insured did not take adequate care and caution to verify the genuineness of the licence or was guilty of willful breach of the conditions of the insurance policy or the contract of insurance lies on the insurer. 11. 11. The view taken by the National Commission that the law as settled in the Pepsu case is not applicable in the present matter as it related to third-party claim is erroneous. It has been categorically held in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh & Ors.(SCC pp.341, para 110) “110. (iii)…Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licenced driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time.” 12. While hiring a driver the employer is expected to verify if the driver has a driving licence. If the driver produces a licence which on the face of it looks genuine, the employer is not expected to further investigate into the authenticity of the licence unless there is cause to believe otherwise. If the employer finds the driver to be competent to drive the vehicle and has satisfied himself that the driver has a driving licence there would be no breach of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) and the Insurance Company would be liable under the policy. It would be unreasonable to place such a high onus on the insured to make enquiries with RTOs all over the country to ascertain the veracity of the driving licence. However, if the Insurance Company is able to prove that the owner/insured was aware or had notice that the licence was fake or invalid and still permitted the person to drive, the insurance company would no longer continue to be liable.” 15. In Ram Chandra Singh’s case (supra), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-11 of the judgment, which read as under:- “11. Suffice it to observe that it is well established that if the owner was aware of the fact that the licence was fake and still permitted the driver to drive the vehicle, then the insurer would stand absolved. However, the mere fact that the driving licence is fake, per se, would not absolve the insurer. Suffice it to observe that it is well established that if the owner was aware of the fact that the licence was fake and still permitted the driver to drive the vehicle, then the insurer would stand absolved. However, the mere fact that the driving licence is fake, per se, would not absolve the insurer. Indubitably, the High Court noted that the counsel for the appellant did not dispute that the driving licence was found to be fake, but that concession by itself was not sufficient to absolve the insurer.” 16. Therefore, in view of the law cited hereinabove, it has become clear that the insurance company would continue to remain liable unless it is proved that the owner/insured was aware or had knowledge of the fact that the driving licence was fake and still permitted that person to drive the vehicle. 17. In the instant case, the owner of the offending vehicle while stepping into the witness box as RW-2, had specifically deposed that before he engaged respondent No.1 as driver in his vehicle, he had seen him driving the vehicles of others and also seen his driving licence Mark-R. He was cross-examined at length, but nothing favourable could be elicited from his cross-examination with respect to the fact that despite having knowledge that the driver engaged by him did not possess a valid and effective driving licence, he had allowed him to drive the vehicle. Therefore, the learned Tribunal below has rightly held that the insurance company has failed to prove that respondent No.2 was aware and had knowledge of the fact that the driver engaged by him to drive the vehicle did not possess a valid and effective driving licence and despite having this knowledge and such awareness, he had allowed such a driver to drive the vehicle. 18. The appellant/insurance company has also challenged the impugned award on the ground that there was no justification in taking monthly income of the deceased at Rs.4,500/- and further addition of 50% to his income for future prospects is contrary to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited Versus Pranay Sethi & others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 . Perusal of the material on record reveals that no documentary evidence has been produced on record by respondents No.1 to 4/petitioners in order to prove the income of the deceased. Perusal of the material on record reveals that no documentary evidence has been produced on record by respondents No.1 to 4/petitioners in order to prove the income of the deceased. However, learned Tribunal below had taken monthly income of the deceased from all sources at Rs.4,500/-.Since it has been established on record that at the time of accident, he was employed with Sirmour Milk Products, situated at Makkarwala, therefore, it can not be said that the monthly income of the deceased at the time of his accident as assessed by the tribunal below was on the higher side. Thus, no fault can be found with the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal below while assessing the income of the deceased at Rs.4,500/- per month. 19. In Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), it has been held that while determining the income, in case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary and below the age of 40 years, an addition of 40% of the established income to the income of the deceased towards future prospects should be made. Para 59.4 of the said judgment reads as follow:- “59.4 In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.” 20. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was of 33 years of age and he was employed with Sirmour Milk Products. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), an addition of 40% of the notional monthly income of the deceased can be made towards future prospects. 21. The learned Tribunal below has assessed the income of the deceased as Rs.4,500/- per month. The deceased was 33 years old and while computing the future prospects @ 40%, the monthly in- come of the deceased comes out to Rs.6,300/- (4500/-+1800/-). 22. Admittedly, at the time of the accident, there were four dependents of the deceased, i.e., his widow, mother, daughter and son. The deceased was 33 years old and while computing the future prospects @ 40%, the monthly in- come of the deceased comes out to Rs.6,300/- (4500/-+1800/-). 22. Admittedly, at the time of the accident, there were four dependents of the deceased, i.e., his widow, mother, daughter and son. In Sarla Verma & others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the Apex Court, on the question of deduction towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased held that the personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from his monthly income, to arrive at the contribution to the dependents. Where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be one-third where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3; one-fourth where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6; and one-fifth where the number of dependent family members exceeds 6. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. 23. In the instant case, since there were four family members, who were dependent upon the income of the deceased at the time of accident, 1/4th of his income is required to be deducted towards personal and living expenses, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma’s case (supra). Thus, after the deduction of 1/4th of the income towards the personal expenses of the deceased, his contribution to family comes out to Rs.4,725/- per month and his annual contribution comes out toRs.56,700/-( 4,725 x 12). 25. Thus, after the deduction of 1/4th of the income towards the personal expenses of the deceased, his contribution to family comes out to Rs.4,725/- per month and his annual contribution comes out toRs.56,700/-( 4,725 x 12). 25. In Sarla Verma’s case (supra), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is as under:- “42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.” 26. Since the deceased was 33 years of age, as such, by applying the multiplier of ‘16’ as per the settled law, which has rightly been applied by the Tribunal below, the compensation under the head, loss of dependency is re-fixed as Rs.9,07,200/- (56,700 x 16). 27. Now, coming to the last aspect, i.e., the amount under conventional heads. Since the deceased was 33 years of age, as such, by applying the multiplier of ‘16’ as per the settled law, which has rightly been applied by the Tribunal below, the compensation under the head, loss of dependency is re-fixed as Rs.9,07,200/- (56,700 x 16). 27. Now, coming to the last aspect, i.e., the amount under conventional heads. In Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that for the conventional heads, namely, “Loss of Estate”, “Loss of Consortium” and “Funeral Expenses” amount of compensation is fixed as Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively and the aforesaid figures quantified by the Apex Court have to be enhanced on percentage basis, at the rate of 10%, in a span of every three years. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is as under: “52.….…. …..It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000, Rs.40,000 and Rs.15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.” 28. In Magma General Insurance Company Limited Vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others , reported in (2018) 18 Supreme Court Cases 130 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down that consortium is not limited to spousal consortium and it also includes parental consortium as well as filial consortium. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:- “21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse: 21.1. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse: 21.1. Spousal consortium is general defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation o the surviving spouse for loss of “company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation”. 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training”. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. 22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognized that the value of a child’s consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child.” 29. While placing reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pranay Sethi’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunita & ors. Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors., Civil Appeal No.9538 of 2025, decided on July 17, 2025, had enhanced the compensation under the conventional heads @ 10% after a span of every three years w.e.f. the year 2017 and held as follows:- “20. Regarding the monthly income of the deceased, we concur with the view taken by the Courts below in assessing the same to be Rs.12,000/- per month, for there being no error therein. Regarding the monthly income of the deceased, we concur with the view taken by the Courts below in assessing the same to be Rs.12,000/- per month, for there being no error therein. Hence, in awarding compensation which is just and fair, we are inclined to increase the amount awarded under the conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses by 10% adverting to the settled principle of law laid down by this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, that such amount should be revised every three years.” 30. Accordingly in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi’s as well as Sunita’s cases (supra), by enhancing the compensation under the conventional heads @ 10%, after every three years from the year 2017, the petitioners are entitled to loss of estate at Rs.19,965/-, funeral expenses at Rs.19,965/-, petitioner No.1, being widow of the deceased, is entitled to spousal consortium of Rs.53,240/-, petitioner No.2 being mother, is entitled to filial consortium of Rs.53,240/- and petitioners No.3 and 4, being children, are entitled to parental consortium of Rs.53,240/- each. Accordingly, the total amount of compensation comes out as under:- Head Amount (i) Loss of dependency Rs. 9,07,200/- (ii) Funeral expenses Rs. 19,965/- (iii) Loss of estate Rs. 19,965/- (iv) Spousal consortium Rs. 53,240/- (payable to petitioner/respondent No. 1) (v) Filial consortium Rs. 53,240/- (payable to petitioner/respondent No. 2) (vi) Parental consortium Rs. 1,06,480/- (Rs. 53,240/- payable to each of petitioners/respondents No. 3 & 4) Total compensation awarded Rs. 11,60,090/- 31. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made here-in-above and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the impugned award stands modified. The remaining terms of the impugned award, including the interest component as well as the apportionment amongst the claimants shall remain the same. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms, so also the pending application(s), if any.