1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty & The Hon’ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee WPCT 67 of 2025 The Chairman, Central Board of Trustees & Anr. Vs. Rajesh Pandey For the Petitioner : Mr. Shiv Chandra Prasad. For the Respondent : Mr. Bharat Bhusan, Mr. Tamal Mondal. Hearing on : 30th July, 2026 Judgment On : 30th July, 2026 2 Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J. Prologue: 1. The present writ petition has been preferred assailing the legality, propriety and justifiability of the order dated 20.06.2024 passed by the learned Tribunal in Original Application No. 350/1882/2021 (hereinafter referred to as "the OA"), as well as in M.A. No. 350/00498/2022 and M.A. No. 350/00544/2024, being applications filed in connection with the said OA. By the impugned order, the learned Tribunal quashed the charge memorandum bearing Memo No. Vig XIV (03) 2019/1368 dated 17.08.2021 issued against the respondent herein. Facts: 2. The factual matrix culminating in the institution of the present writ petition may be noticed as follows: i) Aggrieved by the issuance of the charge memorandum dated 17.08.2021, the respondent filed the OA before the learned Tribunal, praying for, inter alia, quashing thereof. ii) The case sought to be projected in the OA is that, while serving as the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II at the Regional Office, Patna, the respondent had furnished certain information pertaining to alleged corrupt practices prevailing in the said office and upon an enquiry being conducted into the allegations so made, the Vigilance Wing concerned found substance therein and, consequently, transferred certain officials out of the said office. 3 iii) The respondent further alleged in the OA that, by way of retaliation for the aforesaid incident, an explanation was sought from him in the year 2015 while he was serving as the Officer-in-Charge, Sub-Regional Office, Bhagalpur, Bihar. The explanation pertained to allegations concerning the recording of adverse remarks in the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of certain subordinate officials, as well as the alleged delay and/or failure on his part to pass final orders upon conclusion of proceedings under Section 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, 1952 Act) during the period 2010-2014. iv) Upon consideration of the allegations relating to the alleged delay and/or failure to pass final orders in proceedings under Section 7A of the 1952 Act, the Vigilance Wing and the Regional Office, Patna, recommended initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him, notwithstanding the absence of any vigilance angle. v) However, upon due consideration of the allegations, his explanation thereto, and the materials placed on record, the Chairman, Central Board of Trustees, Employees' Provident Fund Organisation, being the competent disciplinary authority, by order dated 03.04.2017, recorded a finding that the institution of formal disciplinary proceedings was not warranted. The competent authority, however, deemed it appropriate to issue a warning and, accordingly, directed the respondent to be more careful in the discharge of his official duties in future. 4 vi) After a lapse of nearly four years, the Central Vigilance Commission (for short, CVC), by its communication dated 03.03.2021, expressed its disagreement with the decision of the competent disciplinary authority. The CVC opined that the warning administered to the respondent was not commensurate with the gravity of the allegations relating to the alleged delay and/or failure to pass final orders in proceedings under Section 7A of the 1952 Act during the period 2010–2014, notwithstanding the absence of any vigilance angle. The CVC, accordingly, advised the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. vii) Acting upon the advice of the CVC, the Chairman, Central Board of Trustees, Employees' Provident Fund Organisation, issued a charge memorandum dated 17.08.2021 under Rule 10 of the Employees' Provident Fund (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971(for shot, the 1971 Rules), in respect of the aforesaid allegations relating to the alleged delay and/or failure to pass final orders in proceedings under Section 7A of the 1952 Act during the period 2010–2014. viii) Upon receipt of the said charge memorandum, the respondent submitted his reply thereto, contending, inter alia, that the very same allegations had earlier been examined by the competent disciplinary authority, which had, by its order dated 03.04.2017, taken a final decision in the matter and declined to institute formal disciplinary proceedings. On that premise, the respondent requested that the disciplinary proceedings initiated pursuant to the charge 5 memorandum be dropped. However, despite submission of the said reply, no decision was taken to drop the proceedings, prompting him to approach the learned Tribunal by filing the OA. 3. The petitioners contested the OA by filing a reply. The specific defence sought to be raised therein was that the complaint forwarded by the CVC in 2019 had also contained two additional allegations, namely, the hiring of an official vehicle and certain irregularities relating to the use of official accommodation. It was further contended that the vigilance investigation had disclosed an unreasonable and unjustified delay in finalizing the proceedings under Section 7A of the 1952 Act, which had resulted in deprivation of provident fund benefits to the subscribers and conferment of undue advantage upon the employer. Although there was no vigilance angle, the nature of the allegations was grave and the warning administered was not commensurate with the alleged misconduct. It was also urged that a warning does not constitute a statutory penalty and, therefore, there was no legal impediment to reopening the matter and initiating further disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. 4. Based on the advice of the CVC, the Chairman, CBT, decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. Accordingly, a charge memorandum dated 17.08.2021 was issued, and the disciplinary inquiry was thereafter commenced. 5. The record reveals that, by the order impugned in the present writ petition, the learned Tribunal observed that proceedings under Section 7A are quasi- judicial in nature and that the said provision does not prescribe any time limit for 6 their conclusion. The learned Tribunal further observed that the Circular dated 11.10.2021 merely contains administrative instructions for the expeditious disposal of such proceedings. It also took note of the respondent's explanation that, at the relevant point of time, the details of the identified employees enrolled with the establishment were not available and that the Hon'ble High Court had, by various orders, held that no order should be passed in the absence of identification of the beneficiaries. 6. In the order impugned in the present writ petition, the learned Tribunal further observed that the decision of the competent authority not to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent and instead to issue him a warning had neither been reversed nor set aside by any higher authority or any court of law. The learned Tribunal further observed that the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, initiated pursuant to the charge memorandum dated 17.08.2021, were commenced nearly eight years after the conclusion of the proceedings under Section 7A and were, therefore, vitiated by inordinate delay. It was further held that, in the absence of any reversal of the earlier decision of the competent authority, the initiation of the subsequent disciplinary proceedings on the very same allegations was also hit by the vice of double jeopardy. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have preferred this present writ petition. Submissions: 7. Mr. Prasad, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contends that the issuance of a warning does not amount to the imposition of a statutory penalty under the applicable service rules and, therefore, does not 7 constitute any legal impediment to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. He further submits that, apart from the allegations relating to the delay/failure in concluding the proceedings under Section 7A, the charge memorandum also contained two additional and distinct allegations concerning irregularities regarding hiring of the official car and official accommodation. 8. He further submits that, having regard to the nature and gravity of the lapses attributed to the respondent, the issuance of a warning was considered to be an inadequate measure. Accordingly, the CVC advised the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. Upon acceptance of the said advice, the Chairman, CBT, issued a charge memorandum proposing the imposition of a major penalty and directed that an inquiry be conducted into the charges levelled against the respondent. He contends that the learned Tribunal misdirected itself in interfering with the disciplinary proceedings at their nascent stage. According to him, at such a stage, the correctness, truthfulness or sustainability of the charges cannot be gone into by the Tribunal. 9. Placing reliance on certain provisions of the Vigilance Manual, Mr. Prasad contends that, in disciplinary proceedings against the employees of the establishment, the advice of the CVC is mandatory and that the CVC is empowered to review the outcome of such proceedings. According to him, the learned Tribunal failed to take these material aspects into consideration and consequently returned an erroneous finding, which calls for interference by this Court. 8 10. Per contra, Mr. Bhusan, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, submits that the respondent had disclosed certain information relating to alleged corrupt practices prevailing in the office, which ultimately led to the transfer of certain officers from their respective places of posting. According to him, with a view to somehow implicate the respondent, a disciplinary proceeding was sought to be initiated on the allegation of delay and/or failure to dispose of proceedings under Section 7A, despite there being no vigilance angle. He further submits that, upon a preliminary inquiry, the then disciplinary authority found merit in the respondent's explanation and, instead of initiating disciplinary proceedings, decided to issue a warning. 11. He further argues that the decision of the then disciplinary authority, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, not to initiate disciplinary proceedings and instead to issue a warning, was never set aside by any superior authority or by any court of law. According to him, although the petitioners subsequently sought to contend that there were two additional issues, namely, irregularities in the hiring of an official vehicle and in relation to official accommodation, neither of these allegations found place in the charge-sheet. He submits that the subsequent disciplinary proceeding was initiated nearly seven years after the alleged misconduct on the very same allegations. Accordingly, he contends that the learned Tribunal rightly held that the subsequent proceeding was vitiated by the principles of double jeopardy as well as by inordinate and unexplained delay. 12. He further contends that the CVC is only empowered to render its advice and cannot review or sit in appeal over a decision taken by the disciplinary authority. He submits that it is an admitted position that the present case does not involve 9 any vigilance angle. He further argues that the present disciplinary authority is equally not empowered to sit in appeal over the decision taken by its predecessor, whereby it was decided not to initiate disciplinary proceedings and instead to issue a warning. Analysis and conclusion: 13. Indisputably, in the present case, a complaint was lodged against the respondent in 2015 alleging delay/failure in passing final orders in proceedings under Section 7A during the period from 2010 to 2014, purportedly in violation of the prevailing Circular dated 11.10.2011. Upon consideration of the complaint and the reply and/or explanation submitted by the respondent, and after holding a preliminary inquiry, the competent disciplinary authority, namely the Chairman, CBT, came to the conclusion that no disciplinary proceedings were required to be initiated against the respondent, there being no vigilance angle involved. Accordingly, by order dated 03.04.2017, the Chairman, CBT, decided to issue only a warning to the respondent. 14. However, subsequently, in 2021, nearly seven years after the alleged misconduct and despite there being no vigilance angle even at that stage, the Chairman, CBT, acting on the advice of the CVC, issued a charge memorandum dated 17.08.2021 in respect of the very same allegations. 15. The principle against double jeopardy has been enshrined in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. Although Article 20(2), in its strict sense, applies to criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has, in a catena 10 of decisions, held that an employee cannot be subjected to repeated or successive departmental proceedings on the very same cause of action after the competent authority has already taken a final decision in the matter. A formal warning, when recorded in the service record pursuant to disciplinary consideration, is recognised in service jurisprudence as a minor penalty or punishment. 16. In the present case, upon considering the entire materials on record, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the allegations contained in the earlier complaint and those incorporated in the subsequent charge memorandum, insofar as they relate to the delay/failure in passing final orders in the proceedings under Section 7A during the period from 2010 to 2014, were inextricably linked and arose out of the very same set of facts. The learned Tribunal, therefore, held that the disciplinary authority had sought to initiate disciplinary proceedings on the basis of the very same allegations which had earlier been considered and concluded. 17. It is well settled through a consistent line of judicial precedents that where, upon considering the allegations of misconduct and the explanation submitted by the delinquent employee in the course of a preliminary inquiry, the competent disciplinary authority consciously decides not to initiate disciplinary proceedings and attains finality in such decision, it cannot subsequently reopen the very same matter merely on the advice of an advisory body such as the CVC with a view to initiating fresh disciplinary proceedings and imposing a more severe punishment. Such a course of action amounts to an abuse of the disciplinary process. A disciplinary authority cannot, as a matter of course, repeatedly revive or alter the 11 charges in respect of the very same lapse after having taken a conscious decision to close the matter. 18. Clause 1.3.1(e) and (f) of the Vigilance Manual, relied upon by Mr. Prasad, empower the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) to review the progress of investigations conducted by the Delhi Special Police Establishment into offences alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, or offences with which a public servant may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, be charged at the same trial, and to review the progress of applications pending before the competent authority for grant of sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. These provisions do not confer upon the CVC any power to review a decision taken by a disciplinary authority. 19. Mr. Prasad's reliance on Clause 1.2.2 of the Vigilance Manual is also misplaced. The said clause provides that, in composite cases, the Commission's advice is required in respect of all officers of the Central Government or an organisation under it, irrespective of their level, if they are involved in the same matter in which a Category 'A' officer is involved. The said provision has no application to the present case. 20. In the present case, upon considering all the factual aspects and the materials on record including complaint lodged against the respondent in 2015, explanation offered by the respondent towards delay in issuing final order in those 7A proceedings, subsequent charge memo dated 17.08.2021 and materials in support thereof, the learned Tribunal arrived at a specific finding that the decision-making process culminating in the initiation of the subsequent disciplinary proceedings was vitiated by the vice of double jeopardy as well as 12 inordinate and unexplained delay. We find no infirmity, perversity, or illegality in the findings or the conclusions reached by the learned Tribunal warranting interference in the present writ petition. Order: 21. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed; however, without any order as to the costs. (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.) (Tapabrata Chakraborty, J.)