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2025 DAILYLAW 3345 (CAL)

UCO BANK v. SUVASISH DASGUPTA AND ORS.

OCOT/12/2025 · 2026-07-27

Madhuresh Prasad, Prasenjit Biswas

body2025

Judgment text

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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ORIGINAL SIDE Present:- THE HON’BLE JUSTICE MADHURESH PRASAD AND THE HON’BLE JUSTICE PRASENJIT BISWAS APOT/295/2025 IN WPO/211/2021 IA NO. GA/1/2025; GA/2/2025 UCO BANK VS SUVASISH DASGUPTA AND ORS. WITH OCOT/12/2025 IA NO: GA/1/2025 UCO BANK VS SUVASISH DASGUPTA AND ORS. For the Appellant : Mr. Soumen Das, Adv. Mr. Sourjya Roy, Adv. For the Respondent : Ms. Ledia Dasgupta, Adv. in APOT 295 of 2025/ Mr. Victor Chatterjee, Adv. petitioner in OCOT 12 of 2025 Judgment on : July 27, 2026. Madhuresh Prasad, J.: 1. The appeal and cross appeal/objection arise out of a judgment passed by the learned Single Judge Bench in writ petition (W.P.O. 211 of 2025) dated 13.08.2025. 2 2. The appellant bank was the respondent before the writ court. The cross objectionist was the writ petitioner. He approached the writ jurisdiction being aggrieved by an order of punishment dated 26.12.2019 dismissing the writ petitioner from the bank’s service. The petitioner also sought quashing of an order of the appellate authority dated 08.09.2020 whereby and whereunder the appellate authority affirmed the penalty. 3. The writ petitioner was proceeded against by a Charge memo dated 9th November, 2018. The substance of the allegations made against the writ petitioner was in respect of certain fraudulent transactions including unauthorized debit in various General Ledger Heads, when he was posted as Branch Head/ Official in various branches. The allegations were in relation to multiple transactions alleging that the Bank’s funds had either been disbursed in cash; or siphoned off into the personal account of the charge sheeted officer, his wife and relatives. The writ petitioner submitted his response to the Charge memo. Relying upon the petitioner’s reply, the bank took a stand that charges were admitted therein. Learned Advocate however, submitted that the petitioner’s reply does not contain any admission of the allegations as per the Charge Memo. 4. We therefore, consider it apposite to quote extract of the petitioner’s reply, relevant to the submission made by the Bank: “………………. In reply of the above referred Show Cause, I explicitly admitted in earlier time, along with other submissions, that all such transactions referred, are true and happened under 3 my extent directions. I further submit that all such transactions are genuine and not deterrent to Bank’s interest. In reply of your present Charge Sheet now, I again admit that all the transactions referred and contained, were made under my extant direction BUT, I deny and Dispute The Article of Charge annexed.” 5. The Enquiry Officer thereafter proceeded with the enquiry and submitted an Enquiry Report on 21st September 2019, holding the charges proved. 6. After an opportunity of making representation against the Enquiry Report, which representation the petitioner has chosen not to place on record, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order dated 26th December 2019. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the enquiry report holding the charges proved and proceeded to award a punishment of dismissal from service. The petitioner was denied any benefits other than subsistence allowance for the period of suspension. The writ petitioner has availed the remedy of appeal under the Rules. The appeal filed by the writ petitioner was also dismissed. The writ petitioner thus assailed the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority, as well as the appellate order, in the writ proceeding. 7. The Hon’ble Single Judge found a procedural irregularity in the enquiry conducted. He held the enquiry report to be without any evidence being led by the presenting officer in the course of enquiry. Relying solely on the printout containing the alleged transactions and asserting that the same were computer generated, the Enquiry Officer proceeded to hold the 4 charges proved. Since the computer-generated printout cannot be considered sacrosanct, the Hon’ble Single Judge found the Enquiry Officer’s conclusion to be unsustainable. 8. However, referring to the stand of the petitioner taken in his reply to the Charge memo, extracted above, the Hon’ble Single Judge was of the view that petitioner’s admission of the transactions alleged in the Charge memo was sufficient to conclude that the petitioner’s conduct was unbecoming of an Officer of the Bank. The Learned Single Judge has proceeded to observe that the petitioner failed to sustain his claim/stand before the Enquiry Officer that the alleged transactions were genuine and not deterrent to the Bank’s interest. The petitioner could not explain that the modus operandi in respect of the admitted transactions, were in any way for the bona fide interest of the Bank, or necessary to a banking transaction, by any standards. 9. However, considering the procedural lapses and giving the petitioner a benefit of such procedural lapse, the Hon’ble Single Judge was of the view that the extreme punishment of dismissal from service was unsustainable. He found that neither any evidence nor any document was produced by the presenting officer. He also found that the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer did not inspire any confidence since the conclusions are not founded on any consideration, or reason/s in support of the conclusion. 5 10. The Hon’ble Single Judge found that the conclusion in respect of the several transactions/charges are mechanical and verbatim repetition of the same findings, in respect of all the charges, contained in the charge memo. 11. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned order quashed the charge- sheet dated 09.11.2018, the Enquiry Report dated 21.09.2019, the Disciplinary Authority’s order of punishment dated 26.12.2019 as well as order of the Appellate Authority dated 08.09.2020, subject to entitlement of the bank to recover the amounts credited to the petitioner’s account and in the account of his wife at different times from the accounts of the constituents of the bank irrespective of any allegation regarding financial loss. 12. The learned Single Judge thus, modified the major penalty to a minor penalty. The petitioner was held entitled to salary with DA and other emoluments from the date of his suspension till the date of superannuation without any increment. The learned Single Judge accordingly directed payment of the arrears difference between the substantial allowance already paid and the amount of salary from the date of his suspension till the date of his superannuation. The petitioner was consequently held entitled to all retiral benefits along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of superannuation till the date of actual payment. At the same time the learned Single Judge held the bank entitled to recover aggregate of all amounts transferred to his account or 6 in the account of his wife/relatives with interest at the rate of 8 per cent from the date of each transactions. SUBMISSIONS 13. The Learned Advocate for the bank submits that findings of the learned Single Judge are unsustainable. The findings are not supported by reasons in support of the findings. He further submitted that the departmental proceeding, by now, is settled, is conducted with a view to bring home the charges on a preponderance of probability. Having regard to the nature of charges, the computer-generated printouts and no denial; rather specific admission of the petitioner in his reply to the Charge Memo, the findings of the Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority did not require any interference. Findings of the Hon’ble Single Judge are therefore unsustainable. The scope of Judicial Review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited to a scrutiny of the procedure. And the court confines its scrutiny to a consideration whether the decision-making process was in accordance with the rules governing the departmental proceeding, and observing principles of natural justice and fair play. The writ court was not required or expected to examine the correctness of the decision itself, as if it was sitting in appeal over the findings of the Enquiry Officer/ Disciplinary Authority. 14. In the present case the Enquiry Officer complied with Regulation 6(13) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (for short 1976 Regulations), the presenting officer presented the 7 documents comprising of printouts in respect of the transactions forming the subject of the allegations. The Enquiry Officer considered the documents which were maintained in the course of routine business by the Bank. The printouts therefore, were rightly considered by the Enquiry Officer. 15. It was also submitted on behalf of the bank that the petitioner specifically admitted to the transactions, forming the basis of the allegation, to have taken place under his direction. He claimed that all such transactions were genuine and not deterrent to the bank’s interest, thus, onus shifted on the petitioner to establish that the transactions had actually benefitted the bank or that the same were sustained by some norms/prescribed procedure. In this connection the learned Advocate for the bank relied upon decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of SBI v. A.G.D. Reddy reported in (2023) 14 SCC 391. 16. Under the circumstances, there is no scope for the petitioner to contend that since witness was not produced before the Enquiry Officer in support of the documents relied upon, findings of the Enquiry Officer are not sustainable. Rules of evidence are not applicable. The requirement of law is that findings are recorded in the departmental proceeding by relying on evidence which a reasonable person, acting reasonably and with objectivity would arrive at, as was done in the instant case, upholding the charge. In this connection he relied upon decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of 8 Haryana v. Rattan Singh reported in (1977) 2 SCC 491, Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) And Ors. v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612. 17. The Learned Advocate representing the writ petitioner/ cross objectionist, on the other hand, submitted that violation of the procedural prescription itself vitiated the findings of the Enquiry Officer, and the writ Court rightly quashed the enquiry report dated 21.09.2019, the punishment order dated 26.12.2019 and the Appellate authority’s order dated 08.09.2020. 18. It is submitted that once the writ Court found a procedural infraction striking at the root of fairness; and the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer in violation of the principles of natural justice, there was no scope for awarding any punishment whatsoever. 19. The learned Advocate for the writ petitioner further submitted that facts, sought to be proved by the documents containing the alleged transactions forming the sub-stratum of the allegation were required to be supported before the Enquiry Officer, by statements made by witnesses in the presence of the petitioner. The printouts ipso facto cannot be relied upon, unless it is supported by statement of witness/s to show that the transactions contained therein had any bearing on the charges for which the proceeding was being conducted. In this connection the learned Advocate relied upon decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. v. 9 Prakash Chand Jain reported in AIR 1969 SC 983, Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank Reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 and State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha Reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772. 20. The learned Advocate for the writ petitioner submitted that parallel criminal proceeding was initiated with respect to the self-same allegations forming the basis of the departmental proceeding. The criminal case was registered as G.R.(S) Case No.03 of 2019 and was considered by the court of the learned 18th Judicial Magistrate at Calcutta. The trial concluded and a judgment dated 30.01.2026 was passed by the Trial Court holding the petitioner not guilty. This fact arose during pendency of the present appeal and was brought on record by way of supplementary affidavit. In view of the judgment passed by the criminal court in respect of the same charge the petitioner was entitled to benefit of the judgment of the criminal trial. And relying upon the judgment, the petitioner is entitled to his exoneration in the departmental proceeding. 21. In this connection the learned Advocate for the cross objectionist writ petitioner relied upon decisions in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 890, Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2024 (1) SCC 175. 22. The learned Advocate for the Bank however, has objected to such submission. He submitted that the law contemplates simultaneous conduct of departmental proceeding and criminal trial in respect of a 10 charge. Whereas the criminal trial is governed by procedural law and the charges are required to be proved on the strict rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, the allegations in the departmental proceedings are required to be considered on a preponderance of probabilty and not on the strict rules of evidence. Therefore, in the event the charges were proved in a departmental proceeding, such finding would not be automatically upset merely because the criminal trial in respect of the charge, resulted in acquittal. 23. The learned Advocate for the Bank, relied upon decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shashi Bhushan Prasad v. CISF reported in (2019) 7 SCC 797, another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh reported in (2021) 12 SCC 569, and SBI v. P. Zadenga reported in (2023) 10 SCC 675. ANALYSIS 24. We have considered the submissions of the learned Advocates representing the parties. We have also perused the record and considered the judgments relied upon. 25. Assailing the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge the first submission advanced was regarding the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Advocate for the Bank thus submitted that once the procedure specified in Regulation 6(13) of the 1976 Regulation was compiled there was no scope for the learned Single 11 Judge to interfere with the decision taken in the departmental proceeding. Reliance placed by the learned Advocate in support of such submission in the case of Rattan Singh (supra) appears to be a valid submission. The limits of judicial review by now are well settled. As per decision relied upon, the writ Court exercises judicial review to consider and ensure that there is exclusion of extraneous material and observance of rules of natural justice. The Court is required to see that the decision is not perverse and that the same is founded on some material/ evidence produced in the enquiry. If there is no evidence in support of the decision, the decision is founded on extraneous consideration, the decision is perverse, and/or in violation with the principles of natural justice, then only the writ Court would be justified in interfering with such a decision. The sufficiency of evidence/ material, normally cannot be looked into by a writ Court. 26. For a proper appreciation in this regard the Court is also required to advert to the decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondent/ writ petitioner in the case of Prakash Chand Jain (Supra), Roop Singh Negi (Supra) and Saroj Kumar Sinha (Supra). 27. In Prakash Chand Jain (Supra) the Apex Court held that domestic Tribunals like an Enquiry Officer are not bound by the technical rules and evidence under the Indian Evidence Act. The Apex Court, however, laid down that substantive rules of conduct of an enquiry ensures compliance with principles of natural justice and the same cannot be ignored. Considering earlier judgments delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme 12 Court in this regard, the Apex Court held that a fact sought to be proved must be supported by statements made in presence of the charge sheeted employee. 28. In the case of Roop Singh Negi (Supra) no witness was examined to prove the documents. The Apex Court held that the materials brought on record pointing to the guilt of the delinquent were required to be proved. The Apex Court held that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function and has a duty to arrive at a finding taking into consideration the material brought before it by the parties. In Saroj Kumar Sinha (Supra) the Apex Court held that in an enquiry it is the duty of the management not only to furnish copies of the documents relied upon but also that the relevant defence documents should also be produced, and statement of witness/es mentioned in the charge memo be recorded. Thereafter, an opportunity of cross-examination was required to be given to the delinquent. 29. These judgments relied upon leave no scope for any doubt regarding the legal position that documents are not only required to be produced before the Enquiry Officer, but also required to be supported by statement of witness/s to show that the documents are relevant to the charge being considered in an enquiry. It is settled law that only relevant material can be considered. Extraneous material is to be excluded. It would be possible to do so only if there is some witness appearing in support of the documentary material to show in the enquiry that the 13 same is relevant and material to the charge being considered, and for supporting the allegations. 30. If the allegations are supported by witnesses in the enquiry, it may not normally be desirable for a writ Court to sit in appeal over such material supported by evidence. In the present case, we found that witnesses were not examined in support of the voluminous printouts containing transactions submitted in the enquiry in support of the charges. Such a procedure, cannot be countenanced in a departmental proceeding. However, the unique situation is different in the present case. There is explicit admission of the writ petitioner in his written reply, as regards the transactions forming the basis of the allegations. 31. The transactions were specifically admitted by the writ petitioner to have taken place under his direction and he had taken a stand that it was not a deterrent to the Bank’s interest. Thereafter, there was no question of there being any obligation on the part of the employer/ management to produce any witness in support of the documents containing the alleged transactions. Such an obligation would arise only if the petitioner had denied or disputed the transactions. But that was not a situation arising in the present case. In fact, the petitioner claimed the transactions to be in the Bank’s interest and, therefore, it was for the petitioner to establish such claim before the Enquiry Officer. 32. We, therefore, proceeded to consider decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.G.D. Reddy (supra) relied upon by the learned Advocate for the 14 Bank. We found that the charge therein was that periodical inspection of the units was not carried out. To examine such a charge, the inspection records were required to be seen. The defence representative made a request for inspection of such records in respect of the units mentioned in the charge memo. The inspection registers were thus brought in the enquiry. After the inspection records registers were produced the defence representative stated that they would respond after going through the documents. However, subsequently they raised an objection that the record pertaining to inspection were produced at the fag end of the enquiry. It is under such circumstance that the Apex Court found that the onus shifted on the respondent who was required to respond and since no response was forthcoming from the defence representative despite the inspection registers being available. The Apex Court upheld the finding arrived at in the enquiry that there was failure to conduct periodical inspection. 33. In the present case, we find an unequivocal acceptance by the writ petitioner that all the transactions referred to in the charge memo were true and that the same had taken place under his directions. He claimed that all such transactions were genuine and not deterrent to the bank’s interest. The very same transactions which the bank was alleging to be part of the alleged misconduct, was claimed by the petitioner to be genuine and not opposed to the bank’s interest. The transactions reveal money being diverted to the petitioner’s own account, the account of his wife and relatives. The transactions also show cash payments being 15 made. Since such facts were not denied, we are of the view that the onus shifted on the writ petitioner to show as claimed by him in his reply to the charge memo that the transactions were genuine and in the interest of the Bank or not deterrent to the Bank’s interest. We however, find that the petitioner has not by any measure been able to establish with reference to any banking norms/procedure that as a branch head he had the discretion to indulge in, or direct execution of the admitted transactions regarding unauthorized debit of various General Ledger (GL) Heads/accounts for carrying on the multiple transactions at the various branches to siphon off funds to his own/wives and relatives account; and for disbursing amounts in cash. 34. He also has failed to show that such transactions, in any way benefitted the bank. We, therefore, find force in the submission advanced by the learned Advocate for the appellant relying upon decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of A.G.D. Reddy (supra). 35. Therefore, we are of the view that no prejudice was caused to the writ petitioner on account of non-examination of witnesses in support of the admitted transactions. 36. Another aspect falling for consideration in the present appeal is whether the petitioner can get any benefit of the acquittal recorded in the trial in relation to the same charges. Since such acquittal was recorded during pendency of the present appeal, such submission is advanced by the cross-objectionist/ writ petitioner in the present appeal. 16 37. The learned Advocate placed reliance on decision in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh (Supra) to contend that the charges and evidence being the same as were considered in the criminal trial, upholding the finding of petitioner being guilty in the departmental proceeding would be unjust, unfair and oppressive since the petitioner was acquitted in the trial. In support of such submission he also relied upon decision in the case of Ram Lal (Supra) to support the submission. The law considered and stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in these two decisions are now axiomatic. An acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order setting aside his punishment in the departmental proceeding. However, when the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in both departmental enquiry and the criminal trial are identical or substantially similar then the situation assumes a different context. In such a circumstance the Apex Court in Maharana Pratap Singh (Supra) held that upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceeding would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. It was held: “47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan.” 17 38. In this connection, the learned Advocate for the Bank placed reliance on decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shashi Bhushan Prasad (Supra), Heem Singh (Supra) and P. Zadenga (Supra). 39. In the case of P. Zadenga (Supra) relied upon by the learned Advocate for the Bank, the issue arising for consideration before the Apex Court was whether pendency of the criminal trial warrants a stay of departmental proceeding. The other issues were also considered as to whether acquittal in criminal trial would preclude the employer to initiate departmental proceedings and non-compliance of provisions of a bipartite agreement would result in disciplinary action being void. The Apex Court held that in some cases it may be desirable or advisable for the disciplinary proceeding to be stayed when criminal proceedings are going on. The Apex Court further held that stay is not a matter of course and is to be given after consideration of all factors. The Apex Court also held that acquittal in the criminal case ipso facto would not tantamount to closure or culmination of departmental proceeding in favour of delinquent employer. The decision in the case of P. Zadenga (Supra) was rendered considering a long line of earlier judgments in this regard. 40. In Shashi Bhushan Prasad (Supra) the Apex Court considered the more relaxed degree of proof required in a departmental proceeding wherein penalty can be imposed on findings recorded on the basis of preponderance of probability. In this judgment also the Apex Court held that acquittal in the criminal trial does not ipso facto absolve the 18 delinquent from liability in disciplinary proceeding. In the case of Heem Singh (Supra) also the legal position as regards the effect of an acquittal was stated by the Apex Court that the verdict of the criminal trial therein did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry since the enquiry was not covered by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which covered the criminal trial. The Apex Court in para 40 stated: “40. In the present case, the respondent was acquitted of the charge of murder. The circumstances in which the trial led to an acquittal have been elucidated in detail above. The verdict of the criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which governed the criminal trial. True, even on the more relaxed standard which governs a disciplinary enquiry, evidence of the involvement of the respondent in a conspiracy involving the death of Bhanwar Singh would be difficult to prove. But there are, as we have seen earlier, circumstances emerging from the record of the disciplinary proceedings which bring legitimacy to the contention of the State that to reinstate such an employee back in service will erode the credibility of and public confidence in the image of the police force.” 41. The various judgments cited by both sides on this proposition have one thing in common that acquittal in criminal trial does not automatically put a closure to the departmental proceeding. An acquittal ipso facto would not be sufficient therefore to exonerate the petitioner in the departmental proceeding. Various factors are required to be considered. Before such closure can be recorded in a departmental proceeding, the management is required to see that the charges were one and the same the witness and the evidence in both proceeding are same and that on a consideration of the same, a complete acquittal was recorded in the criminal trial. 19 42. In the present case we find a stark variance between the criminal trial and the departmental proceeding, on the ground that in the departmental proceeding there is a specific admission of the petitioner in writing as regards the transactions forming the basis of the allegation/ misconduct. There is no such admission in the criminal trial wherein the writ petitioner was acquitted. Therefore, there is no scope for the Court to hold that the material evidence and witnesses were common in the criminal trial and the departmental proceedings so as to extend any benefit to the petitioner. 43. In view of our above consideration, we find that the conclusion of the Hon’ble Single Judge that the petitioner failed to explain how the alleged transactions were in the Bank’s interest requires no interference. Thus, we also found that acquittal in the criminal trial, would not automatically benefit the petitioner in the departmental proceeding, wherein he admitted to the transactions. 44. The nature of transaction alleged and admitted are also required to be considered by the writ Court exercising extraordinary, equitable and discretionary jurisdiction, having regard to the nature of service being discharged by the writ petitioner. He was a Branch Manager in a Nationalised Bank. He was dealing with public money. The public trust and confidence in the banking system, therefore, was paramount. Under the circumstance the writ petitioner was expected to maintain high degree of integrity, probity and commitment to the organization with a view to safeguarding its public image and confidence in the banking 20 system. The writ petitioner having regard to the nature of allegations, therefore, cannot except any leniency whatsoever. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is to be dealt with firmly. Once the unauthorized and fraudulent transactions were accepted; and there was a failure to establish that the transactions were in the Bank’s interest, the petitioner was required to be awarded a punishment which would be a deterrent for any other Bank employee/ Officer in future to deal with the deposit of investors/constituents, in a Bank through cash transactions, and through his own, his wife’s and his relative’s accounts. 45. In view of our consideration above we are of the view that the relief granted to the writ petitioner by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable. There was no scope for the learned Single Judge to interfere with, or modify the penalty of dismissal from service, to withholding of increment and promotion for the period of his suspension till the date of his superannuation. 46. Such relief in our opinion is also not sustainable in view of the settled law which contemplates a very limited scope for interference with the quantum of punishment, where the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the allegations. Even in such cases, the law frowns upon, and restrains substitution of the punishment by the writ court, in place of the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority in exercise of judicial review. Even where the punishment is found to be unsustainable within the limited scope of interference in judicial review, the law mandates that the matter be relegated to the 21 Disciplinary Authority for reconsidering the issue to decide the punishment to be awarded. 47. Our view if fortified by several precedents, including recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Subrata Nath reported in (2024) 20 SCC 402, wherein the apex court held: “24. To sum up the legal position, being fact-finding authorities, both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the disciplinary authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554] . If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the disciplinary/appellate authority may be called upon to reconsider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor.” 22 48. As a result of such consideration, we set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The Bank’s appeal is allowed. The cross objection filed by the writ petitioner is accordingly dismissed. 49. Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties, expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal formalities. (Madhuresh Prasad, J.) I agree. (Prasenjit Biswas, J.)