( 2025:HHC:36636 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 2479 of 2025 Reserved on: 30.10.2025 Date of Decision: 03.11.2025. Vipin Singh ...Petitioner versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Lovneesh Kanwar, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Ritesh Bhardwaj, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, assisted by H.C. Manoj Kumar No.50, I/o PS Sainj, District Kullu (H.P). Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 15 of 2023, dated 03.03.2023, registered at Police Station Sainj, District Kullu (HP), for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as “NDPS Act”). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police party was checking the vehicles on 02.03.2023 at Dhaman Bridge. The police stopped the vehicle bearing registration No. HP01K-7535, at about 09.45 PM. The driver tried to conceal something with his legs after seeing the police. The police checked the bag in the presence of two independent witnesses and recovered black sticks, balls and rectangles wrapped with transparent tape, which were found to be cannabis. The police arrested the driver and seized the cannabis. The petitioner has earlier filed Cr. MP(M) No. 2872 of 2023, Cr. MP(M) No. 176 of 2024, Cr. MP(M) No.1488 of 2024, Cr. MP(M) No. 2772 of 2024, Cr. MP(M) No. 782 of 2025 and Cr. MP(M) No. 2062 of 2025 which was dismissed on 06.12.2023, 29.02.2024, 24.07.2024, 13.12.2024, 20.06.2025 and 09.09.2025 respectively. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The petitioner is in judicial custody, and there is a delay in the progress of the trial. The petitioner is a permanent resident of Tehsil Banjar, District Kullu (HP), and there is no likelihood of his absconding. He would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence the petition. 3 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) 3. The State has filed a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 02.03.2023. They intercepted a vehicle bearing registration no. HP01K-7535. They searched the vehicle and recovered 2 kg 603 grams of Charas during the search. The driver of the vehicle revealed his name as Sanju. The police arrested the driver. Sanju made a disclosure statement that Charas was given to him by one Vipin Singh (present petitioner). He could identify the place where the Charas was handed over. The police checked the mobile phone of Sanju and found that the petitioner had talked to Sanju six times. He had also paid the money to the petitioner. Sanju identified the place where Charas was handed over to him. As per the report of the analysis, the substance was found to be Charas, having 30.14% w/w in it. Sonu Devi and Kirna Devi made statements that they had handed over the SIMs to Sanju and the petitioner. There is sufficient material to connect the petitioner with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) read with Section 29 of the ND&PS Act, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to his case. He has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the ND&PS Act. A charge sheet was filed before the Court after 4 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) the completion of the investigation. The police have cited 26 witnesses, out of whom 09 witnesses have been examined. The matter is listed before the learned Trial Court on 16.12.2025 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Lovneesh Kanwar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Ritesh Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Loveneesh Kanwar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. There is a delay in the progress of the trial, which is evident from the copies of the order sheets. The petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. The petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Saurav Negi vs. State of HP, 2025:HHC:2762, in support of his submission. 5 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner abetted the possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner had filed the bail petitions earlier, which were dismissed by this Court. The present petition only lies on the change in the circumstances, and there is no change in the circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed various bail petitions before this Court, which were dismissed by the Court. It was held in State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a 6 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 7 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: 30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: 8 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) 7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 9 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered based on the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court. 14. This Court had concluded while deciding the earlier bail petitions that there was sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of crime. It is impermissible to review the findings recorded by the Court and to hold that there is insufficient material to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime. 15. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1520: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070 that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It was observed at page 676: 8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this 10 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments. 16. Thus, the submission that the petitioner is not involved in the commission of any offence cannot be accepted in the present bail petition. 17. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, which violates the right of the petitioner to a speedy trial. This submission is not acceptable. The charges were framed on 07.12.2023. Statement of one witness each was recorded on 04.05.2024 and 27.12.2024. Statements of two witnesses each were recorded on 17.05.2024 and 09.08.2024. Statements of three witnesses were recorded on 17.05.2025. Thus, the statements of nine witnesses have been recorded within 1½ years. The matter has been listed for recording the prosecution witnesses, and it cannot be said that there is any violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. In Saurav Negi (supra), the Court had found that the learned Public Prosecutor had insisted that the witnesses mentioned at Serial no. 1 to 4 be summoned first, and no witness was examined. Thus, the facts in Saurav Negi (supra) were different, and the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 11 ( 2025:HHC:36636 ) 18. The petitioner is involved in the abetment of the possession of 2 kg and 603 Grams of charas, which is a huge quantity. Keeping in view the adverse impact of the charas on society, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail. 19. No other point was urged. 20. In view of the above, the present petition fails and it is dismissed. 21. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 03rd November 2025 (Shamsh Tabrez)