- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF APRIL, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO. 25909 OF 2024 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: 1. SMT. AYYAMMA W/O LAXMAN AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS. 2. SMT. NAGAMMA W/O MANAPPA AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS. 3. SRI SANGAPPA H/O RENUKA AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS. 4. SRI KASHAPPA W/O SOBANNA AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS 5. SMT NAGAMMA W/O NAGAPPA AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS. 6. SMT.SHIVALINGAMMA W/O AYYAPPA AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS. 7. SMT.HULIGAMMA W/O MALLAPPA AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS. Digitally signed by NAGAVENI Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 8. SMT.MAREMMA W/O PARASHURAMA AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS. 9. SMT. NAGAMMA W/O BHIMAPPA AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS 10. SMT.RENUKAMMA W/O ANANDA AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS 11. SMT.AYYAMMA W/O HANUMANTH AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS. 12. SMT.N.NAGAMMA W/O NAGAPPA AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS. 13. SMT.MAREPPA W/O MALLAPA AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS. 14. SMT.SHVALILA W/O SOMALINGAPPA AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS. 15. SMT HALLAMMA W/O SHARANAPAP AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS. 16. SMT.SHARANAMMA W/O SIDDAPPA AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS. - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 17. SMT. REHANA BEGUM W/O MOHAMMED AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS. 18. SMT BHIMA BAI W/O CHANDAPPA AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS. 19. SMT. YAMUNAMMA W/O MALLIKARJUN AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS 20. SMT.YALLAMMA W/O SHANTAPPA AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS 21. SMT.GANGAMMA W/O MALLAPPA SAMBUR AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS 22. SMT.BHIMABAI W/O GUNDAPPA AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS 23. SMT.SANGEETHA W/O BASAVARAJ AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS 24. SMT. NINGAMMA W/O NINGANNA AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS 25. SMT. BHAGAMMA W/O HUSSAIN AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 26. SMT.PARVATHI W/O BASAVARAJU AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS ALL THE PETITIONERS ARE RESIDING IN TIN SHED IN ANNASANDRA PALYA, VIGNANAGAR, WARD NO.81 BENGALURU – 560 037. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI CLIFTON ROZARIO, ADVOCATE FOR MS.MAITREYI KRISHNAN,ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY VIDHANA SOUDHA DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BENGALURU – 560 001. 2. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING VIKASA SOUDHA DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BENGALURU – 560 001. 3. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT BENGALURU – 560 009. 4. RAJIV GANDHI HOUSE BUILDING CORPORATION CAUVERY BHAVAN, 9TH FLOOR, C & F BLOCK, - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 K. G. ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 009 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI MOHAMMED JAFFAR SHAH, AGA FOR R-1 TO R-3; SMT.SHILPA RANI, ADVOCATE FOR R-4 SRI SANJEEV RAO S., ADVOCATE FOR IMPLEADING APPLICANT IN I.A.NO.2/25; THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE AN APPROPRIATE WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION TO THE RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE DIGNIFIED HOUSING FOR THE PETITIONERS IN 19 GUNTAS OF GOVERNMENT LAND IN SURVEY NO. 181, MAHADEVAPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU EAST TALUK, WITHIN A PERIOD OF 12 MONTHS AND PROVIDED ALL NECESSARY BASIC AMENITIES. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioners, who are all working as powrakarmikas in the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike ('the BBMP for short), for several years now are at the doors of this Court seeking a direction to the respondents to provide dignified housing for the petitioners in 19 guntas of Government land in Sy.No.181 of Mahadevapura Hobli, Bengaluru East Taluk. - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 2. Heard Shri Clifton Rozario, learned counsel for Ms. Maitreyi Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners; Shri Mohammed Jaffar Shah, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents No.1 to 3; Shri Sanjeev Rao S., learned counsel for impleading applicant in I.A.No.2/2025 and Smt. Shilpa Rani, learned counsel appearing for Rajiv Gandhi House Building Corporation. 3. Facts in brief germane are as follows: The petitioners are working as a powrakarmikas in the BBMP and are all residing in minute tin sheds in various parts of Annasandara playa, Vignanagar, Ward No.81. They are said to be living in the said sheds for over decades now. They are at the doors of this Court seeking the aforesaid direction in the light of the rehabilitation being done to safaikaramcharis including powrakarmikas. 4. The genesis of the issues traces back to the Committee on the improvement and working conditions of sweepers and scavengers – 1976. The committee has exposed the sub-human living conditions endured by the safaikarmacharies. Over the years, multiple committees have - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 recommended legislative intervention and welfare measures. Yet, the plight of these petitioners and the like remain unaddressed. 5. In their relentless pursuit of dignity qua housing the petitioners through their organization submitted memoranda to the State authorities imploring rehabilitation and grant of modest housing facilities. The petitioners identify survey No.181 measuring 19 guntas in the place as averred in the petition as suitable site for such rehabilitation. A second memorandum is also placed highlighting the urgent need. However, administrative inaction has compelled them to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for appropriate directions. 6. Shri Clifton Rozario, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners takes this Court through the documents appended to the petition which are vivid and photographic evidence portraying the deplorable living conditions of the petitioners. He would emphasise that right to live with dignity is enshrined both in International Human Rights Law and the - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 Indian Constitution, referring to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 7. During the subsistence of the petition, the State Government files an affidavit. The certain paragraphs are germane to be noticed. They read as follows: "7. I respectfully submit that the prayer sought in the Writ Petition with regard to the said Sy. No. 181/1 is not viable for the facts stated above and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and the difficulty being so and primarily interest of the Petitioner's also needs to be protected and as per the direction of this Hon'ble Court, I am herewith submitting the details of total land i.e., reserved for the upliftment of the weaker sections from different strata of society being unable to afford proper housing facilities. The Government of Karnataka has reserved several Government lands and same are being developed under Aegis of Rajiv Gandhi House Building Corporation, which is an Authority constituted under the Government of Karnataka to provide Housing for the homeless and weaker sections of the society. 8. 1 respectfully submit that there are several lands reserved for such purpose in Bengaluru urban District the copy of the proceedings and order dated-14/12/2017 is produced as Annexure-R1 and in the said Document itself certain Government lands more specifically in Bengaluru East Taluk, itself there are several lands reserved for that Such purpose, the details of the land reserved in Bengaluru east Taluk alone are stated herein below: - Details of the Government Gomal land in Bengaluru east Taluk Sl No Taluk Hobli Village Sy No. Extent A/G 1 Bengaluru East Bidarahalli Bidarahalli 193 20.00 2 Bengaluru East Bidarahalli Manduru 155 131.07 - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 3 Bengaluru East K R Pura Kyalasanahal li 15 4.07 4 Bengaluru East K R Pura Nagareshwar a/Nagenahal li 13 6.22 5 Bengaluru East K R Pura Horamavu/ Agara 104/ 1 2.25 9. I Respectfully submit that these lands have been handed over also to the Rajiv Gandhi House Building Corporation and the details are also placed before this court at Annexure-R2. 10. I respectfully submit that the Hon'ble Court could pass appropriate orders directing the said corporation to consider the case of these Petitioners, in any such project, they are specifically herein marked to provide respectable housing to the Petitioners herein." (Emphasis added) The State has come forward to allot certain survey numbers, where houses can be built to these petitioners. The details are found in the afore-quoted paragraphs of the affidavit. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners also filed the affidavit of the petitioners in acceptance of the affidavit filed by the State. The affidavit of authorized petitioner No.20 reads as follows: Page No.09 is retyped and replaced vide court order dated 04.06.2025 - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 "AFFIDAVIT I, Smt. Yallamma, W/o: Shantappa, Aged about: 37 years, residing in tin sheds in Annasandara Palya, Vignanagar, Ward No. 81, Bengaluru - 560 037 do, hereby solemnly swear on oath and state as follows: 1. I am the 20th Petitioner and am authorized to swear this affidavit on behalf of the other Petitioners. I am aware of the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. I state that the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban, had submitted an affidavit dated 04.04.2025, detailing the lands in Bengaluru East Taluk reserved to provide housing for the weaker sections of the society. 3. I state that the Petitioners seek that residential homes be provided in the land detailed in Para 8 (1) in Sy No. 193, Bidarahalli, Bengaluru East which as per the affidavit was handed over to the Rajiv Gandhi House Building Corporation. I state that in the same above said area, 20 x 30 sites have been provided to other residents of slums who have been rehabilitated there. 4. It is prayed that similarly the Petitioners be provided 20x30 sites in the same manner." Page No.10 is retyped and replaced vide court order dated 04.06.2025 - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 The petitioners are agreeable to the residential homes to be provided as indicated in the affidavit of the State. The construction is to be done by the respondent - Rajiv Gandhi Housing Corporation. 9. In the light of the affidavit of the State and the affidavit of acceptance of the petitioners, the prayer that is sought for deserves to be granted, albeit at different place. 10. Before parting, it is pertinent to underscore the observations of the division bench of the High Court of Delhi in the case of AJAY MAKEN & Ors. Vs. UNION OF INDIA & Ors.1, wherein the division bench highlights the right to adequate housing observing both international law and Indian Constitutional law and the statutes, in that regard. 11. The division bench highlights the International law on the right to adequate housing, which reads as follows: 1 2019 SCC Online Del 7618 Page No.11 is retyped and replaced vide court order dated 04.06.2025 - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 "International law on the right to adequate housing 56. The legal regime, both international and domestic, in relation to the right to adequate housing and the right against forced evictions is examined next. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted in 1966 is a multi-party treaty, ratified by India in 1976. India being a country that adopts the principle of ‘dualism’, the ICESCR is not enforceable straightway. However, with the enactment of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (PHRA), and in particular Section 2(f) thereof, the ICESCR is one of the human rights covenants recognised by the Indian Parliament to be enforceable. Consequently, the obligations under the said covenant are enforceable in India. 57. Under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, each State party has undertaken to take steps, “individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” Under Article 2(2), ICESCR every State party, including India, has undertaken to guarantee “that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 58. Article 11(1) ICESCR, which is immediately relevant for the present purposes, reads as under: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international cooperation based on free consent.” 59. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), a body of experts formed by the Economic and Social Council to assist it in the consideration of the reports submitted by the State parties, has produced ‘General Comments’ which explain in some detail the - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 substantive and procedural aspects of the ICESCR. Two of these are relevant for the present purposes. General Comment No. 4 is on the ‘Right to Adequate Housing’ and was adopted at the Sixth Session of the CESCR on 13th December, 1991. 60. Paragraph 7 of General Comment No. 4 expresses the view of the CESCR that: “The right to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it with, for example, the shelter provided by merely having a roof over one's head or views shelter exclusively as a commodity. Rather it should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity. This is appropriate for at least two reasons. In the first place, the right to housing is integrally linked to other human rights and to the fundamental principles upon which the Covenant is premised. This “the inherent dignity of the human person” from which the rights in the Covenant are said to derive requires that the term “housing” be interpreted so as to take account of a variety of other considerations, most importantly that the right to housing should be ensured to all persons irrespective of income or access to economic resources. Secondly, the reference in article 11(1) must be read as referring not just to housing but to adequate housing.” 61. In terms of General Comment 4, among the aspects of the right to adequate housing were : (i) legal security of tenure (ii) availability of services and materials, facilities and infrastructure (iii) affordability (iv) habitability (v) accessibility (vi) location and (vii) cultural adequacy. The CESCR emphasised that the right to adequate housing cannot be viewed in isolation from other human rights contained in the two international covenants i.e. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ICESCR. Emphasising the indivisibility of rights it observed: “the full enjoyment of other rights - such as the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of association (such as for tenants and other community- based groups), the right to freedom of residence and the right to participate in public decision-making - is indispensable if the right to adequate housing is to be realized and maintained by all groups in society. Similarly, the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 unlawful interference with one's privacy, family, home or correspondence constitutes a very important dimension in defining the right to adequate housing.” 62. The CESCR identified the steps to be taken immediately and underscored that the State parties “must give due priority to those social groups living in unfavourable conditions by giving them particular considerations”. Among the steps that each party was expected to take was to adopt ‘a national housing strategy’ which should reflect: “extensive genuine consultation with, and participation by, all of those affected, including the homeless, the inadequately housed and their representatives. Furthermore, steps should be taken to ensure coordination between ministries and regional and local authorities in order to reconcile related policies (economics, agriculture, environment, energy, etc.) with the obligations under article 11 of the Covenant.” 63. This is particularly relevant in the context of Delhi, where there is a multiplicity of agencies dealing with the issue of slums on both public and private lands. In Delhi, most of the slums are on public land, and the agencies involved include, among others, the Central Government, the Government of the NCT of Delhi, the DDA, the MCD, the NDMC and, now the DUSIB. The Central Government itself is comprised of several ministries and departments. The Railways and the Public Works Department (PWD) are some of the major departments which are identified as ‘land holding agencies’. What General Comment No. 4 emphasises is that there should be coordination between all ministries and local authorities in order to reconcile the related policies with the obligation under Article 11 of the ICESCR. Among the remedies that Article 11 of the ICESCR envisages is the provision of “legal appeals aimed at preventing planned evictions or demolitions through the issuance of court-ordered injunctions.” They would also include “legal procedures seeking compensation following an illegal eviction, complaints against illegal actions carried out or supported by landlords (whether public or private) in relation to rent levels, dwelling maintenance and racial or other forms of discrimination”. 64. Specific to the issue of ‘forced evictions’, the CESCR produced General Comment No. 7 in their 16th Session in - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 1997. The CESCR took note of the fact that the expression ‘forced evictions’ seeks to convey “a sense of arbitrariness and of illegality”. It pointed out that to many observers, however, “the reference to “forced evictions” is a tautology, while others have criticized the expression “illegal evictions” on the ground that it assumes that the relevant law provides adequate protection of the right to housing and conforms with the Covenant, which is by no means always the case. Similarly, it has been suggested that the term “unfair evictions” is even more subjective by virtue of its failure to refer to any legal framework at all.” 65. The CESCR, therefore, chose to define the expression ‘forced evictions’ as “the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.” The CESCR added that “the prohibition on forced evictions does not, however, apply to evictions carried out by force in accordance with the law and in conformity with the provisions of the International Covenants on Human Rights.” 66. Paragraph 13 of General Comment 7 reads as under: “13. States parties shall ensure, prior to carrying out any evictions, and particularly those involving large groups, that all feasible alternatives are explored in consultation with the affected persons, with a view to avoiding, or at least minimizing, the need to use force. Legal remedies or procedures should be provided to those who are affected by eviction orders. States parties shall also see to it that all the individuals concerned have a right to adequate compensation for any property, both personal and real, which is affected. In this respect, it is pertinent to recall article 2.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires States parties to ensure “an effective remedy” for persons whose rights have been violated and the obligation upon the “competent authorities (to) enforce such remedies when granted”. 67. The procedural protections identified by the CESCR as being applicable in situations of forced evictions include: - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 “(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b) adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the proposed evictions, and, where applicable, on the alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be used, to be made available in reasonable time to all those affected; (d) especially where groups of people are involved, government officials or their representatives to be present during an eviction; (e) all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified; (f) evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless the affected persons consent otherwise; (g) provision of legal remedies; and provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to seek redress from the courts.” 68. The provisions of the ICESCR have been noticed in some of the early decisions of the Supreme Court of India on the right to shelter, which will be discussed in a separate section hereafter. The discussion of General Comments 4 and 7 of the CESCR in the context of both the right to adequate housing and the right against forced evictions forms a central part of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sudama Singh, which again will be discussed at some length later. That decision also referred to the jurisprudence developed by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which is proposed to be examined next. V South African Jurisprudence on the Right to Adequate Housing 69. Among the recent written constitutions that have adopted the language of the CESCR in incorporating provisions that recognize the right to adequate housing is the Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter the ‘Final Constitution’ : FC). The jurisprudence developed by the South African Constitutional Court around the right to adequate housing is instructive and helps understand the expanding horizons of the right. - 17 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 70. To begin with, it is necessary to briefly touch upon the background to the drafting of the Final Constitution (FC). The South African Law Commission (SALC) had submitted a report stating that the socio-economic rights should receive protection, either in the form of Directive Principles of State Policy or through specific tailor-made legislation. When the exercise of drafting the Bill of Rights in the 1996 South African Constitution was undertaken, one of the issues that arose was whether socio-economic rights should be included as justiciable rights in the Constitution. Nelson Mandela, the then President of the African National Congress, expressed his expectation of the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of socio-economic rights thus : “We leave it to the judiciary to determine which rights are directly enforceable at the instance of individuals. We shall be surprised if such rights as the right to clean water, to minimum nutrition and to adult education cannot be enforced by courts”. 71. Apart from the spectrum of political parties being in favour of socioeconomic rights in some form, there was strong civil society support for including them as fully justiciable rights in the Bill of Rights. An alliance named ‘Ad Hoc Campaigning for Socio-Economic Rights’ presented a petition to the Constituent Assembly and stated: “[I]t is useful to see the constitution as a mirror…If this mirror does not show protection from shelters being demolished, does not show protection from being chased out of school or hospital queues, then it does not reflect the lives to which we aspire for all South Africans. If it is only a mirror that reflects the image of a more privileged sector of society then it is a constitution for only those people and not all the people” 72. There was consensus that socio-economic rights should be drafted in a way that: “(a) they do not place an obligation on the state which cannot be fulfilled in terms of its resources and capacity; (b) they preserve the distinction between the roles of the judiciary and the legislature. This entails ensuring that the legislature is given the main responsibility for elaborating and implementing the rights, with the Courts possessing the necessary powers of review; (c) the main duty on the State is to provide opportunities and remove constraints which prevent access to social and economic rights in South Africa”. - 18 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 73. The influence of the ICESCR in the drafting of the provisions concerning socio-economic rights in the FC is perceptible. The qualified positive duty of the State to take “reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources” and the concept ‘progressive realization’ in the FC was a borrowing of the language of Article 2 of the ICESCR. The Constitutional Court of South Africa, which had to certify the draft Constitution, had to deal with an objection that the socio-economic rights were not fully universally accepted fundamental rights; their inclusion was inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers and that they were not justiciable. While the Constitutional Court disposed of the first objection on the basis that Constitutional Principle II, permitted the Constituent Assembly to supplement the universally accepted fundamental rights with other rights not universally accepted, it acknowledged that the inclusion of socio-economic rights within a Bill of Rights did not confer upon Courts a task “so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them by Bill of Rights that it results in a breach of separation of powers.” As regards the justiciability objection, it was observed that the mere fact that socioeconomic rights have budgetary implications “is not an automatic bar to the justiciability”, and that “at the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion”. Accordingly, Sections 26, 27, 28(1)(c) and 29 continued in the FC as such. 74. One of the earliest decisions of the South African Constitutional Court on the scope of Section 26 of the FC was Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Irene Grootboom [2000] ZACC 19. The Applicant Irene Grootboom was one of a group of 510 children and 390 adults. They had been living in appalling circumstances in the Wallacedene informal settlement and, therefore, came to occupy nearby land earmarked for low-cost housing. The Municipality forcibly evicted them : their shacks were bulldozed and their possessions were burnt and destroyed. Subsequent to their eviction, they were forced to settle on a sports field adjacent to Wallacedene, awaiting their turn to be accommodated in low-cost housing. 75. The Constitutional Court had to determine whether the measures taken by the Municipality were reasonable. After briefly discussing the debate surrounding the - 19 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 justiciability of socio-economic rights, the Court outlined the scope of the state's obligations under Section 26 of the FC: “everyone has a right to have access to adequate housing…The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to a progressive realization of this right…The state is obliged to take positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing”. 76. 76. Significantly, the Court also sketched the contours of the reasonableness requirement under Section 26(2) of the FC: “…a court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the State to meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this requirement is met.” 77. The Court concluded that in the given circumstances the Municipality's housing programme did not constitute taking “reasonable legislative and other measures” under Section 26(2) of the FC, as the programmes did not make any provision for emergency relief for those desperately in need. 78. While in Grootboom the Constitutional Court was concerned with determining the “reasonableness” of the State's housing programme, in Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers [2004] ZACC 7, it had to consider the obligations of the state under Section 26(3) of the FC in the context of forced evictions. The residents of a certain area had petitioned the Port Elizabeth Municipality. The Municipality sought an eviction order against a number of persons living in shacks on privately owned land. 79. The issue before the Constitutional Court was whether it would be ‘just and equitable’ under Section 6 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 1998 (‘PIE Act’) read with Section 26 of the FC to evict the occupants. The Court held that the - 20 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 PIE Act had to be interpreted and applied within a “defined and carefully calibrated constitutional matrix”. 80. Dismissing the Port Elizabeth Municipality's application for leave to appeal, the Constitutional Court observed as under: “In sum, the Constitution imposes new obligations on the courts concerning rights relating to property not previously recognised by the common law. It counterposes to the normal ownership rights of possession, use and occupation, a new and equally relevant right not arbitrarily to be deprived of a home. The expectations that ordinarily go with title could clash head-on with the genuine despair of people in dire need of accommodation. The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather it is to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case.” 81. The Court held that the rights in Section 26(3) of the FC were “defensive rather affirmative in nature”. Reading Section 26(3) of the FC along with Section 6(3) of the PIE Act, the Constitutional Court noted that although there is no “unqualified constitutional duty on local authorities to ensure that in no circumstances should a home be destroyed unless alternative accommodation or land is made available”, the Court “should be reluctant to grant an eviction against relatively settled occupiers unless it is satisfied that a reasonable alternative is available, even if only as an interim measure pending ultimate access to housing in the formal housing programme.” 82. The Constitutional Court concluded that it would not be ‘just and equitable” to order the eviction of the occupiers in view of the following factors: “the lengthy period during which the occupiers have lived on the land in question, the fact that there is no evidence that either the Municipality or the owners of the land need to evict the occupiers in order to put the land - 21 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 to some other productive use, the absence of any significant attempts by the Municipality to listen to and consider the problems of this particular group of occupiers, and the fact that this is a relatively small group of people who appear to be genuinely homeless and in need…” 83. A proposition of considerable significance that emerges from the judgment in Port Elizabeth Municipality (supra) is that even when unlawfulness of occupation is established, “the eviction process is not automatic”, and the Courts will have to exercise broad judicial discretion in deciding what is ‘just and equitable’ in the particular circumstances. 84. In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of Johannesburg [2008] ZACC 1, the Constitutional Court while dealing with another forced eviction, delineated the “meaningful engagement” requirement and the legal basis for the same. The factual context was that the city municipality had sought to evict the residents of six buildings for the reason that based on its inspection; the buildings had become unsafe for habitation as per the South African Building Regulations. The Municipality filed an eviction application in the Witwatersrand High Court, which interdicted the Municipality from evicting without providing alternative accommodation. The Municipality appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which ordered the eviction on the basis that the buildings had become unsafe to occupy. It, however, ordered that the Municipality assist those “desperately in need of housing assistance with relocation to a temporary settlement area”. 85. The issue for determination before the Constitutional Court was whether the order for the eviction of the residents ought to have been granted, and whether the City's housing programme complied with the obligations imposed upon it by Section 26(3) of the FC. The Constitutional Court passed an interim order directing that the Municipality and the residents meaningfully engage and arrive at a settlement. 86. In laying down the need for meaningful engagement, the Constitutional Court relied on the observations in Grootboom (supra) on the relationship between reasonable state action and human dignity, and - 22 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 the observations in Port Elizabeth Municipality (supra) on the inextricable link between procedural and the substantive aspects of justice. The Constitutional Court also noted that a municipality “that ejects people from their homes without first meaningfully engaging with them acts in a manner that is broadly at odds with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional obligations…taken together”. It laid down that the failure of a municipality to meaningfully engage “would ordinarily be a weighty consideration against the grant of an ejectment order”. 87. On the specifics of what meaningful engagement entailed, the Constitutional Court observed that the requirements would be context-specific. However, it noted that meaningful engagement would require that the “parties engage with each other reasonably and in good faith. Intransigent attitudes or the ‘making of non-negotiable, unreasonable demands undermined the deliberative process”. In the circumstances, the Constitutional Court found that the Municipality had made no effort to “meaningfully engage” either at the time of, or before the eviction proceedings were initiated in the High Court. It, however, approved the comprehensive settlement agreement between the parties, which included steps for rendering safer and more habitable buildings and detailed provisions for relocation of the occupiers. 88. In 2009, the Constitutional Court in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes [2009] ZACC 16, had to consider whether it would be ‘just and equitable’ for the Municipality to evict the occupants of an informal settlement for it to be able to undertake reconstruction of the settlement. The government adopted a national policy aimed at eliminating informal settlements. The Joe Slovo Informal Settlement was targeted for reconstruction in terms of that policy and accordingly, the Respondents launched an application in September 2007 in terms of the PIE seeking the eviction of Applicants. The Western Cape High Court granted an eviction order, without issuing a declaratory order that the residents of the Joe Slovo Informal Settlement were entitled to any percentage of the permanent houses to be built in the location that they were vacating. The residents of Joe Slovo appealed to the Constitutional Court. - 23 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 89. Five concurring judgments of the learned Judges of the Constitutional Court, on divergent legal bases, held that in seeking the eviction of Applicants, the Respondents (particularly the national Minister for Housing and the Minister for Housing in the Western Cape) had complied with their obligations to act reasonably in attempting to promote the right of access to adequate housing under Section 26 of the FC. However, a common judgment, also containing the order of eviction, was prepared. There are three significant features of the order of eviction. First, the order of eviction was made ‘conditional upon and subject to’ the applicants being relocated to temporary housing; second, it stipulated specifications on the quality of the temporary accommodation in which the occupiers would be housed after their eviction; third, the order required an “ongoing process of meaningful engagement between the residents and the Respondents concerning various aspects of the eviction and relocation process.” 90. In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd. [2011] ZACC 33, the Applicant Municipality challenged the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal, declaring its policy to be unconstitutional to the extent that it did not provide alternative housing for persons who were subject to eviction from land by private landowners. The occupiers in the instant case-many of whom were workers in the informal sector - inhabited a building in Johannesburg. The Respondent property developer, upon purchasing the said building, sought to evict the occupiers and, therefore, initiated eviction proceedings against the occupiers. 91. Following Grootboom (supra), the Constitutional Court opined that a reasonable housing programme has to account for those most in need and held that the policy of the Municipality was unconstitutional: “By drawing a rigid line between persons relocated by the City and those evicted by private landowners, the City excludes from the assessment, whether emergency accommodation should be made available, the individual situations of the persons at risk and the reason for the eviction…Once an emergency of looming homelessness is created, it in any event matters little to the evicted who the evictor is. The policy does not meaningfully and - 24 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 reasonably allow for the needs of those affected to be taken into account.” 92. The Constitutional Court concluded that in the circumstances the eviction would not be ‘just and equitable’ unless the City provided the occupiers with alternative accommodation. Further, the Court noted that, “[although] Blue Moonlight cannot be expected to be burdened with providing accommodation to the Occupiers indefinitely, a degree of patience should be reasonably expected of it and the City must be given a reasonable time to comply.” 93. The Court, thus, ordered that the date of eviction be linked to the date on which the City provided accommodation. 94. The principles evolved in the above decisions of the South African Constitutional Court provide useful guidance to Courts on developing the jurisprudence around the right to adequate housing. One is the refusal by the South African Constitutional Court to rigidly separate civil and political rights from socio-economic rights. It acknowledged that both these sets of rights entail positive obligations that can have budgetary implications without resulting in breach of separation of powers. It explained that the model of judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights was premised on “negative constitutionalism” i.e. ensuring that the actions of the State do not interfere with people's liberties. It held that effective protection of socioeconomic rights entails imposing a duty on the State to refrain from interfering with people's existing access to socio-economic resources. The other important facet is the emphasis placed by the Constitutional Court on deliberative democratic practices through the device of ‘meaningful engagement’ with the affected groups. In this model, the Court becomes both a democratic space where such dialogue can take place and also the Constitutional authority that facilitates it. The State is obliged to take into confidence the affected groups about the schemes for rehabilitation it proposes for them and is prepared to review and re-shape them based on their inputs." - 25 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 It further observes the Indian Constitutional Law and Statutes, which reads as follows: "Indian Constitutional law and Statutes 103. In the Constitution of India, there is no specific right to housing spelt out separately. The Preamble highlights the guarantee of social justice, and of the right to dignity. A collective reading of the provisions relating to equality, the freedom of movement, of residence anywhere in the country, and the freedom to carry on one's trade or profession read with Article 21 impliedly invalidates the denial of the rights of the underprivileged to the basic survival rights. It also enjoins the State to not adopt measures that would deprive them of such basic rights. 104. Article 21, which guarantees that “no person shall be deprived of his life and liberty except according to procedure established by law”, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of India to include a range of basic survival rights. In a famous passage in Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator (1981) 1 SCC 608, the Supreme Court explained that: “…the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing one- self in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self.” 105. The Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of Constitution refer to the right to work, the right to education and to just and humane conditions of - 26 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 work and maternity relief, even while they do not expressly speak of the right to shelter as such. Olga Tellis 106. Among the early judgments of the Supreme Court acknowledging the right to shelter as forming part of the Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution, was the judgment in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545. The Petitioners included pavement and ‘basti’ dwellers living on the footpaths/pavements or slums in Mumbai. The judgment was delivered in a batch of petitions, some of which were filed as Public Interest Litigation (‘PIL’). They were challenging the decision of the Bombay Municipal Corporation (‘BMC’) to forcibly evict and demolish the pavement dwellings, exercising powers under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act (‘BMC Act’). In fact, the constitutional validity of Sections 312, 313 and 314 of the BMC Act was challenged as being violative of Articles 14, 19 and 20 of the Constitution. 107. The demolition drive took place during the peak monsoon season in July, 1981. The trigger for the demolition was an announcement made by the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra on 13th July, 1981 that all pavement dwellers in Mumbai would be evicted forcibly and deported to their respective places of origin or removed to places outside the city of Mumbai (then Bombay). The Chief Minister directed the Commissioner of Police to provide necessary assistance to the BMC to demolish the pavement dwellings and deport the pavement dwellers. The justification provided by the Chief Minister was that the existence of the slum dwellers was ‘inhuman’ and that the structures were ‘flimsy and were open to the elements’. According to him, “during the monsoon, there is no way these people can live comfortably”. 108. One of the pavement dwellers, who was a Petitioner before the Supreme Court, stated that on 23rd July, 1981 his dwelling had been demolished and he and his family had been put in a bus for Salem in Tamil Nadu. While his wife and daughters stayed back in Salem, he returned to Bombay in search of a job and “he got into a pavement house” again. The Supreme Court noted, “It is like a game of hide and seek. The Corporation removes the ramshackle shelters on the pavements with - 27 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 the aid of police, the pavement dwellers flee to less conspicuous pavements in by-lanes and, when the officials are gone, they return to their old habitats. Their main attachment to those places is the nearness thereof to their place of work.” 109. Some of the Petitioners, who lived in the Kamraj Nagar Basti, first approached the High Court of Bombay, which granted an ad interim injunction which was in force till 21st July, 1981. On that date, the Respondents agreed that the huts would not be demolished till 15th October, 1981. Nevertheless, it was alleged that on 23rd July, 1981, the Petitioners were huddled in a state transport bus to be deported out of Bombay. 110. The stand of the Government of Maharashtra was that “it neither proposed to deport any payment dweller out of the city of Bombay nor did it, in fact, deport anyone.” According to the Government, only those pavement dwellers who opted to return to their home towns and who sought assistance from the Government, were paid rail and bus fare for the onward journey. It was pointed out that out of 10,000 hutment-dwellers who were likely to be affected by the proposed demolition of hutments constructed on the pavements, only 1024 had opted to avail of the transport facility and the payment of incidental expenses”. 111. The Supreme Court first rejected the contention of the BMC that since the pavement dwellers had conceded before the Bombay High Court that they did not claim any fundamental right to construct houses on the pavement, and had undertaken before the High Court that they would not obstruct the demolition of the huts after 15th October, 1981, they were estopped from resisting the demolition. The Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the undertaking given by the Petitioners before the Bombay High Court, “they are entitled to assert that any such action on the part of public authorities will be in violation of their fundamental rights”. It was reiterated that there could be no waiver of any fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. 112. The Supreme Court next examined whether “the right to life includes the right to livelihood”, and answered it in the affirmative. It was observed “that, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life liveable, must - 28 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life”. The Supreme Court acknowledged that this explained “massive migration of the rural population to big cities” namely that “they migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages”. Therefore, there was unimpeachable evidence “of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood”. 113. The Supreme Court then discussed Article 39- A of the Constitution, a Directive Principle of the State Policy which provided that the State shall “in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood”. Reference was made to Article 41, which provided that the State shall, “within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work in cases of unemployment and of undeserved want”. It was emphasized that the Principles contained in these two provisions “must be regarded as equally fundamental in the understanding and interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights”. It was concluded that “any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21”. 114. Specific to the linkage between the right to shelter and the right to livelihood, the Supreme Court discussed the empirical data that around 200 to 300 people enter Bombay every day in search of employment. According to the Court, the facts justify the conclusion that: “persons in the position of petitioners live in slums and on pavements because they have small jobs to nurse in the city and there is nowhere else to live. Evidently, they choose a pavement or a slum in the vicinity of their place of work, the time otherwise taken in commuting and its cost being forbidding for their slender means. To lose the pavement or the slum is to lose the job. The conclusion, therefore in terms of the constitutional phraseology is that the eviction of the petitioners will lead to deprivation of their livelihood and consequently to the deprivation of life”. - 29 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 115. The Court then drew two conclusions : one, that the right to life which is conferred by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and two, that it is established that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. The Court rejected the plea of BMC that no notice need be given because, there can be no effective answer to it. According to the Supreme Court, this betrayed “a misunderstanding of the rule of hearing, which is an important element of the principles of natural justice”. In discussing this aspect, the Supreme Court acknowledged “eviction of the pavement or slum dweller not only means his removal from the house but the destruction of the house itself. And the destruction of a dwelling house is the end of all that one holds dear in life. Humbler the dwelling, greater the suffering and more intense the sense of loss”. 116. For the purposes of the present case, the importance of the decision in Olga Tellis (supra) is two-fold : one is the link between the right to shelter and the right to livelihood and how these cannot be separated into different compartments, as both inextricably form part of the life itself; second is that any attempt of deprivation of either right to shelter or right to livelihood, would mandate compliance with basic principles of natural justice i.e. providing a hearing to those sought to be evicted forcibly. The running theme of the decision in Olga Tellis is the acknowledgement that poverty itself could constitute a barrier to the realization of fundamental rights. The Court was acknowledging the processes of impoverishment where people are forced to migrate to cities and live in squalor just to eke out their livelihood. The Court was acknowledging the need to protect the dignity of such persons since that was an inextricable part of the right to life itself under Article 21 of the Constitution. Xxx xx xxx Statutes 131. As regards the statutes specific to the question of removal and rehabilitation of slums, the earliest is the SAIC Act. In the Second Five Year Plan, - 30 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 the problems of slums and slum clearance strategy were based on the following two principles: “The first principle is that there should be the minimum dislocation of slum dwellers and the effort should be to re-house them as far as possible at or near the existing sites of slums, so that they may not be uprooted from their fields of employment. The second principle is that in order to keep rents within the paying capacity of the slum dwellers, greater emphasis should be on the provision of minimum standards of environmental hygiene and essential civic amenities rather than on the construction of elaborate structures.” 132. However, as far as the National Capital Territory of Delhi is concerned not many slums were notified under the SAIC Act. The last of the slums notified in Delhi under the SAIC Act was in 1994. One reason for the failure to notify slums was that a notified slum would have to be dealt with only in accordance with the SAIC Act in terms of in-situ rehabilitation, which clearly was not the priority of the State. In many senses, therefore, the SAIC Act failed to achieve its purposes. With there being no increase in notified slums in Delhi since 1994, there has been a marked growth of non-notified slums. In terms of the multiplicity of statutes, there are JJ clusters, slum designated areas, resettlement colonies, unauthorized colonies, regularized colonies, urban villages, rural villages and planned colonies. 133. Specific to Delhi, the Delhi Development Act, 1957 was enacted “to check the haphazard and unplanned growth of Delhi.” The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) was constituted thereunder. Large tracts of land were acquired by invoking the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LAA) and placed at the disposal of the DDA for the planned development of Delhi. However, the failure of the DDA to adequately safeguard the lands so acquired led to large scale encroachments. Under the DDA Act, the DDA has been empowered to frame the master plan for Delhi (MPD). The first MPD was published in 1962. A large population of construction labour helped to construct the stock of public housing, but the MPD did not earmark any space for their housing needs. This - 31 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 was a major contributory factor leading to the exponential growth of slums. 134. In 1990, the MCD in its annual plan “Relocation of JJ Clusters” quoted a three-pronged strategy : “Strategy-I : Relocation of these Jhuggi households where land owning agencies are in a position to implement the projects on the encroached land pockets as per requirements in larger public interest and they submit request to S&JJ Department for clearance the jhuggi cluster for project implementation and also contribute due share towards the resettlement cost. Strategy-II: In-situ upgradation of JJ clusters and informal shelters in case of those encroached land pockets where the land owning agencies issue NOCs to Slum & JJ Department for utilization of land. However, the utilization of land under this strategy is linked with clearance of the project by the Technical Committee of the DDA. Strategy-III: Extension of minimum basic Civic amenities for community use under the Scheme of Environmental Improvement in JJ clusters and its component schemes of construction of Pay and Use Janasuvidha complexes containing toilets and baths and also the introduction of mobile toilet vans in the clusters, irrespective of the status of the encroached land till coverage under one of the aforesaid two strategies.” 135. In 2007, the DDA notified MPD 2021, which in paras 4.2.3 and 4.2.3.1 laid out who would be included in the category of ‘urban poor’ and what would be the scheme for rehabilitating/relocating slum and JJ clusters. It noted that during the Plan period 1981-2001, sites and services approach based relocation was employed in which resettlement of squatter slums was done on 18 sq.m and 12.5 sq.m plots (transit accommodation) allotted to eligible persons on licence basis. This had led to “a number of aberrations” and this called for a changed approach. 136. The MPD-2021 stated that it was necessary, as an interim measure, to continue, in case of the existing squatter settlements, the three-fold strategy of (i) relocation from areas required for public purpose, (ii) in-situ upgradation at other sites to be - 32 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 selected on the basis of specific parameters and (iii) environmental up-gradation to basic minimum standards. The rest of the clusters till they were covered by either of the first two components of the strategy should be continued. 137. The decision of this Court in Sudama Singh recognised MPD 2021 to be a legislative document with a statutory character, and thus, enforceable. In that process it referred to the decisions in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Mudappa (1991) 4 SCC 54, Delhi Science Forum v. DDA (2012) 2004 DLT 944 and Joginder Kumar Singh v. Government of NCT Delhi (2005) 117 DLT 220 (FB). (Emphasis supplied) and draws up certain conclusions. The conclusions are as follows: "194. The right to housing is a bundle of rights not limited to a bare shelter over one's head. It includes the right to livelihood, right to health, right to education and right to food, including right to clean drinking water, sewerage and transport facilities. 195. The law explained by the Supreme Court in several of its decisions discussed hereinbefore and the decision in Sudama Singh discourage a narrow view of the dweller in a JJ basti or jhuggi as an illegal occupant without rights. They acknowledge that the right to adequate housing is a right to access several facets that preserve the capability of a person to enjoy the freedom to live in the city. They recognise such persons as rights bearers whose full panoply of constitutional guarantees require recognition, protection and enforcement. That is the running theme of the DUSIB Act and the 2015 Policy. 196. Once a JJ basti/cluster is eligible for rehabilitation, the agencies should cease viewing the JJ dwellers therein as ‘illegal encroachers’. The decisions of the Supreme Court of India on the right to shelter and the decision of this Court in Sudama Singh require a Court approached by persons complaining against forced eviction not to view them as - 33 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 ‘encroachers’ and illegal occupants of land, whether public or private, but to require the agencies to first determine if the dwellers are eligible for rehabilitation in terms of the extant law and policy. Forced eviction of jhuggi dwellers, unannounced, in co-ordination with the other agencies, and without compliance with the above steps, would be contrary to the law explained in the above decisions. 197. In view of the positive stand of the Respondents, including the Railways, that in terms of the DUSIB Act, the 2015 Policy and the decision in Sudama Singh it is essential to first complete a survey and consult the JJ dwellers, there is, as of now, no imminent possibility of eviction of the JJ dwellers of the Shakur Basti. If no in situ rehabilitation is feasible, then as and when the Respondents are in a position to rehabilitate the eligible dwellers of the JJ basti and jhuggis in Shakur Basti elsewhere, adequate time will be given to such dwellers to make arrangements to move to the relocation site. The right of the JJ dwellers to raise objections to the 2015 Policy and the Protocol and to seek legal redress at the appropriate stage, if the occasion so arises, is reserved." The division bench was considering the inmates of JJ basti/cluster of persons living in dire conditions and their right to shelter and adequate housing. The conclusions, the observations, the consideration of the International law on right to adequate housing would all become applicable to the case at hand. Though the State has come forward to rehabilitate these petitioners at different places and petitioners have agreed it, the respondent - Rajiv Gandhi Housing Corporation, without brooking any further delay owing to the right of these petitioners for rehabilitation, develop - 34 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 such liveable houses for powrakarmikas / safaikarmacharis, who have been consigned to inhabiting in fragile tin sheds for over decades. The heart-wrenching paradox of their existence – labouring for civic cleanliness, while themselves in bereft of humane living conditions. 12. In the light of the affidavit so filed and in terms thereof, the petition is to be disposed, with a direction to the Rajiv Gandhi Housing Corporation to undertake necessary steps to provide dignified housing to the petitioners in the Government identified lands expeditiously. 13. The impleading application – I.A.No.2/2025 is preferred by a person, who is claiming to be the owner of the property, which the petitioners are wanting to claim for the purpose of constructing of their houses. In the light of the aforesaid reasons and the affidavit of acceptance, which does not concern the property of the impleading applicant, the application – I.A.No.2/2025, seeking impleadment of the applicant as party respondent, is unnecessary to be considered. - 35 - NC: 2025:KHC:17807 WP No. 25909 of 2024 Accordingly, I.A.No.2/2025 is disposed as having become unnecessary. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER i) The writ petition stands disposed. ii) A direction issues to the wings of the State - respondents herein to develop appropriate housing to these petitioners in the places indicated in the affidavit, as quoted hereinabove. iii) The Rajiv Gandhi House Building Corporation, who has now been handed over the lands shall without brooking any delay construct and make the lives of these petitioners liveable in future, at least. Ordered accordingly. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE JY List No.: 1 Sl No.: 13