[2025:RJ-JP:1033-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18809/2024 Ghisa Lal Kaloya S/o Late Shri Prem Raj Kaloya, R/o 251, Vivek Vihar New, Sanaganer Road Jaipur (Rjs, Retired Civil Judge (Sd) And Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate) ----Petitioner Versus Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Its Registrar General ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vinod Kumar Mathur with Mr. Rahul Ghiya For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vishnu Kant Sharma HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UMA SHANKER VYAS Order 08/01/2025 1. Mr. Vishnu Kant Sharma, learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondent on advance copy. 2. Heard. 3. The petitioner, who is a retired Judicial Officer, has prayed for following reliefs:- “a) By an appropriate writ, order and direction in the nature thereof the action of the Respondent of not promoting the petitioner to RHJS Cadre from 4.4.2002 when junior officers were promoted and Order dated 14.6.2024 & 14.8.2024 may kindly be quashed and set aside. b) By an appropriate writ order and direction in the nature thereof the respondent may kindly be directed to consider the exoneration of the petitioner vide Order dated 24.9.2002 and 19.7.2003 as if the petitioner was never charge sheeted and to promote the petitioner to RHJS Cadre in terms of Promotion Order dated 4.4.2002 when junior officers have been promoted to RHJS Cadre. The respondents may kindly be further directed to give notional to promotion to the petitioner to RHJS Cadre till retirement and accordingly to calculate post retirement [2025:RJ-JP:1033-DB] (2 of 4) [CW-18809/2024] benefits and pay arrear from date of retirement to the date of actual payment along with 18% interest. c) Any other order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper be also passed in favour of the petitioners. d) Cost of the writ petition may be awarded to the petitioners.” 4. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the main operative reason for supersession of the petitioner and promotion of his junior vide order dated 04.04.2002 was two pending enquiries which eventually culminated in his exoneration vide order dated 24.09.2002 and 19.07.2003. In the meantime, the petitioner retired on 31.08.2002. 5. In the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner’s cause of action arose to challenge the supersession only after his retirement on account of his exoneration and that cause of action of supersession is a continuing cause of action and, therefore, he could file the petition anytime. In the alternative, it is submitted that though the petition has been filed after some delay, the petitioner has stated in the petition that he was suffering from heart ailment and, therefore, he could not immediately approach the Court of law. In support of the submission, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M. R. Gupta Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 669 and Division Bench order of this Court dated 05.05.2022 passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.562/2022-Mohan Singh Panwar Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. [2025:RJ-JP:1033-DB] (3 of 4) [CW-18809/2024] 6. The petitioner was superceded on 04.04.2002 presumably because of the two enquiries pending against him. He suffered supersession when the officer junior to him was promoted on 04.04.2002. Indisputably, the two departmental enquiries were finally closed vide order dated 24.09.2002 and 19.07.2003. The petitioner’s grievance is that after the order having been passed in the departmental enquiries, his case was liable to be considered as on the date when his junior was promoted prior to his retirement. The issue arose as soon as two departmental enquiries came to an end i.e. in 2002 and 2003. There is nothing in the petition which shows that any other proceeding was pending in any other Fora and after rejection of his claim, the petitioner approached this Court only in the year 2024 by filing the instant petition. 7. The position of fact, as stands today, is that the petitioner has approached this Court after more than two decades challenging the supersession and claiming other consequential reliefs. In the considered opinion of this Court, the petition suffers from gross delay and latches. 8. The decision in the case of M. R. Gupta Vs. Union of India (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is completely distinguishable on fact as it related to fixation of initial pay and in the context of the same, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that right of a Government servant to be paid the correct salary throughout his tenure according to computation made in accordance with rules, is akin to the right of redemption which is an incident of a subsisting mortgage and subsists so long as the [2025:RJ-JP:1033-DB] (4 of 4) [CW-18809/2024] mortgage itself subsists, unless the equity of redemption is extinguished. 9. The other decision in the case of Mohan Singh Panwar Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra), is also distinguishable on fact. In that case, this Court found that when the order for grant of selection scale was passed on 13.12.2011, the respondents therein denied the benefit of continuity of service which was assured under the agreement dated 02.09.1998. It gave rise to cause of action for the appellant to file the petition in the year 2013. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent has rightly placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 2271. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken into consideration the aspect of delay. It was held that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. 11. True it is that in the present case, the cause of action arose only when the order was passed in the two departmental enquiries but even thereafter, the petitioner failed to approach this Court within reasonable time. 12. Therefore, this petition suffers from gross delay and latches and is, accordingly, dismissed only on the ground of delay and latches. Pending application, if any, also stands dismissed. (UMA SHANKER VYAS),J (MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA),CJ KAMLESH KUMAR-RAHUL/35