( 2025:HHC:34296-DB ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No.11359 of 2024 Date of Decision:- 06.10.2025 State of H.P. and Another ....Petitioners Versus Shalinder Zinta and Others ....Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioners : Mr. Pranay Pratap Singh, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondents : Ms. Sunita Sharma, Senior Advocate with Ms. Sugandh Verma and Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocates, for respondents No.1 & 2. : Mr. Ajay Chauhan, Advocate, for respondent No.4. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral). The challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 15.07.2019 of erstwhile Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal Shimla, whereby T.A. No.60 of 2015 titled Shalinder Zinta and another Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others has been allowed. The employees-applicants as such was given the benefit of regularization in line with the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 benefit given to private respondents No.5 and 6 with all consequential benefits within two months from the date of production of certified copy of the order and the actual financial benefits were restricted to three years prior to filing the transferred application. 2. The present writ petition came to be filed and having been prepared in September, 2023 and is dated 09.10.2023. A further perusal of the paper-book would go on to show that there was a delay in re-filing the petition, which was initially filed in September, 2023. Thereafter, it was apparently returned and filed only on 09.09.2024 and again returned and refiled finally on 13.09.2024 and on 21.09.2024 had been returned and thereafter the present petition was refiled on 03.10.2024. 3. The reason given in the writ petition is that after receiving the copy of the judgment dated 15.07.2019 on 01.11.2019 in the Office of the Director Urban Development, Himachal Pradesh the matter remained under process. Thereafter, the matter was examined by the Law Department and it was decided to file the writ petition as conveyed on 21.03.2020. 4. The reason for delay is stated to be Pandemic of COVID-19 period. It has further been mentioned that Execution Petition No.97 of 2023 came to be filed and thereafter it was 3 adviced to agitate it further as the file had remained unattended and could not be filed immediately on receipt of Law Department’s advice. It has also been mentioned in paragraph 14 that neither the petitioner made any inquiry in this regard and only when the Execution Petition was filed, the State apparently got up from its slumber. Thus, as noticed when the advice was given by the Law Department is also not clear. The copy had been received on 01.11.2019, but no effort was made for a period of four years to file the petition till October, 2023. Even, if the grace period of COVID-19 is given, though, we can only give the benefit of two years to the maximum. 5. In similar circumstances, writ petitions filed against the Armed Forces Tribunal, Chandigarh, Regional Circuit Bench at Shimla beyond a period of one year have been dismissed by us in a bunch of petitions, the lead case being CWP No.2522 of 2025 titled Union of India and others Vs. Pawna Devi, decided on 25.02.2025. 6. In sum and substance, though there is no limitation as such in filing the writ petition against the order of the Tribunal but stale matters as such cannot be raked up at the leisured pace by the State. The relevant portion of the said judgment, after discussing the law as such, reads as under:- 4 “3. The writ petitions by the Union of India have been filed in January and February 2025. We are not deciding the issue on merits in these set of cases. We are primarily concerned with the issue of delay in filing these petitions. We would take the facts from Union of India while taking up case of Pawna Devi in CWP No.2522 of 2025 to notice that the claim is for grant of ordinary family pension and the Tribunal vide impugned order dated 04.11.2022, while granting the benefit had restricted the arrears to three years prior to the filing of the application which is 28.01.2019. The amounts were to be released within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy by the Learned Senior Panel Counsel, failing which it was to carry interest @ 8% from the date of the order till realization of the entire amount. 4. We are of the considered opinion that though there is no period prescribed for filing the writ petitions which challenge the orders of the Tribunal while invoking the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the Union of India cannot be permitted free play, as such to challenge the said orders at its own whims and fancies after a period of over two years in all these set of cases. The parties to the litigation have developed a vested right as such after the orders have come in force in their favour and for the Union of India as such to file these writ petitions after the delay as mentioned above, cannot as such be countenanced in the absence of any justifiable reasons. 5 to 19 xxxxxxxx...... 20. In Esha Bhattacharjee versus Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649, the principles of limitation were culled out as under: “i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 5 iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 21. In State of Madhaya Pradesh versus Bherulal (2020) 10 SCC 654, the apex Court has commented upon the tendency of the State as such to file ‘Certificate Cases’ in order to cover up its lapse. 6 22. In State of Orissa and others versus Sunanda Mahakuda (2021) 1 SCC 560, similar observations came forth from the apex Court while dismissing a Special Leave Petition which was time barred and proceedings had been filed after contempt proceedings had been initiated on the dismissal of the writ appeal and therefore, the conduct of the State Government was depreciated while imposing costs of Rs.25000/-. 23. Similar was the position in State of Uttar Pradesh and others versus Sabha Narain and others (2022) 9 SCC 266, which is a three Judge Bench verdict. The relevant portion reads as under:- “4. We have also categorized such kind of cases as “certificate cases” filed with the only object to obtain a quietus from the Supreme Court on the ground that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. The objective is to complete a mere formality and save the skin of the officers who may be in default in following the due process or may have done it deliberately. We have deprecated such practice and process and we do so again. We refuse to grant such certificates and if the Government/public authorities suffer losses, it is time when concerned officers responsible for the same, bear the consequences. The irony, emphasized by us repeatedly, is that no action is ever taken against the officers and if the Court pushes it, some mild warning is all that happens. 24. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs and others vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 SC OnLine SC 513, it was also held that stale matters cannot be entertained to defeat the substantial law of limitation and Statute. 25. It is not the case of Union of India that there is any fraud or misrepresentation in the present set of cases, whereby mainly the legal representatives of the Armed Forces are seeking redressal of their rights. The State or the public body can be given some acceptable latitude keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the principle of limitation and though no precise formula, as such, can be laid down, but we cannot brush aside the fact that the parties in view of the orders passed by the Tribunal could have 7 also resorted to getting the orders executed by filing appropriate remedies and Tribunal has also granted the benefit of penal interest, if the payment is not made within the prescribed period. Inspite of this fact the Union of India chose to sit tight and chose not to file the writ petitions within a reasonable period which can be classified as one year and beyond the same, no indulgence can be granted. 26. Therefore, the period prior to 18.10.2023 as such between the date of the decisions ranging from May/August/November, 2022 cannot be condoned in any manner and therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the present writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches as on account of Union of India not having resorted to its legal remedies expeditiously or even having made reasonable effort to challenge the said orders or even take a decision as such to challenge the said orders for a period of over one year. The latitude as such on account of laxity on the department, in such circumstances cannot be extended. 27. Without going into the merits of the cases, we are of the considered opinion that there is a delay of over a year from passing of the orders and no effort was made to challenge the order passed by the Tribunal within a reasonable time, therefore, on account of the opinion given on 18.09.2023, the Union of India cannot raise the issue on merits. 28. Resultantly, there is no other option, but to dismiss these four writ petitions on account of the principle of delay and laches and the same are accordingly dismissed alongwith pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.” 7. We have now been informed by the counsel for the respondents-employee herein that even the order has been implemented on 08.04.2025 by the Director, Urban Development, Himachal Pradesh by noticing the Execution Petition filed however, subject to the outcome of the present writ petition. 8 8. The employee retired way-back on 31.05.2019 by serving as Junior Engineer and his services have been regularized w.e.f. 24.06.2000 subject to the outcome of the writ petition. The actual financial benefits were restricted to three years prior to filing of the transferred application. 9. In such circumstances, the absence of any reasonable sufficient cause having been shown and the State being slept over the matter from the year 2019 till the filing of the Execution Petition in the year 2023, we do not find any plausible reasons to entertain the writ petition at the belated stage. The application for delay in refiling was preferred and delay of refiling has been condoned on an earlier occasion. The whole sequence would go on to show the negligence as such of the State in pursuing the said litigation at all stages. We do not wish to press the unnecessary litigation as the employee already stands retired six years back and who has already got the benefits as such. The stand taken by the State is already contradictory on the one hand by giving the excuses of the Pandemic of COVID-19 and on the other hand, the employee had not come to them and only on the filing of the Execution Petition, they came to know about the fact that litigation had to be persued. The contradictory stand as such has thus further compounded the whole issue against the State 9 and therefore, no cause is made out to condone the inordinate delay. 10. Resultantly, we are of the considered opinion that the present petition deserves to be dismissed on account of delay and laches, which is accordingly dismissed as such. 11. Pending miscellaneous application(s) if any, shall also stand disposed of. (G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice (Jiya Lal Bhardwaj) Judge 6th October, 2025 (munish thakur)