2025:HHC:36352 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4033 of 2013 Reserved on: 24.09.2025 Date of Decision: 31.10.2025. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Khiali Ramand another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr. Y. P. Sood, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 01.03.2013 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) Una, District Una (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 342 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:36352 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 342 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Kavita (PW5) was married to Sanjay Kumar on 30th January 2006. Her parents-in- law started harassing her after the marriage, and the cases were pending between her and them. She and her mother, Tripta Devi (PW1), went to Sohari on 30th November 2011. When she and her mother tried to enter the house at about 5:30 pm, the informant’s mother-in-law, Satya Devi (accused no. 2) and father-in-law, Khiali Ram (accused no. 1), pushed the informant and her mother. The informant sustained injuries on her left fingers. Both the accused bolted the informant and her mother inside the room. They shouted for help. The informant said that she was calling the police, after which Khiali Ram opened the room. The informant and her mother came out of the room. The matter was reported to the police. An entry in the daily diary (Ex.PW4/A) was recorded in the Police Station. ASI Mehar Deen 3 2025:HHC:36352 (PW4) and other police officials went to the spot. The informant Kavita made a statement (Ex. PW-4/B), which was sent to the police station, where FIR (Ex. PW-4/D) was registered. Dr Vikas Banyal (PW3) examined the informant, Kavita, and found that she had sustained simple injuries which could have been caused by a blunt weapon within six hours of examination. He issued MLC (Ex.PW3/A). The statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 342 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 5 witnesses to prove its case. Tripta Devi (PW1) is an eyewitness. Ajay Kumar (PW2) informed the police station about the incident. Dr Vikas Banyal (PW3) medically examined Kavita. ASI Mehar Deen (PW4) investigated the matter. Kavita (PW5) is the informant/victim. 4 2025:HHC:36352 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They stated that the case was false and that they were innocent. They did not lead any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that various contradictions and improvements in the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses made the prosecution’s case highly suspect. Mehar Deen (PW4) admitted that 10-11 people were present at the time of his arrival on the spot, but he failed to join any of them without any reasonable cause. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, the accused was acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material on record. Learned Trial Court had wrongly discarded the statements of the informant and her mother. They had supported the prosecution’s version, and their testimonies corroborated each other. Minor contradictions were bound to come with time, and they do not shake the 5 2025:HHC:36352 prosecution’s case. The informant had informed Ajay Kumar (PW2) about the incident, and his testimony was wrongly ignored. The medical evidence also corroborated the informant’s testimony. The prosecution’s case was duly proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr. Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution’s case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Learned Trial Court erred in discarding the prosecution’s case without any cogent reasons. The minor contradictions were blown out of proportion to record the acquittal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Y.P Sood, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, supported the judgment passed by the 6 2025:HHC:36352 learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with it. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various 7 2025:HHC:36352 earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325), SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a 8 2025:HHC:36352 double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748), this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the 9 2025:HHC:36352 evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The informant had specifically stated in her statement (Ex. PW4/B) that the relationship between her and her parents-in-law was strained and cases were pending between them. The informant Kavita Kumari (PW5) stated in her examination in chief that she had made two-three police 10 2025:HHC:36352 complaints against the accused before this incident. She admitted in her cross-examination that she had filed a case under Section 498A of the IPC and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act against the accused. Tripta Devi (PW1) stated in her cross-examination that the informant demands a share in the property of the accused. Thus, the parties had a strained relationship, and the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses should be viewed with due care and caution. 15. Copy of the order (Ext. D1) passed by the learned CJM, Kangra Dharamsala shows that the accused Khiali Ram had obtained an injunction order against the informant and her husband for restraining them from visiting his house at Sohari and learned CJM passed an order, directing the informant’s husband to provide her accommodation at Bangana, where he was residing. Learned CJM believed that the residence order could not be passed regarding the house in possession of the accused Khiali Ram because of the injunction order. This shows that the informant and her mother were acting in defiance of the court order. 11 2025:HHC:36352 16. Ajay Kumar (PW2) stated that the informant, Kavita Devi, called him and told him that she was confined to a room. He advised her to call the police, and he had also telephoned the police. The entry in the daily diary (Ex. PW4/A) does not support his version because the call was made by the informant, and not by this witness. He also stated that the informant had told him about her confinement, and his statement is silent regarding the confinement of the informant’s mother. Thus, his testimony does not corroborate the prosecution’s version, and the learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting it. 17. The informant stated that the accused pushed her mother, and she sustained injury to her head. However, the informant’s mother, Tripta Devi, was not medically examined to prove this version. Hence, the medical evidence does not corroborate the informant’s version. 18. The informant stated that the accused shut the door, and she sustained injury on her hand. Dr Vikas Banyal (PW3) found an abrasion on the left middle finger and a linear scratch over the base of the left little finger. These injuries could have been caused by a fist blow if the person giving the blow was 12 2025:HHC:36352 wearing a ring on his finger. The Medical Officer did not say that the injury could have been caused by closing the door on the hands of a person. The victim never said that any person wearing a ring gave her any blow. Therefore, the medical evidence does not provide any corroboration for the prosecution’s case. 19. Kavita Devi (PW5) had stated before the police that the accused bolted the door and opened it after about 20 minutes. This version was changed in the Court. Kavita (PW5) stated that Anju Kumari borrowed the lock from Reeta and handed it over to the accused, who locked the room from outside. Tripta Devi (PW1) stated that the accused borrowed a lock from Reeta and put the lock outside the door. The version that a lock was put on the door was not stated in the earlier complaint made to the police. Thus, the prosecution’s witnesses changed the manner of confinement in the Court, which would make the prosecution’s case suspect. 20. Kavita Kumari (PW5) stated in her cross-examination that about 10-11 people were present at the time of her arrival at the spot. Tripta Devi (PW1) stated in her cross-examination that 10-15 people were present on the spot at the time of the arrival of 13 2025:HHC:36352 the police. When the relationship between the parties was strained, the medical evidence did not support the prosecution’s case, the informant was restrained from visiting the house located at Sohari, and the manner of confinement to the room was changed, the prosecution was required to examine an independent person, and the learned Trial Court was justified in drawing an adverse inference for the non-examination of the independent witnesses. 21. The victim, Kavita Kumari (PW5) and her mother, Tripta Devi (PW1), stated that the accused threatened to parade the informant naked. This version was not narrated before the police, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held it to be an improvement. 22. When the police reached the spot, the informant and her mother were found in the courtyard. They explained that the accused had opened the door. It is not explained why the accused would confine the informant and her mother in the room and thereafter open the door without any reason. This also casts a doubt regarding the prosecution’s version. 14 2025:HHC:36352 23. All these circumstances made the prosecution’s case suspect, and the learned Trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused. This was a reasonable view which could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with it, even if another view is possible. 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is sustainable. Hence, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 26. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondents/accused are directed to furnish their personal bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the 15 2025:HHC:36352 respondents/accused, on receipt of notice(s) thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 27. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 31st October, 2025 (Nikita)