JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 21.06.2013 passed by learned Sessions Judge (Forests), Shimla, (learned Appellate Court), vide which judgment of conviction dated 17.04.2009 and order of sentence dated 18.04.2009, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No.2,Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act). It was asserted that the injured, Rajesh Rekta (PW-7), Yog Raj (PW-2), Surinder Kumar and the petitioner, Om Parkash, consumed liquor on 31.12.2002 with their friends. The informant Rajesh Rekta (PW-7), Yog Raj and Surinder Kumar boarded the vehicle bearing registration No. HP25-0507, which was being driven by the petitioner, Om Parkash. The vehicle met with an accident on the way to Sanan and fell into a Nala. The occupants of the vehicle sustained injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the petitioner. An intimation was given to the police regarding the accident. An entry (Ext.PW-5/A) was recorded in the Police Station. HC Dula Ram (PW-10) was directed to verify the correctness of the information. He went to IGMC, Shimla and recorded the statement of Rajesh Rekta (PW-7) (Ext.PW-7/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-10/A) was registered. HC Dula Ram (PW-10) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared a site plan (Ext.PW-10/C).He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP25-0507 vide memo(Ext.PW-1/A). Tara Singh (PW-11) took photographs(Ext.PW-11/A to Ext.PW-11/C) whose negatives are Ext.PW-11/D to Ext.PW-11/F.HC Gian Chand (PW-8) mechanically examined the vehicle and issued his report (Ext.PW-8/A). The documents of the vehicle were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-7/B).An application (Ext.PW-10/D) was made for conducting the medical examination of the victim. Dr Krishan Anand (PW-3) conducted the medical examination of Yog Raj (PW-2) and found that he had sustained simple injuries, which could have been caused within 72 hours of examination. He issued the report (Ext.PW-3/A). The documents of the vehicle were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-7/B).An application (Ext.PW-10/D) was made for conducting the medical examination of the victim. Dr Krishan Anand (PW-3) conducted the medical examination of Yog Raj (PW-2) and found that he had sustained simple injuries, which could have been caused within 72 hours of examination. He issued the report (Ext.PW-3/A). Dr Krishan Anand examined the accused and found that he had sustained simple and grievous injuries, which could have been caused within 72 hours of examination. He issued MLC (Ext.PW-3/B). He also examined Surinder Kumar and found that he had sustained simple and grievous injuries, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He issued his report (Ext.PW-3/D).Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 & 338 of the IPC and Section 185 of the M.V. Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined twelve witnesses to prove its case. Gian Chand(PW-1) and Kuldeep Thakur (PW-12)are the eyewitnesses. Yog Raj (PW-2), Rajesh Rekta (PW-7) were the occupants of the vehicle. Dr Krishan Anand (PW-3) conducted the medical examination of the injured. Maghu Ram (PW-4) is the witness to the recovery of the vehicle. Constable Sandeep Kumar(PW-5) proved the entry in the daily diary. Constable Raj Kumar (PW-6) was working as MC with whom the case property was deposited. HC Gian Chand (PW-8) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. HC Kuldeep Singh (PW-9) was working as an MHC in Police Station Dhalli, who sent the case property for examination. HC Dula Ram (PW-10) investigated the matter. Santosh Kumar (PW-11)took the photographs. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration No.HP25-0507 and Yog Raj, and Surinder Kumar were travelling in the vehicle. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He stated that he was innocent, and a false case was made against him. He did not produce any evidence in defence. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He stated that he was innocent, and a false case was made against him. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6 Learned Trial Court held that it was undisputed that the accused was driving the vehicle which had met with an accident. The plea taken by the accused in the cross- examination of the witnesses that there was snow on the road and the car skidded due to the snow was highly improbable. The photographs did not show any snow on the spot or the hills adjoining the spot. The place of the accident was 27 feet wide, and there was no possibility of the vehicle skidding on the road. The fact that occupants of the vehicle did not support the prosecution’s case was not sufficient to discard it. It was duly proved by the report of analysis that the accused had consumed alcohol, and 66.2 mg per cent alcohol was found in his blood. Therefore, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279,337 & 338 of IPC and Section 181 of M.V. Act. and was sentenced as under:- Sections Sentences 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 337 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months 338 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 181 of the M.V. Act The accused was sentenced to pay Rs.1000/- It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Appellate Court. Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the vehicle, which had skidded off the road. The plea taken by the accused that the accident occurred due to the snowfall was not probable. The medical evidence showed that the injuries could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. The accused had 66.2 ml percentage of alcohol in his blood and 138 ml percentage of alcohol in his urine. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. The medical evidence showed that the injuries could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. The accused had 66.2 ml percentage of alcohol in his blood and 138 ml percentage of alcohol in his urine. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the material on record. The link between the report of analysis and the taking of the sample was missing. Learned Courts below relied upon the statement of Gian Chand (PW-1); however, he was not eye eyewitness to the incident and reached the spot after hearing the noise. The statements of the occupants of the vehicle proved that there was snow on the road, and the possibility that the vehicle skidded due to the snow could not be ruled out. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Vinod Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Vinod Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The explanation provided by the petitioner that the vehicle had skidded off the road due to the snowfall was highly probable. The learned Courts below erred in rejecting this plea. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that both the learned Courts have concluded that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. This is also apparent from the fact that the vehicle left the road and fell into a gorge. The explanation provided by the accused that the road had snow was not established by the statement of any witness, and this plea was rightly disbelieved by the learned Courts below. There is no infirmity in the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 12. The explanation provided by the accused that the road had snow was not established by the statement of any witness, and this plea was rightly disbelieved by the learned Courts below. There is no infirmity in the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13 It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10.Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14.The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoorv. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12.This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Keralav. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13.Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavanv. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. …” 13.Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavanv. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court 18. The accused did not dispute in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He replied to questions No. 2 and 3 of his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. to this effect in the affirmative. Thus, the only question to be determined is whether the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner at the time of the accident. 19. The site plan (Ext.PW-10/C) shows that the metalled portion and unmetalled portion of the road at the place of the accident were 27 feet and 4+2 feet, respectively. Thus, the road was 33 feet wide at the place of the accident. The vehicle left the road and fell into a gorge. The vehicles do not usually leave the road, and when they do, the driver has to explain the circumstances leading to the accident. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Akbar versus State of Karnataka 1980 (1) SCC 30 , that the burden of proving everything essential to establish the charge against the accused rests on the prosecution. However, where the facts of the accident are such that the accident could not have been caused except for the negligence of the accused, the principle of res ipsa loquitor can be applied. It was observed:- “29. However, where the facts of the accident are such that the accident could not have been caused except for the negligence of the accused, the principle of res ipsa loquitor can be applied. It was observed:- “29. However, shorn of its doctrinaire features, understood in the broad, general sense, as by the other line of decisions, only as a convenient ratiocinative aid in the assessment of evidence, in drawing permissive inferences under S. 114, Evidence Act, from the circumstances of the particular case, including the constituent circumstances of the accident, established in evidence, with a view to come to a conclusion at the time of judgment, whether or not, in favour of the alleged negligence (among other ingredients of the offence with which the accused stands charged), such a high degree of probability, as distinguished from a mere possibility has been established which will convince reasonable men with regard to the existence of that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Such harnessed, functional use of the maxim will not conflict with provisions and the principles of the Evidence Act relating to the burden of proof and other cognate matters peculiar to criminal jurisprudence. 30. Such simplified and pragmatic application of the notion of res ipsa loquitur, as a part of the general mode of inferring a fact in issue from another circumstantial fact, is subject to all the principles, the satisfaction of which is essential before an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. There are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the accident, from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, the circumstances should make a chain so complete that they cannot reasonably raise any other hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt. That is to say, they should be incompatible with his innocence, and inferentially exclude all reasonable doubt about his guilt. 20. In Keshavamurthy versus State 2002 Cri. L.J 103, a car left the road and hit a tree. It was held that the accident prima facie showed that the driver was negligent, and he had to explain the circumstances leading to the accident. 20. In Keshavamurthy versus State 2002 Cri. L.J 103, a car left the road and hit a tree. It was held that the accident prima facie showed that the driver was negligent, and he had to explain the circumstances leading to the accident. It was observed: - “It could therefore be seen that, at about 1.00 a.m. in the night, on a road of a total width of 19ft with 6ft kacha road on either side, with no other vehicles in the area, the car hits the roadside tree. As the Supreme Court points out in Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2000 (3) Crimes 119 (2000 Cri LJ 3508 (SC)), an accident of such a nature would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case, the driver has to explain how the accident was for a reason other than his negligence. This is what the Supreme Court states in paragraph6 of the judgment:- "It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident, negligence of the driver should be presumed. An accident of such a nature as would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted to anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case, the driver has to explain how the accident happened without negligence on his part." In light of this ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court, the facts of the present case could be seen. Here is a car proceeding from Bangalore to Shimoga. At the place concerned, there are no other vehicles on the road. There is no obstruction. The road is of a width of 19 ft. of cement and tar road, with 6 ft. kacha road on either side. Still, the vehicle hits a roadside tree. Added to that, there is a report of IMV Inspector at Ex.P5 to the effect that the accident is not due to any mechanical defect in the vehicle. In such a situation, an accident of this nature would prima facie show that the same could not be accounted for anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle, i.e., the petitioner. A presumption in that regard thus arises. In such a situation, an accident of this nature would prima facie show that the same could not be accounted for anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle, i.e., the petitioner. A presumption in that regard thus arises. In such a case, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, it was for the petitioner driver to explain how the accident occurred without negligence on his part. What the petitioner has done in the course of his examination under S.313 Cr. P.C. is simply denying everything. He does not say anything, and even to the general question that is asked at the end as to whether he has got anything to say, he did not choose to say anything, nor did he care to explain the manner in which the accident occurred, i.e., in order to rebut the above said presumption as regards the accident occurring due to his negligence, and in order to show that accident occurred for a particular reason not attributable to his negligence. This was, therefore, an appropriate case wherein, on the basis of a presumption that the Supreme Court was speaking about a conviction that could be based on. 21. In Thakur Singh versus State of Punjab (2003) 9 SCC 208 , the accused admitted that he was driving the bus, which left the road and fell into the canal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the principle of res ipsa loquitur will apply and the burden will shift upon the accused to explain how the accident had taken place. It was observed:- “4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge, and then it fell into the canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part.” 22. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part.” 22. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, where the facts speak for themselves and there can be no explanation for the accident except the negligence of the accused, the Court can apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur, and the burden will shift upon the accused to show how the accident took place. 23. Yog Raj (PW-2) stated that there was snow and the vehicle skidded off the road. There was no negligence of any person. Rajesh Rekta (PW-7) stated in his examination-in- chief that there was heavy fog or snowfall. Hence, the vehicle left the road and fell into the gorge. Both the witnesses contradicted their previous statements recorded by the police, wherein they had stated that the accident occurred due to high speed and negligence of the accused. These statements were proved by HC Dula Ram (PW-10) to have been recorded as per their versions. Thus, the witnesses are shown to have made two inconsistent statements, one before the Court that the accident occurred due to the fog and the snow and another before the police that the accident had occurred due to the high speed and negligence of the accused. Both these statements cannot stand together, and the credibility of these witnesses has been impeached. 24. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” 25. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:- “12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court observed: "It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony". 26. In the present case, the credibility of the witnesses Yog Raj (PW-2) and Rajesh Rekta (PW-7) were impeached with reference to their previous statement, and no reliance can be placed on their statements in the Court that the accident occurred due to the fog and snowfall. 27. Learned Trial Court had rightly noticed that the snow was not visible in the photographs (Ext.PW-11/A to Ext.PW-11/C), which falsified the statements of Yog Raj (PW- 2) and Rajesh Rekta (PW-7) regarding the snowfall. 28. 27. Learned Trial Court had rightly noticed that the snow was not visible in the photographs (Ext.PW-11/A to Ext.PW-11/C), which falsified the statements of Yog Raj (PW- 2) and Rajesh Rekta (PW-7) regarding the snowfall. 28. Gian Chand (PW-1) stated in his cross- examination that the weather was inclement on the date of the incident, but he did not state that there was snow.Kuldeep Thakur (PW-12) stated in his cross-examination that he was not aware that snow had fallen on the date of the incident. HC Gian Singh (PW-8) denied in his cross-examination that there was snowfall on the date of the accident. HC Dula Ram (PW-10) and Tara Chand (PW-11) were not asked any questions regarding snowfall. The accused has also not stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that there was a snowfall and the vehicle skidded off the road because of snowfall. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly discarded this version. 29. Thus, the accused has failed to rebut the presumption arising out of the accident by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur,and he was held rightly guilty of driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. 30. Dr Krishan Anand (PW-3) conducted the medical examination of the injured. He found simple injuries on the person of Yog Raj and Rajesh Rekta.He found simple and grievous injuries on the person of the accused and Surinder Kumar. This part of his testimony was not challenged in the cross-examination, and he was only cross-examined regarding the taking of blood and urine samples of the accused. Hence, it was duly proved by the testimony of Dr Krishan Anand (PW-3) that Surinder Kumar had sustained grievous injuries, whereas Yog Raj and Rajesh Rekta had sustained simple injuries. These injuries were sustained in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligent driving of the accused. Therefore, the accused was rightly held guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 337 and 338 of the IPC. 31. Dr Krishan Anand (PW-3) stated in his cross- examination that he had taken the blood sample of Om Parkash. HC Kuldeep Singh (PW-9) stated that blood and urine sample were deposited with him, and he sent them to FSL, Bharari, through Constable Raj Kumar (PW-6). Constable Raj Kumar (PW-6) stated that he deposited the sample at FSL Bharari in safe condition. HC Kuldeep Singh (PW-9) stated that blood and urine sample were deposited with him, and he sent them to FSL, Bharari, through Constable Raj Kumar (PW-6). Constable Raj Kumar (PW-6) stated that he deposited the sample at FSL Bharari in safe condition. Their statements are corroborated by the report of the analysis (Ext.PZA), in which it was mentioned that two samples bearing the sample impression CMOS were received through Constable Raj Kumar. The seals were intact and tallied with the specimen seal sent separately. This establishes the integrity of the case property. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P. 2007 HLJ 707, that where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, the case of prosecution that the case property remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed: “A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner, and the sample seal was separately sent, tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.” 32. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557 , wherein it was held: “It has also come to evidence that to date, the parcels of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, and the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves and establishes that there was no tampering with the previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and the sample received by the analyst for chemical examination contained the same opium, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to the appellant.” 33. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402 , the High Court had concluded that there could have been tampering with the case property because there was a delay of seven days in sending the samples to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after taking samples therefrom, which were properly sealed. The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure and seal put on the samples were in any manner tampered with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the case property might have been tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot take the place of proof. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557 in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the samples were intact till they were handed over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal to the prosecution’s case. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case in this regard. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with. 34. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was held: - “10. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with. 34. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was held: - “10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), handed over the case property for producing the same before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after such production was not examined, as such, the link evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13. The concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar, till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. 11. Further, he has returned the case property, after production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex. P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. Therefore, the integrity of the case property was established. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex. P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. Therefore, the integrity of the case property was established. The report of analysis states the blood sample of the accused had 66.2 mg percent of proof alcohol. Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the accused was driving the vehicle with 66.2 mg percent proof alcohol. 36. Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that whoever, while driving a vehicle, has in his blood alcohol exceeding 30 mg per 100 ml of the blood shall be punished. In the present case, the accused had 66.2 mg percent of proof alcohol. Therefore, he had violated Section 185 of the M.V. Act, and he was rightly held guilty for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 185 of the M.V. Act. 37. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for three months for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC each and six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 338 of IPC. 38. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused, and the learned Courts below failed to consider this aspect. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road acci- dents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the of- fence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 39. A similar view was taken in Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208 , wherein it was observed:- 6. Learned counsel lastly made an alternative plea that the Probation of Offenders Act may be applied to secure his job. This Court has held inDalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 ] that the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked in cases involving rash or negligent driving of the bus resulting in death of human beings.” 40. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: - 13.It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh[ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 41. It was laid down in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, that a deterrent sentence has to be awarded to a person convicted of negligent driving. It was observed at page 196: “25.Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. It was observed at page 196: “25.Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 42. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and a deterrent sentence was to be imposed. 43. The maximum sentence of six months imposed by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be excessive, keeping in view that the deterrent sentence has to be imposed in cases involving motor vehicle accidents. Hence, no interference is required with it. 44. No other point was urged. 45. In view of the above, the present revision fails and it is dismissed, so also the pending application, if any. 46. The records of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of this judgment for the information.