JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 119 of 2025, dated 12.05.2025, registered at Police Station Sadar, District Chamba, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a permanent resident of Village Bharian, Post Office Kupahara, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. He belongs to a respectable family. He was arrested on 12.05.2025. The petitioner is innocent and has not committed any offence. The petitioner has nothing to do with the contraband stated to have been recovered by the police. The allegation that the Aadhaar card of the petitioner was found in the bag containing 27.94 grams of charas is prima facie proof of false implication. The quantity of charas stated to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioner is an intermediate quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The police have completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence the petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party were present at Gate on Chamba Jot Road on 12.05.2025 at about 4:35 P.M. when they received secret information that the petitioner, Arvind @ Chahna was supplying heroin. The information was credible. It was reduced to writing and was sent to the Additional Superintendent of Police. The police associated Kanta Devi and Kuldeep Singh and went to the shop of the petitioner. The police searched the shop and recovered a rexine bag containing one Aadhaar card, Rs.2,29,000/- and a transparent polythene containing 27.94 grams of heroin. The police seized the currency notes and heroin and arrested the petitioner. The heroin was sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga, and as per the report, it indicated the presence of Diacetylmorphine (Heroin). The police filed a charge sheet before the Court on 09.07.2025. The matter was listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 16.10.2025, 17.10.2025 and 18.10.2025. The heroin was sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga, and as per the report, it indicated the presence of Diacetylmorphine (Heroin). The police filed a charge sheet before the Court on 09.07.2025. The matter was listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 16.10.2025, 17.10.2025 and 18.10.2025. FIR No. 318/23, FIR No. 216/23, FIR No. 293/23, FIR No. 203/24 and FIR No. 217/24 are pending against the petitioner. The petitioner has criminal antecedents. He would influence the witnesses and indulge in the commission of similar crimes if released on bail. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. I have heard Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Anuj Bali, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlheria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to him, and his arrest is illegal. He relied upon the judgments of Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2025) 5 SCC 799 and Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 7 SCC 576 in support of his submission. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found involved in the commission of similar offences and there is every likelihood of the petitioner committing similar offences in case of his release on bail. Heroin adversely affects society, and its possession should not be condoned. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:- (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the wit- nesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Need- less to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, how- ever, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application can- not undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if re- leased on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be sup- ported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The status report shows that the police searched the shop of the accused and recovered 27.94 grams of heroin and Rs.2,29,000/- from a bag. These allegations prima facie show the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. 11. It was submitted that the prosecution’s case is false, which is apparent from the fact that his Aadhaar card was also found in the bag and no reasonable persons would keep their Aadhaar card in the bag containing the contraband. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The polythene packet was found in the shop, and police had also recovered Rs.2,29,000/- in the same bag from which the heroin was recovered. No reasonable person would keep the currency notes with the heroin and would keep it separate so as not to connect it to the drugs. The recovery of the currency notes and Aadhaar card prima facie indicate that the petitioner never contemplated that the search would be conducted and recovery would be made. No reasonable person would keep the currency notes with the heroin and would keep it separate so as not to connect it to the drugs. The recovery of the currency notes and Aadhaar card prima facie indicate that the petitioner never contemplated that the search would be conducted and recovery would be made. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 12 SCC 180 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 614: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 872 that a Court deciding the bail petition has to see a prima facie case and is not allowed to weigh the evidence. It was observed at page 185: 10…Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual scenario and, therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. The court has to only opine as to whether there is a prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake a meticulous examination of the evi- dence collected by the police and comment on the same..” 12. Therefore, it is impermissible to say anything about the falsity of the prosecution’s case. 13. The status report shows that eight FIRs have been registered against him. However, the petitioner had not mentioned this fact in the bail petition. It was laid down by this Court in Prem Singh vs. State of H.P. 2020 (1) Shim. L.C. 476 that a person seeking bail should mention the pendency of the criminal cases against him in the bail petition. It was observed: “7. The burden is on the petitioner to mention his criminal history. The data bank of the State and the Country is not elaborate enough to contain the criminal history of every accused. Apart from that, there would be some cases where the petitioner might have committed serious offences outside India. As such, the burden is on the petitioner to mention all such facts in the bail petition. 8. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, mandates that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 14. A direction was issued to the petitioners to mention the criminal history in the bail petition. It was observed: “15. 8. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, mandates that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 14. A direction was issued to the petitioners to mention the criminal history in the bail petition. It was observed: “15. Given above, henceforth it is obligatory that in every bail petition, the petitioner must mention all pending FIRs and pending criminal trials, where the sentence provided is seven years or more. Furthermore, the petitioner must specify details of all cases where he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more. 16. In addition to the above, in every bail petition filed in any Court within the jurisdiction of the State of Himachal Pradesh, the State/Respondent(s) shall explicitly mention in the status report the criminal history. In bail petitions where there is no pleading about the criminal history, then the State/Respondent(s) shall bring it to the notice of the concerned Court about the non-mentioning of the criminal history. In such a situation, it shall be for the concerned Court to take a call, if it so desires, depending upon the facts of each case.” 15. A similar direction was issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Munnesh v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1319, wherein it was observed: “11. However, before parting, we consider it necessary to dwell on one aspect. A growing trend is being noticed of individuals seeking from this Court the concession of bail or the concession of protection from arrest, not disclosing in the special leave petitions their involvement in other criminal cases. In such cases where involvement is not disclosed, on a prima facie satisfaction that long incarceration without reasonable progress in the trial is invading the right to life of the accused or that the offences for which the FIR has been registered are not too serious, notices are issued and only thereafter, information of criminal antecedents is being provided in the counter affidavits filed by the respective respondents-States, as in the present case. The result is that this Court, being the apex court of the country, is being taken for a ride. This Court has shown leniency in the past, but we think it is time that such a state of affairs is not allowed to continue further. 12. The result is that this Court, being the apex court of the country, is being taken for a ride. This Court has shown leniency in the past, but we think it is time that such a state of affairs is not allowed to continue further. 12. We, accordingly, direct that henceforth each individual who approaches this Court with a Special Leave Petition (Criminal) challenging orders passed by the high courts/sessions courts declining prayers under Sections 438/439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or under Sections 482/483, Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita shall mandatorily disclose in the ‘SYNOPSIS’ that either he is a man of clean antecedents or if he has knowledge of his involvement in any criminal case, he shall clearly indicate the same together with the stage that the proceedings, arising out of such case, have reached. Should the disclosure be found to be incorrect subsequently, that itself could be considered as a ground for dismissal of the special leave petition. 13. We are conscious that complying with this direction could result in inconvenience for some; however, having noticed that orders dated 13th October, 2023 and 19th October, 2023 of this Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 12876 of 2023 Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and SLP (Crl.) No. 2863 of 2023Sheikh Bhola v. State of Bihar, respectively, requiring steps to be initiated for eliciting proper and correct information from the individuals seeking orders of regular bail/pre-arrest bail have not produced the desired results, we have proceeded to make the aforesaid direction in the institutional interest so that proceedings before this Court are not taken lightly by those who choose to approach it and the process of law is not abused. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court issued directions to the High Court in Kaushal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1473, to require the accused to furnish the details of the criminal cases pending against him. It was observed: “22. Before parting, we would like to state that accounting for the criminal antecedents of the accused while considering the bail applications has been the subject matter of concern for Courts across the country. The rules and orders of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, to be specific, Rule 5 of Chapter 1-A(b) Volume-V specifically provide as be- low: “5. Bail applications. The rules and orders of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, to be specific, Rule 5 of Chapter 1-A(b) Volume-V specifically provide as be- low: “5. Bail applications. - In every application for bail presented to the High Court, the petitioner shall state whether a similar application has or has not been made to the Supreme Court, and if made, shall state the result thereof. The petitioner/applicant shall also mention whether he/she is/were involved in any other criminal case or not. If yes, particulars and decisions thereof. An application which does not contain this information shall be placed before the bench with the necessary in- formation.” 23. We feel that every High Court in the country should consider incorporating a similar provision in the respective High Court Rules and/or Criminal Side Rules, as it would impose an obligation on the accused to make disclosures regarding his/her involvement in any other criminal case(s) previously registered.” 17. In the present case, the offence punishable under Section 21 of the NDPS Act is punishable with imprisonment of 20 years, and it was necessary to mention the same in the bail petition. 18. The pendency of multiple FIRs shows that the petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court exhaustively dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents in Aminodin vs State of H.P. 2024: HHC: 6091 and held, after referring to various judgments, that a Judge must consider the criminal antecedents of the accused, the nature of offences and his general conduct while considering the bail petition. Bail should not be generally granted to an accused with criminal antecedents when there is a likelihood of the commission of the crime. 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail except where the circumstances suggest creating trouble by repeating the offence. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 20. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 20. It was held in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 that where the person seeking bail has criminal antecedents, he is not entitled to bail. It was observed: “9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is there- fore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 21. It was held in V. Senthil Balaji v. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, that where the petitioner can become a threat to society because of her criminal antecedents, he should not be released on bail. It was observed: “27…..An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.” 22. Similarly, it was held in Union of India v. Barakathullah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019, that where the persons were involved in the commission of similar offences, they should not be released on bail. It was observed: - “20. … So far as the respondents in the instant appeals are concerned, they are in custody for hardly one and a half years, apart from the fact that all the respondents are shown to have been involved in previous cases. There are about 8 to 9 previous cases shown in the chargesheet against the respondents, except accused Nos. 1, 4 and 6, who are shown to have been involved in two cases. There are about 8 to 9 previous cases shown in the chargesheet against the respondents, except accused Nos. 1, 4 and 6, who are shown to have been involved in two cases. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal antecedents, in our opinion High Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UAPA.” 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781 that the liberty of a person has to be balanced with peace and harmony in society. Liberty cannot be elevated to such a high pedestal as would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. It was observed at page 384: “65. We are absolutely conscious that the liberty of a person should not be lightly dealt with, for the deprivation of the liberty of a person has an immense impact on the mind. Incarceration creates a concavity in the personality of an individual. Sometimes it causes a sense of emptiness. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic body polity which is wedded to the rule of law, an individual is expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law. Individual liberty is restricted by larger social interests, and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly society, an individual is expected to live with dignity, having respect for the law and also giving due respect to others' rights. It is a well-accepted principle that the concept of liberty is not in the realm of absolutism but is a restricted one. The cry of the collective for justice, its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity for security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individual living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated, and such regulations, which are the source of law, subserve the social balance and function as a significant instrument for the protection of human rights and the security of the collective. The life of an individual living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated, and such regulations, which are the source of law, subserve the social balance and function as a significant instrument for the protection of human rights and the security of the collective. This is because, fundamentally, laws are made for their obedience so that every member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve their individual as well as social interests. That is why Edmond Burke, while discussing liberty, opined, “it is regulated freedom”. 66. It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal that it would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. The prospect of greater justice requires that law and order prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there can be no arithmetical formula for fixing the parameters in precise exactitude, but the adjudication should express not only application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction on accepted and established norms. Law and order in a society protect the established precepts and see to it that contagious crimes do not become epidemic. In an organised society, the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be responsible and not to disturb the tranquillity and safety which every well-meaning person desires. Not for nothing, J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right to act without interference within the limits of the law.” 67. Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly cherished value in the life of an individual, it is a controlled and restricted one, and no element in the society can act in a manner by consequence of which the life or liberty of others is jeopardised, for the rational collective does not countenance an anti-social or anti-collective act. (See: Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172.). 24. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail because of his criminal antecedents. 25. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this ground. This submission is not acceptable. 24. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail because of his criminal antecedents. 25. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this ground. This submission is not acceptable. First, the bail petition is silent regarding the communication of the grounds of arrest; therefore, the State had no adequate opportunity to place the material before the Court to show that the grounds of arrest were communicated to the petitioner. Hence, this plea cannot be raised without the foundational material in its support. 26. Further, the status report shows that recovery was effected in the presence of the petitioner, and he was aware of the nature of the crime committed by him. It was laid down by three Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye, In re, (1969) 1 SCC 292 : 1968 SCC OnLine SC 374, that if the accused is arrested red-handed, there is no need to explain the grounds of arrest: it was observed at Page 298: “Lord Simonds gave an illustration of the circumstances where the accused must know why he is being arrested. “There is no need to explain the reasons for arrest if the arrested man is caught red-handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven.” 27. It was held in Balbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2009) 15 SCC 795 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 997: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1258, that where the accused knew that she was being searched for the contraband, the plea taken by her regarding non-communication of the reason of arrest is technical in nature. It was observed at page 802: “20. In view of the concurrent findings of the trial court and as also the High Court holding that the appellant was in conscious possession of the said contraband goods, the allegation of non-disclosure of the purpose of the search and the grounds of arrest to her is of a technical nature and without there being any material force in them. The appellant herself knew that she was being searched for possession of contraband goods, and therefore, she had also sought protection as provided under Sections 52 and 57 of the NDPS Act. 21. The appellant was being searched and arrested on account of possession of contraband goods. The appellant herself knew that she was being searched for possession of contraband goods, and therefore, she had also sought protection as provided under Sections 52 and 57 of the NDPS Act. 21. The appellant was being searched and arrested on account of possession of contraband goods. The violation of the provisions of the NDPS Act was clearly known to her. The allegation that she herself asked for such protection instead of prosecution, giving her the option to be searched before a gazetted officer, as required under the law, would not in any manner adversely affect her conviction and order of sentence passed by both the courts below. No prejudice could be shown by the appellant against the DSP, who was a gazetted officer and the lady officer present at the time of the search.” 28. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702 that where the arrest memos and remand record showed that the accused was aware of the reasons of their arrest, they were represented by their counsel and had applied for their bail, no prejudice was caused to them and the irregularity in not communicating the grounds of arrest is not sufficient to grant bail. It was observed: “20.1. Delay in furnishing the grounds of arrest cannot, by itself, constitute a valid ground for the grant of bail. 20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents - accused contended that the arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 Cr. P.C. (now Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). This sub- mission, however, is devoid of merit. 20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that “no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice”. Similarly, Section 50 (1) Cr. P.C. requires that “every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest. 20.1.3. Similarly, Section 50 (1) Cr. P.C. requires that “every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest. 20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus mandates that the arrested person must be in- formed of the grounds of arrest - but neither provision prescribes a specific form or insists upon writ- ten communication in every case. Judicial precedents have clarified that substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is shown. 20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana 2025 SCC OnLine SC 456, it was reiterated that Article 22(1) is satisfied if the accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance, even if not conveyed in writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 INSC 768 , it was observed that when an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient compliance. Both these post-Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that written, individualised grounds are not an in- flexible requirement in all circumstances. 20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr. P.C. is mandatory; the consistent judicial approach has been to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend. 20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the remand orders about service of memo of grounds of arrest (para 45); the arrest memos were allegedly template-based and not personalised (para 50); and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024) 7 SCC 576 and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it concluded (paras 43, 49 - 50) that from 03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest imme- diately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail. 20.1.7. Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024) 7 SCC 576 and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it concluded (paras 43, 49 - 50) that from 03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest imme- diately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail. 20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail.” 29. In the present case, the petitioner had filed the bail petition before the learned Trial Court on 20.05.2025 immediately after his arrest. He has not shown any prejudice caused to him by the non-supply of the grounds of arrest. Therefore, he cannot be held entitled to bail. 30. In any case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed: “58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating the written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied) 31. Therefore, the non-supply of grounds of arrest will not make any difference. 32. It was submitted that the quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioner is intermediate, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, that the menace of drug addiction has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, and the release of an accused on bail in NDPS Act cases will send a negative signal to society. It was observed: “8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril. 9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is clueless in respect of evidence against the petitioner. Though allegations against the petitioner are yet to be proved in accordance with the law, it cannot be taken singly as a factor to grant bail to the petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record on behalf of the petitioner to divulge as to how and in what manner he came in contact with the persons who were residents of the State of Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is sufficient prima facie material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the crime. In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will send a negative signal in society, which will definitely be detrimental to its interests. 10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will send a negative signal in society, which will definitely be detrimental to its interests. 10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. It cannot be guaranteed that there will be re-indulgence by the petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released on bail.” 33. Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996, that the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right even if the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was observed: “6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not technically fall under the category of commercial quantity; nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed to be less by any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts of each and every case. 7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.” 34. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim release on bail because the quantity of heroin was intermediate. 35. No other point was urged. 36. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 37. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.