- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.1160 OF 2017 (PAR-) BETWEEN: 1. SRI S SIDDARAMU S/O LATE S SIDDAIAH, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, R/AT NATIVE OF CHIKKA MANDYA KASABA HOBLI, MANDYA TALUK NOW R/AT 4TH CROSS, HANIYAMBADI ROAD,, HOSAHALLI EXTENSION, MANDYA CITY …APPELLANT (BY SRI.K.R.NAGARAJA, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SMT CHANNAMMA W/O LATE S. SIDDAIAH, AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS, R/AT CHIKKAMANDYA VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, MANDYA TALUK 2. SRI. PAPANNA S/O LATE S. SIDDAIAH, AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS, R/AT CHIKKAMANDYA VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, MANDYA TALUK Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 3. SRI. KUMARA C S S/O LATE S. SIDDAIAH, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, R/AT CHIKKAMANDYA VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, MANDYA TALUK 4. SRI. MALLESHA C S S/O LATE S. SIDDAIAH, AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS, R/AT CHIKKAMANDYA VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, MANDYA TALUK …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.K.L.SREENIVASA, ADVOCATE FOR R-4; R-2 AND R-3 ARE SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) REGULAR FIRST APPEAL FILED UNDER SECTION 96 AND ORDER 41 RULE 2 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 31.3.2017 PASSED IN OS NO.14/2013 ON THE FILE OF THE I ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND CJM, MANDYA PARTLY DECREEING THE SUIT FOR PARTITION AND SEPARATE POSSESSION. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 ORAL JUDGMENT This appeal by the plaintiff in O.S.No.14/2013, challenging the judgment & decree dated 31.03.2017, on the file of I Additional Senior Civil Judge and CJM., Mandya. 2. The present appeal arises out of suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff against the respondents/defendants for partition and separate possession of his alleged share in the suit schedule properties. The suit schedule properties comprises of 24 items of immovable properties amongst which the Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the appellant/plaintiff in respect of all the properties except items 13, 14, 15 and 24 in relation to which the Trial Court dismissed the suit of the appellant/plaintiff against the respondents/defendants. 3. The relationship between the parties is not in dispute. The appellant/plaintiff is the son of Smt. Channamma and Late Siddaiah. The said Channamma has been arraigned as defendant No.1 in the suit. - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 4. The respondent Nos.2 to 4/defendant Nos.2 to 4 are the children of Channamma and Siddaiah along with the plaintiff. 5. During pendency of the appeal, Smt. Channamma having expired, this Court treated the plaintiff as well as the respondent Nos.2 to 4 as the only legal representatives of the deceased respondent No.1/defendant No.1 - Channamma, vide order dated 07.08.2024 passed on I.A.No.1/2024 as hereunder: “Heard on IA No.1/2024. Respondent No.1 is said to have been died. The appellant being the son of respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2 to 4 are the only remaining legal representatives of deceased respondent No.1. An application is filed to treat them as the legal representatives of deceased respondent No.1. The appellant being already there on record, prosecuting his own interest against his own father in the appeal. As such, he cannot be treated as the legal representative of respondent No.1 insofar as to prosecute the appeal as legal representatives of his father. Insofar as other legal representatives are concerned, respondents No.2 to 4 being the legal representatives of deceased respondent No.1, 'right to be sued' survives only - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 in them as 'right to sue' is already accrued in favour of the appellant. Accordingly, the application is allowed in part. Respondents No.2 to 4 are treated as the legal representatives of respondent No.1. Learned counsel for the appellant to amend the cause title accordingly and file amended appeal memo. Post the matter for Hearing.” 6. Heard learned Counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for respondent No.4 and perused the material on record. 7. On perusal of the material on record, it would indicate that the appellant/plaintiff who is none other than the son of defendant No.1 - Channamma and defendant Nos.2 to 4 being her other children instituted the aforesaid suit for partition and separate possession of alleged 1/5th share in the suit schedule immovable properties. 8. It is the matter of record and fact that amongst 24 items of suit schedule properties, all the properties except items 13, 14, 15 and 24 were the joint family properties and upon the demise of Siddaiah on 01.06.2010, the undivided - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 share in the suit schedule properties except 13, 14, 15 and 24 devolved upon the plaintiff and the defendants. However, items 13, 14, 15 and 24 having stood in the name of Channamma, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the same were separate, absolute and self acquired properties of Smt. Channama, the same being her Sthreedhana properties and in the light of judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gangamma & Others v. G. Nagarathnamma & Others reported in (2009) 15 SCC 756, held that neither the appellant nor the respondent Nos.2 to 4 who have any shares in the aforesaid Sthreedhana properties of Smt. Channamma. 9. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree to the limited/restricted extent of dismissing the suit insofar as items 13, 14, 15 and 24 are concerned, the appellant/plaintiff is before this Court by way of the present appeal. 10. It is the matter of record that the respondents/defendants have not challenged the impugned judgment and decree insofar as it relates to the remaining items of suit schedule properties and the said impugned judgment and decree in relation to all other items except items - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 13, 14, 15 and 24 has attained finality and become conclusive and binding upon the parties. 11. Infact it is relevant to state that though the respondents/defendants propounded their alleged Will of Channamma, the same was never produced and consequently the Trial Court proceeded to decree the suit in favour of the appellant/plaintiff in relation to the properties except items 13, 14, 15 and 24 which are the subject matter of the present appeal. 12. A perusal of the material on record discloses that during pendency of the present appeal, Smt. Channamma expired and appellant and respondent Nos.2 to 4 have been treated as the only legal representatives of deceased respondent No.1 - Channamma. During her life time itself, aforesaid Channamma executed a registered gift deed vide Ex.D.4 dated 12.09.2011, gifting item No.24 of the suit schedule properties in favour of respondent No.4/defendant No.4 to the exclusion of the appellant and respondent Nos.2 and 3. - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 13. Under these circumstances, in the light of the registered gift deed executed by respondent No.1 - Channamma in favour of respondent No.4, neither the appellant nor respondent Nos.2 and 3 can have claim over item No.24 of the suit schedule properties and consequently, the Trial Court is fully justified in dismissing the suit insofar as item No.24 of the suit schedule properties is concerned and consequently, the impugned judgment and decree insofar as it relates to dismissing the suit of the appellant/plaintiff in respect of item No.24 of the suit schedule properties deserves to be confirmed and affirmed by this Court in the present appeal. 14. Insofar as contentions urged by the appellant/plaintiff that respondent No.1 Channamma was the house wife and did not had any source of income, much less independent source of income to acquire item No.24 of the suit schedule properties or items 13 to 15 which stood in the her name is concerned, in the light of the provisions contained under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act by the Apex Court in the case of Gangamma & Others v. G. Nagarathnamma & Others reported in (2009) 15 SCC 756, the said items 13, 14, 15 and 24 would not partake the - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 nature of joint family properties in the hands of Channamma and on the other hand, the same would enlarge and blossom into her absolute/exlusive Sthreedhana properties as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as hereunder: A.K. Ganguly, J.— Leave granted. The subject-matter of challenge before this Court is the judgment and order dated 1-12-2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Regular First Appeal No. 617 of 2004 and in Cross-Objection No. 47 of 2006 filed under Order 41 Rule 22 against the judgment and decree dated 28-1-2004 passed in Original Suit No. 6169 of 1992 by the XXth Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City. 2. The dispute arose out of a partition suit filed by (i) Smt Nagarathnamma wife of late G. Srinivas, and (ii) by G. Hemlata who was a minor at the time of filing of the suit in 1992. Plaintiff 2 was the only child of Plaintiff 1, who was her mother and natural guardian and she represented Plaintiff 2. The plaintiffs are Respondents 1 and 2 before this Court. This suit was filed for partition claiming one-third share in the suit properties and also claiming separate possession by metes and bounds and for mesne profits and other incidental reliefs. The first defendant in the suit is the mother-in-law of Plaintiff 1 and Defendants 2, 3 and 4 are the daughters of Defendant 1 and Defendant 5 is the son of Defendant 1. Defendants 6 to 14 are tenants in the suit properties. 3. The plaint case is that Shri Ganganna, the father-in-law of Plaintiff 1 expired in 1973 leaving behind his wife, three daughters and two sons. The genealogical table of the family is as under: - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 4. The suit properties consist of both agricultural lands and urban properties and the plaint case is that they are ancestral properties belonging to the joint family. The further plaint case is that though some of the properties stand in the name of the first defendant, they were bought benami in her name by the late Ganganna out of the income from agricultural lands and the income of the first plaintiff's husband who was working as an accountant in a private firm and drawing salary. He also had a leather business and had earning from running a taxi. Thus he was contributing seven to eight thousand rupees every month to the family and out of such income the suit properties were purchased. 5. The first defendant being a housewife had no income to purchase properties. However, later on relationship between Plaintiff 1 and her husband and Defendant 1 became strained and Plaintiff 1 and her husband had to leave the ancestral house. The plaint case is that out of the properties those at Items 1 to 4 are joint family properties. 6. In the written statement filed by the first defendant, the plaint case was denied excepting the relationship between the parties. The other defendants adopted the stand of the first defendant. The trial court however decreed the suit for partition in part and held that the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/6th share in the schedule property and to separate possession by metes and bounds. They are also entitled to an enquiry into mesne profits under Order 20 Rule 12 of the - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 Civil Procedure Code. Challenging the said judgment, the present appellants filed a regular first appeal being RFA No. 617 of 2004 and the respondent-plaintiffs filed a cross- objection, as mentioned above. 7. In the first appeal the High Court found that no evidence was adduced by the appellant to show that she had any independent sources of income. It has also come in evidence that at the time of death of the husband of the appellant only G. Srinivas was sixteen years old and the other children of the appellant herein were minors and they had no income. The High Court found that evidence was adduced to show that the husband of the plaintiff had substantial income and he owned an Ambassador car. In view of this evidence, the High Court held that properties at Items 1 and 2 are joint family properties. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that without any evidence the High Court came to a finding that the husband of Plaintiff 1 had substantial income. From the list of the documentary evidence produced before the trial court nothing appears on record to indicate that there was any document evidencing the income of the husband of Plaintiff 1. Therefore the High Court fell into an error by holding that though the properties at Items 1 and 2 are recorded in the name of the appellants, they are joint family properties. 9. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) has a bearing on the issue. As the properties at Items 1 and 2 are recorded in the name of the appellant, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary in this case, the appellant by operation of Section 14(1) of the said Act is the full owner of those properties. In the facts of this case discussed above it has to be accepted that those properties are not joint properties but the appellant is the sole owner of those properties. 10. The principle laid down in Section 14(1) of the said Act has been read by courts in a very comprehensive manner since the said Act overrides the old law on stridhana in - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 respect of properties possessed by a female Hindu. In Eramma v. Veerupana [AIR 1966 SC 1879] Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court held that Section 14(1) of the Act contemplates that a female Hindu, who in the absence of the said provision would have been a limited owner of the property, will now become full owner by virtue of the said section. Such female Hindu will have all powers of disposition to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder. 11. Again, in Punithavalli Ammal v. Minor Ramalingam [(1970) 1 SCC 570 : AIR 1970 SC 1730] a three-Judge Bench of this Court reiterated the position that the said Act has overriding effect and confers full ownership on Hindu female and made it very clear that rights conferred under Section 14(1) to a Hindu female are not restricted or limited by any rule of Hindu Law. In the opinion of the Court in Punithavalli [(1970) 1 SCC 570 : AIR 1970 SC 1730] the said section makes a clear departure from all texts of Hindu laws and rules and those texts and rules cannot be used for circumventing the plain meaning of Section 14(1) of the said Act. 12. In Seth Badri Prasad v. Kanso Devi [(1969) 2 SCC 586 : AIR 1970 SC 1963] the learned Judges held that the word “acquired” in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the said Act has to be given the widest possible meaning (see paras 6 and 7). In V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy [(1977) 3 SCC 99 : AIR 1977 SC 1944] Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court held that sub-section (1) of Section 14 is very large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu. Regardless of whether such property was possessed by a female Hindu on the date of commencement of the Act or was subsequently acquired or possessed, she would be the full owner of the property. 13. In view of such consistent views taken by this Court on the interpretation of Section 14, we hold that Section 14(1) of the said Act would apply in respect of the properties which stand in the name of the appellant and the appellant would be the full owner of those properties. - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 14. Therefore, the order of the High Court cannot be upheld and is set aside. The order of the learned trial Judge is affirmed. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There is no order as to costs. 15. It is well settled that there is no presumption in Hindu Law that the property acquired with the aid of joint family funds in the name of a female member of a Hindu undivided family would become a joint family property as held by this Court in the case of R.Subbammal and others v. K.Subbalakshmi and others in RFA No. 2522/2007 dated 23.02.2024: “Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 22.09.2007 passed in O.S.No.8294/2002 on the file of the learned XVII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore (CCH- 16), dismissing the suit for declaration and injunction, the plaintiffs have filed this appeal 2. The parties would be referred to as per their ranks before the trial Court for the sake of convenience. 3. Brief facts of the case of the plaintiffs are as below: Plaintiff No.1 is mother of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3. Defendant No.1 is the wife of R.S.Mani, who is another son of plaintiff No.1. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are the sons of defendant No.1 and R.S.Mani. Plaintiff No.1 Subbammal is the absolute owner of the suit schedule 'A' property, which is a site with structure facing towards North measuring 30 ft x 40 ft.+ 42 ft., Schedule 'B', 'C' and 'D' properties are part and portions of schedule 'A' property. 4. The plaintiffs contended that the suit schedule 'A' property was purchased by plaintiff No.1 in the year 1972 and she constructed a building over the same. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 are residing in schedule 'D' property which is on the southern side of schedule 'A' property. Defendant Nos. 4 to 8 were the tenants in occupation of the portions of schedule 'A' property. The plaintiffs contended that plaintiff No.1 had gifted the schedule 'B' and 'C' properties which are on the western and eastern side of schedule 'A' property to plaintiff No.2 and plaintiff No.3 under two registered Gift Deeds dated 26-6-2002 and she retained the schedule 'D' property for herself. The plaintiffs contended that a few days prior to filing of the suit, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 made efforts to change katha of the properties into their names based on a Sale Deed alleged to have been executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3. On enquiry, the plaintiffs came to know that defendant No.1 representing that he is a Power of Attorney Holder of plaintiff No.1 dated 07-07-1984, has executed sale deed in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 on 10-10-2001 even though plaintiff No.1 had not executed any such Power of Attorney. It was alleged that the said power of attorney dated 07-07-1984 is a forged and fabricated document. Therefore, the plaintiffs contended that defendant Nos.1 to 3 do not have any right, title or interest over the suit schedule properties. Hence, they prayed for a declaration that there is no valid Power of Attorney by plaintiff No.1 in favour of defendant No.1 and consequently, to declare that the sale deed dated 10-10- 2001 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 is not binding on the plaintiffs. Consequentially, they also sought for injunction to restrain defendant Nos. 1 to 3 from interfering in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule 'A' to 'D' properties. 5. After service of summons, the defendants appeared before the trial Court through their counsel and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 filed their written statement denying the plaint averments. They contended that plaintiff No.1 Subbammal is an illiterate and had no source of income. The husband of defendant No.1, R.S. Mani, was a Carpenter by Profession and he contributed money to purchase the site in the name of plaintiff No.1. Plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 were not residing with plaintiff No.1. It was contended that the said R.S. Mani borrowed money and constructed residential building in the year 1981-1982. It was contended that the loan borrowed by plaintiff No.1 and R.S. Mani accumulated and therefore, plaintiff No.1 was constrained to sell the suit schedule property to one N. Venkatesh under a registered Sale Seed dated 31-5-1982. In turn, the said N. Venkatesh has - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 executed an agreement agreeing to re-convey the suit schedule property in favour of plaintiff No.1 provided the entire loan amount was paid. Accordingly, a Reconveyance Agreement was executed on 19-09-1983. 6. It was alleged that the plaintiffs could not discharge the loan and therefore, at the request of the plaintiffs, defendant No.1 discharged the loan by borrowing money from her parents. Under the above circumstances, in order to retain the property, plaintiff No.1 has executed the General Power of Attorney in favour of defendant No.1 on 07-07-1984. Therefore, the plaintiffs are estopped from contending that plaintiff No.1 had not executed any General Power of Attorney. It was defendant No.1 who was looking after the property and collecting rents from the tenants and in order to discharge the debts borrowed from her parents, defendant No.1 has sold the property in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 under a registered Sale Deed dated 10-10- 2001. Hence, the plaintiffs have no right in whatsoever manner over the suit schedule properties and they were never in possession of any portion of the suit schedule properties. In October, 2002, at the request of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3, the defendants have permitted the occupation of portion of the suit schedule property by the plaintiffs. Thus, contending that plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 are in permissive possession and occupation of a portion of the property, the defendants have sought for dismissal of the suit. They claimed that the plaintiffs are liable to be evicted from the suit schedule property and as such, they made a counter claim for eviction of the plaintiffs. 7. In the rejoinder, the plaintiffs denied that they were in permissive possession of the suit schedule property and they are liable to be evicted. They contended that the entire property was purchased by plaintiff No.1 and for any reason, this Court hold that the Power of Attorney was executed by plaintiff No.1 in favour of defendant No.1, then the entire property has to be considered as a joint family property and therefore, the same has to be divided amongst the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in the proportion of their respective shares. 8. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the issues and additional issues. Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 are examined as PWs.1 and defendant No.2 was examined as DW1 and a witness was examined as DW2 and - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 Exhibits D1 to D19 were marked in evidence and after hearing both the sides, the trial Court has answered issues framed as below: Sl. No. Issues Findings 1. Whether the plaintiffs proves that the Power of Attorney dated 7.7.1984 alleged to have been executed by plaintiff No.1 in favour of defendant No.1 is null and void? In the affirmative 2. Whether the defendant Nos.1 to 3 proves that Power of Attorney dated 7.7.1984 executed by plaintiff No.1 in favour of defendant No.1 is valid? In the negative 3. Whether the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 proves that there is a valid Sale Deed dated 10.10.2001 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3? In the negative 4. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the Sale Deed dated 10.10.2001 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.2 ad 3 is not binding on the plaintiffs? In the affirmative 5. Whether the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 proves that plaintiff No.1 had no title to execute two gift deed dated 26.6.2002 in favour of plaintiff No.2 and in favour of plaintiff No.3 are not valid? In the affirmative 6. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the two gift deeds dated 26.6.2002 executed by plaintiff No.1 in favour of plaintiff No.2 and in favour of plaintiff No.3 are valid? In the negative - 17 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 7. Whether the defendant No.1 to 3 prove that Sri R.S Mani husband of 1st defendant and father of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 purchased vacant site in the name of his mother, first plaintiff and that Sri R.S Manu constructed residential building over the site by availing loan? In the negative 8. Whether the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 proves that the 1st plaintiff has sold the property in favour of Sri N.V Venkatesh under Sale Deed dated 31.5.1982? In the affirmative 9. Whether the defendant Nos.1 to 3 proves that Sri N Venkatesh executed reconvey agreement dated 19.9.1993 in favour of 1st plaintiff as claimed? In the affirmative 10. Whether the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 proves that the 1st defendant borrowed money from her parents and discharged the loan of N Venkatesh and the 1st plaintiff executed General Power of Attorney in favour of 1st defendant on 7.7.1984 as alleged? Partly in the affirmative 11. Whether the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 proves that the suit is not properly valued and the court fee paid is insufficient? In the negative 12. What Order or Decree? As per final order below for the following Additional Issues 1. Whether the defendants prove that defendant Nos.2 and 3 are the absolute owners of the written statement Schedule property as claimed in the In the negative - 18 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 counter claim? 2. Whether the defendants are entitled for possession of the written statement Schedule property? In the negative 3. Whether the Court fee paid by the defendants is sufficient? In the negative 4. Whether the plaintiffs prove that counter claim is barred by limitation? In the negative 9. The said judgment and decree is challenged by the plaintiffs in this appeal. 10. On issuance of notice by this Court, despite service of notice through paper publication respondent Nos. 1 to 3/defendant Nos. 1 to 3 did not appear before this Court and engaged the services of any counsel and notice to respondent Nos.4 to 8 are served. 11. On admitting the appeal, the trial Court records have been secured and heard the arguments by learned counsel for appellants. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants in his arguments submitted that, the trial Court has committed an error by holding that the suit schedule property are joint family properties. He submitted that the suit schedule property was purchased by plaintiff No.1 under the sale deed Ex.D1 out of her own income. Even the property was purchased by her husband in her name, it becomes her property. He submits that, it is settled principle of law that, if any property has been purchased by a woman in her name, it becomes her absolute property. It is submitted that there is no joint family in respect of the property which is belonging to a woman and the source for acquisition of the property of a woman cannot be probed into. In this regard, he relies on the judgment in the case of Kanakarathnammal Vs. V.S.Loganatha Mudaliar and another1. He also relies on the judgment in the case of Smt.Pushpa Devi Vs. the Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi,2 Mangathai Ammal (died) through 1 AIR 1965 SC 271 2 AIR 1977 sc 2230 - 19 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 LRs Vs. Rajeswari3 and in the case of Marabasappa (D) by LRs and others Vs. Ningappa (D) by LRs and others4. 13. He further submitted that the sale deed executed by plaintiff No.1 Subbammal in favour of one N.Venkatesh and referred to by defendant Nos. 1 to 3 was a Nominal Sale Deed. The said Sale Deed was not acted upon and said N. Venkatesh has not come in possession of suit schedule property and though this is an admitted fact by the defendants, the trial Court fell in error and held that title of the suit schedule property has been transferred in favour of N.Venkatesh and therefore, the plaintiffs and defendants are not the title holders. When the trial Court holds that the plaintiffs and defendants were not the holders of the title, it was directly in the teeth of the finding of the trial Court that the suit schedule property is a joint family property, for, the alienation was not approved by other members. Therefore, he contends that the finding of the trial Court is totally erroneous and not sustainable in law. He further submitted that the said N. Venkatesh had endorsed on the agreement that he has received the entire consideration amount and had agreed to reconvey the property to plaintiff No.1. However, he did not do so and therefore, it is submitted that the sale deed allegedly executed in favour of the said N.Venkatesh was in fact, loan document, but not a conveyance of title. In other words, it was a Nominal Sale Deed. 14. He further submitted that plaintiff No.1 has gifted the portion of the suit schedule property in favour plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 under a registered Gift Deeds dated 26-6-2002 and in pursuance to the said Gift Deeds, they have become absolute owners of the respective portions. It is submitted that appellant No.1 had retained the portion of the property i.e. schedule 'D' property with her till her death. It is submitted that even though there were oral admissions by PW.1 as well as DW.1 that money was contributed for the construction of the suit schedule property and there were several transactions showing the mortgage and redemption of the mortgage and letting of tenements, it would not come in the way of question of title held by plaintiff No.1. Simply, because it is held that husband of defendant No.1 had 3 AIR 2019 SC 2918 4 2011 AIR SCW 6059 - 20 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 contributed certain amount for the construction of the building; the property remained to be that of plaintiff No.1, who was the mother of the husband of defendant No.1 as well as plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 cannot be negated. Therefore, the said transactions cannot be of any relevance or can act as a clog on the title of plaintiff No.1. 15. Lastly, he contended that defendant No.1 had sold portion of the property to none else than to her sons on the basis of a Power of Attorney allegedly executed by plaintiff No.1. Obviously, the said power of attorney has not been produced. Therefore, the basis on which defendant No.1 had acquired the right to transmit the property has not been established. On this count, the finding of the trial Court, even though is correct, it failed to hold that plaintiff No.1 remained to be the absolute owner of the property. When the trial Court holds that either the plaintiffs or the defendants do not have the title, it really fell in error. The trial Court has to appreciate the evidence on record on the basis of the available evidence and the trial Court should have considered the principle of preponderance of probability in arriving at a conclusion. However, the trial Court has held that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants are the holders of title of the suit schedule property, which is grossly erroneous. 16. After hearing the arguments by learned counsel for the appellants, the points that arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the trial Court fell in error in holding that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the sale deed executed in favour of N. Venkatesh was a nominal sale deed? (ii) Whether the plaintiff No.1 has proved that she was the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and she had gifted two portions of the suit schedule property to plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3? (iii) To what relief the parties are entitled to? 17. The first aspect to be considered is, whether the title to the suit schedule property remained with plaintiff No.1 or defendant No.1 was justified in transferring portion of property to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 on the basis of a power of attorney? - 21 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 18. It is relevant to note that the acquisition of the suit schedule property in the name of the plaintiff No.1 is not in dispute. It is the case of the plaintiffs that, plaintiff No.1 acquired the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed. The said registered sale deed is produced by plaintiffs at Ex.P1. The fact that the property was acquired by plaintiff No.1 is not in dispute. In this regard, it is necessary to consider whether the property remained to be the absolute property of plaintiff No.1 in her hands or it was the joint family property? 19. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Kanakarathnammal Vs.V.S. Loganatha Mudaliar and another referred supra. In para 8 of the said judgment, it was held as below: "8. It is true that the actual management of the property was done by the appellant's father; but that would inevitably be so having regard to the fact that in ordinary Hindu families the property belonging exclusively to a female member would also be normally managed by the Manager of the family; so that the fact that appellant's mother did not take actual part in the management of the property would not materially affect the appellant's case that the property belonged to her mother. The rent was paid by the tenants and accepted by the appellant's father; but that, again, would be consistent with what ordinarily happens in such matters in an undivided Hindu family. If the property belongs to the wife and the husband manages the property on her behalf, it would be ideal to contend that the management by the husband of the properties is inconsistent with the title of his wife to the said properties. What we have said about the management of the properties would be equally true about the actual possession of the properties because even if the wife was the owner of the properties, possession may continue with the husband as a matter of convenience. We are satisfied that the High Court did not correctly appreciate the effect of the several admissions made by the appellant's father in respect of the title of his wife to the property in question. Therefore, we hold that the property had been purchased by the appellant's mother in her own name though the consideration which was paid by her for the said transaction had been received by her from her husband." - 22 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 20. Further, in the case of Smt. Pushpa Devi Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, referred supra, it was categorically held by the Apex Court that 'a female member of the joint family cannot blend her separate property with the joint family property'. In para 16, by relying on another judgment of the Apex Court, it was held as below: "16. xxx xxx xxx While concluding the discussion on this topic, the Court observed at page 787 (of SCR) : (at p.1272 of AIR) that on first principles, the result which was canvased by the appellants was inconsistent both with "the basic notion of blending" and with "the basic character of a limited owner's title to the property held by her". The 'basic notion of blending" which the Court has highlighted at several places in its judgment is that it is the coparcener who alone can blend his separate property with joint family property and that the said right is not available to a female who, though a member of the joint family, is not a coparcener. We are clear that Mallesappa is an authority for the proposition that a Hindu female, not being a coparcener, cannot blend her separate property with joint family property. Whether that separate property is the female's absolute property or whether she has a limited estate in that property would make no difference to that position. We may mention that Mallesappa is quoted in Mulla's Hindu Law (14th Ed. p. 277) as an authority for the proposition that the doctrine of blending cannot be applied to the case of a Hindu female who has acquired immovable property from her father, for sale is not a coparcener." 21. Further, the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mangathai Ammal (Died) through her LRs Vs. Rajeswari referred supra, lays down that, on the ground of Benami transaction by husband in favour of wife, out of the proceeds of the ancestral property cannot be a ground to hold that the property is of a joint family. In this judgment, it was held as below: "xxx xxx xxx However, considering the date of transactions with respect to the suit properties and the ancestral properties sold by husband, it can be seen that all the suit properties - 23 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 purchased in the name of wife were much prior to the sale of the ancestral properties by husband. Therefore, also it cannot be said that the suit properties were purchased in the name of wife by husband from the funds received by selling of the ancestral properties. It can be said that husband might have purchased the properties in the name of wife in order to provide his wife with a secured life in the event of his death. It is required to be noted that the benami transaction came to be amended in the year 2016. As per S. 3 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act 1988, there was a presumption that the transaction made in the name of the wife and children is for their benefit. By Benami Amendment Act, 2016, S. 3 (2) of the Benami Transaction Act, 1988 the statutory presumption. which was rebuttable, has been omitted. Once it is held that the Sale Deeds in favour of wife were not benami transactions, in that case, suit properties, which were purchased in name wife and the same can be said to be her self-acquired properties and therefore cannot be said to be Joint Family Properties, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have any share in the suit properties." 22. Lastly, in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Marabasappa (D) by LRs and others Vs. Ningappa,(D) by LRs and others referred supra, it was held that when the property was gifted to a woman by her father under a registered Gift Deed, she is the owner of the said land and she continued to be in possession of the said land till she bequeath the same. The property cannot be brought into the hotchpot of the joint family property and would not be available for partition. At para 18, it was held as below: "18. xxxxxxx Stridhana belonging to a woman is a property of which she is the absolute owner and which she may dispose of at her pleasure, if not in all cases during coverture, in all cases during widowhood. Since the plaintiffs have proved that Parwatevva had not alienated the property by executing a Will in favour of defendant No. 5 during her lifetime, the property is the absolute property of Parvatevva and would not be available for partition among the members of joint family since it does not partake the character of joint family property." - 24 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 23. Examining the case on hand in the light of above proposition of law, it is clear that when the property is purchased in the name of plaintiff No.1 either by the contribution of the husband of the defendant No.1 R.S. Mani or by the husband of the plaintiff No.1, the property remains to be the absolute property of plaintiff No.1. It cannot be said that plaintiff No.1 had allowed the property to be put into the hotchpot of the joint family and the principle of blending will not be applicable. The property remains to be the absolute property of the woman. Even the source for purchasing the property cannot be probed into as per the wordings of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, even if a woman had limited estate in the property, it converts into an absolute holding. The defendants or plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 cannot contend that it is the joint family property. When the property is acquired by a female member, the principle of blending or treating the same as the joint family property is totally illegal to such contention. Hence, the trial Court has clearly fell into an error in holding that the suit schedule property though it was purchased by plaintiff No.1, is the joint family property of the plaintiffs and defendants. 24. It may be true that, the evidence of PW1, PW2 and depositions of DW.1 and DW.2 show that building was constructed over the site purchased by plaintiff No.1 with the contribution by her son R.S.Mani as well as plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2. The evidence discloses that several money transactions were there and there were mortgages of the portions of the property in the form of Lease and even some portions of the property were given on rent. These transactions entered into by plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 as well as the husband of defendant No.1, R.S. Mani, are only for the purpose of the management of the property. It may be true that there were contribution by them for construction of the building. That could not take away the right of plaintiff No.1 over the suit schedule property. Therefore, the conclusions reached by the trial Court that suit schedule property is the joint family property cannot hold any water. 25. The next question that arises is, whether the plaintiffs have lost title over the suit schedule property by way of sale deed executed by her in favour of N. Venkatesh. On this aspect, the plaintiffs as well as the defendants do not have any conflicting views. The plaintiffs contend that there was a need for money and therefore, a sum of - 25 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 Rs.40,000/- was received from N. Venkatesh and she had executed a Sale Deed. It may be true that loan was raised for the purpose of construction over the suit property. It is also true that defendant No.1 also contributed for the construction of the building. In the evidence of PW1/plaintiff No.1 at some point, she admits that her son R.S.Mani had contributed for the construction. At some other point, she states that husband of defendant No.1 had not contributed any amount. Be that as it may, that did not take away the title of plaintiff No.1 over the suit schedule property in any way. It is not the case of defendants that the Sale Deed executed in favour of N.Venkatesh was an absolute sale deed and it was acted upon. However, it is the case of the defendants that brother and father of defendant No.1 had contributed for repayment of the loan to said N. Venkatesh. But N. Venkatesh is not a party to the present suit. 26. It is not in dispute that N. Venkatesh had endorsed on the agreement that he had received the entire consideration amount to reconvey the property. On the contrary, defendant No.1 contend that her father and brother had contributed for payment of loan to N. Venkatesh and there were documents to establish the same. DW.2 is none other than the brother of PW1. He states that he and his father, stayed in the suit schedule property for some time and they had paid the amount to the tune of Rs.40,000/- to the said N. Venkatesh and thereby, they got the endorsement. In other words, the Sale Deed was in fact, was in the like of the mortgage to N. Venkatesh and it was DW.2 and his father who had redeemed it. 27. In order to establish this contention, it was necessary for the defendants to show that the money due to N. Venkatesh was paid by the said R.S. Mani, and the father of defendant No.1. Though, it is contended that there are documents, no such documentary evidence is available on record. On the contrary, the endorsement produced at Ex.D17 and Ex.D18 by the plaintiffs show that said N. Venkatesh re-conveyed the property and the money of Rs.10,000/-was paid by none else than plaintiff No.1 on 19- 09-1993 and 27-2-1995 to the tune of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.11,000/- respectively. If at all, defendant No.1, her husband or her father had paid the money to said N. Venkatesh, the same would have been written in Ex.D17 and Ex. D.18. But on the contrary, it is endorsed that it was - 26 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 plaintiff No.1 who paid the amount. Under these circumstances, there is nothing on record which would show that the money for re-conveyance of the property was paid by the husband of defendant No.1 or her father. 28. Though DWs.1 and 2 contend that there are documents in the form of Demand Promissory Notes etc., no such cogent evidence is available on record. The said N. Venkatesh would have been a better witness to speak about the same and the defendants have not adduced such evidence. Therefore, when it is available on records that plaintiff No.1 had trust in her eldest son i.e. Mani and he had the custody of all documents, it was incumbent upon defendant No.1 to establish that the loan was repaid to N. Venkatesh by her husband R.S.Mani and he alone had paid the amount. The re-conveyance is not in favour of said R.S. Mani. On the other hand, N. Venkatesh had agreed to reconvey the property to plaintiff No.1. Under these circumstances, the contentions of the defendants that the husband of defendant No.1 had full title over the suit schedule property cannot be accepted. 29. The second aspect put forth by the defendants is that plaintiff No.1 had executed General Power of Attorney authorizing defendant No.1 to sell the property. Though the alleged sale deed in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 may contain an averment that defendant No.1 was the GPA Holder, such General Power of Attorney has not been produced. Therefore, when the document on the basis of which defendant No.1 had executed the sale deed in favour of her sons is not produced, an adverse inference has to be drawn. It was incumbent upon the defendants to produce such General Power of Attorney alleged to have been executed by plaintiff No.1. There is no such authority for defendant No.1 to convey the portion of suit schedule property to defendant No.1 to N.Venkatesh. Under these circumstances, the transfer of the title to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 is also not established by the defendants. 30. The above facts and circumstances would establish that plaintiff No.1 Subbammal continued to be the absolute owner in title to the suit schedule property till her heath. Obviously, she died during the pendency of this appeal on 20-1-2008. The transactions by plaintiff No.1 in favour of N. Venkatesh was a Nominal Sale Deed and it had not conveyed any title to the said N. Venkatesh. Therefore, it is evident - 27 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 that she continued to be the absolute owner of the suit schedule 'A' property comprising of suit schedule 'B', 'C' and 'D' property. 31. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court would show that in para 22 of the judgment, it appears that trial Court was confused about the Gift Deeds executed by plaintiff No.1 in favour of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 and the sale deeds executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3. It failed to consider that the alleged Sale Deed in the name of Venkatesh, was a Nominal Sale Deed and it was not acted upon. Obviously, the revenue entries had not changed in the books of Tax Assessment Register of the Local Body i.e. Bangalore City Corporation and said N. Venkatesh had not come in possession of the suit schedule property. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiffs that it was a Nominal Sale Deed could not have been brushed aside by the trial Court. It appears that the trial Court has believed the sale deed executed by the plaintiff No.1 in favour of N. Venkatesh and validated the said sale deed, eventhough the other records show that the name of plaintiff No.1 continued in the municipal records. In that view of the matter, the trial Court has fell in error in holding that Subbammal, plaintiff No.1 had no title to the suit schedule property. 32. It is also relevant to note that the trial Court had failed to note that the property acquired by a female hindu cannot be blended with the joint family under any circumstances. Such blending with the joint family is permissible only if such woman is a coparcener. Obviously, plaintiff No.1 was never the coparcener of the family of her husband and her sons. Therefore, if the husband of plaintiff No.1 as well as the father of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 as well as R.S.Mani had purchased the property in the name of plaintiff No.1, it remains to be her individual property and it cannot be termed as the joint family property. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the joint family of husband of plaintiff No.1 i.e. Ramachari and his sons had sufficient nucleus to purchase the property. There is no evidence available in this regard. Therefore, the impugned judgment of the trial Court is not sustainable in law. It had overlooked the nature of the property and the fact that the sale deed in favour of N. Venkatesh was a Nominal Sale Deed. It failed to observe that there was no such dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants that it is a Nominal Sale Deed. Though the defendants admit that N. Venkatesh - 28 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 going to re-convey, it is their contention that such re- conveyance has to be made in favour of R.S. Mani. There is no material on the record to show this aspect. Hence, this Court is unable to appreciate the views of the trial Court. Under these circumstances, the impugned judgment is not sustainable in law. 33. During the pendency of this appeal, plaintiff No.1 Subbammal has died. Subbammal had executed two Gift Deeds in respect of portion of the properties in favour of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3. These Gift Deeds are produced at Exs.P4 and P5. When plaintiff No.1 was the absolute owner of the property, she had every right to alienate the property as per her wish and will. Therefore, these Gift Deeds executed in favour of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 are to be upheld. Therefore, plaintiff No.1 had the remaining property as her absolute property at the time of her death. As a consequence, plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 and defendants would get shares by way of succession under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. Consequently, the suit schedule 'D' property is liable to be partitioned equally by plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 and the husband of defendant No.1 in equal proportions. 34. It is relevant to note that by way of rejoinder, the plaintiffs have sought for partition. Therefore, in order to avoid further litigation in the matter, it would be proper to determine the share of the parties as above. Therefore, the points raised above are answered in favour of the appellants/plaintiffs. Hence, the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is allowed. (ii) The impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in OS No.8294/2002 dated 22-09-2007 is hereby set aside. (iii) The sale deeds executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 dated 10- 10-2001 being without any title, are declared as void and not binding on the plaintiffs. (iv) The Plaintiffs being the absolute owners of the suit schedule 'B' and 'C' property, defendants 1 to 3 are restrained by an injunction from interfering with - 29 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by the plaintiffs. (v) Plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 are entitled for 1/3rd share each and the defendants are entitled for 1/3rd share in the suit schedule 'A' property, excluding the property which was gifted by plaintiff No.1 in favour of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3. (vi) Draw the decree accordingly” 16. Under these circumstances, the said contentions urged on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff in relation to items 13, 14, 15 and 24 cannot be accepted. 17. It is also relevant to state that though the Trial Court was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that item Nos.13, 14, 15 and 24 of the suit schedule properties were the separate and self acquired properties of Smt. Channamma - respondent No.1, having regard to the undisputed fact that Smt. Channamma died intestate during pendency of the present appeal, leaving behind the appellant and respondent Nos.2 to 4 as her only heirs and legal representatives, her estate comprising of items 13, 14 and 15 would devolve upon the appellant and respondent Nos.2 to 4 by way of succession under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act and consequently, the appellants and respondent Nos.2 to 4 would - 30 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 be entitled to 1/4th share each in items 13, 14, 15 of the suit schedule properties. 18. 18. Insofar as item No.24 of the suit schedule properties is concerned as stated supra, the same having been already held to be the separate and absolute Sthreedhana properties and in the light of the registered gift deed Ex.D.4 dated 12.09.2011 executed by Channamma prior to institution of the suit, the said item No.24 would become the absolute property of the respondent No.4/defendant No.4 and the impugned judgment and decree insofar as item No.24 is concerned deserves to be confirmed, while modifying the impugned judgment and decree by declaring the shares of all parties in favour of all the parties in respect of items 13, 14 and 15 of the suit schedule properties. In the result, following: ORDER (i) Appeal is hereby allowed in part. (ii) The impugned judgment and decree insofar as it relates to dismissing the suit of the - 31 - NC: 2025:KHC:10594 RFA No. 1160 of 2017 appellant/plaintiff in respect of item Nos.13, 14 and 15 is hereby set aside. (iii) The suit of the appellant/plaintiff is hereby decreed in respect of item Nos.13, 14 and 15 also by declaring that the appellant and respondent Nos.2 to 4 are entitled to 1/4th share each in all the items of the suit schedule properties except item No.24 of the suit schedule properties. (iv) Registry to draw up decree accordingly. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE MR List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1