JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 30.05.2015 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge III, Kangra at Dharamshala, Circuit Court at Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.10.2008, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Palampur, District Kangra (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that Neetu, the daughter of informant Bindu (PW1), had gone to the school on 24.05.2006. Pooja (PW2) and Jyoti told the informant that a tempo had hit Neetu, she had sustained multiple injuries, and she was taken to the hospital. The matter was reported to the police. HC Dev Raj (PW7) went to the hospital for verification of the information. He recorded the statement of Bindu (Ext.PW1/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW7/A) was registered. Injured Neetu was medically examined, and an MLC (Ext.PA) was issued, mentioning that she had sustained multiple injuries. X-rays were advised, and the final opinion was reserved. HC Dev Raj (PW7) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW7/C). He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP68-6697 vide memo (Ext.PW6/A). Anil Kumar (PW9) took the photographs of the spot (Ext.PW9/A-1 to Ext.PW9/A-3) whose negatives are Ext.PW9/A4 to Ext.PW9/A6. Rajinder Singh (PW5) mechanically examined the vehicle and found that there was no mechanical defect in it, which could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW5/A). Neetu subsequently succumbed to her injuries. An application (Ext.PW7/H) was filed for conducting her postmortem examination, and the report (Ext. PB) was obtained. The photograph of the dead body (Ext.PW7/J) was taken. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. PB) was obtained. The photograph of the dead body (Ext.PW7/J) was taken. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case. Bindu (PW1) reported the matter to the police. Pooja (PW2) and Ganesh Thapa (PW4) are eyewitnesses. Raj Kumar (PW3) did not support the prosecution’s case. Rajinder Singh (PW5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. Saman Singh (PW6) is the witness to recovery. HC Dev Raj (PW7) conducted the investigation. Ambia Ram (PW8) is the owner of the vehicle. Anil Kumar (PW9) took the photographs. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration No. HP68-6697 on 24.05.2006 at about 2:15 pm. He stated that the accident occurred when Neetu tried to cross the road from the rear side of the tempo. She struck against the tempo and sustained injuries. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He claimed that he was innocent, and a false case was lodged against him. He stated that he wanted to lead the defence evidence. However, no evidence was produced, and a statement was made on behalf of the accused that no evidence was to be led. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The plea taken by the accused that Neetu tried to cross the road and the accident occurred due to her sudden appearance was not probable. The prosecution witnesses proved that Neetu was on the side of the road and she was not crossing it. Hence, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304 A of the IPC and was sentenced as under: 7. The prosecution witnesses proved that Neetu was on the side of the road and she was not crossing it. Hence, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304 A of the IPC and was sentenced as under: 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, III, Kangra at Dharamshala, Circuit Court at Baijnath, District Kangra (Learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material placed before them. The prosecution’s witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The names of Raj Kumar (PW3) and Ganesh Thapa (PW4) were not mentioned in the FIR, and their testimonies could not have been relied upon. The prosecution did not examine Jyoti, who was accompanying Neetu at the time of the accident, and an adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution. Ganesh Thapa (PW4) had materially improved upon his version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Rajesh Mandhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Rajesh Mandhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. Pooja (PW2) and Raj Kumar (PW3) did not support the prosecution’s case. Learned Courts below relied upon the testimony of Ganesh Thapa (PW4), whose name was not mentioned in the FIR. This was sufficient to cast doubt on his presence. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Learned Courts below relied upon the testimony of Ganesh Thapa (PW4), whose name was not mentioned in the FIR. This was sufficient to cast doubt on his presence. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon the testimony of Ganesh Thapa (PW4). The mere fact that Pooja (PW2) and Raj Kumar (PW3) had not supported the prosecution’s case was not sufficient to doubt it. Their credibility was impeached by their previous testimonies, and their testimonies could not have been used for acquitting the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This  position  was  reiterated  in  State  of  Gujarat  v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding  that  the  High  Court  exceeded  its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. The informant Bindu (PW1) admitted in her cross- examination that she was not present on the spot at the time of the accident. She volunteered to say that the victim was already taken to the hospital, and she had reached the hospital after about 10 minutes. 19. 18. The informant Bindu (PW1) admitted in her cross- examination that she was not present on the spot at the time of the accident. She volunteered to say that the victim was already taken to the hospital, and she had reached the hospital after about 10 minutes. 19. The informant was not an eye witness, and she could not have known about the persons present on the spot at the time of the accident; thus, the fact that she had not mentioned the names of Raj Kumar (PW3) and Ganesh Thapa (PW4) in her statement recorded by the police will not make their presence on the spot suspect. 20. In any case, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 736: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 393 that the statement of a witness cannot be discarded because his name was not mentioned in the FIR. It was observed at page 92: “13. We also do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the statement of Kiran (PW 7) should not be given any weight because her name is not mentioned in the FIR. There is no requirement of law for mentioning the names of all the witnesses in the FIR, the object of which is only to set the criminal law in motion. Kiran (PW 7) herself was injured and, being the niece of Hari Ram (deceased), had no reason to involve innocent persons in the commission of the crime. Merely because PWs 7, 12 and 22 happen to be the relations of the deceased, cannot be made a ground to discard their evidence. In the circumstances of the case, the High Court has rightly found the aforesaid witnesses to be natural witnesses of the occurrence.” 21. This position was reiterated in Chittar Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC 397 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1377: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 715, wherein it was observed at page 399: - “7. [Ed. Para 7 corrected as per the official corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./80/2003] Evidence of the person whose name did not figure in the FIR as a witness does not perforce become a suspect. There can be no hard-and-fast rule that the names of all witnesses, more particularly eyewitnesses, should be indicated in the FIR. [Ed. Para 7 corrected as per the official corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./80/2003] Evidence of the person whose name did not figure in the FIR as a witness does not perforce become a suspect. There can be no hard-and-fast rule that the names of all witnesses, more particularly eyewitnesses, should be indicated in the FIR. As was observed by this Court in Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 6 SCC 296 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1095, mere non-mention of the name of an eyewitness does not render the prosecution version fragile. The information was not lodged by an eyewitness. Mental condition of a person whose father has lost his life inevitably gets disturbed. Explanation offered by witnesses for non-mention of PW 3's name is plausible. Additionally, it is to be noted that in the present case the statement of PW 3 was recorded on the same day of the incident, immediately after the investigation process was set into motion. Therefore, the plea that PW 3's testimony is doubtful lacks substance….” 22. Thus, the testimony of Ganesh Thapa (PW4) cannot be discarded because his name was not mentioned in the FIR. 23. Ganesh Thapa (PW4) stated that he was walking near CSIR. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-68-6697 came at a high speed and hit Neetu, who was dragged for 15-20 feet. Neetu was taken to the hospital. The accused was driving the tempo at the time of the accident. The accident occurred due to the high speed of the vehicle and the negligence of the accused. He stated in his cross-examination that he was present on the spot waiting for the bus. Neetu was taken to the hospital by three people. He denied that he and Raj Kumar had reached the spot when Neetu was being taken to Dharamshala. His statement was recorded after he had returned from Dharamshala. 24. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. Nothing was suggested to him that he had any motive to depose against the accused or in favour of the prosecution. He claimed that he had taken the injured to the hospital. This is evident from the fact that his statement was recorded on the date of the incident itself. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon his testimony. 25. He claimed that he had taken the injured to the hospital. This is evident from the fact that his statement was recorded on the date of the incident itself. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon his testimony. 25. The accused did not dispute the accident in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. He stated that Neetu had tried to cross the road from the rear side of the tempo and was hit by the tempo. This statement does not explain the accident. It is not explained how a girl walking behind the tempo would sustain multiple injuries. MLC (Ext.PA) shows an abrasion on the back and buttocks and distension of the abdomen. The postmortem report (Ex.PB) mentions a shattered spleen and intra-abdominal bleeding due to splenic injury. The postmortem report clearly shows that the deceased was crushed under the tyres of the vehicle. Hence, the explanation provided by the accused that the victim had herself hit the rear side of the tempo and sustained injuries cannot be accepted, and the statement of Ganesh Thapa (PW4) has to be accepted as correct that the deceased was hit by the tempo and crushed under its tyres. 26. The site plan (Ex.PW7/C) shows the dupatta of Neetu at point ‘D’ and her bag at point ‘Y’. The deceased was dragged for 15 yards by the tempo. This is corroborated by the fact that the dupatta and the bag of Neetu were lying at some distance from each other. The fact that the accused was unable to stop the tempo after the accident and dragged Neetu for 15 yards shows his negligence. It was laid down by this Court in State of H.P. versus Dinesh Kumar, 2008 Cr. L.J 2024 that the spot map showing the skid marks to the extent of 74 feet, it proved the negligence of the accused. It was observed: “10. Once again reverting to the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A, the skid marks on the road were 74 feet in length. For the vehicle going from Hamirpur to the Nadaun side point 'A' shown in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is on the extreme right side. It is not the case that the accident took place on the left side of the road for a vehicle going from Hamirpur to Nadaun, or even in the middle of the road. For the vehicle going from Hamirpur to the Nadaun side point 'A' shown in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is on the extreme right side. It is not the case that the accident took place on the left side of the road for a vehicle going from Hamirpur to Nadaun, or even in the middle of the road. The skid marks of 74 feet on the road are clear to show that the jeep was being driven at high speed. The respondent could not control the jeep due to his rash or negligent driving and high speed, and the jeep went from the left side to the right side and crushed the girl at point 'A'…” 27. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligent. 28. Pooja (PW2) stated that she, Neetu and Jyoti got off the bus. They were going to their homes when a tempo coming from Palampur hit Neetu. Tempo dragged her for some distance. She and Jyoti went towards the house of Neetu and informed Neetu’s mother about the accident. She did not know the name of the driver of the tempo. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She denied the previous statement recorded by the police. She admitted that the tempo came after they had got off the bus. She did not know that the registration no. of the tempo was HP68-6697. She admitted that the tempo was being driven by the accused at a high speed. She denied, in her cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence, that all the girls were crossing the road. She volunteered to say that Neetu had already crossed the road. 29. This witness was declared hostile because she failed to name the accused as the driver of the tempo or mention the registration number of the tempo. This was no reason for declaring her hostile. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivkumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2223, that a witness should not be indiscriminately declared hostile. It was observed: “9. We are at a loss to understand as to why the witness was treated as hostile in the first place. We are frequently coming across cases where the prosecutor, for no ostensible reason, wants to treat the witnesses as hostile, and the Court indiscriminately grants permission. It was observed: “9. We are at a loss to understand as to why the witness was treated as hostile in the first place. We are frequently coming across cases where the prosecutor, for no ostensible reason, wants to treat the witnesses as hostile, and the Court indiscriminately grants permission. It is well settled, by judgments of this Court, that before a witness can be declared hostile and the party examining the witnesses is allowed to cross-examine, there must be some material to show that the witnesses are not speaking the truth or have exhibited an element of hostility to the party for whom he is deposing. No doubt, the circumstances under which the Court will exercise the discretion under Section 154 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 157 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023) and permit the party calling the witness to put any question which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, this Court has held that the contingency of cross-examining the witness by the party calling, is an extraordinary phenomenon and permission should be given only in special cases. Small or insignificant omissions cannot be the basis for treating the witnesses as hostile, and the Court, before exercising its discretion, must scan and weigh the circumstances properly and ought not to exercise its discretion in a casual or routine manner.” 30. The accused admitted in his statement, recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, that he was driving the tempo and the accident had taken place with the tempo. Therefore, the fact that Pooja has not supported the prosecution’s case regarding the accused being a driver of the tempo or the registration number of the tempo will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. She categorically stated that the tempo was being driven at a high speed, which is evident from the fact that the accused could not control it and dragged the victim for a distance of 15 yards. Her statement in the cross- examination that the victim Neetu had crossed the road will also not make the prosecution’s case suspect because the site plan (Ext.PW7/C) and the photographs (Ext. PW9/A1 to Ext. PW9/A3) show the dupatta and the bag on the edge of the road, which corroborate her testimony. Her statement in the cross- examination that the victim Neetu had crossed the road will also not make the prosecution’s case suspect because the site plan (Ext.PW7/C) and the photographs (Ext. PW9/A1 to Ext. PW9/A3) show the dupatta and the bag on the edge of the road, which corroborate her testimony. Thus, the plea taken by the accused before the learned Court below that the victim appeared all of a sudden is not established. 31. Raj Kumar (PW3) stated that he came to know that Neetu had met with an accident. He went to the hospital, from where she was referred to Dharamshala. He was not aware of the registration number of the tempo or the name of the driver. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He stated that he did not know that the accused was driving the tempo at a high speed in a negligent manner. He could not say whose negligence led to the accident. 32. The presence of this witness was not asserted by any person, and there is no material to infer that he was present on the spot. Hence, the fact that he was unable to mention the name of the driver or the registration number of the tempo will not make the prosecution case suspect and his testimony can be used to discard the prosecution case. 33. Testimonies of Ganesh Thapa (PW4) and Pooja (PW2) proved that the accident occurred when the tempo being driven by the accused had hit Neetu at a high speed. This is duly corroborated by the fact that the victim, Neetu, was dragged for 15 yards after the accident. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the vehicle negligently and his negligence led to the accident. 34. The postmortem report (Ext. PB) proves that Neetu died due to the injuries sustained by her. Since the injuries were sustained in an accident which occurred because of the negligence of the accused; therefore, it was duly proved on record that Neetu had died due to the negligence of the accused. Hence, learned Courts below had rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. 35. Since the injuries were sustained in an accident which occurred because of the negligence of the accused; therefore, it was duly proved on record that Neetu had died due to the negligence of the accused. Hence, learned Courts below had rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. 35. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused, and the learned Courts below failed to consider this aspect. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304- A of the IPC. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile  almost  throughout  his  working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 36. A similar view was taken in Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208 , wherein it was observed: - 6. Learned counsel lastly made an alternative plea that the Probation of Offenders Act may be applied to secure his job. This Court has held in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 ] that the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked in cases involving rash or negligent driving of the bus resulting in death of human beings.” 37. This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: - 13. This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: - 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 38. It was laid down in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, that a deterrent sentence has to be awarded to a person convicted of negligent driving. It was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 39. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and a deterrent sentence was to be imposed. 40. Learned Trial Court has imposed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC. This was a lenient view because a young life was lost, and six months’ imprisonment does not provide any deterrence; therefore, no further leniency is required in the matter. 41. No other point was urged. 42. Learned Trial Court has imposed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC. This was a lenient view because a young life was lost, and six months’ imprisonment does not provide any deterrence; therefore, no further leniency is required in the matter. 41. No other point was urged. 42. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 43. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.