APHC010514672024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3506] TUESDAY, THE TWELFTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 858/2024 Between: 1. DINTYALA SATYA RAJESWARI, W/O LATE SARVESWARASARMA, HINDU, FEMALE, 43 YEARS. HOUSEWIFE, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT 2. DINTYALA KRISHNA BRAMARAMBIKA, D/O LATE SARWESWARASARMA, HINDU, FEMALE, 24 YEARS, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. 3. DINTYALA SIMHADRI APPANNA SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI, S/O. LATE SARWESWARASARMA, HINDU, MALE, 21 YEARS. STUDENT, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI. 4. DINTYALA SEETHA MAHALAKSHMI, W/O BHIMANNASASTRI, HINDU, FEMALE, 70 YEARS. HOUSEWIFE, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. 5. DINTYALABHIMANNASASTRI, S/O SARWESWARASASTRI HINDU, MALE, 72 YEARS. DEPENDENT, ELURU WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. ...APPELLANT(S) AND 2 1. NUTIKURTHI SRINIVAS, S/O VEERASWAMY, HINDU, MALE, AGE NOT KNOWN DRIVER OF AUTO BEARING NO.AP 37 TA 4823, D.NO.8-112, KOTHA PET, GUMMALURU VILLAGE OF PODURU MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT 2. NUTIKURTHI LAKSHMI, W/O VEERASWAMY, HINDU, FEMALE, AGE NOT KNOWN. OWNER OF AUTO BEARING NO.AP 37 TA4823, D.NO.8-112, KOTHA PET, GUMMALURU VILLAGE OF PODURU MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT 3. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNIVERSAL. SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED DIVISIONAL OFFICE, 2ND FLOOR, D.NO.39-10-19, VETERINARY HOSPITAL ROAD, OPP ACP OFFICE, LABBIPET, VIJAYAWADA. ...RESPONDENT(S): Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be pleased toAggrieved by the order and Decree passed in MVO.P.No.817 of 2012 on the Court of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Cum I Addl. District Judge Eluru dt 10- 06-2015 IA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to condone the delay of 3347days in filing the MACMA against MVO.P.No.817 of 2012 on the Court of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal -Cum I ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ELURU dt 10 June 2015 and pass IA NO: 2 OF 2024 3 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to declare us as Majors by discharging my mother from guardianship in MACMA.No. of 2024 against MVO.P.No.817 of 2012 on the Court of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal -Cum-I Addl. District Judge Eluru dt: 10-06-2015 pending disposal of the above MACMA, and pass IA NO: 3 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to discharge the 1st petitioner from guardianship in the above MACMA since the petitioners /appellants 2 and 3 became majors and pass Counsel for the Appellant(S): 1. CHAKRADHARA RAJA Y Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. 4 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN I.A.No.1 OF 2024 IN/AND M.A.C.M.A.NO: 858/2024 COMMON JUDGMENT: Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. Notice taken out to respondent No.1 is returned unserved with endorsement “addressee left”. As the same has been taken out on the address as mentioned before the Tribunal, the service is complete. 3. Notices taken out to respondent Nos.2 & 3 are served. However, none appears for them. 4. I.A.No.1 of 2024 is filed seeking to condone the delay of 3347 days in filing the appeal against the order dated 10.06.2015 passed in M.V.O.P.No.817 of 2012 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-I Additional District Judge, Eluru, West Godavari District. 5. Petitioners herein are claimants and have instituted the aforesaid MVOP under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, 5 claiming compensation of Rs. 6,00,000/-. After contesting, the Tribunal ultimately awarded compensation of Rs. 7,82,500/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till realization. However, liability was fixed only on the driver and owner of the offending vehicle, and the insurer was exonerated. Assailing the said order, Appellants have preferred present appeal. 6. There is considerable delay of 3349 days in filing the appeal. The reasons set out in the affidavit filed in support of I.A, in particular, Para-5, reads as follows: “I submit that I have received the certified copy of the order on 31.08.2017 and the order copies were misplaced and again I applied on 26.03.2021 and I received on 31.03.2021, due to corona pandemic I could not approach the advocate I have approached my counsel during last week of July 2024. I further stated that I am a housewife and my father-in-law was deceased after death of my husband and me along with my daughters and my mother-in-law are staying alone and we don’t have any family support and due to death of my husband we suffered mental agony and unable to come out to look after the affairs and we also lost only earning member of our family and due to the above said reasons I could not file the appeal within time. In the meanwhile the limitation in filing the appeal is expired. In this process there is a delay of 3347 days in filing appeal, the said delay is neither willful nor wanton except for the reasons as explained above, unless this Hon’ble Court condone the said delay, the appellant will suffer irreparable loss and hardship. I submit that my case was genuine and entitled to get compensation on account of death of my husband.” 7. Learned counsel for the appellants, while reiterating the reasons mentioned above, urged that by taking a lenient view the 6 delay be condoned, having regard to the illiteracy and financial difficulties of the claimants. 8. No doubt, while exercising the discretionary powers of this Court for considering petition filed under Section 5 of limitation Act for the purpose of condoning the delay, to meet ends of justice, a liberal approach to be adopted. However, in the present case, there is abnormal delay of 3,349 days i.e., nearly ten years. The reasons set out are very vague and do not show bona fides on the part of the appellants to be diligent in pursuing the matter. The Tribunal has allowed the claim by order dated 10.06.2015, however, certified copy was stated to have been applied for and received on 31.08.2017 initially, and as the same came to be misplaced, another copy was applied for and received on 31.03.2021. 9. It is stated that due to Covid-19, they could not contact the counsel for filing appeal and only last week of July 2024 they could contact the counsel, but thereafter preferred appeal on 15.11.2024. When they could obtain certified copies for the second time on 31.03.2021, no reasons are forthcoming as to why they remained quiet till July 2025, except for stating that due 7 to Covid-19 they could not contact the counsel for filing appeal, which does not appear to be justifiable. If they had all means to apply for and secure the certified copy, nothing prevented them to take immediate steps to file appeal. The reasons for delay therefore, do not show that there was sufficient cause preventing them in preferring appeal on time. They were clearly negligent in taking steps. 10. The Hon’ble Apex court, while dealing with the aspect of condoning delay, recently in the judgment of Pathapati Subba Reddy and Others v. Special Deputy Collector and Others1 held as follows at paragraph No.26: “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of 1 2024 SCC Online SC 513 8 substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (Vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 11. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary 2 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows at paragraph Nos. 6 and 7: “6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. 2 2024 SCC Online SC 3612 9 Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495: AIR 1981SC 733).” 12. In Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran and another3, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows at paragraph Nos.31 and 32: “31. It is a well-stated law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause 3 2025 SCC online SC 1093 10 or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasized in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet.” 13. In view of the above principles, as the facts of the present case do not indicate that the appellants have bona fidely pursued the appeal and as it is evident that they have shown clear negligence, this Court is not inclined to exercise the discretionary power in condoning the delay. Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2024 stands dismissed. Consequently, the Motor Accident Civil Miscellaneous Appeal also stands rejected. No costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. _____________________________ JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN Date: 12.08.2025 ANS 11 225 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 858/2024