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2025 DAILYLAW 3381 (HP)

State of H. P. v. Pawan Kumar

2025-11-06

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.08.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted for the commission of offences punishable under Section 61 (1) (a) of the Punjab Excise Act as applicable to State of H.P. and Section 182 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 61 (1) (a) of the Punjab Excise Act as applicable to the State of H.P. and Section 182 of the M V Act. It was asserted that SI Raj Kumar (PW9), HC Suresh Kumar (PW1), HHC Joginder Singh (PW7), and Constable Suresh Kumar (PW2) were on patrol in an official vehicle being driven by HHC Ram Saran at Dehriyan on the intervening night of 31.03.2007 and 01.04.2007. A jeep bearing registration no. HP-67-0372 came on a high speed from Sujanpur at 01:25 am. The police signalled the driver to stop. The driver identified himself as Pawan Kumar, and the person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Lekh Raj. The vehicle was covered with the tarpaulin, which was got removed and cartons containing liquor bottles were found in the vehicle. SI Raj Kumar demanded a permit/license for transporting the liquor, but the accused could not produce any document. The place was lonely and deserted; hence, no independent witness could be associated. The cardboard boxes were checked, and they were found to be 130 in number. 120 boxes contained 12 bottles of country liquor each bearing the mark Una No. 1, and 10 boxes contained 12 bottles of country liquor each bearing the mark Lal Quila. Thus, the police recovered 1440 bottles of country liquor bearing the mark Una no. 1 and 120 bottles of country liquor bearing the mark Lal Quila. One bottle each was taken out as a sample from 6 boxes of Una No. 1, and one bottle each was taken out as a sample from 3 boxes of Lal Quila. Each bottle was sealed with a seal ‘R’. 1 and 120 bottles of country liquor bearing the mark Lal Quila. One bottle each was taken out as a sample from 6 boxes of Una No. 1, and one bottle each was taken out as a sample from 3 boxes of Lal Quila. Each bottle was sealed with a seal ‘R’. Seal impression (Ext.PW9/E) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to HC Suresh Kumar after use. The remaining 1434 bottles of Una No. 1 and 117 bottles of Lal Quila, vehicle bearing registration no. HP-67-0372 and the samples were seized vide memo (Ext. PW1/A). Copies of seizure memos were supplied to each of the accused. Rukka (Ext.PW9/A) was prepared and was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW8/A) was registered. SI Raj Kumar investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext. PW9/B) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He deposited the case property with MHC Ranjit Singh (PW6), who deposited it in Maalkhana and made an entry in the malkhana register (Ex. PW6/D). He sent the sample bottles to CTL Kandaghat for analysis vide R.C. 5/2007 (Ext.PW6/C) through HHC Roop Lal (PW3), who deposited the bottles in the CTL Kandaghat and handed over the receipt to MHC on his return. The results of the analysis (Ext.PW6/A and Ext. PW6/B) were issued, stating that samples contained 50.0% proof alcohol each, and they were fit for human consumption. The documents of the vehicle were seized vide memo (Ext.PW4/A). After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, the accused Pawan Kumar was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Section 61 (1) (a) of the Punjab Excise Act, and Section 182 of MV Act and the accused Lekh Raj was charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61 (1) (a) of Punjab Excise Act, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to prove its case. ASI Suresh Kumar (PW1), Constable Suresh Kumar (PW2) and Joginder Singh (PW7) are the witnesses to the recovery. HHC Roop Lal (PW3) carried the samples to CTL Kandaghat. Sanjeev Kumar (PW4) and Vijay Kumar (PW5) are the witnesses to the recovery of the documents. 4. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to prove its case. ASI Suresh Kumar (PW1), Constable Suresh Kumar (PW2) and Joginder Singh (PW7) are the witnesses to the recovery. HHC Roop Lal (PW3) carried the samples to CTL Kandaghat. Sanjeev Kumar (PW4) and Vijay Kumar (PW5) are the witnesses to the recovery of the documents. MHC Ranjit Singh (PW6) was working as the MHC with whom the case property was deposited. HC Jai Chand (PW8) signed the FIR. SI Raj Kumar (PW9) investigated the matter. HC Ranjit Singh (PW10) proved the entry in the daily diary. 5. The accused, in thier statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They claimed that the witnesses deposed against him because they are police officials. The police falsely implicated them in the present case. They did not lead any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that various contradictions in the statements of the official witnesses made the prosecution’s case highly suspect. The police had failed to associate independent witnesses without any reasonable cause. Witnesses to the recovery of the documents turned hostile and did not support the prosecution’s case. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, the accused were acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material on record. 120 cartons of country liquor bearing mark Una No. 1 and 10 cartons of country liquor bearing Mark Lal Quila containing 1560 bottles of country liquor were found in exclusive and conscious possession of the accused. The accused were apprehended at midnight, and it was not possible to associate any independent witness. The contradictions were superficial and bound to come with time. The prosecution’s case was duly proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and M/s Raman Sharma and Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution’s case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the statements of the police officials. 8. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and M/s Raman Sharma and Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution’s case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the statements of the police officials. Learned Trial Court erred in discarding the prosecution’s case without any cogent reasons. The minor contradictions were blows out of proportion to record the acquittal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Raman Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with it. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325), SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748), this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Learned Trial Court noticed the following contradictions in the testimonies of the official witnesses: (i) HC Suresh Kumar (PW1) and Constable Suresh Kumar (PW2) stated that the cartons were unloaded from the vehicle, and the bottles were counted after unloading the cartons. Joginder Singh (PW7) and Rajkumar (PW9), on the other hand, stated that cartons were not unloaded, and the bottles were counted inside the vehicle. SI Rajkumar (PW9) categorically denied the suggestion that the cartons were unloaded for counting the bottles. (ii) HC Suresh Kumar (PW1) stated that the accused drove the vehicle bearing registration number HP-67-0372 to the police station, and HHC Joginder Singh sat beside the accused in the vehicle. Constable Suresh Kumar (PW2) stated that HC Suresh Kumar (PW1) drove the vehicle to the police station, and the accused sat beside him in it. (iii) HC Suresh Kumar (PW1) stated that Constable Suresh Kumar (PW2) took the Rukka to the police station in a truck and returned in a scooter. Constable Suresh Kumar (PW 2) stated that he left a spot in the HRTC bus and returned in a truck. SI Rajkumar (PW9) stated that constable Suresh Kumar took the rukka to the Police Station on foot and returned in a bus. (iv) Constable Suresh Kumar (PW 2) stated that there was no jungle at the place of the incident. This is contrary to the site plan (Ext. PW9/B), the rukka (Ext. SI Rajkumar (PW9) stated that constable Suresh Kumar took the rukka to the Police Station on foot and returned in a bus. (iv) Constable Suresh Kumar (PW 2) stated that there was no jungle at the place of the incident. This is contrary to the site plan (Ext. PW9/B), the rukka (Ext. PW 9/A) and the statement of Joginder Singh (PW7), in which it was mentioned that the place of the incident was a jungle. (v) HHC Joginder Singh (PW7) stated that the police remained on the spot till 2:30 am and left for the police station afterwards. This is contrary to the prosecution’s case because the rukka was sent from the spot at 4:10 am. (vi) Constable Suresh Kumar (PW2) stated that they had not checked the buses. SI Raj Kumar (PW9) stated that they had checked every vehicle. 15. It was submitted that the contradictions are minor and bound to come with time. This submission will not help the State. These contradictions relate to the circumstances surrounding the recovery and would make the recovery doubtful. When the witnesses are not consistent about the place of recovery, the time for which the investigation continued, the manner of counting the bottles, taking the rukka and returning to the police station, the whole prosecution’s case becomes suspect, especially  when the  police  had not  joined the independent witnesses. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 756 that the evidence of the prosecution must be tested for its inherent consistency: consistency with the account of other witnesses and consistency with undisputed facts. It was observed: “21. …. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful, independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged,  making  any  other  evidence,  including the medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts, the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts, the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 16. It was held in David Piper vs Mark Hales 2013 EWHC B1 (QB) that the Court has to see whether the statement of the witness is consistent or not. It was observed: - 34. The guidance about how courts approach this is given in the extra-judicial writing of the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill, approved by the courts is apposite. In "The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues", published in "The Business of Judging", Oxford 2000, reprinted from Current Legal Problems, vol 38, 1985, p 1-27, he wrote: ". . . Faced with a conflict of evidence on an issue substantially affecting the outcome of an action, often knowing that a decision this way or that will have momentous consequences on the parties' lives or fortunes, how can and should the judge set about his task of resolving it? How is he to resolve which witness is honest and which dishonest, which reliable and which unreliable? The normal first step in resolving issues of primary fact is, I feel sure, to add to what is common ground between the parties (which the pleadings in the action should have identified but often do not) such facts as are shown to be incontrovertible. In many cases, letters or minutes written well before there was any breath of dispute between the parties may throw a very clear light on their knowledge and intentions at a particular time. In other cases, evidence of tyre marks, debris or where vehicles ended up may be crucial. To attach importance to matters such as these, which are independent of human recollection, is so obvious and standard a practice, and in some cases so inevitable, that no prolonged discussion is called for. In other cases, evidence of tyre marks, debris or where vehicles ended up may be crucial. To attach importance to matters such as these, which are independent of human recollection, is so obvious and standard a practice, and in some cases so inevitable, that no prolonged discussion is called for. It is nonetheless worth bearing in mind, when vexatious conflicts of oral testimony arise, that these fall to be judged against the background not only of what the parties agree to have happened but also of what plainly did happen, even though the parties do not agree. The most compendious statement known to me of the judicial process involved in assessing the credibility of an oral witness is to be found in the dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403at p 431. In this, he touches on so many of the matters which I wish to mention that I may perhaps be forgiven for citing the relevant passage in full: ''Credibility' involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour', which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by too much discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional and who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes, the memory becomes fainter, and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason, a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. For that reason, a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point, it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously  are  entailed  when  a  Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process, contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part." Every judge is familiar with cases in which the conflict between the accounts of different witnesses is so gross as to be inexplicable save on the basis that one or some of the witnesses are deliberately giving evidence which they know to be untrue . . .. more often dishonest evidence is likely to be prompted by the hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties. The main tests needed to determine whether a witness is lying or not are, I think, the following, although their relative importance will vary widely from case to case: (1) the consistency of the witness's evidence with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other evidence, to have occurred; (2) the internal consistency of the witness's evidence; (3) consistency with what the witness has said or deposed on other occasions; (4) the credit of the witness in relation to matters not germane to the litigation; (5) the demeanour of the witness. The first three of these tests may, in general, be regarded as giving a useful pointer to where the truth lies. If a witness's evidence conflicts with what is clearly shown to have occurred or is internally self-contradictory, or conflicts with what the witness has previously said, it may usually be regarded as suspect. It may only be unreliable and not dishonest, but the nature of the case may effectively rule out that possibility. The fourth test is perhaps more arguable. " 35. It may only be unreliable and not dishonest, but the nature of the case may effectively rule out that possibility. The fourth test is perhaps more arguable. " 35. The following guidance of Lord Goff in Grace Shipping v. Sharp & Co [1987] 1 Lloyd's Law Rep. 207 at 215- 6 is also helpful. "And it is not to be forgotten that, in the present case, the Judge was faced with the task of assessing the evidence of witnesses about telephone conversations which had taken place over five years before. In such a case, memories may very well be unreliable, and it is of crucial importance for the Judge to have regard to the contemporary documents and the overall probabilities. In this connection, their Lordships wish to endorse a passage from a judgment of one of their number in Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas S.A. (The Ocean Frost), [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1, when he said at p. 57: - "Speaking from my own experience, I have found it essential in cases of fraud, when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and also to pay particular regard to their motives and the overall probabilities. It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not, and where there is a conflict of evidence, such as there was in the present case, reference to the objective facts and documents, to the witnesses' motives, and the overall probabilities, can be of very great assistance to a Judge in ascertaining the truth." [emphases added]. That observation is, in their Lordships' opinion, equally apposite in a case where the evidence of the witnesses is likely to be unreliable, and it is to be remembered that in commercial cases, such as the present, there is usually a substantial body of contemporary documentary evidence." In that context, he was impressed by a witness described in the following terms. "Although, like the other main witnesses, his evidence was a mixture of reconstruction and original recollection, he took considerable trouble to distinguish precisely between the two, to an extent which I found convincing and reliable." That is so important and so infrequently done." 36. "Although, like the other main witnesses, his evidence was a mixture of reconstruction and original recollection, he took considerable trouble to distinguish precisely between the two, to an extent which I found convincing and reliable." That is so important and so infrequently done." 36. This approach to fact-finding was amplified recently by Lady Justice Arden in the Court of Appeal in Wetton (as Liquidator of Mumtaz Properties) v. Ahmed and others [2011] EWCA Civ 610, in paragraphs 11, 12 & 14: 11. By the end of the judgment, it is clear that what impressed the judge most in his task of fact-finding was the absence, rather than the presence, of contemporary documentation or other independent oral evidence to confirm the oral evidence of the respondents to the proceedings. 12. There are many situations in which the court is asked to assess the credibility of witnesses from their oral evidence, that is to say, to weigh up their evidence to see whether it is reliable. Witness choice is an essential part of the function of a trial judge, and he or she has to decide whose evidence and how much evidence to accept. This task is not to be carried out merely by reference to the impression that a witness made by giving evidence in the witness box. It is not solely a matter of body language or the tone of voice or other factors that might generally be called the 'demeanour' of a witness. The judge should consider what other independent evidence would be available to support the witness. Such evidence would generally be documentary, but it could be other oral evidence, for example, if the issue was whether a defendant was an employee, the judge would naturally consider whether there were any PAYE records or evidence, such as evidence in texts or e-mails, in which the defendant seeks or is given instructions as to how he should carry out work. This may be particularly important in cases where the witness is from a culture or way of life with which the judge may not be familiar. These situations can present particular dangers and difficulties to a judge. 14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present, and the oral evidence can then be checked against it. These situations can present particular dangers and difficulties to a judge. 14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present, and the oral evidence can then be checked against it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. For instance, if the judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous documentation is likely to have existed were the oral evidence correct and that the party adducing oral evidence is responsible for its non-production, then the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence, and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its absence. 37. Contemporaneity, consistency, probability and motive are key criteria and more important than demeanour, which can be distorted through the prism of prejudice: how witnesses present themselves in a cramped witness box surrounded for the first time with multiple files can be distorted, particularly elderly ones being asked to remember minute details of what happened and what was said, and unrecorded, nearly 4 years later as here. Lengthy witness statements prepared by the parties' lawyers long after the events also distort the accurate picture, even though they are meant to assist the court.” 17. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case because of contradictions. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view of the matter while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 18. No other point was urged. 19. In view of the above, the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is sustainable. Hence, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 20. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondents/accused are directed to furnish their personal bonds in the sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused, on receipt of notice(s) thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 21. 21. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.