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High Court of Jharkhand · body

2025 DAILYLAW 33624 (JHR)

PRADEEP KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA

WPC/1008/2021 · 2025-10-09

Sri Ananda Sen

Transfer Petitionbody2025

Judgment text

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2025:JHHC:32401 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 1008 of 2021 ---- Pradeep Kumar aged about 42 years, Son of Sri Jay Kumar Thakur, resident of NK STPP Colony, Tandwa, P.O. and P.S. Tandwa, District- Chatra. … … Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India 2. Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force. Headquarters at Central Coalifields Limited, darbhanga House, PO: GPO, PS: Kotwali, District- Ranchi. 3. Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, CISF Unit C.C.L., NK & Piparwar Area, P.O: Piparwar, P.S.- Khalari 4. Assistant Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, CISF Unit NK STPP, Tandwa, PO & PS: Tandwa, District- Chatra … … Respondents ---- CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. ---- For the Petitioner : Mr. Ashim Kr. Sahani, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Ms. Leena Mukherjee, CGC ---- 11/ 09.10.2025 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Petitioner in this writ petition has prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of Certiorari or an order or direction for quashing the order of punishment dated 10.12.2020 whereby the respondent no.4 imposed a punishment of censure under Rule 34(vi) of Central Industrial Security Force Rules 2001. The Appellate Order dated 29.12.2020 and the Revisional Order dated 28.01.2021 passed by the respondent no. 3 and 2 respectively, are also under challenge. 3. The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner being a Inspector posted at Tandwa under administrative control of CISF Unit CCL NK & Piparwar was issued a charge memorandum dated 03.12.2020 under Rule 37 of CISF Rules 2001 alleging that on 30.10.2020 at about 9:10 PM, without permission of the unit In-charge, he directed the night shift In-charge 2025:JHHC:32401 2 on his mobile to give entry of two loaded vehicles, bearing registration numbers JH01DT4543 & JH01DC3278, in the premises without making any entry on record and accordingly two vehicles of Starcon Company were parked inside the gate, which is in violation of approved Standard Operating Procedure. The petitioner in his reply on 5.12.2020 stated that he was instructed by Sri Rajesh Rana, Deputy General Manager to allow two vehicles of Starcon Company for emergency work with no necessity of making any entries. When petitioner was informed by Aditya Kumar, Shift In- charge that no entry was made, he directed for such entry and the vehicles were permitted to leave. Thereafter the Petitioner was communicated vide memo dated 10.12.2020 (Annexure-4) that the respondent no. 4 has imposed a punishment of Censure under Rule 34(vi) of Central Industrial Security Forces Rules upon him in exercise of his powers under Section 32(1) of Central Industrial Security Forces Rules. The Petitioner being aggrieved filed an appeal before respondent No. 3 on 20.12.2020 which was rejected by respondent no. 3 vide order dated 29.12.2020 (Annexure-6). Further, respondent no. 2 vide order dated 28.01.2021 rejected the revision also filed by the petitioner. Thus the petitioner has challenged the impugned orders dated 10.12.2020, 29.12.2020 and 28.01.2020 before this court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts forth his arguments stating that the petitioner has submitted his explanation on 5.12.2020 denying the allegations in the memo of charge issued to him stating that he received instructions from Sri, Rajesh Rana, Deputy General Manager for allowing two vehicles of Starcon Company for emergency work without the necessity of making entries, which has been audio recorded. He contends that despite the petitioner’s explanation, he has been inflicted with punishment of censure under provisions of Rule 34(vi) of Central Industrial Security Force Rules. He submits that the petitioner is suffering from irreparable loss due to such 2025:JHHC:32401 3 punishment and it is affecting petitioner’s promotional avenues in future. He lastly submitted that the impugned orders passed by the respondent no. 2, 3, and 4 are improper and liable to be set aside. 5. Learned counsel representing the respondents submits that the petitioner conduct was serious in nature for security point of view as the installation comes under Extremist (Naxalite) prone area. The competent authority ordered to conduct preliminary enquiry in the matter wherein prima facie case surfaced against the petitioner. Accordingly, Charge Memorandum under Rule 37 of Central Industrial Security Force Rules 2001 was issued to him for gross negligence and for indiscipline act. After considering the reply of the petitioner he was punished by the Disciplinary Authority. He further submits that the after due consideration and through examination of all evidences on record the Appellate as well as Revisional Authorities did not find any proper and cogent reasons to interfere with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. He also submits that the Disciplinary Authority has taken a very lenient view keeping his future service career in mind and awarded a minor penalty of "Censure" which does not attract any financial loss or future promotional avenues of the petitioner. The counsel lastly submits that in view of the above following reasons petitioner is not entitled for grant of any reliefs as prayed and therefore the writ petition is liable to be set aside being devoid of merits. 6. After hearing the counsel for the parties and perusal of the records, I find that it is evident that the petitioner directed entry of two vehicles in a high-security, naxal-prone installation without proper authorization or following the prescribed Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). Even if done under alleged verbal instructions from a superior officer, the petitioner, being a responsible officer himself, was expected to ensure that due procedures were to be followed, especially in a sensitive zone. The alleged act of letting 2025:JHHC:32401 4 the vehicles enter the campus without any record in entry list is admitted. Further the procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be said to be arbitrary as sufficient opportunity was provided to the petitioner to place his case by submitting proper reply. The Disciplinary Authority has taken into consideration the fact of the case and passed the order impugned. The Appellate and Revisional Authorities have also considered the petitioner’s contentions and passed reasoned orders. There is no violation of the principle of natural justice, nor there is any procedural lapse. 7. The Court does not sit in appeal over departmental findings unless perversity or gross illegality is shown, which is absent in the present case. Further, it is well settled that the punishment awarded to the petitioner, unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review by the court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372, at para-19, has held as hereunder:- “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the 2025:JHHC:32401 5 employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 8. In the present case, I find that, in the punishment order dated 10.12.2020 the Disciplinary Authority has taken a lenient view keeping future of the petitioner in mind and further, the “censure” as per Rule 34(iv) of Central Industrial Security Forces Rules is a minor punishment which is rightly imposed on the petitioner. 9. In view of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the facts of the case, I find no merit in this writ petition. This writ petition, is accordingly, dismissed. (ANANDA SEN, J.) 09 th October, 2025 Prashant. Cp-2