1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5014 of 2024 1 - Sani Ram Bhagat S/o Late Shri Suku Ram Bhagat Aged About 61 Years R/o Village Pharsabahar, District Jashpur Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Industry Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Director Industry Udyog Bhawan Ring Road No. 1, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Divisional Joint Director Treasury Accounts And Pension, Ghadi Chowk, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 4 - The Accountant General, Zero Point Baloda Bazar, Raipur (C.G.) (As Per Honble Court Order Dated 23-04-2025). ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner (s) : Shri J.D. Bajpai, Advocate. For State : Shri Kawaljeet Singh Saini, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent No.4 : Shri Raj Kumar Gupta, Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order Reserved on 10.06.2025 O rder delivered on 08 .09.2025 1. The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition claiming promotion and other consequential benefits from the date of his entitlement and prayed for the following reliefs:- “10.1. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner for kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court. 10.2. To direct the respondents by way of writ of mandamus to give promotion for the post of Inspector to manager, thereafter, to the post of General Manager. At present the petitioner is holding Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2025.09.08 17:31:37 +0530 2 the post of Inspector/Assistant Manager, since 09-11-2023. The petitioner is claiming such relief from 11-12-1991. 10.3. That, to direct the respondents to pay further monetary benefit such as refixation of pay from the date 11-12-1991 up to 01-07-2024. 10.4. That the respondents also be directed to pay the difference remaining arrears of pay by refixation of pay scale to the petitioner before 30-09-2024. 10.5. Any other relief, which may be deemed fit by this Hon’ble Court just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be provided in favour of the petitioner.” 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was working as Industry Inspector with the Respondent No. 2/District Industries Centre, Raipur. In the year 1998, he was charged with the allegation that he granted certain loans under the Prime Minister’s Employment Scheme, and the offence under Section 13 (1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and was convicted by the learned Trial Court on 04-08-2003 in S.T. No. 08/1998. As a consequence of his conviction, he was terminated from service vide order dated 04-08-2003. He challenged his conviction before this Court in Cr.A. No. 851/2003, which is allowed on 04-10-2017, and the petitioner is acquitted of the charges, and the judgment of conviction and sentence are set aside. The State Government had filed SLP (Criminal) No. 41488/2018, before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which is also dismissed vide order dated 30-09-2022. Thereafter, he moved his representation before the authorities for his reinstatement, and after the passing of the order dated 02-11-2023 in W.P.S. No. 8739/2023, by this Court, he could be reinstated on the post of Industries Inspector (presently known as 3 Assistant Manager) vide order dated 09-11-2023, and was posted at the Industries Directorate, Raipur. He is superannuated on 30-09-2024. 3. On 29-07-2024, he made a representation that he is going to retire on 30-09-2024, and his juniors have been posted to superior post, and despite his request and representations, he has not been given any promotion, nor have any monetary benefits been provided to him. Hence, this petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is acquitted of the charge levelled against him and he is reinstated in service on 09-11-2023. He was reinstated after the passing of the order dated 02-11-2023 in W.P.S. No. 8739/2023. When the petitioner is reinstated in service, he is entitled to all the service benefits from the date of his initial appointment, including promotion and monetary benefits. His pay is also required to be fixed as per the revision of pay and promotional posts. In the meantime, his juniors have been promoted and they are working on senior posts; therefore, the petitioner is also entitled to the benefits of promotion posts. The petitioner is not at any fault, and he has been acquitted after facing criminal charges for about 27 years, which is upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court also. He would also submit that, though the respondent department has fixed the pay scale of the petitioner on 15-07-2024 (Annexure P-9), no benefits of the promotional avenue were granted to him. He would also submit that vide order dated 15-07-2024 (Annexure P-9), his probation period was revoked and his services were counted from 1992. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to all the benefits, including the revision of pay and other promotional benefits. He would 4 further submit that the State Government has taken two grounds for rejection of the claim of the petitioner that the 5-year ACR of the petitioner is not available, and the acquittal of the petitioner is not the Honourable Acquittal, but that would not be a ground to reject the claim of the petitioner. He has been acquitted of the charges either clean acquittal or by giving the benefit of doubt; he is entitled to the benefits of acquittal. The ACR of the petitioner was also with the department, and the petitioner has nothing to do with the official records. Thus, the action of the respondent authorities is against the interest of the petitioner and is arbitrary. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions of the petitioner and submits that the petitioner was terminated in the year 2004, and he could be reinstated in the year 2023. His ACRs between these years are not available with the department, as he was terminated. In the absence of ACR for the last 5 years, his promotion cannot be considered. He would further submit that the petitioner cannot claim the promotion as a matter of right, particularly when he was out of service because of his conviction. Though the petitioner is acquitted but his acquittal is not an Honorary acquittal, but after giving him the benefit of doubt, he is acquitted. The promotion of the employee can be considered on the basis of his ACR for the last five years. The petitioner is reinstated in the year 2023, and therefore, in the absence of his ACR for the last five years, his candidature for promotion cannot be considered. Therefore, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 5 6. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 4 would submit that the issue involved in the present petition is with respect to promotion and refixation of the pay scale of the petitioner, which relates to the State Government, and they have to answer it properly. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed to the petition by the respective parties. 8. The question is whether the petitioner is entitled to all the consequential benefits of his service, including promotion and monetary benefits, in light of sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules? 9. The facts are not in dispute in the case that the petitioner was terminated from service on 16-01-2004. He was convicted by the learned Trial Court for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, vide judgement of conviction and sentence dated 04-08-2003. In the Cr.A. No. 851/2003, he was acquitted vide judgment dated 04-10-2017, and the SLP filed by the State before the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 30-09-2022. Thereafter, the petitioner could be reinstated in service vide order dated 09-11-2023, on the post of Industries Inspector (presently known as “Assistant manager”), and retired on 30-09-2024. As per the order dated 15-07-2024, his pay scale is refixed according to the applicable pay scale, which is revised time to time. During the pendency of the present petition, the Respondent No. 2 calculated the arrears of pay of the petitioner from 18-11-1997 to 08-11-2023 and sought information about the deduction of income tax from their CA, vide letter dated 29- 01-2025 (Annexure P-13). As per the submission of the petitioner, after 6 deduction of income tax, the amount of arrears of pay has been paid to him. It transpires from the letter dated 29-01-2025 (Annexure P-13), the arrears of pay are calculated from 18-11-1997, which was the date of his suspension till his reinstatement, i.e. 08-11-2023. Thus, the respondents themselves treated the petitioner in continuous service since the date of his appointment. 10. To adjudicate the above-stated question, it would be appropriate to notice sub-rule (1), (2), (3), (6) & (7) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules, which is applicable to the Government servant for pay and allowances on his reinstatement, which states as under: “F.R. 54. Pay and allowances on reinstatement. (1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired is reinstated as a result of appeal or review or would have been so reinstated [but for his retirement on superannuation, while under suspension or not], the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty, including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be; and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (2) Where the authority competent to order re instatement is of the opinion that the Government servant who had been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired has been fully exonerated, the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of subrule (6), be paid full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be: Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation [within 60 days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him] and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of subrule (7), be paid for 7 the period of such delay, only such amount not being the whole of such pay and allowances as it may determine. (3) In a case falling under sub-rule (2), the period of absence from duty, including the period of suspension preceding dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. 6) The payment of allowances under sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (4) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible. (7) The amount determined under the proviso to sub-rule (2) or under sub-rule (4) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under rule 53” 11. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules would show that when a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired, is reinstated as a result of appeal or review or would have been so reinstated (but for his retirement on superannuation, while under suspension or not), the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules provides that where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the Government servant who had been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired has been fully exonerated, the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (6), be paid full pay and allowances to which he would dismissed, suspended compulsory retirement, as the case may be. 12. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 54 states that the payment of allowances under sub-rule (2), shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible, as such, once the Government servant has 8 been fully exonerated, the Government servant shall be subject to the provisions of subrule (6) is entitled for full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired. As such, sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules is mandatory, but this rule is subject to a proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 54, which provides that if the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within 60 days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded have been removed entitled, had or compulsorily he not been retired or removal or prior to such dismissal, in writing, that the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of subrule (7), be paid for the period of such delay, only such amount not being the whole of such pay and allowances as it may determine. However, subrule (7) of Rule 54 provides that the amount determined under the proviso to subrule (2) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under rule 53, as such, subrule (2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules is mandatory in nature and once the Government servant who had been dismissed has been fully exonerated, he shall be entitled for full pay and allowances subject to proviso to subrule (2), but in any case, it shall not be less than subsistence allowance and other allowances payable under Rule 53. 9 13. Question of “full exoneration” comes into play only when the Government servant is dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired. Dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement may have been preceded by suspension. In this case, it is the case of the petitioner that he has been acquitted of criminal case honourably by this Court from all criminal charges; it must be held that he was “fully exonerated”, therefore, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances by virtue of sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules. 14. An accused may be acquitted of criminal charges levelled against him on any of these grounds: (1) When a criminal case is dismissed on a technical ground. (2) When the guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (3) An accused may also be acquitted by the Court holding that the prosecution’s case is false and he has been falsely implicated. 15.In the considered opinion of this Court, only when the third category of the case mentioned hereinabove, may it be said that the accused is 'fully exonerated' from criminal charges and in the other two cases, as the blame is not 'fully' removed from the accused. As such, sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules would apply when the prosecution case is found to be false or the Government servant is found to have been falsely implicated, though he is innocent. The word 'fully exonerated' employed in sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 can be considered from another angle by holding that an accused is fully exonerated when he is honourably acquitted of criminal charges for which the concerned accused person is charged. 16.The issue of “Honourable Acquittal” and “Acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt” though may have to be discussed in the cases of 10 “Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram” 2013 (1) SCC 598, “Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal” 1994 (1) SCC 541, “Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh” 2013 (7) SCC 685 where the claim of back wages after reinstatement is involved but in the present case, it does not have much significance because of the reason that the State Government has treated the petitioner continue in service and his pay from 1991 till his retirement is revised by the order dated 15-07-2024 (irrespective of the acceptance of the petitioner) and the arrears of full salary has been paid to him which transpires from the document dated 29-01-2025 (Annexure P-13) and his suspension and period of termination is considered as service period, i.e. from 18-11-1997 to 08-11-2023, and after deduction the TDS under the rules, it has been paid to the petitioner. Further from the Leave Encashment Certificate (Annexure R- 1), the length of service of the petitioner is counted from 10-03-1987 to 30-09-2024 (34 years, 09 months and 18 days). Thus, even if the petitioner is acquitted on the benefit of doubt, he was reinstated in service and treated in continuous service. 17.In the matter of “State Bank of India and Another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim”, 2013 (11) SCC 67, the Hon’ble supreme Court has held that:- “11……….During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant-bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant-bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate to retrospectively wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same have been granted by the appellant bank.” 11 18. In the matter of “Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujrat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar and Another”, 1996 (11) SCC 603, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that- “3. The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is: whether he is entitled to back wages? It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basic of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceeding and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant, Each case requires to be considered in his own backdrops. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned single judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference.” 19. In the matter of “Baldev Singh v. Union of India and Others” 2005(8) SCC 747, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “7. As the factual position noted clearly indicates the appellant was not in actual service for the period he was in custody. Merely because there has been an acquittal does not automatically entitle him to get salary for the concerned period. This is more so, on the logic of no work no pay. It is to be noted that the appellant was terminated from service because of the conviction. Effect of the same does not get diluted because of subsequent acquittal for the purpose of counting service. The aforesaid position was clearly stated in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Anr. (1996 (11) SC 603).” 20.Reverting to the facts of the present case, the State Government granted the entire salary of the petitioner from the date of his suspension and termination till his reinstatement after calculating the admissible pay scale to the petitioner. Though the petitioner is claiming promotional and other consequential benefits at par with the other similarly situated employee, the fact remains that he was out of service because of his conviction and termination. He could be reinstated only 12 as a consequence of acquittal, although it was on the benefit of the doubt. The effect of the same does not get diluted because of subsequent acquittal for the purpose of counting service. Nowhere was there an admission of the entitlement of the petitioner. In any event, the petitioner having not rendered service, the question of inclusion of the period does not arise, and he is not entitled to any consequential benefits apart from the benefits which have already been awarded to him. 21.The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of “Union of India and Others v. Jaipal Singh”, 2004(1) SCC 121, held that – “4…..If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest or by department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and it after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges, a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing re-instatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be re-instated, in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court in so far as it directed payment of back wages are liable to be and is hereby set aside.” 22. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the matter of “Rakesh Kumar Rathore v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others”, W.A. No. 329/2019, decided on 17-07-2019, held that- “8….the only circumstance under which the acquittal was granted by the Court was by granting “benefit of doubt”. In otherwords, there is no case of the appellant that he was granted,“honourable acquittal”. Nor is there any case for the appellant that the prosecution launched against him was a malicious one or it was false and fabricated. A person who is proceeded against for his deeds or misdeeds, if ultimately comes to be 13 acquitted from the criminal charge for the fact that the prosecution had failed to prove the offence 'beyond reasonable doubt' or by granting “benefit of doubt”, cannot aspire the State to pay him the entire service benefits. The tax payers' money cannot be sought to be siphoned out insofar as the action against the appellant was pursuant to his own deeds or misdeeds, especially when he does not have any case that there was any attempt on the part of the State/respondents in falsely implicating him in the crime.” 23. In the light of the aforesaid analysis, though the petitioner has been acquitted of criminal charges on the benefit of doubt, the period from his suspension and termination cannot be counted for the service period for the consequential benefits of promotion and other monetary benefits. The salary for the entire service period has already been counted and paid to the petitioner after pay fixation as per the applicable pay revision. In a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, “Government of West Bengal and Others v. Dr. Amal Satpathi and Others”, 2024 SCC Online SC 3512, it has been held that an employee whose promotion was not finalised before his retirement is not entitled to the benefits of his promotional post from a retrospective date. 24. In that view of the matter, I do not find merit in the claim of the petitioner, accordingly, the writ petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder