APHC010507002009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 714/2009 Between: 1. THE STATE OF A.P., REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD. 1. REDDOLLA KURUVA SIDDA REDDY, S/O. PEDDA HANUMANTHAPPA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE 2. REDDOLLA KURUVA KULLAYASWAMY DIED, S/O. LATE REDDOLLA RAMANA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE SINCE RESPONDENT NO.2 HAS DIED, CRIMINAL APPEAL AGAINST RESPONDENT NO.2 IS ABATED AS PER THE COURT'S ORDER DATED 12.08.2025 IN CRL.A.NO.714 OF 2009. 3. REDDOLLA KURUVA YERRISWAMY, S/O. PEDDA HANUMANTHAPPA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE 4. MOPIDI KURUVA YERRISWAMY, S/O.M. MUDDAPPA @ MUDDANNA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE 5. VADDE NARAYANASWAMY, S/O. VADDE SADHU YERRAPPA R/O. CHINNA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE 6. VADDE SEENAPPA, S/O. A. RAMANJINEYULU R/O. CHINNA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE 7. KURUVA MOPIDI RAM BHEEMAPPA, S/O. BHEEMALINGAPPA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) THE FIRST DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 714/2009 THE STATE OF A.P., REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD. ...AP AND REDDOLLA KURUVA SIDDA REDDY, S/O. PEDDA HANUMANTHAPPA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE REDDOLLA KURUVA KULLAYASWAMY DIED, S/O. LATE REDDOLLA RAMANA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE SINCE RESPONDENT NO.2 HAS DIED, CRIMINAL APPEAL AGAINST RESPONDENT NO.2 IS ABATED AS PER THE COURT'S ORDER DATED 12.08.2025 IN CRL.A.NO.714 OF 2009. REDDOLLA KURUVA YERRISWAMY, S/O. PEDDA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE MOPIDI KURUVA YERRISWAMY, S/O.M. MUDDAPPA @ MUDDANNA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE VADDE NARAYANASWAMY, S/O. VADDE SADHU YERRAPPA R/O. CHINNA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE VADDE SEENAPPA, S/O. A. RAMANJINEYULU R/O. CHINNA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE KURUVA MOPIDI RAM BHEEMAPPA, S/O. BHEEMALINGAPPA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3369] THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO THE STATE OF A.P., REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH ...APPELLANT REDDOLLA KURUVA SIDDA REDDY, S/O. PEDDA REDDOLLA KURUVA KULLAYASWAMY DIED, S/O. LATE REDDOLLA RAMANA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE SINCE RESPONDENT NO.2 HAS DIED, CRIMINAL APPEAL AGAINST RESPONDENT NO.2 IS ABATED AS PER THE COURT'S ORDER REDDOLLA KURUVA YERRISWAMY, S/O. PEDDA MOPIDI KURUVA YERRISWAMY, S/O.M. MUDDAPPA @ VADDE NARAYANASWAMY, S/O. VADDE SADHU YERRAPPA R/O. VADDE SEENAPPA, S/O. A. RAMANJINEYULU R/O. CHINNA KURUVA MOPIDI RAM BHEEMAPPA, S/O. BHEEMALINGAPPA R/O. 2 8. KURUVA MALLIKESU, S/O. BHEEMANNA R/O. PEDDA KOWKUNTLA VILLAGE ...RESPONDENT(S): Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to To present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal against the Judgment in S.C.No. 242/2002 on the file of the Principal Asst. Sessions Judge, Ananthapur, dated 7th day of January, 2004 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused (Respondent) for the offence with which they were charged. IA NO: 1 OF 2009 (CRLAMP 1319 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of "1885" days in representing the above Crl.A.SR.No. 5059 of 2004 presented against the judgment in S.C. No. 242/2002 on the file of the Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Ananthapur, dated 7.1.2004. Counsel for the Appellant: 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. KASA JAGANMOHAN REDDY The Court made the following JUDGMENT: 1. This appeal, under section 378(3) & (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C’) is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.242 of 2002 on the file of Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Anantapur (for short, ‘the Sessions Court’) by its judgment dated 07.01.2004, acquitted the accused for the offences punishable under section 148, 324, 307 r/w 149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and sections 3 and 5 of Explosive Substance Act (for short, ‘E.S.Act’). 2. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of 3 PWs.1 to 10 and documents marked Exs.P.1 to P.11 as well as contradictory statements, i.e., Exs.D.1 to D.3, which were elicited during the cross- examination of PWs.2 and 4, were marked. 3. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the present appeal, are as follows: Accused 1 to 4 and 7 and 8 are residents of Pedda-Koukuntla Village, while Accused 5 and 6 reside in Chinna Kowkuntla Village. A factional rivalry exists in Kowkuntla Village between supporters of the Congress- I and Telugu Desam parties. The accused are alleged to be Congress-I supporters and sympathizers of the C.P.I. (M.L) PWG (Sanketham Dalam) led by Yerikela Vema Narayana Reddy. During the Assembly elections on 05.09.1999, Boya Mareppa (PW.1) and others voted for the Telugu Desam Party, sparking animosity between the two factions. On 16.09.1999, Accused 1 and 2 allegedly abused Telugu Desam supporters. In response, PW.1 and his associates chastised them, leading Accused 1 and 2 to develop a grudge and seek revenge. Later that day, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Accused 1 to 8, along with others, allegedly formed an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, including country-made bombs, intending to kill PW.1 and other witnesses. They are said to have hurled six bombs from the terrace of A.1's house, causing injuries to PW.1 through PW.5. During the investigation, remnants of the bombs were seized. An expert examination confirmed the presence of a prohibited explosive mixture. The Collector and District Magistrate subsequently granted sanction to prosecute the accused under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. 4. After laying the Charge Sheet by the Investigating Officer, the committal Court passed an order under Section 209(a) of Cr.P.C., following the provisions of Sections 207 and 208 Cr.P.C. The case is committed to the Court of Sessions. Subsequently, the case in Sessions Case No.242 of 2002 4 has been numbered. After hearing the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, the Trial Court framed the charges against the accused, punishable under Sections 148, 324, 307 r/w 149 of the IPC & sections 3 and 5 of the E.S.Act. The accused did not plead guilty but claimed to be tried. 5. The learned Sessions Judge examined the accused as required under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., to enable them to consider the evidence that had been led on the part of the prosecution and also appeared against them. However, the accused denied the truth of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the contradictory portions of Exs.D1 to D3, as per Section 161 Cr.P.C. Statements were marked during the cross-examination of P.Ws.2 and 4. 6. After considering the material on record, the learned Sessions Judge found A.1 to A.8 not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 148, 324, and 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC, as well as Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosives Substances Act, and accordingly acquitted them. 7. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, representing the State, contends that the Sessions Court erred in failing to note that the evidence of PWs.1 to 5 was cogent and creditworthy, as such, the absence of motive is immaterial, and the medical evidence supported the prosecution, and that the scene of the offence was properly established. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the accused supported the findings and conclusions recorded by the Sessions Court. 9. I have heard the learned counsel on both sides and perused the material on record, including the oral and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution before the Sessions Court. 10. The point for determination is: Was the Sessions Court justified in acquitting the accused? 5 P O I N T: 11. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1, at paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows: "26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the appellate Court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the judgment of acquittal of the Court below if the findings so recorded by the Court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the Court below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate Court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that acquittal by the Court below bolsters the presumption of his innocence." 12. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the power of the appellate Court to interfere in an appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point, has concluded as under: "16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with.” 1 (2011) 6 SCC 279 2 (2007) 3 SCC 755 6 13. With the above principles in mind, this Court analyze the reasoning and ultimate conclusion of the Sessions Court in interfering with the order of acquittal. 14. The prosecution examined PWs.1 to 5 as eyewitnesses to the incident, with PWs.2 to 5 also testifying to the injuries they allegedly sustained. The material on record indicates that PW.1 lodged the report marked as Ex.P.1 in connection with the incident in question. PW.6, the Medical Officer, examined PWs.2 to 5 and issued the corresponding wound certificates. PW.7, a Junior Assistant in the District Collector’s office, was examined to prove the sanction order marked as Ex.P.7. PWs 8 and 9 were cited as witnesses to the scene observation conducted by the Investigating Officer. Although they denied being present during the observation, they acknowledged their signatures on the observation mahazar, marked as Exs.P.8. The Investigating Officer, PW.10, was examined to establish the course of the investigation. 15. The Trial Court, after recording its reasons, held that PWs.2 to 5 (Harijana Laleppa, Kuruba Bandar Rangaiah, Banku Boya Yerriswamy and Boya Govindu respectively) sustained injuries due to a bomb explosion. To establish this, the prosecution examined PW.6 (Dr.V.Narayana Swamy), the medical officer, who examined the injured and issued Exs.P3 to P6 (Wound Certificates). PW.6 opined that the injuries sustained by PWs.2 to 5 could be possible due to the explosion of a bomb. Considering the testimony of PWs.2 to 5 along with Exs.P3 to P6, the Trial Court concluded that the prosecution had successfully proven that PWs.2 to 5 sustained injuries from the explosion. 16. Based on the suggestions put to witnesses during cross-examination, it was argued before the Trial Court that the defence had conceded the occurrence of the bomb explosion at the scene of the offence. The prosecution relied on Ex.P8, the Observation Mahazar, which indicated that there was a mark of an explosion on the front wall of Boya Sreeramulu's terraced house, whose main doorway faced west. Ex.P10, the letter of advice, 7 and Ex.P11, the RFSL report, also support the prosecution’s case concerning the bomb explosion. Ex.P8 also noted that from the house of A.1 up to the house of Dasari Subramanyam, remnants of bomb pieces were found on the road (rastha) and seized under the cover of the Mahazar. Considering the observations in Ex.P8 along with the testimony of PW.10 (P.Krishna Murthy), the Investigating Officer, the Trial Court held that while there was evidence of an explosion along the road running from south to north, no bomb remnants were found. The Trial Court observed that, in view of the suggestions put to PWs.1 to 5 during cross-examination, that they sustained injuries due to an accidental explosion of bombs they were carrying, the prosecution cannot contend that the charges against the accused have been proved beyond doubt. As rightly observed by the Trial Court, the mere occurrence of a blast and injuries sustained by PWs.2 to 5 cannot, by itself, establish that A.1 to A.8 hurled the bombs as alleged by the prosecution. It noted that suggestions put to PWs.1 to 5 during cross-examination that the injured were carrying bombs and that the explosion was accidental, were not substantiated by the defence. However, the mere failure of the defence to prove this version does not automatically establish the prosecution’s case. Even if the defence version is found to be false, such a finding can at best serve as an additional circumstance in support of the prosecution’s case, and does not, by itself, establish guilt. 17. As per the defence put forth by the accused, they denied the truth of the prosecution’s evidence. The mere fact that the defence did not dispute the explosion of bombs or that PWs.2 to 5 sustained injuries in the incident cannot lead to the conclusion that the prosecution proved its case, as noted by the Trial Court. 18. According to the prosecution, PWs.1 to 3, accompanied by PWs.4 and 5, were proceeding to arrange labour for work in the fields of PWs.4 and 5 at the time of the incident. Evidently, PWs.1 to 3 are residents of Pedda Koukuntla village, whereas PWs.4 and 5 reside in Y. Ramapuram village. 8 Based on this evidence, the Trial Court observed that PWs.4 and 5 should have travelled to Pedda Koukuntla village and met PWs.1 to 3 at some point, after which all of them would have proceeded together to arrange labour. However, the evidence of PWs 1 to 5 is inconsistent with respect to the location where they had assembled before proceeding through the scene of the offence. The Trial Court has extracted these discrepancies in their testimony in this regard. 19. As seen from the record, PW.3 did not support the prosecution’s case. The Trial Court noted that PW.2 did not state the presence of PW.1 in his evidence, except to state that he took them to the hospital at Uravakonda. The Trial Court observed, after considering the evidence of PWs.1 to 5 that each witness provided a different version regarding how they were proceeding together at the time of the alleged incident. In support of this observation, the Trial Court relied on the testimony of PWs.1 to 5. The Trial Court further noted that the prosecution’s evidence concerning the scene of the incident was not satisfactory. According to the charge sheet, the accused hurled country-made bombs from the terrace of A.1’s house while the victims were proceeding along the street. A similar allegation is also found in Ex.P1 report. The Trial Court observed that, if the bombs were indeed hurled from the terrace of A.1’s house, the persons on the street running from south to north may not have been able to identify the individuals who hurled the bombs, although they might have been able to indicate the direction from which the bombs came. In making this observation, the Trial Court referred to the evidence of PWs.1 to 5 in relation to the topography of the scene of the offence. Upon considering the evidence of PWs.1 to 5, this Court is of the view that the Trial Court’s findings in this regard are sustainable. 20. In this context, the Trial Court referred to the evidence of PW.5, who stated that the bombs were hurled from the northern side, fell behind them, and then exploded. PW.1’s evidence, however, contains contradictions: he 9 states that the street in front of A.1’s house is called Dasarigeri, and then later denies that it is called by that name. 21. PW.5 testified that they had crossed the house of A.1 and that the incident occurred while they were passing by the house of Sreeramulu. He stated that the house of Sreeramulu faces west, while the house of A.1 faces east. The Trial Court expressed doubt about the presence of PW.1 at the scene of the offence, as his presence was not corroborated by PW.2. Further, PW.1 did not sustain any injuries in the incident, which raised additional suspicion regarding his testimony. If PW.1 was not proceeding along with PWs.2 to 5, there was no apparent reason for the accused to attack them. 22. The Trial Court also observed that PW.3, one of the injured, did not implicate the accused. PW.2 stated that he had no enmity or differences with any of the accused, did not belong to any party or group, and was unaware of any reason for the bomb attack. Similarly, PW.4 affirmed that he had no personal differences or disputes with the accused and that there was no necessity for the accused to attack him with the intention to kill. PW.5 also stated that he had no enmity or differences with the accused. Although the prosecution claimed that the accused had enmity with PW.1, the Trial Court, after recording reasons, doubted PW.1’s presence at the scene of the offence. Considering that PW.1 was uninjured, that his presence was not corroborated by PW.2, and that the accused had no enmity with PWs.2 to 5, the Trial Court concluded that there was no sufficient motive for the accused to hurl bombs causing injuries to PWs.2 to 5. 23. It was elicited during the cross-examination of PW.1 that he did not mention in Ex.P1, nor did he state to the police in his statement under Section 162 Cr.P.C., the specific overt acts of hurling bombs by the accused, the injuries sustained by others due to the bomb explosion, or the details of the persons who hurled the bombs. PW.1’s evidence further indicates that he supported the TDP candidate in the 1999 Assembly elections, whereas A.1 to 10 A.8 supported the Congress Party. During cross-examination, PW.1 admitted that he is an accused in a separate case concerning the blasting of Keshava’s house, in which the police filed a case against him and certain Naxalites, alleging that the PWG carried out the blast; PW.1 clarified that he was merely a sympathizer of the PWG for two years. The evidence elicited during the cross-examination of the eyewitnesses casts doubt on the exact location from which the bombs were allegedly hurled. PW.1 stated that the bombs exploded near the house of Sreeramulu; he described the layout of the houses: the house of Venkoba, facing east, abuts the road and is the last house in Dasarigeri; adjacent to it towards the west are the houses of Patil Venkata Ramanappa and Patil Ramaiah, followed by the house of A-1, which is situated approximately 30 meters from the house of Sreeramulu. PW.2, in his cross-examination, admitted that he did not inform the police that the accused hurled bombs from the midde of Boya Sreeramulu’s house, nor did he state that he and PWs.3 to 5 were proceeding to secure labour, that they ran into Dasarigeri as mentioned in Ex.D1, or that they were carried in a lorry as recorded in Ex.D2. 24. The evidence of PW.2 is inconsistent with the version he provided during the investigation. Based on the evidence on record, the Trial Court correctly concluded that, despite discrepancies regarding the scene of the offence, the testimony of PW.4 that A.1 to A.5 hurled bombs cannot be entirely relied upon. In his cross-examination, PW.4 admitted that he did not provide the name of Reddolla Kuruba Yerri Swamy to the police as recorded in Ex.D3. Similarly, a perusal of PW.3’s evidence indicates that he did not state before the police that the accused hurled bombs from the terrace (midde) of the house. 25. In view of these circumstances, and after a comprehensive evaluation of the entire evidence, the Trial Court rightly concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused for the offences under Sections 148, 324, and 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC, as well as Sections 3 and 11 5 of the E.S.Act, beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Trial Court acquitted the accused of the said charges. 26. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of Karnataka3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section 378 of the Code as under: “Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the Court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having seen the witnesses. 27. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh V. Sheeshpal4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of decisions in which this Court is of the considered opinion that State has not made out any case which would permit this Court to exercise such wide powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on the part of learned judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been rightly undertaken by the Court below and therefore when such eventuality is 3 2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184 4 (2017) CriLJ 169 12 reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein after: "10. The above principle has been reiterated by this Court in a number of judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal. 11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the accused should be adopted. 28. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out no case to establish the guilt of the respondents / accused. 29. It is a settled principle of law that if the Trial Court takes the view, it should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by the Trial Court is a plausible one. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to reverse the Trial Court's finding. 30. The Trial Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or misinterpretation by the Trial Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no flaw in the findings of fact by the Trial Court. Therefore, the acquittal of the respondents cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed, and there is no 13 reason to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the point is answered. 31. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal No.714 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Anantapur, in Sessions Case No.242 of 2002, dated 07.01.2004, stands confirmed. Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. _____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 01.09.2025 SAK 14 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 714 of 2009 Date: 01.09.2025 SAK