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2025 DAILYLAW 3371 (HP)

Ramneesh Kumar @ Lavallu v. State of H. P.

2025-11-06

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.01.2010 passed by learned Special Judge (Sessions Judge), Una, District Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the appellant (accused before learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC&ST Act) and Sections 353 and 506 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and was sentenced as under:- All the sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the informant, Dr Parkash Chand (PW-1), was posted as a Medical Officer/In-charge in Civil Hospital Chintpurni. He was examining the patients on 03.06.2005 in his room. Accused Ramneesh Kumar @ Lavllu came to the informant’s duty room at about 11:30 p.m. and started abusing him. The accused caught hold of the informant’s neck and abused him in the name of his caste. He threatened to kill the informant and his family members. He tore the attendance register(Ext.P-1) kept on the table. The matter was reported to the police, and F.I.R. (Ext.PW-3/A) was registered in the Police Station. Vimal Gupta (DW-6) investigated the matter. He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. Ashwani Kumar (PW-4) produced the service book and personal file of the informant. The informant belonged to the Scheduled Caste as per the service record. It was found after the investigation that no incident, as alleged by the informant, had occurred. There was a dispute between the informant and the accused regarding the deflation of the tyres of the informant’s scooter. No caste-based remarks were uttered. The OPD register was concealed by the informant, and a fresh OPD register was started, which showed that the informant intended to implicate the accused. Hence, a final report was submitted before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Amb, District Una, H.P. 3. The notice of final report was issued to the informant, who filed a protest petition and examined himself. 4. Learned Magistrate concluded that there was sufficient ground to proceed against the accused; therefore, the final report submitted by the police was rejected, and cognisance was taken. 5. The notice of final report was issued to the informant, who filed a protest petition and examined himself. 4. Learned Magistrate concluded that there was sufficient ground to proceed against the accused; therefore, the final report submitted by the police was rejected, and cognisance was taken. 5. When the accused appeared before the learned Magistrate, the matter was committed to the learned Special Judge, Una (learned Trial Court) after completing the formalities. 6. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Section 3(1)(x)of SC&ST and Sections 353 and 506 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Dr Parkash Chand (PW-1) is the informant. Lekh Raj (PW-2)is the eyewitness. Parkash Chand (PW-3)recorded the F.I.R. Ashwani Kumar (PW- 4)produced the service record of the informant. Mahinder Singh (PW-5) could not trace the summoned record. G.R.Chaudhary (PW-6) did not support the prosecution’s case. 8. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that a false case was registered against him. He examined six witnesses in defence. 9. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by the testimony of Lekhraj. Nothing was elicited in their cross-examination to show that they were deposing falsely. The fact that the presence of Lekh Raj (PW-2)in the Civil Hospital was not recorded in the OPD register or that the prescription slips were not seized by the Investigating Officer would not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. The testimony of the informant proved that the accused had abused him in the name of his caste. Minor discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses were not sufficient to discard them. The testimony of Vimal Gupta (DW-6), Investigating Officer, did not cast any doubt on the prosecution’s case. The statements of the remaining defence witnesses were not credible. Therefore, the accused was convicted and sentenced as mentioned above. 10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence. The police had found after investigation that no case was made out. Therefore, the accused was convicted and sentenced as mentioned above. 10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence. The police had found after investigation that no case was made out. There was a delay of twelve hours in reporting the matter to the police.The distance between Police Post Chintpurni and the Hospital is ½ KM. The prosecution did not explain the delay, and the same is fatal to the prosecution’s case. The informant’s statement regarding the call made to the police was an afterthought, and such a statement was made to explain the delay. Dr S.K. Verma (DW-5) specifically stated that no complaint was made to him regarding the caste-based abuse. Vimal Gupta (DW-6) specifically stated that no caste-based words were used as per his investigation. The presence of Lekh Raj (PW-2) and G.R.Chaudhary (PW-6) on the spot was highly doubtful. These witnesses were procured by the informant to establish his case. The informant stated that his wife rescued him; however, the prosecution did not examine her to corroborate the informant’s version. The accused stated that there was a dispute over the scooter, and this was corroborated by the findings of the Investigating Officer. Learned Trial Court did not appreciate these aspects; therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 11. I have heard Mr N.S.Chandel, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr Vinod Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, Mr.Parshant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State and Mr Pawan Gautam, learned counsel for the victim. 12. Mr N.S.Chandel, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The police found after the investigation that no case was made out. The learned Magistrate erred in taking cognisance, and the learned Trial Court erred in trying the matter. The prosecution’s case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The presence of Lekh Raj (PW-2) on the spot was not satisfactorily established. G.R. Chaudhary (PW-6) did not support the prosecution’s case. The defence witnesses categorically deposed that no such incident had taken place. The testimonies of defence witnesses could not have been discarded without any cogent reasons. The prosecution’s case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The presence of Lekh Raj (PW-2) on the spot was not satisfactorily established. G.R. Chaudhary (PW-6) did not support the prosecution’s case. The defence witnesses categorically deposed that no such incident had taken place. The testimonies of defence witnesses could not have been discarded without any cogent reasons. Learned Trial Court rejected the testimonies of the defence witnesses without any plausible reasons. The informant was posted as a Doctor and never disclosed his caste. The accused did not have any opportunity to know about the caste of the informant. He could not have abused the informant in the name of his caste. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the police. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 13. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the prosecution witnesses proved the incident. The mere fact that the police had found that no incident had taken place is not material because the Courts are not bound by the opinion of the Investigating Officer and have to arrive at their independent conclusion. The learned Trial Court has assigned cogent reasons to discard the testimonies of defence witnesses. There was no delay as the police were informed telephonically immediately after the incident. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 14. Mr Pawan Gautam, learned counsel for the informant/victim, adopted the submissions advanced by Mr.Parshant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State and submitted that the present appeal be dismissed. 15. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 16. Informant Dr Parkash Chand (PW-1) stated that he was attending to the patients on 03.06.2004 at about 11:30 a.m. The accused came to his room and abused him in the name of his caste. He also tore the employee’s register and obstructed the informant from discharging his duties. He informed Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Una, Block Medical Officer (BMO), Amb, and the In-Charge Police Station Chintpurni telephonically as well as in writing. He filed a written complaint (Ext.PW-1/A) with the police post Chintpurni. 17. DrS.K.Verma (DW-5) was posted as BMO. He also tore the employee’s register and obstructed the informant from discharging his duties. He informed Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Una, Block Medical Officer (BMO), Amb, and the In-Charge Police Station Chintpurni telephonically as well as in writing. He filed a written complaint (Ext.PW-1/A) with the police post Chintpurni. 17. DrS.K.Verma (DW-5) was posted as BMO. He stated that the informant telephonically informed him about the quarrel, which had taken place in the hospital and requested him to take action. CMO also informed him about the incident, and directed him to visit Civil Hospital Chintpurni. The informant did not complain that the accused had abused the informant in the name of his caste. He went to the spot. The informant was busy with the public on the spot and had no time to discuss the matter with him. 18. This witness specifically said that no complaint of abuse in the name of his caste was made by the informant. He is a Block Medical Officer, and nothing has been shown in his cross-examination to discard his testimony. The informant admitted in his cross- examination that he had no enmity with Dr S.K. Verma. Therefore, his testimony cannot be disbelieved. His testimony makes the prosecution’s case suspect that the accused had abused the informant in the name of his caste. 19. The informant stated in his cross-examination that he had visited the Police post, Chintpurni, at about 8:00 p.m. and made a complaint(Ext.PW-1/A). This complaint mentions the date and time as 03.06.2004 at 11:15 p.m., which clearly shows that the complaint was written at 11:15 p.m. The complainant had not provided any explanation as to why he had not reported the matter immediately after his arrival in the Police Station and why he wrote the complaint at 11:15 p.m. when he had reached the Police Post at 8:00-8:15 p.m. The incident had occurred at 11:30 a.m., and no reason was assigned as to why the matter was reported to the police at 11:15 p.m. by means of the application (Ext.PW1/A). Thus, there is force in the submission of Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/accused that the delay has not been properly explained. 20. Thus, there is force in the submission of Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/accused that the delay has not been properly explained. 20. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and therefore, the Court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante- dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 21. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 ; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].” 22. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed at page 182: “14.We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 23. Therefore, the prosecution’s evidence is to be seen with due care and caution because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police. 24. Informant Dr Parkash Chand (PW-1) stated that the incident was witnessed by Lekh Raj (PW-2)and G.R. Chaudhary (PW-6). G.R.Chaudhary (PW-6) did not support the prosecution’s case. He stated that he had obtained the prescription slip and waited for his turn outside the informant’s room. Many people had gathered, who disclosed that a scuffle had taken place between a Chemist and Dr Parkash Chand (PW-1).No incident had occurred in his presence. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that he had made a statement to the police voluntarily, and he was recanting his statement to save the accused from punishment. Thus, this witness has not supported the prosecution’s case, and no advantage can be derived from his previous testimony. 25. Lekh Raj (PW-2) stated that he had gone to Civil Hospital Chintpurni on 03.06.2004. He obtained an OPD slip for his medical examination. He went to room No. 102, where the informant was sitting alone. Four to five patients were present in the room. 25. Lekh Raj (PW-2) stated that he had gone to Civil Hospital Chintpurni on 03.06.2004. He obtained an OPD slip for his medical examination. He went to room No. 102, where the informant was sitting alone. Four to five patients were present in the room. The informant was examining him when the accused entered the room and abused the informant in the name of his caste. The accused also caught hold of the informant by his collar. A scuffle took place between them. He saved the doctor from the accused. He admitted in his cross-examination that he was posted as a Head Draftsman at Bharwain in the HPPWD division, and he had visited the hospital after obtaining permission from his superior by filing an application. He admitted that the was present in his office on 03.06.2004, as per the attendance register (Ext.DXX). He volunteered to say that he had obtained half day’s leave, and his application was available in the office. He admitted that he had signed the attendance register in the forenoon and afternoon. He volunteered to say that he was the head of the branch and was required to sign the attendance register. 26. The cross-examination of this witness makes his presence on the spot highly doubtful. He admitted that his attendance was marked in the attendance register (Ext.DXX). He claimed that he had signed the attendance register as a Branch Incharge, but that is not correct because the attendance register shows that his signatures were put in token of his attendance and not in the capacity of the Branch Incharge. He claimed that he had left an application for half-day’s leave, but no such application was produced on record. Further, he stated that he had visited the hospital and obtained the prescription slip; however, no such prescription slip was placed on record. The OPD register, showing that a prescription slip was issued to him, was also not brought on record. Therefore, there is a reasonable doubt regarding the presence of Lekh Raj (PW-2) on the spot, and no reliance can be placed upon his testimony. 27. The OPD register, showing that a prescription slip was issued to him, was also not brought on record. Therefore, there is a reasonable doubt regarding the presence of Lekh Raj (PW-2) on the spot, and no reliance can be placed upon his testimony. 27. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was corroborated by the statement of Lekh Raj (PW-2); however, marking of presence by him in the attendance register and non-production of the OPD register and the prescription slip were brushed aside on the ground that Vimal Gupta (DW-6) was in collusion with the informant and had committed irregularities. Even if it was so, nothing prevented Lekh Raj (PW-2) from bringing his prescription slip to the Court and producing it before the Court by saying that this prescription slip was not seized by the police. Therefore, the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court for relying upon the testimony of Lekh Raj are not plausible. 28. The informant admitted in his cross-examination that Dr Bhupinder Singh Rana used to sit with him in the Male OPD. 29. Dr Bhupinder Singh Rana (DW-4) stated that he used to sit in room No. 102 with the informant. He was examining the patients on 03.05.2004 (sic). The informant was also sitting in the room. The informant had sent for the accused to the Doctor’s duty room. The accused visited the duty room, and there was an argument between the accused and the informant. The informant stated that the accused had deflated his scooter’s tyre, but the accused denied this fact. The accused had not abused the informant in the name of his caste. The informant seized the OPD register and kept it under lock and key. The informant called the Officers of the Health Department, the police and other authorities. The local public also gathered on the spot. The informant did not tell anybody that the accused had abused the informant in the name of his caste. The accused had also not torn the attendance register. 30. The testimony of this witness falsifies the prosecution’s version. The informant admitted the presence of this witness. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 7 SCC 716 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 312: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 465 that equal weightage must be given to the defence witnesses. 30. The testimony of this witness falsifies the prosecution’s version. The informant admitted the presence of this witness. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 7 SCC 716 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 312: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 465 that equal weightage must be given to the defence witnesses. It was observed at page 829: “219. It has been held by this Court in a catena of cases that while examining the witnesses on record, equal weightage shall be given to the defence witnesses as that of the prosecution witnesses. In Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar [ (2002) 1 SCC 351 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 175], this Court held as under: (SCC p. 356, para 3) “3. …Before drawing the curtain on this score, however, we wish to clarify that the evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason of the factum of the witnesses being examined by the defence. The defence witnesses are entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and the trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution — a lapse on the part of the defence witnesses cannot be differentiated and be treated differently from that of the prosecutors' witnesses.”(emphasis supplied) 220. Further, it has been held in State of Haryana v. Ram Singh (2002) 2 SCC 426 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 350 as under: (SCC p. 439, para 19) “19. … Incidentally, be it is noted that the evidence tendered by defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one — the defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment and equal respect as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution. Rejection of the defence case based on the evidence tendered by the defence witness has been effected rather casually by the High Court. The issue of credibility and trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution. Rejection of the defence case based on the evidence tendered by the defence witness has been effected rather casually by the High Court. Suggestion was there to the prosecution witnesses, in particular PW 10 Dholu Ram that his father Manphool was missing for about 2/3 days before the day of the occurrence itself— what more is expected of the defence case: a doubt or a certainty—jurisprudentially a doubt would be enough: when such a suggestion has been made the prosecution has to bring on record the availability of the deceased during those 2/3 days with some independent evidence. Rejection of the defence case only by reason thereof is far too strict and rigid a requirement for the defence to meet — it is the prosecutor's duty to prove beyond all reasonable doubts and not the defence to prove its innocence — this itself is a circumstance, which cannot but be termed to be suspicious in nature.” 221. Also, in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram (2000) 4 SCC 515 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 845, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 524-25, paras 21-23) “21. Shri N.P. Midha, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted written submissions over and above the oral arguments addressed by him. One of the contentions adverted to by the learned counsel pertains to the evidence of the defence witness (DW 1 Moharam Ali). The counsel contended that if the evidence of DW 1 Moharam Ali can be believed, it is sufficient to shake the basic structure of the prosecution’s evidence. Shri N.P. Midha invited our attention to the following observations contained in the decision of this Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P.[ (1981) 2 SCC 166 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 379] : (SCC p. 173, para 19) ‘19. … Defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of the prosecution. And, courts ought to overcome their traditional, instinctive disbelief in defence witnesses.’ 22. We may quote the succeeding sentence also from the said decision for the sake of completion of the observations of Their Lordships on that score.It is this: ‘Quite often they tell lies, but so do the prosecution witnesses.’ 23. And, courts ought to overcome their traditional, instinctive disbelief in defence witnesses.’ 22. We may quote the succeeding sentence also from the said decision for the sake of completion of the observations of Their Lordships on that score.It is this: ‘Quite often they tell lies, but so do the prosecution witnesses.’ 23. Depositions of witnesses, whether they are examined on the prosecution side or defence side or as court witnesses, are oral evidence in the case, and hence the scrutiny thereof shall be without any predilection or bias. No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as a prosecution witness or even as a court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed as for those different categories of witnesses.” (emphasis supplied) 31. It was submitted that a case was filed before the H.P. State Administrative Tribunal regarding the transfer, and the relationship between the informant and this witness was strained. Even if this fact is taken into consideration, the statement of this witness that the accused had not abused the informant in the name of his caste is duly corroborated by the statement of Dr S.K.Verma (DW-5), against whom nothing was stated by the informant; therefore, the testimony of this witness cannot be discarded. 32. Learned Trial Court held that Mamta, a female patient, was examined by Dr B.S. Rana as per the prescription slip (Ext.PYY) on 03.06.2004 at about 11:30 a.m. and Dr B.S. Rana would not have examined her in the male OPD room. Therefore, his presence in the male OPD was doubtful. This conclusion is not acceptable because the prescription slip does not mention the time of the examination, and Dr B.S.Rana (DW-4) admitted that Mamta was examined by his wife as per the OPD slip (Ext.PYY). Therefore, the learned Trial Court erred in discarding the testimony of Dr B.S. Rana. 33. The informant stated that his wife had rescued him from the accused. However, she was not examined, and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. 34. Dr B.S.Rana (DW-4) stated that the informant had kept the OPD register in his lock and key. This is duly corroborated by the statement of Harminder Singh (DW-1), who stated in his cross-examination that the informant had taken the register. However, she was not examined, and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. 34. Dr B.S.Rana (DW-4) stated that the informant had kept the OPD register in his lock and key. This is duly corroborated by the statement of Harminder Singh (DW-1), who stated in his cross-examination that the informant had taken the register. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he had made a false statement. His statement corroborates the statement of B.S.Rana (PW-4) that the informant had concealed the OPD register. The absence of the earlier OPD register has a material bearing in this case because the earlier OPD register would have contained the entry regarding the name of Lekhraj (PW-2). 35. Therefore, the evidence on record was insufficient to prove that the accused had abused the informant in the name of his caste or obstructed him in the discharge of his official duty. Hence, the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court cannot be sustained. 36. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court are set aside, and the accused is acquitted of the charged offences. His bail bonds are discharged. The fine amount, if deposited by the appellant/accused, be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 37. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the appellant is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 38. In view of the above, the present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 39. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.