Page No.# 1/7 GAHC030002902025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : CRL.A(J)/31/2025 Sh. Chatuan Vanhlamawia S/o Fakzuala R/o Siahatla - II Siaha VERSUS The State of Mizoram and Anr. Aizawl2:Sh. X (Informant Advocate for the Petitioner : Mrs. H Lalmalsawmi (Amicus Curiae) Advocate for the Respondent : P.P./Addl.PP, Mizoram for R1 B E F O R E HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR SHARMA ORDER 04.06.2026 (Michael Zothankuma,J) Heard Ms. H Lalmalsawmi, learned Amicus Curiae. Also heard Ms. Mary L Khiangte, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor and Ms. Emily L Chhangte, Legal Aid Counsel for respondent No. 2. Page No.# 2/7 2. The present appeal has been filed against the impugned Order dated 05.04.2023/11.04.2023 passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, Siaha District, in Crl. Tr. No. 51/2023 arising out of Siaha P.S Case No. 4/2023, by which the appellant has been convicted on his own plea of guilt under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 20 years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, and in default, simple imprisonment for 2 (two) months. 3. The appellant’s counsel submits that the appellant had given a confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C and at the time of framing of charge, the appellant had pleaded guilty to the charge of having committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault multiple times upon the victim, who was 13 years of age, by saying that “he and the victim had had sexual intercourse more than once last December”. 4. The appellant’s counsel submits that in the memorandum of appeal submitted by the appellant before this Court, a plea had been taken in paragraph No. 2 that the Investigating Officer had induced the appellant to make a confession before the learned Trial Court, telling the appellant that if he pleaded guilty and made a confession before the learned Trial Court, he would be let off lightly and that he would be released soon. Further, it was stated that Page No.# 3/7 if he did not do so, it would not be good for him and his case would take a long time. In view of the above, the appellant had pleaded guilty. 5. The appellant’s counsel submits that the appellant, having been lured with a false promise that he would be let off lightly, made the admission of guilt. 6. Ms. Emily L Chhangte, the learned Legal Aid Counsel for respondent No. 2, submits that there is no infirmity with the decision of the learned Trial Court in convicting the appellant on his own plea of guilt, which has been corroborated by his confessional statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. 7. Ms. Mary L Khiangte, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, submits that there is no infirmity with the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court and as such, the same should not be interfered with. 8. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 9. On a perusal of the Trial Court Records, we find that the appellant had made a confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C on 03.02.2023. Charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act was framed on 05.04.2023, in which the appellant pleaded guilty to having had sexual intercourse with the 13-year-old victim more than once during the month of December of the previous year. 10. In view of the admission of guilt made by the appellant at the stage of Page No.# 4/7 framing of charge, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 6(1) of the POCSO Act and sentenced him, vide the impugned order dated 05.04.2023/11.04.2023. 11. The impugned Order dated 05.04.2023/11.04.2023, records the fact that the Trial Court found the appellant guilty under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and had accordingly convicted him. The above impugned order then continues by stating that the hearing on the sentence to be awarded to the appellant was done. The above impugned order continues with the sentencing of the appellant, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for 2 (two) months. The impugned order concludes by stating that the same was announced in the open court on 11.04.2023 i.e. 6 days later. This discrepancy can be explained by the Order dated 05.04.2023 passed in the order sheet of the Trial Court Records, where it has been recorded that 10.04.2023 had been fixed for hearing on the sentence to be awarded. Thus, though the conviction of the appellant and the sentencing had been amalgamated into one impugned order, which started on 05.04.2023 and ended on 11.04.2023, it is clear that there was a separate date fixed for hearing, on the quantum sentence to be awarded to the appellant, i.e. on 10.04.2023. Page No.# 5/7 12. The above being said, the question that arises is as to whether the appellant was given the assistance of a defence counsel at the time of giving his confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C and at the time of consideration/framing of charge. In this regard, it would be profitable to refer to the Supreme Court in the case of Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa vs. State of Meghalaya, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 116, wherein the decision made in Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 has been referred to. The Supreme Court in the above case held that an accused would need a lawyer to resist remand to police or judicial custody and for granting of bail, to clearly explain to him the legal consequences in case he intended to make a confessional statement in terms of Section 164 Cr.P.C and to represent him when the Court examines the charge-sheet submitted by the police and decide upon the future course of proceedings and at the stage of framing of charges. 13. In the present case, there is nothing in the Trial Court Records to show that any Legal Aid Lawyer had been provided to the appellant. There is also no Vakalatnama or memorandum of appearance showing that any lawyer/counsel was engaged by the appallant, to represent the appellant. Interestingly, the impugned Order dated 05.04.2023/11.04.2023 speaks of one L.C Catherine as Page No.# 6/7 the counsel for the appellant. There is nothing in the Trial Court Records to show as to how L.C Catherine became the lawyer of the appellant. Further, the impugned order dated 05.04.2023/11.04.2023 is actually two orders. A careful perusal of the impugned order shows that the name of the counsel L.C Catherine appears in the impugned order, only after the appellant had been convicted under Section 6(1) of the POCSO Act. 14. On going through the impugned order, we do not find it safe to uphold the conviction of the appellant by the learned Trial Court, when there is no clear proof that there was any counsel to represent the appellant at the time of framing of charge. 15. In view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision stated above, we set aside the impugned Order 05.04.2023/11.04.2023 and remand the matter back to the learned Trial Court, to restart the criminal proceedings from the stage of consideration of charge. 16. The Trial Court shall ensure that if there are no private counsels to assist the appellant, the assistance of a Legal Aid Counsel should be provided to the appellant. 17. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Send back the Trial Court Record. Page No.# 7/7 18. In appreciation of the assistance provided by the learned Amicus Curiae and the learned Legal Aid Counsel, their fees should be paid by the High Court Legal Services Committee. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant