Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2025 DAILYLAW 3374 (BOM)

USHA HARI PANSE AND ORS v. RAMCHANDRA BHIKAJI PANSE AND ANR

SA/484/2025 · 2026-08-14

Civil Appealbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

Vaishnavi 26-SA-484-2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SECOND APPEAL NO. 484 OF 2025 WITH INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 11373 OF 2025 IN SECOND APPEAL NO. 484 OF 2025 Usha Hari Panse and Ors. ...Appellants (Orig. Plaintiffs) V/s. Ramchandra Bhikaji Panse and Anr. ...Respondents (Orig. Defendants) ________________ Mr. Surel Shah, Senior Advoate, with Mr. Sumed-h Ruikar, Mr. Viraj Shelatkar, Mr. Kunjan makwana, for Appellant. Mr. S.S. Patwardhan with Ms. Mrinal A. Shelar and Mr. A.V. Hardas, for Respondent Nos. 2a (i) to (iii) ________________ CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J. DATED: 14 AUGUST 2026 P.C.: 1) By this Appeal, the Appellant has challenged the judgment and decree dated 27 February 2025 passed by District Court, Pune, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 475 of 2012. The First Appellate Court has dismissed the Appeal and has confirmed the judgment and decree dated 17 January 1996 passed by the Trial Court in Special Civil Suit No. 5 of 1990. Page No. 1 of 5 14 August 2026 Vaishnavi 26-SA-484-2025 2) I have heard Mr. Shah, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Appellants and Mr. Patwardhan, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 2a (i) and (iii) and have considered the submissions canvassed by them. 3) Plaintiffs main case was that the Suit property is a joint family property and that Petitioner No. 1 is entitled to inherit the same through her husband. It was the case of the Plaintiffs that father-in-law Bhikaji did not have right to make Will in respect of joint family property. The Plaintiffs, however, failed to prove the assertion and both the Courts have concurrently held that the suit property is the self-acquired property of father-in-law, Bhikaji. 4) Considering fact that there are concurrent findings by both the Courts on the issue of Suit property being self-acquired property, Mr. Shah has fairly not pressed the Appeal on the point of Suit property being self-acquired property. 5) Mr. Shah, however, submits that Plaintiffs had also raised the alternative plea that even if the suit property is held to be self-acquired property of Bhikaji, they had a share in the same. Defendant No. 1 came out with the defence of execution of the Will by Bhikaji in his name. The Trial and Appellate Courts have held the Will to be proved and has accordingly negatived the claim of the Plaintiffs. 6) Mr. Shah has submitted that there is no proper proof of valid execution of Will within the meaning of Section 63 of the Indian Page No. 2 of 5 14 August 2026 Vaishnavi 26-SA-484-2025 Succession Act, 1925 (Succession Act). He submits that though the attesting witnesses, Shri. Madhukar Kulkarni had seen the testator signing the Will, there is no evidence on record to suggest that both the witnesses had signed the Will in presence of the testator. According to him, the mandatory requirements of Section 63 of the Succession Act are not fulfilled. 7) I have considered the evidence of the witness Mr. Madhukar kulkarni and after going through his evidence, it can be gathered that all the parties, who have signed the Will were in the same room. There is no suggestion give by the Plaintiffs to the attesting witness that testator was not present when the witness signed the Will. In my view therefore, the Trial and Appellate Courts have rightly held that execution of the Will is validly proved within the meaning of Section 63 of the Succession Act. 8) Mr. Shah has thereafter submitted that there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will and therefore, the Trial and Appellate Courts could not have recorded a finding of valid execution of the Will. He has placed reliance on judgment the Apex Court in Ramesh Chand (D) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Suresh Chand and Anr 1 , in which it is held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 27 is as under: 27. Considering the aforementioned cases, it is clear that in order to rely upon a Will, the same has to be proved in accordance with law. A Will has to be attested by two witnesses, and either of the two attesting witnesses have to be examined by the propounder of the will. In the present matter, we have carefully perused the Trial Court's judgment. There is not an iota of discussion about the validity of the Will as contemplated under Section 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1879 Page No. 3 of 5 14 August 2026 Vaishnavi 26-SA-484-2025 63 of the Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and yet, the validity of the Will has been upheld. This is contrary to law. Even the High Court, while evaluating the validity of the Will, has gone on a different tangent and has erroneously held that the requirement of examining the attesting witnesses springs into action only in cases of disputes between legal heirs. Such an observation is quite contrary to law, for Section 68 of the Evidence Act makes it mandatory to examine at least one of the attesting witnesses of the Will. Mere fact that the Will was registered will not grant validity to the document. Besides that, the will propounded by plaintiff is surrounded with suspicious circumstances, in as much as the alleged propounder of the Will, Lt. Sh. Kundan Lal, had four children, including the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1. There is not even a whisper of reasoning as to why the propounder of the Will choose to exclude other three children from the bequest, and whether any other properties or assets were given to them. It is highly unlikely that a father would grant his entire property to one of his children, at the cost of three others, without there being any evidence of estrangement between the father and the children. This suspicious circumstance surrounding the will has not been removed by the plaintiff either. Hence, for these cumulative reasons, the Will propounded by plaintiff though registered would not confer any valid title on the plaintiff either. 9) However, before the Apex Court, it appears that there was no discussion by the Trial Court about valid execution of the Will within the meaning of Section 63 of the Succession Act. Presence of suspicious circumstance was only an additional facet in the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the present case, there is proper discussion about valid execution of the Will by the Trial and the Appellate Courts as per the requirement laid down in Section 63 the Succession Act. I am also not inclined to accept the contention that the Plaintiffs were able to prove existence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will in the facts of the present case. Mere presence of propounder of the Will at the time of execution of the Will in the Registrar’s Office would not ipso facto lead to presumption of existence of surrounding circumstances. Going by that standard, every Will would be rendered void on account of presence of the legatee at the time of execution of the Will. No suggestion is given to Page No. 4 of 5 14 August 2026 Vaishnavi 26-SA-484-2025 the propounder during the course of his cross-examination that the father-in-law actually desired to execute the Will in some other form, but the propounder prevailed upon him and forced or coerced him to execute the Will in his favour alone. 10) Even otherwise, it is difficult to accept an abstract principle of law that even where valid execution of the Will is proved by meeting all the requirements under Section 63 of the Succession Act, the Court has walk a step further and also quell existence every circumstance which is perceived by the challenges of Will to be suspicious. If the case of existence of suspicious circumstance is set up by the challenger, the burden if on him to prove existence of suspicious circumstances. Once valid execution of the Will is proved within the meaning of Section 63 of the Succession Act, the Will has to take legal effect. 11) Considering the above position, in my view, no substantial question of law is involved in the Second Appeal. The Second Appeal is accoridngly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. [SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.] Page No. 5 of 5 14 August 2026