JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. This writ petition has been filed for grant of following substantive relief :- “(i) That the respondents may kindly be directed to grant family pension to petitioner from due date alongwith interest and arrears from the date of reckoning of the same after quashing the order dated 18.09.2021 and order dated 04.11.2004 attached with Annexure P-3.” 2. The Case Following facts are not in dispute:- 2(i) The petitioner is wife of Sh. Bhikham Ram. Shri Bhikham Ram was engaged as daily wage Beldar in the respondent- Public Works Department in the year 1983-84. His services were regularized on 18.05.1995. The petitioner’s husband accepted his regularization order and joined his services as regular employee accordingly. 2(ii) While petitioner’s husband Sh. Bhikham Ram was in service, the respondents received complaint against him about his having furnished false ‘date of birth’ certificate at the time of regularization of his services. It is the stand of the respondents that after adopting all codal formalities, inquiry into this complaint was conducted. During inquiry, it came out that Bhikham Ram’s date of birth was recorded in the school register as 24.03.1941 but while joining services, his date of birth was entered in the service book as 24.03.1947 on the basis of a ‘date of birth certificate’ produced by him. The inquiry report established that date of birth certificate produced by Sh. Bhikham Ram, husband of the petitioner was fake and false; He had hidden true facts about his date of birth. An office order was issued on 5.8.2003 relieving Sh. Bhikham Ram from service by treating his date of birth as 24.03.1941. On the basis of said inquiry report, the competent authority came to the conclusion that Bhikham Ram had indeed furnished fake date of birth certificate to seek employment and as such, in exercise of powers under applicable provisions of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, the Executive Engineer, B & R Division, H.P.P.W.D, Division Dharampur, Tehsil Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P. issued an order on dated 04.11.2004 terminating services of Sh. Bhikham Ram from due date of his retirement i.e. with effect from 31.03.2001. Bhikham Ram from due date of his retirement i.e. with effect from 31.03.2001. 2(iii) Shri Bhikham Ram instituted O.A. No.3359/2003 seeking following substantive reliefs from the respondents including grant of pension from the date he was retired from government service:- “(1) That the respondents be directed to grant pension to the applicant from the date on which the applicant has retired from government service on attaining the age of superannuation. (2) That the respondents be directed to pass ex-post facto sanction before six years of applicant’s superannuation so that he may be eligible for pension and pensionary benefits. (3) That Annexure A-1 passed against the provisions of law and natural justice may kindly be quashed and set- aside. (4) That the applicant may be deemed to be in continuous service under the respondents taking the date of birth of the applicant as 24.03.1947 and in the alternative the applicant may kindly be paid all arrears of wages, salary etc. taking the date of birth of the applicant as 24.3.1947.” Pertinently, Sh. Bhikham Ram besides seeking quashing of order dated 05.08.2003 had also prayed for treating his date of birth as 24.3.1947 and for consequential benefits on that basis. Alongwith the reply the respondents placed on record documents concerning the inquiry conducted against the petitioner’s husband with respect to his date of birth and the consequential orders passed thereupon including the office orders dated 05.08.2003 and 04.11.2004. 2(iv) During pendency of original application, Sh. Bhikham Ram died on 20.04.2007. He was substituted by his legal representatives i.e. wife (the present petitioner), his daughter and two sons. The Original Application preferred by Bhikham was decided as CWP(T) No.9816/2008 on 17.12.2010 as under:- “The petitioner was initially engaged on daily wage basis in the year 1982-83. He was regularized w.e.f.1.1.1994. He was retired/relieved from duties on 6.8.2003. However, the petitioner has not been paid pension. The fact of the matter is that as per law laid down by this Court in State of H.P and others versus Sarab Dayal, CWP No.180 of 2001, decided on 19.7.2007, half of the daily wage service rendered by the workman has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of pensionary benefits. 2. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The fact of the matter is that as per law laid down by this Court in State of H.P and others versus Sarab Dayal, CWP No.180 of 2001, decided on 19.7.2007, half of the daily wage service rendered by the workman has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of pensionary benefits. 2. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to consider half of the daily wage service rendered by the petitioner/workman followed by more than 9 years service on regular basis for the purpose of granting him pension. The needful be done within a period of two months from the date of production of certified copy of this judgment by the petitioner. The petitioner is also entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum. The release of pension shall abide by the outcome of S.L.P. preferred by the State of Himachal Pradesh against the judgment in Sarab Dayal’s case. No costs.” Since the respondents did not implement the above order, the present petitioner instituted execution petition No.61 of 2021. The respondents filed reply to the execution petition placing on record the memorandum dated 04.11.2004 as also the office order dated 18.09.2021 rejecting the case of the petitioner for grant of pension. Taking note of aforesaid document, the execution petition was disposed of on 05.09.2022 reserving liberty to the petitioner to seek appropriate remedy against the consideration order passed by the respondents. 2(v) It is in the above background that the present petitioner, wife of late Sh. Bhikham Ram laid challenge to the order dated 18.09.2021 passed by the respondents rejecting her prayer for grant of family pension. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing an order passed by respondents on 04.11.2004 terminating services of her husband late Sh. Bhikham Ram w.e.f. 31.03.2001. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the case file as well as the record produced by the respondents. I have also perused the record of CWP(T) No.9816/2008. 4. It comes out from the record that respondents had conducted an inquiry into Bhikham Ram’s correct date of birth. During inquiry, it was discussed that Sh. Bhikham Ram had produced fake date of birth certificate, on the basis of which, 24.03.1947 was recorded as his date of birth in the service record whereas 24.03.1941 was ascertained to be his correct date of birth. During inquiry, it was discussed that Sh. Bhikham Ram had produced fake date of birth certificate, on the basis of which, 24.03.1947 was recorded as his date of birth in the service record whereas 24.03.1941 was ascertained to be his correct date of birth. Office order in this regard was issued on 05.08.2003 and copy thereof was endorsed to Sh.Bhikham Ram. On that basis, memorandum was issued on 04.11.2004 terminating Bhikham Ram’s services with effect from 31.03.2001. Bhikham Ram instituted O.A. No.3359/2003 on 02.11.2003 primarily in respect of office orders issued by the respondents regarding his date of birth including the order dated 05.08.2003. He had prayed for direction to the respondents to treat his date of birth as 24.03.1947 instead of 24.03.1941. Sh. Bhikham Ram had died during the pendency of the original application. Present petitioner was one of his legal heirs brought on record of the case. The said original application was disposed of on 17.12.2010 with directions to respondents to consider the case of petitioner’s husband for grant of pension in the light of law down in State of Himachal Pradesh versus Sarab Dayal, CWP No.180 of 2001, decided on 19.07.2007. The petitioner accepted the judgment dated 17.12.2010 wherein no interference was made with the date of birth of the petitioner as verified by the respondents to be 24.03.1941 and also with his consequential retirement w.e.f. 31.03.2001. That being the admitted position, the petitioner’s challenge now to the order dated 04.11.2004 in the instant writ petition filed on 28.06.2023, is hopelessly hit not just by principles of delay and laches but also of acquiescence. In Bichitrananda Behera Versus State of Orissa and others, Civil Appeal No.6664 of 2023 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.16238 of 2017), decided on 11.10.2023, Hon’ble Supreme Court highlighted the significance of the doctrines of delay & laches and acquiescence in service-related disputes. Hon’ble Court observed that the claimant therein had delayed pursuing his claim for over 12 years despite being aware of the appointment of another person to the same post of Physical Education Trainer (PET). This prolonged inaction was held to amount to acquiescence, which effectively bars the claim because it implies consent through silence or failure to act. Hon’ble Court observed that the claimant therein had delayed pursuing his claim for over 12 years despite being aware of the appointment of another person to the same post of Physical Education Trainer (PET). This prolonged inaction was held to amount to acquiescence, which effectively bars the claim because it implies consent through silence or failure to act. Hon’ble Apex Court explained that while laches refers to an unreasonable delay without active consent, both delay and laches serve the important purpose of preventing stale claims that disrupt settled rights and administrative decisions. In service matters, these doctrines were held to play crucial roles as they protect the stability and finality of administrative decisions. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- “ 21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court: “(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) (B)…………….. 21-23. …………….. Acquiescence 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.” (C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301 : 36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non- existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non- existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. Xxx 38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 ] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126 ] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action. The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213). “12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911, p. 395 as follows: ‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’ 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’ 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?” 39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107 ] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584 ] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34 ] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence. 40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584 ] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584 ] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.” In view of the finality attached to the respondents action in terminating service of petitioner’s husband w.e.f. 31.03.2001, the petitioner’s claim for family pension cannot be allowed. The impugned order dated 18.09.2021 rejecting the petitioner’s case for grant of family pension is in order taking into consideration the fact that her husband’s services were terminated by the respondents w.e.f. 31.03.2001. Accordingly, the present petition fails and is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.