2025:HHC:33888 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 467 of 2021 Reserved on: 16.9.2025 Date of Decision: 07.10.2025. Sanjay Chottani ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : M/s Rajesh Batra, Sonia Khurana and Janesh Mahajan, Advocates. For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for setting aside the orders dated 20.4.2020 and 31.3.2021 and quashing the complaint and consequent proceedings arising out of the same. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:33888 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that complainant-Labour Inspector, Talhiwal, District Una, H.P. filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court under Sections 62, 51, 54, 56 and 79 of the Factories Act, read with Rules 80 and 88 of the Himachal Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950. It was asserted that the Labour Officer and Labour Inspector inspected the establishment on 27.11.2019. They found that the names and other particulars of contractual workers were not entered in the adult workers register, weekly hours of the workers were not being observed, workers were working for more than nine hours, and annual leave with wages was not allowed/added. A show cause notice was issued for rectification, but the Employer/Occupier/Factory Manager failed to produce any authentic record or the register. Therefore, the complaint was filed to take action as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court ordered issuance of summons vide order dated 31.3.2021. 4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint and issuance of notice, the present petition has been filed taking various pleas; however, Mr Rajesh Batra, learned counsel for the 3 2025:HHC:33888 petitioner, submitted that he would confine his arguments to the question of limitation alone. Hence, only a plea of limitation is being noticed. It has been asserted that the complainant visited the premises on 27.11.2019. He filed a complaint on 20.4.2020. The complaint is required to be filed within three months under Section 106 of the Factories Act. Learned Trial Court erred in taking cognisance beyond the period of limitation. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the complaint and the consequential proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. 5. I have heard M/s Rajesh Batra, Sonia Khurana and Janesh Mahajan, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 6. Mr Rajesh Batra, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the inspection was carried out on 27.11.2019 and the complaint was filed on 20.4.2020, beyond the period of three months prescribed under Section 106 of the Factories Act. The proceedings could not have been initiated after the period of limitation. Therefore, he prayed that the present 4 2025:HHC:33888 petition be allowed and the complaint and the consequential proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. 7. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the complainant had issued a notice to the accused asking them to rectify the deficiencies noticed by the complainant. The period of limitation would start running from the date of the notice and would be six months, and not three months. The complaint was within the period of limitation. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: 5 2025:HHC:33888 “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 6 2025:HHC:33888 (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal 7 2025:HHC:33888 proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 8 2025:HHC:33888 12. It was specifically mentioned in the complaint that the complainant visited the factory premises on 27.11.2019. The petitioner asserted in paragraph 3 of the petition that the complaint was filed on 20.4.2020. The State contended that the petitioner mentioned a wrong date of filing, and the complaint was filed on 27.2.2020. The record of the learned Trial Court shows that the complaint was filed on 31.3.2021. Thus, there is a discrepancy in the date of filing of the petition. 13. The State applied to the learned Trial Court for rectification of the date of the filing of the application. The Learned Trial Court held that the Case Information Software mentioned the date of registration of the complaint as 13.3.2020. Hence, the contention of the petitioner/accused that the complaint was filed on 20.4.2020 was not correct. The date 20.4.2020, as mentioned in the file, was a clerical error, or it was a date when the file was put up before the Court. Hence, it was clarified that the date of filing of the petition is 13.3.2020. 14. Therefore, the plea taken by the State that the complaint was filed on 27.2.2020 was not accepted by the learned 9 2025:HHC:33888 Trial Court. Learned Trial Court held the date of filing of the complaint was 13.3.2020. 15. Section 106 of the Factories Act provides a limitation of three months for filing the complaint. It reads as follows: “106. Limitations of prosecutions. No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector: Provided that where the offence consists of disobeying a written order made by an Inspector, complaint thereof may be made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. 2 Explanation. — For the purposes of this section, — (a) in the case of a continuing offence, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time during which the offence continues; (b) where, for the performance of any act, time is granted or extended on an application made by the occupier or manager of a factory, the period of limitation shall be computed from the date on which the time so granted or extended expired.” 16. In the present case, the inspection was carried out on 27.11.2019, and the period of three months had expired on 26.2.2020. The complaint filed before the Court on 13.3.2020 was beyond the period of three months prescribed under Section 106 of the Factories Act. 10 2025:HHC:33888 17. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.D. Jambekar v. State of Gujarat, (1973) 3 SCC 524: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1088: 1973 SCC (L&S) 162: 1972 SCC OnLine SC 489, that the period of three months prescribed under Section 106 would apply from the date of the knowledge of the commission of the offence and the complaint has to be filed within three months. It was observed at page 526: - “6. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that when the report conveyed the information about the accident, the Inspector should have enquired into it with reasonable promptness and as Section 106 prescribes a period of only three months, from the date of the knowledge of the commission of the offence for filing a complaint the Inspector ought not have waited for a period of 6 months for making the inquiry. It was argued that if an Inspector were to come to know of an accident, he cannot wait till such time as he chooses to make the inquiry and then say that he came to know of the commission of an offence under the Act as a result of the inquiry and thus postpone at his whim the starting point of limitation. There can be no doubt that if the Inspector had conducted the inquiry earlier, he would have come to know of the commission of the offence earlier. But our attention was not drawn to any provision in the Act or the rules framed under the Act which obliged the Inspector to conduct an inquiry within any specified period after the receipt of the report into the cause of the accident. And in interpreting a provision in a statute prescribing a period of limitation of a proceeding, questions of equity and hardship are out of place. See the decisions of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chandra [AIR 1932 PC 165: ILR (1932) 60 Cal 1 (PC): 137 IC 529] and Maqbul Ahmed v. Pratap Narain [AIR 1935 PC 85: 11 2025:HHC:33888 ILR (1935) 57 All 242 (PC): 155 IC 205]. We have to go by the clear wording of the section, and the date of knowledge of the commission of the alleged offence alone is made the starting point of limitation. 7. In State v. Keshavlal [AIR 1958 Bom 243: ILR 1959 Bom 358: 1958 Cr LJ 756: (1958) 2 Lab LJ 698], Mudholkar, J., had to deal with a similar question. No doubt, he was concerned with the interpretation of Section 23(2) and Section 79 of the Mining Act, 1952. Section 79 of the Mining Act provides: “No Court shall take cognisance of any offence under this Act, unless a complaint thereof has been made. (i) * * * (ii) within six months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector.” Section 23(2) states that when a notice given under sub- section (1) relates to an accident causing loss of life, the authority shall make an inquiry into the occurrence within two months of the receipt of the notice. It was contended on behalf of the State in that case that the commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector only after the completion of the inquiry and that the complaint, having been made within six months of the completion of the inquiry, was within time. On the other hand, it was contended for the accused that where the knowledge of the commission of an offence was dependent upon the result of an inquiry, such inquiry must necessarily be commenced within two months of the date of intimation of the accident and that the period of two months cannot be extended by delaying the inquiry. Dealing with the question, the learned Judge said: “It was then said that had an inquiry been instituted earlier, the Inspector would have come to know of the breach in question earlier, and so limitation must be deemed to have started running from the date of the notice of the accident or at most from the expiry of two months of the giving of the notice. It is common ground 12 2025:HHC:33888 that the knowledge of an accident is not the same thing as the knowledge of an “offence”, that is, of a breach which is made penal. Therefore, the date of the notice of the accident can in no circumstances be regarded as a starting point for the commencement of limitation. The expiry of two months from the date of notice cannot, for the same reason, be regarded as a starting point of limitation.” “No doubt, had the inquiry been made earlier, the fact of the commission of the breach or offence would have come to the knowledge of the Inspector. But Section 79(ii) does not say that the date on which an Inspector would or ought to have acquired knowledge of the commission of an offence had he been diligent or had he complied faithfully with the provision of the Act, would also be a starting point of limitation. In the circumstances, therefore, the delay in making the inquiry, however irregular or deplorable, cannot affect the question of limitation.” 8. As Section 106 makes the date of knowledge of the commission of the offence the starting point of the period of limitation, we find it difficult to read the Section so as to make the date on which the Inspector would or ought to have acquired knowledge of the commission of the offence had he been diligent, the starting point of limitation, especially where, as here the statute does not provide for an inquiry into the accident much less the period with which the inquiry has to be made. It is only in the jurisprudence of Humpty Dumpty that we can equate the “date on which the alleged offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector” with the date on which the alleged offence ought to have come to his knowledge. We think that the High Court was right in its conclusion. 18. Similar view by this Court in Rajesh Pandya versus State of H.P. in Cr.MMO No. 26 of 2014 decided on 28.04.2015, wherein it was held: - 13 2025:HHC:33888 “2. The complaint lodged beyond a period of three months by the complainant comprised in Annexure P-2 would render the learned Court before it had come to be instituted incapacitated to take cognizance thereon only in event of it having come to be substantiated at this stage by the petitioners herein that it had come to be lodged at the instance of a functionary/official who was empowered as an Inspector. Only in the event of substantiating material qua the factum of Deputy Director (Factories), Una being empowered as an Inspector would, the provisions of Section 106 of the Factories Act barring the criminal Court of competent jurisdiction to take cognizance thereon unless it is instituted within three months from the date of acquisition of knowledge by the Inspector qua the commission of the offence at the instance of the petitioners herein come to the aid of the petitioners herein to anvil a submission that hence, the criminal Court of competent jurisdiction is barred to take cognizance thereon.” 19. This position was reiterated in Saugata Gupta v. State of H.P., 2019 SCC OnLine HP 1672, wherein it was observed: “13. The Factories Act is a special Statute dealing with a specific field and provides for taking cognisance of certain offences related to the violation of the Act as well as the Rules made thereunder, and a specific period of limitation has been provided under Section 106 of the Act for taking cognisance of the offences. Explanation thereto also describes the manner in which the limitation shall be calculated in a continuing offence. However, there is no specific provision with regard to extension of the period of limitation as provided under Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short ‘Cr. P.C’). Cr.P.C. is a Statute general in nature and Section 4(2) of Cr.P.C., provides that all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to provisions of Cr.P.C., but subject to any enactment for the 14 2025:HHC:33888 time being in force regulating manner or place of investigation, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offence. In the Factories Act, there is a specific provision providing limitation for taking cognisance of commission of offence, including continuing offence, but there is no provision for extension of time of period of limitation, corresponding to Section 473 Cr. P.C.” 20. Therefore, in view of the above binding precedents, the period of three months is mandatory, and the complaint could not have been filed after the expiry of three months. 21. It was submitted that the rectification notice was issued and the petitioners failed to comply with it; therefore, the period of six months would apply to the present case. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The complaint does not mention any offence of violation of the written order issued by the Inspector. Therefore, the rectification notice will not extend the period of limitation. It was held in Saugata Gupta v. State of H.P., 2019 SCC OnLine HP 1672, that the six-month limitation period will apply only when the offence consists of disobeying the written order. It was observed: “10. Proviso to Section 106 of the Act, providing six months' limitation for filing complaint from the date of commission of offence shall come into force only where offence consists of disobeying a written order made by an Inspector and for that purpose, compliance report if any, submitted by the offender is required to be considered, 15 2025:HHC:33888 referred and verified by the said Inspector and in case such disobedience is found, only then, benefit of proviso shall be available which is lacking in the present case.” 22. In the present case, the complaint does not mention any offence of violating the written order, and the limitation of six months will not apply. 23. Consequently, the complaint filed before the learned Trial Court was barred by limitation, and the learned Trial Court could not have taken its cognisance; hence, the present petition is allowed and the complaint and the consequential proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court are ordered to be quashed. 24. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the pending applications, if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 7th October, 2025 (Chander)