APHC010512392009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3369] WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTIETH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1420/2009 Between: 1. THE STATE OF A.P., REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD. ...APPELLANT AND 1. ANDI VELU, S/o. A. GOVINDASWAMY @ GOVINDASWAMY REDDY, MITTA KANDRIGA VILLAGE, SRIKALAHASTI, CHITTOOR DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal against the judgment in S.C. No. 302 of 2007 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikalahasti, dated 4th day of January, 2008 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the judgment of acquittal and convict the accused (Respondents) for the offences with which he was charged. IA NO: 1 OF 2009(CRLAMP 582 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of "329 days" in presenting the appeal against the order of acquittal of the accused/respondent in S.C. No. 302/2007 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikalahasti dated 4.1.2008. Counsel for the Appellant: 2 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) Counsel for the Respondent: 1. T C KRISHNAN The Court made the following: J U D G M E N T 1. This appeal is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.302 of 2007 on the file of Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikalahasti, (for short, ‘the trial Court’) vide judgment dated 04.01.2008, whereby the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the Respondent / Accused for the offences punishable under sections 498-A and 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act (for short, ‘D.P. Act’). 2. Heard learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the Appellant / State and the learned counsel for the Respondent / Accused. 3. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence from PWs.1 to 8 and documents marked as Exs.P.1 to P.7. No oral or documentary evidence was marked on behalf of the Respondent/Accused. 4. The brief facts of the prosecution case, are as follows: (a) The accused and P.W.1, Sarada, are residents of Mitta Kanriga Village, Srikalahasti. P.W.2, Pushpamma, is the mother of P.W.1. On 10.03.2005, P.W.1 married the accused at Srikalahasti Town. At the time of marriage, P.W.2 allegedly gave the accused a gold chain (3 sovereigns), bangles (2 sovereigns), a red stone gold ring, two pairs of ear studs, other gold ornaments, Rs.50,000/- in cash, and a motorcycle worth Rs.36,000/- as dowry. The couple lived happily for two months. Thereafter, the accused reportedly developed an illicit relationship with one Bharathi of Panagal, began 3 staying at her house, and started harassing P.W.1, demanding additional dowry. When confronted, he assaulted and ill-treated her. (b) It is further alleged that the accused attempted to murder P.W.1 by tying a saree around her neck and hanging her from a ceiling fan. Upon hearing her cries, P.W.2 intervened and rescued her. P.W.1 then complained with the police and also filed a private complaint before the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Srikalahasti. The learned Magistrate forwarded the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and directed the Station House Officer to register and investigate the case. Accordingly, the case was registered as Crime No. 56 of 2006 for the offences stated supra. 5. After laying the Charge Sheet by the Investigating Officer, the committal Court passed an order under Section 209(a) of Cr.P.C., following the provisions of Sections 207 and 208 Cr.P.C. The case is committed to the Court of Sessions. Subsequently, the case in Sessions Case No.302 of 2007 has been numbered. After hearing the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, the trial court framed the charges against the accused, punishable under Sections 498-A and 307 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. The accused did not plead guilty but claimed to be tried. 6. The learned Sessions Judge examined the accused as required under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., to enable him to consider the evidence that had been led on the part of the prosecution and also appeared against him. The accused denied the entire prosecution evidence and reported that he had no defence witnesses to be examined. 7. After considering the available material on record, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 307 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act and acquitted him. 4 8. I have examined the oral and documentary evidence produced on the record by the prosecution before the learned Sessions Judge. 9. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, representing the State, contends that the learned Sessions Judge failed to appreciate the evidence on record properly. It is argued that the prosecution established the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 307 of the IPC, as well as Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The testimonies of P.Ws.1 and 2 are consistent and credible regarding the demand for additional dowry and the physical and mental harassment of the complainant. However, the Sessions Judge did not assess the prosecution's evidence in its proper perspective, and the reasons given for acquitting the accused are legally unsustainable. 10. The point for determination is: Was the Sessions Court justified in acquitting the accused? P O I N T: 11. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1, at paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows: "26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the appellate Court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the judgment of acquittal of the Court below if the findings so recorded by the Court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the Court below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate Court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that acquittal by the Court below bolsters the presumption of his innocence." 1 (2011) 6 SCC 279 5 12. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the power of appellate Court to interfere in an appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point, has concluded as under: "16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with." 13. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court is not warranted. However, the appeal is heard by an appellate court, which is the final Court of fact. In that case, it is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power, and the appellate Court is free to arrive at its conclusion, keeping in mind that acquittal provides for a presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence applies to every person, and in criminal jurisprudence, every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty by a competent court. If two reasonable views are possible based on the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate Court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its conclusion. The appellate Court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court concerning both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, the 2 (2007) 3 SCC 755 6 appellate Court must marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. 14. With the above principles in mind, this Court analyse the reasoning and ultimate conclusion of the Sessions Court in interfering with the order of acquittal. 15. The prosecution primarily relied on the testimony of PW.1, A. Sarada, who claims to be the wife of the accused, and PW.2 P. Pushpamma, the mother of P.W.1, to establish its case. In support, the prosecution also examined PW.3 (P. Mani), PW.4 (P. Vasanthama) and PW.5 (M. Changalraya Reddy) and PW.6 (P. Govinda Reddy) as independent witnesses. However, PWs.3 to 6 did not support the prosecution's version and, during their depositions, stated that they did not know about the incident. Additionally, PW.7 (V. Krishnappa) and PW.8 (S.M. Ramesh Babu) were examined to substantiate the investigation carried out by them. 16. The Sessions Court observed that PWs.1 and 2 are interested witnesses, and any independent evidence did not corroborate their testimony. The Trial Court further noted material inconsistencies between the depositions of P.W.1 and P.W.2. Upon analyzing their respective statements, the Court found that PW.1 claimed her parents had paid a dowry of Rs.50,000/- to the accused at the time of her marriage. In contrast, PW.2, her mother, deposed that only Rs.5,000/- had been given as dowry. Furthermore, according to the contents of Ex.P1 report, it was alleged that a substantial amount of jewellery had also been given to the accused; however, no specific details regarding such jewellery were furnished in the said report. 17. In her testimony, PW.1 stated that she had confronted the accused regarding his alleged illicit relationship with a woman named Bharathi. She 7 further alleged that the accused frequently assaulted her and threatened to hang her from the ceiling fan. However, the Trial Court observed that none of these serious allegations were mentioned in the Ex.P1 report. The Court reasoned that, had such incidents occurred, it is improbable that P.W.1 would have omitted them from her initial complaint. Moreover, no explanation was provided for the discrepancy between the testimonies of PWs.1 and 2 regarding the amount of dowry allegedly paid. If dowry had indeed been given, such a substantial inconsistency in their accounts would be unlikely. 18. In Shashidhar Purandhar Hegde V. State of Karnataka3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 12. The word "contradiction" is of a wide connotation which takes within its ambit all material omissions, and under the circumstances of a case, a court can decide whether there is one such omission as to amount to contradiction. 19. It is a well-settled legal proposition that, when evaluating the evidence, the Court must consider whether the contradictions/omissions were of such magnitude as to materially affect the trial. In S. Govidaraju vs. State of Karnataka 4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, and the other witnesses also make material improvements before the Court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon such evidence. 20. The Trial Court further noted that PWs.1 and 2 failed to provide specific details regarding the jewellery allegedly given, including in the Ex.P1 report. In view of these discrepancies and inconsistencies in their evidence, coupled with the absence of corroboration from any independent witnesses, the Trial Court found their version to be unreliable. Consequently, the Trial Court rightly acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 307 of the IPC, as well as Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. 3 (2004) 12 SCC 492 4 MANU/SC/0839/2013 8 21. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of Karnataka5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section 378 of the Code as under: "Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the Court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having seen the witnesses. 22. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is well defined by now by series of decisions, and the same is not to be repeated time and again; however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh V. Sheeshpal6, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of decisions in which this Court is of the considered opinion that State has not made out any case which would permit this Court to exercise such wide powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on the part of learned judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been rightly undertaken by the Court below and therefore when such eventuality is reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of 5 2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184 6 (2017) CriLJ 169 9 the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein after: "10. The above principle has been reiterated by this Court in a number of judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal. 11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the accused should be adopted. 23. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out no case to establish a definite guilt of the respondents / accused. 24. It is a settled principle of law that if the trial court takes the view, it should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The trial court's view is a plausible one. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to reverse the trial court's finding. 25. The Trial Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or misinterpretation by the Trial Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no flaw in the findings of fact by the Trial Court. Therefore, the acquittal of the respondent cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed, and there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the point is answered. 10 26. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal No.1420 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikalahasti, in Sessions Case No. 302 of 2007, dated 04.01.2008, stands confirmed. Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. ____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 20.08.2025 MS 11 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1420 of 2009 Date:20.08.2025 MS