IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No.10787 of 2023 Date of Decision: 9.12.2025 _____________________________________________________________________ Kishan Chand ……...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. …....Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Petitioner: Mr. Varun Chauhan, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General, Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General and Mr. Ravi Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General. ___________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, who at present is working as Sweeper on regular basis in the respondent department is that he ought to have been regularized w.e.f. 31.3.2013 instead of 20.1.2015, when he had completed eight years service on daily wage basis. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerge from the pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties are that petitioner herein was initially appointed as Part Time Bhisti at Subsidiary Health Centre Purthi, Pangi on 10.1.1990 (Annexure P-1). After his having put in more than 15 years’ service, petitioner was made daily wage from Part Time Bhisti vide order dated 30.12.2005 (Annexure P-3). Though petitioner herein completed eight years daily wage service with 240 days in each calendar year on 31.3.2013, but yet his services were not - 2 - regularized in terms of Regularization Policy framed by the Government of Himachal Pradesh w.e.f. 31.3.2013, rather his services were ordered to be regularized vide order dated 20.1.2015. In the afore background petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for following main relief: “a) The respondents may kindly be directed to consider the regularization of the petitioner from year 2013 instead of the year 2015.” 3. Reply filed by the respondents if perused in its entirety, nowhere disputes facts, as have been noticed herein above, rather an attempt has been made to refute the claim of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner did not possess requisite qualification for the post of Sweeper as per Recruitment & Promotion Rules. There is no dispute to the effect that after being granted daily wage status w.e.f. 30.12.2005, petitioner worked continuously on daily wage basis with 240 days in each calendar year till 31.3.2013. Once Policy of Regularization framed by the Government of Himachal Pradesh clearly provides that a daily wage employee, who has completed eight years daily wage service with 240 days in each calendar year is entitled to regularization, there was no occasion, if any, for the respondents to regularize the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 20.1.2015, whereas services of the petitioner ought to have been regularized w.e.f. 31.3.2013. Ground of the petitioner’s having not possessed requisite qualification is not sustainable, rather deserves outright rejection for the reason that petitioner now stands regularized against the post of - 3 - Sweeper. If petitioner was not eligible for the post of Sweeper for his having not possessed requisite qualification, there was no occasion, if any, for the respondents to regularize him w.e.f. 20.1.2015. 4. While making this court peruse Policy of Regularization framed by the Government of Himachal Pradesh, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, attempted to argue that there was specific condition for regularization of such worker as per instructions dated 8.7.2013 that daily waged/contingent paid workers being considered for such regularization shall possess minimum educational qualification as prescribed in the Recruitment & Promotion Rules of such post. 5. Though having carefully perused aforesaid document there appears to be no justification for this Court to disagree with Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, but once respondents have themselves granted relaxation in educational qualification for the purpose of regularization, they are estopped at this stage to refute claim of the petitioner on the afore ground. Once condition with regard to educational qualification as prescribed in Recruitment & Promotion Rules has already been relaxed by the Government, petitioner herein cannot be denied regularization w.e.f. 31.3.2013, on which date, he had completed eight years daily wage service with 240 days in each calendar year. 6. Though at this stage, learned Additional Advocate General attempted to argue that there is a delay of eight years because - 4 - petitioner has approached this Court in the year 2023, whereas he ought to have approached this Court for redressal of his grievance, if any, immediately in the year 2015 when he was granted regularization w.e.f. 20.1.2015. Though there is nothing on record, save and except one representation dated 19.5.2023 filed by the petitioner to demonstrate that prior to filing of the petition at hand, petitioner herein raised dispute, if any, with regard to his regularization w.e.f. 31.3.2013, but once it is not in dispute that respondents themselves faulted at the time of regularizing the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 20.1. 2015 instead of 31.3.2013, coupled with the fact that on account of non-grant of regularization from due date i.e. 31.3.2013, petitioner shall suffer recurring loss, plea of delay and laches deserves to be rejected outrightly in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in case titled Vikram Singh and Ors. v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Ors., Latest HLJ 2023 (HP) (2) 1469, wherein it has been held that relief, if based on discrimination leading to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied on the ground of delay and latches. Para 23 of the afore judgment reads as under: “ 23. In so far as the plea of limitation/delay and laches is concerned, the same is also liable to be rejected. As has already been stated supra, the plea of petitioners is based on discrimination which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Thimmappa and others vs. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of - 5 - India and another, 2001 (2) SCC 259, wherein, it has been categorically laid down that if there is an infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India then petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.” 7. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, SBI, (2001) 2 SCC 259. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “8. Mr Rao, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, on the other hand, vehemently urged that if the treatment meted out to the petitioners is found to be discriminatory, and as such, violates Article 14 of the Constitution, then the Court will not throw away the petitions merely on the ground of laches. In support of the contention, reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra [(1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137 : (1974) 2 SCR 216] . In the said case, this Court had observed: (SCC p. 327, para 10) “Moreover, it may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of equal opportunity under Article 16 is itself a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like.” Mr Rao also relied upon the observation of this Court in the case of B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of A.P. [1985 Supp SCC 432 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 49 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 573] wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for the Court observed thus: (SCC p. 462, para 20) - 6 - “[T]he burden of establishing the reasonableness of a classification and its nexus with the object of the legislation is on the State. Though no calamitous consequences were mentioned in any of the counter- affidavits, one of the submissions strenuously urged before us by the learned Advocate General of Andhra Pradesh and the several other counsel who followed him was the oft-repeated and now familiar argument of ‘administrative chaos’. It was said that there would be considerable chaos in the administration if those who had already retired are now directed to be reinducted into service.” A passage from the judgment of Lord Denning in Bradbury v. London Borough of Enfield [(1967) 3 All ER 434] was also pressed into service by Mr P.P. Rao, which it is worthwhile to quote hereunder: “It has been suggested by the Chief Education Officer that, if an injunction is granted, chaos will supervene. All the arrangements have been made for the next term, the teachers appointed to the new comprehensive schools, the pupils allotted their places, and so forth. It would be next to impossible, he says, to reverse all these arrangements without complete chaos and damage to teachers, pupils and the public. I must say this: if a local authority does not fulfil the requirements of the law, this Court will see that it does fulfil them. It will not listen readily to suggestions of ‘chaos’. The Department of Education and the Council are subject to the rule of law and must comply with it, just like everyone else. Even if chaos should result, still the law must be obeyed; but I do not think that chaos will result. The evidence convinces me that the ‘chaos’ is much overstated.” 9. On consideration of the aforesaid legal position, though, we are inclined to agree with Mr P.P. Rao that these cases should not be thrown out on the ground of laches alone, inasmuch as - 7 - the placement made on 1-10-1979 was assailed in the year 1988 at the earliest and 1998 at the latest, yet the same may not be brushed aside, particularly, when we have not been able to find out any infraction of any fundamental right of these petitioners, guaranteed under the Constitution.” 8. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that claim for enforcement of fundamental right of equal opportunity under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, cannot be permitted to be defeated on the ground of delay and laches. 9. Consequently, in view of the above, the present petition is allowed and respondents are directed to regularize the services of the petitioner from the date he has completed eight years daily wage service with 240 days in each calendar year after his being granted daily wage status alongwith all consequential benefits. All pending applications stand disposed of. December 9, 2025 (Sandeep Sharma), (manjit) Judge