APHC010502952009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: Between: 1. STATE OF A.P., REP.BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD. 1. KILARI NAGESWARA RAO, S/O.KILARI SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. 2. KILARI SESHAIAH, S/O.SUBBAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. 3. KILARI RANGAMMA, (CASE AGAINST A-3 IS ABATED AS PER DOCKET ORDER DT.11 2001 AS SHE REPORTED DEAD) 4. KILARI SUBBA RAO, S/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. 5. KILARI CHINNAKKA, W/O.SUBBA RAO SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. 6. KILARI SUBBULU, W/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr. P.C., praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal against the Judgment in S.C.No.233 of 2001 on the file of the Judge, Darsi dated 14th day of December 2004, and to set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused (respondents) for the offence with which they were charged. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE SIXTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1564/2009 STATE OF A.P., REP.BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF ...APELLANT AND KILARI NAGESWARA RAO, S/O.KILARI SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM KILARI SESHAIAH, S/O.SUBBAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. KILARI RANGAMMA, W/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. 3 IS ABATED AS PER DOCKET ORDER DT.11 2001 AS SHE REPORTED DEAD) KILARI SUBBA RAO, S/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. KILARI CHINNAKKA, W/O.SUBBA RAO SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. W/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. ...RESPODENT(S): Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr. P.C., praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal against the Judgment in S.C.No.233 of 2001 on the file of the Asst.Sessions Judge, Darsi dated 14th day of December 2004, and to set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused (respondents) for the offence with which IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3369] MALLIKARJUNA RAO STATE OF A.P., REP.BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF ...APELLANT KILARI NAGESWARA RAO, S/O.KILARI SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM KILARI SESHAIAH, S/O.SUBBAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. W/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. 3 IS ABATED AS PER DOCKET ORDER DT.11-1- KILARI SUBBA RAO, S/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. KILARI CHINNAKKA, W/O.SUBBA RAO SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. W/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE. ...RESPODENT(S): Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr. P.C., praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal Asst.Sessions Judge, Darsi dated 14th day of December 2004, and to set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused (respondents) for the offence with which 2 IA NO: 1 OF 2009(CRLAMP 1768 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 1396 days in representing the above Crl.A.Sr.No.13177 of 2005 presented against the Judgment in S.C.No.233 of 2001 on the file of the Asst.Sessions Judge, Darsi dated 14th day of December, 2004. IA NO: 2 OF 2009(CRLAMP 1950 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of (151) days in presenting the appeal against the order of acquittal of the accused / respondents in S.C.No.233 of 2001 on the file of the Asst.Sessions Judge, Darsi dated 14.12.2004 Counsel for the Appellant: 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR Counsel for the Respodent(S): 1. P NAGENDRA REDDY The court made the following J U D G M E N T: 1. This appeal is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.233 of 2001 on the file of Assistant Sessions Judge, Darsi (for short, ‘the Sessions Court’) by its judgment dated 14.12.2004, acquitted the accused for the offences punishable under section 376 and 498-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). 2. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of PWs.1 to 11 and documents marked Exs.P.1 to P.11 and contradictory statements i.e., Exs.D.1 to D.8 which were elicited during the cross- examination of PWs.1, 2, 3 and 6, were marked. 3. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the present appeal, are as follows: 3 (a) On 15.02.1999 at around 12:00 noon, while the victim (PW.1) was returning from Guntaka Chenu after delivering food to her father, A1, noticing her alone, forcibly dragged her into the Japanbabul bushes in the fields of Pedda Subbaiah and gagged her mouth and had sexual intercourse without her, will, and that she informed the same to her parents. She was taken to the Government Hospital for medical examination. Meanwhile, village elders, including PWs 6 to 8, mediated a compromise between A1 and PW.1, resulting in their marriage on 16.02.1999. PW.1 began living with A1, but their marital life lasted only five days. Thereafter, all the accused started harassing and ill-treating her, demanding Rs.50,000/- as dowry. A1 also physically assaulted her, frequently picking quarrels without any fault on her part. (b) On 25.03.1999, PW.1 lodged a report at the K.K. Mitla Police Station, which was registered as Crime No.09/1999 under Sections 323 and 498-A IPC by the Sub-Inspector (LW.5). During the ongoing investigation, on 27.03.1999, PW.1 filed a complaint before the court alleging rape by A1 and dowry-related harassment by all the accused. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Podili, forwarded the complaint to the police. The Sub-Inspector (LW.15) registered the case on 01.04.1999 under Section 376 IPC and issued an express FIR to the concerned authorities. As PW.1 was below 15 years of age at the time, A1 is liable for punishment under Section 376 IPC for rape, and all the accused are liable under Section 498-A IPC for dowry harassment and ill-treatment. 4. The Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Podili vide his order dated 19.06.2001 in PRC No.16 of 2000 on his file has committed the accused persons to the court of Sessions, Prakasam Division, to take up their trial for the offences punishable under Sec.498-A IPC and sec. 376 IPC, against A.1, and under Section 498(A) r/w.34 of IPC against A.1 to A.6. 4 5. As per the Sessions Court’s docket order dated 11.06.2001, the case against A.3 is abated. 6. The learned Sessions Judge, Prakasam Division at Ongole by its order dated 02.07.2001 has taken up the case on file under Section 376 of IPC against A.1, and under Section 498-A r/w. Section 34 of IPC against A1, A.2, A.4 to A.6 and made over the case to the Court of Asst. Session's Judge, Darsi, for disposal according to law. Subsequently, the case in Sessions Case No.233 of 2001 has been numbered. After hearing the charges presented by the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, the Sessions court framed charges against the accused, punishable under Section 376 of IPC against A.1 and under Section 498-A of IPC against A.1, A.2 and A.4 to A.6, which were read over and explained to them in Telugu, as required under sub section (2) of section 228 of Cr.P.C. The accused did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. The learned Sessions Judge examined A.1, A.2, A.4 to A.6 as required under Section 313 (1)(b) of Cr.P.C., to enable them to consider the evidence that had been led on the part of the prosecution and also appeared against them. However, the accused denied the truth of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the contradictory portions of Exs.D1 to D.8, as per section 161 Cr.P.C. Statements were marked during the cross-examination of P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 6. 8. After considering the available material on record, the learned Sessions Judge found A.1 not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 498-A of IPC and also found A.2, A.4 to A.6 not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC and acquitted them. 9. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State contends that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have seen that the ingredients to constitute offences punishable under sections 498-A and 376 of IPC are made out by the prosecution against the accused; the learned Sessions Judge ought 5 to have seen the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 5 coupled with the evidence of P.Ws.9 and 10is sufficient to base conviction; the learned sessions judge has not considered the evidence of prosecution witnesses in its correct prospective; the other reasons assigned by the learned judge in acquitting the accused are unsustainable. 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the accused supported the findings and conclusions recorded by the Sessions Court. 11. I have heard learned counsel on either side and perused the material on record, including the oral and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution before the Sessions Court. 12. The point for determination is: Was the Sessions Court justified in acquitting the accused? P O I N T: 13. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1, at paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows: "26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his innocence." 1 (2011) 6 SCC 279 6 14. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the power of appellate court to interfere in an appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point has concluded as under: “16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with.” 15. In Chandrappa and Others V. State of Karnataka3, while considering the similar issue, namely, appeal against acquittal and power of the appellate court to re-appreciate, review or reconsider evidence and interfere with the order of acquittal, this court, reiterated the principles laid down in the above decisions and further held that: “42.....The following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such 2 (2007) 3 SCC 755 3 (2007) 4 SCC 415 7 phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this court, is not warranted. However, the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact. In that case, it is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power, and the appellate court is free to arrive at its conclusion, keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to every person, and in criminal jurisprudence, every person is presumed innocent unless proven guilty by a competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the Sessions Court concerning both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, the appellate court must marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when 8 there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. 17. With the above principles in mind, this court analyse the reasoning and ultimate conclusion of the Sessions Court in interfering with the order of acquittal. 18. As seen from the record, the prosecution examined the victim as PW.1. Based on the report dated 25.03.1999 (Ex.P.1), a case was registered in Crime No.9 of 1999 at K.K. Mitla Police Station by the Sub-Inspector of Police. Subsequently, the victim (PW.1) filed another complaint dated 27.03.1999 (Ex.P.2) before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Podili, which was forwarded to the Station House Officer, K.K. Mitla Police Station, and registered as Crime No.10 of 1999. The concerned Station House Officer thereafter filed a consolidated charge sheet by clubbing both cases together. 19. As seen from the Ex.P.1 report, and as rightly observed by the Sessions Court, the victim (PW.1) did not mention any allegation of rape. However, the accusation of rape appears for the first time in the Ex.P.2 complaint. Notably, within two days of submitting Ex.P.1, she filed a private complaint (Ex.P.2) against the accused, wherein the allegation of rape was included. 20. The prosecution examined PWs.6 to 8; however, they did not support the prosecution’s case. During cross-examination conducted by the Public Prosecutor, PWs.6 to 8 denied having made the statements attributed to them in Exs.P.4 to P.6, respectively. 21. As seen from the record, A.3 passed away during the pendency of the case. According to the evidence of PW.2, the father of PW.1, A.1, is his son-in- law. It is not in dispute that A.2 and A.3 are the parents of A.1, A.4 is the brother of A.1, A.5 is the wife of A.4, and A.6 is the daughter of A.2. Thus, all the accused are closely related and interlinked by familial ties. 9 22. PW.1/victim, testified that the incident occurred approximately five years ago at around 1:00 PM. She stated that she had taken lunch to her father, who was ploughing in their Guntathota fields; after handing over the meals, while returning home, and upon reaching a point about half a kilometer from the fields, A.1 approached her from the opposite direction and held her hand; when she objected and warned that she would inform her father, A.1 allegedly snatched her apparel (voni), gagged her mouth, dragged her into a cluster of Japanbabul trees, and attempted to rape her; despite her resistance, A.1 allegedly forced himself upon her, slapped her, and then raped her; following the incident, she returned home weeping and informed her mother and father; subsequently, her parents (PWs.2 and 3), her brother Mannamu Venkateswarlu (LW.4), and her aunt (PW.4) took her to the Government Hospital at Podili, where the police recorded her statement. 23. In this regard, PWs.2 to 4 also corroborated the version of events in their evidence. According to the testimony of PWs.1 to 3, PW.8 visited the hospital and made a proposal to PW.1's father that A.1 would marry PW.1, and requested that no criminal case be registered against A.1; initially, PW.2 was reluctant to accept the proposal; however, on the following day, under the influence of elders, PW.2 agreed to the marriage; subsequently, A.1 and PW.1 exchanged garlands at the R & B bungalow in the presence of A.2, A.4, and PWs.2, 6, and 8; photographs were also taken at the time of the garland exchange. 24. In this regard, the Sessions Court considered the evidence of PWs.6 and 7. PW.6, Chappidi Ramalingaiah, deposed that he acted as a mediator in the case and facilitated the marriage discussions between A.1 and PW.1 at the R&B bungalow in Podili, after which he returned to his village. PW.7, Jastavati Jayanarasimha, stated that he was unaware whether A.1 had married PW.1. PW.8, Karravula Bala Ankaiah, testified that about three or four years ago, he went to the R&B bungalow in Podili, where a quarrel took place between the groups of the accused and PW.1. He further stated that he came 10 to know that the altercation was related to the proposed marriage between A.1 and PW.1. The evidence of PWs.6 to 8, however, does not support the prosecution’s case regarding the alleged marriage ceremony said to have taken place at the R&B bungalow, Podili. 25. The prosecution examined PW.11, Shaik Abdul Rasheed, to establish the investigation conducted in the case. The Sessions Court, after considering the evidence of the witnesses, particularly at paragraph No.29 of its judgment, noted that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged marriage between A.1 and PW.1. Although PWs.1 to 5 categorically deposed that the marriage was performed at the R&B bungalow by way of exchanging garlands and taking photographs, the prosecution did not produce any such photographs or its negatives as evidence before the court. The testimonies of PWs.1 to 5, who are close relatives, are not corroborated by any independent witnesses. When it is claimed that photographs were taken at the time of the marriage, there appears to be no justifiable reason for their non-production before the court. The Investigating Officer also failed to explain why the photographs allegedly taken at the time of the marriage were neither collected nor submitted. In the absence of any documentary or photographic evidence, and with no supporting testimony from independent witnesses, the oral evidence of PWs.1 to 5 alone is insufficient to prove the solemnization of the alleged marriage between PW.1 and A.1. 26. The Sessions Court further observed that, under Hindu customs and rites, three essential ingredients are required to establish a valid marriage. However, there is no evidence on record to show that mangalasutram was tied or that saptapadi (seven steps around the sacred fire) was performed. Upon a thorough appreciation of the evidence on record, the Sessions Court rightly concluded that the alleged marriage between PW.1 and A.1 has not been proved. 11 27. The prosecution examined PW.9, A. Sarojini Devi, to establish that PW.1 had undergone a medical examination. PW.9 deposed that she examined PW.1 on 01.04.1999 at 08:40 PM, with the assistance of Civil Surgeon Dr. K. Madhusudana Rao. According to the prosecution, the earlier report marked as Ex.P.1 mentions that the marriage between PW.1 and A.1 took place on 16.02.1999. However, as previously noted, Ex.P.1 contains no reference to any allegation of rape. In that report, PW.1 stated that she and A.1 were in a love relationship, and upon learning of the same, their marriage was solemnized as per caste customs on 16.02.1999 at the R&B bungalow, Podili. Conversely, in the private complaint marked as Ex.P.2, PW.1 alleged that A.1 committed rape on her on 15.02.1999. The Sessions Court observed that there is no mention of rape in Ex.P.1, but the allegation was subsequently introduced in the private complaint, Ex.P.2. 28. It is well settled through judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the victim of a sexual assault is the most competent witness, and her testimony is entitled to great weight. In the absence of any infirmity, a conviction can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, even without corroboration from medical evidence, provided her testimony inspires confidence. 29. The Sessions Court noted that if PW.1’s allegation were true, she would have mentioned in Ex.P.1 that A.1 had committed rape on her prior to their alleged marriage. In her cross-examination, PW.1 admitted that the contents of Ex.P.1 were recorded by the police based on her narration. The Sessions Court observed that Ex.P.1 is a typed complaint and pointed out a material discrepancy, namely, the omission of any reference to the alleged incident of rape in the initial report. No plausible explanation has been offered for this omission. 12 30. In Shashidhar Purandhar Hegde V. State of Karnataka4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 12. The word “contradiction” is of a wide connotation which takes within its ambit all material omissions and under the circumstances of a case, a court can decide whether there is one such omission as to amount to contradiction. 31. It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions were of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. In S. Govidaraju vs. State of Karnataka5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, and the other witnesses also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon such evidence. 32. Upon a careful and comprehensive examination of the material available on record, this court finds sufficient justification to concur with the finding of the learned Sessions Court. The omission in question, which amounts to a material contradiction, casts a grave shadow of doubt on the veracity and reliability of the testimony given by the witness, particularly that of the victim (PW.1). PW.1 proceeded to file a private complaint two days after the lodging of Ex.P.1 report, wherein significant improvements were made in comparison to her earlier report. What is particularly striking, and remains unexplained, is why, if the accused had indeed committed the grave offence of rape, such a crucial allegation was not mentioned in the initial report. No plausible or satisfactory explanation has been offered by the victim for this omission, nor is there any indication of the circumstances that prompted her to file a private complaint incorporating those serious allegations at a later stage. In the considered opinion of this court, if the allegations made by the victim were indeed truthful and genuine, it is inconceivable that such a serious 4 (2004) 12 SCC 492 5 MANU/SC/0839/2013 13 accusation would have been omitted from the earlier version of the Ex.P.1 report. The absence of such a critical detail in the initial report raises serious concerns about the credibility of the prosecution's case. 33. The Sessions Court further taken note of the fact that the medical officer who examined PW.1 (on 01.04.1999 at 08:40 PM) deposed that there were no external or internal injuries on her body and no semen was detected on the articles (Items No.1 to 4) sent for forensic analysis. According to PW.1's testimony, she lived with A.1 as husband and wife in his house for about one week following their alleged marriage on 16.02.1999, before A.2, A.4, and A.6 allegedly forced A.1 to leave the village. Hence, even by PW.1's version, they cohabited as a married couple for one week. In light of this, the medical evidence fails to support the prosecution's case. 34. Upon appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the Sessions Court found the testimony of the PW.1, who is the prime witness to the alleged incident of rape, to be unreliable and accordingly disbelieved her version. 35. The Sessions Court took note of several contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, and marked documents Exs.D.1 to D.8 in support of the defence case. The Investigating Officer confirmed that Exs. P.1 and P.2 are typed complaints, whereas PW.1, in her testimony, claimed to have written Ex.P.1 in her own handwriting to the police. Furthermore, the medical officer deposed that there were no external or internal injuries on the body of PW.1, and no semen was detected on Items No.1 to 4, which were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL). In view of these inconsistencies and the lack of medical or corroborative evidence, the Sessions Court disbelieved the version of the prosecution witnesses. Upon a comprehensive evaluation of the entire evidence on record, the Sessions Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused for the offences under Sections 376 and 498-A IPC beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 36. In a criminal case, degree of proof is the dictum than that what is required in a civil proceedings and if there is slightest doubt in the mind of the court regarding involvement of the accused person, then the court should not go for convicting the accused person with such a doubt. Rather it would be proper for the court to pass a judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused. When Sessions Court after proper appreciation of the evidence of witnesses passed a judgment of the acquittal, it would not be appropriate for the appellate court to disturb the said judgment, unless the said judgment of acquittal is unreasonable, even if two views are possible, then also, the appellate court should not disturb the said judgment, instead, the court should upheld the view favoured the accused. 37. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal appeal, if another view is possible, then also the appellate court cannot substitute its view by reversing the acquittal into a conviction unless the findings of the Sessions Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. 38. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of Karnataka6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section 378 of the Code as under: “Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having seen the witnesses. 6 2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184 15 39. In State of Gujarat V. Thanabhai Ganeshbhai Rajput7, the High Court of Gujarat held that as per the settled legal position when two views are possible, the judgment and order of the acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for special reasons. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Rajasthan V. Ram Niwas8 can be relied on in this regard. 40. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh V. Sheeshpal9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of decisions in which this court is of the considered opinion that State has not made out any case which would permit this court to exercise such wide powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on the part of learned judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been rightly undertaken by the court below and therefore when such eventuality is reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein after: "10. The above principle has been reiterated by this court in a number of judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this court will not interfere with the judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could 7 2022 Latest Caselaw 3827 Guj 8 (2010) 15 SCC 463 9 (2017) CriLJ 169 16 also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal. 11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the accused should be adopted. 41. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on record, this court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out no case to establish a definite guilt of the respondents / accused. 42. It is a settled principle of law that if the Trial Court takes the view, it should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by the Trial Court is a plausible one. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this court is not inclined to reverse the Trial Court's finding. 43. The Sessions Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or misinterpretation by the Sessions Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no flaw in the findings of fact by the Sessions Court. Therefore, the acquittal of the respondents cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed, and there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Sessions Court. Accordingly, the point is answered. 44. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal No.1564 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by 17 the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Darsi, in Sessions Case No.233 of 2001, dated 14.12.2004, stands confirmed. Miscellaneous applications, pending, if any, shall stand closed. ____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 06.08.2025 MS / SAK 18 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1564 of 2009 Date: 06.08.2025 SAK