IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMP(M) No.1704 of 2025 Date of Decision: 15 December, 2025 Satnam Singh .....Applicant/Appellant Versus Sobha Nath and Anr. ….non-Applicants/respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Applicant: Mr. Hitesh Kumar, Advocate. For the Respondents: Ms. Devyani Sharma, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Dhanwanti, Advocate. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral). The present application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 3 years 2 months and 21 days in filing the present appeal against the impugned judgment passed by the Courts below. 2. The judgment sought to be assailed in the case at hand was passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, HP on 09.06.2022, in Civil Appeal No.32-NL/13 of 2018. The Regular Second Appeal along with the present application seeking condonation of delay has been filed in the Registry of this Court on 18.09.2025. From a perusal of the application so filed, the sole ground mentioned for delay in filing the appeal being that the applicant was facing an acute financial hardship, as a loan taken by him had been declared to be a non-performing asset (NPA) and as a consequence whereof 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 under the SARFAESI Act, auction proceedings have been initiated in March 2022. 3. In the application it has been averred that the aforesaid proceedings with respect to settlement of debts and reorganization of the asset of the applicant had been continuously engaging the applicant and that the applicant in the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, did not have the necessary funds to engage a counsel. It is submitted that for pursuing the present appeal, help was solicited from well- wishers on the personal effort of the applicant. 4. In response filed, the non-applicants/respondents have categorically averred that against the impugned judgment dated 09.06.2022, a Regular Second Appeal had been preferred by the non-applicants/respondents. The same had been registered as RSA No.23 of 2023, titled Shobha Nath Verma and Anr. Vs. Satnam Singh. Appeal so preferred was listed before the Coordinate Bench of this Court on 30.12.2022 and on the said date notice was issued. The same was received back on 28.03.2023 and in the same, a counsel had been engaged by the applicant on 18.04.2023. The counsel so engaged was regularly appearing and contesting the appeal preferred by the non-applicants/respondents. 5. In the reply, it is further averred that the RSA so preferred was dismissed on 22.11.2023. Subsequent thereto, a review petition was filed and the same was registered as RP 3 No.112 of 2024. Notice in the same were issued for 29.11.2024, which was duly received by the applicant on 20.12.2024. A memorandum of appearance was filed by the counsel for the applicant in the aforesaid review petition on 03.01.2025. Subsequent thereto, Power of Attorney was filed in the Review Petition on 23.04.2025 and the same had been signed on 18.04.2025 by the applicant. The review petition so filed by the non-applicants/respondents was allowed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court on 23.07.2025. The RSA was restored to its original number. Thereafter, on 31.07.2025, the Coordinate Bench of this Court issued notices to the appellant in RSA No.23 of 2023, on account of the death of the counsel, who had been engaged by the applicant earlier and was representing the applicant in the review petition and the Regular Second Appeal so filed by the non-applicants/respondents. 6. In the aforesaid backdrop, it is submitted that the applicant has not been diligent in pursuing remedies available to him in law. Besides the aforesaid, it is further contended that the explanation proffered is nothing but an excuse and hence, would not constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal. 7. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to refer to the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in SLP (C) No.17575 of 2023 title Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran 4 & Anr. decided on 13.05.2025, relevant extract whereof is being reproduced herein below; “Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasized in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet”. 8. Other than the aforesaid, it would be appropriate to refer to case reported as Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 for the legal propositions laid therein qua law of limitation. “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: 5 “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.” 9. Admittedly, the delay in the case at hand is of 3 years 2 months and 21 days. The length of delay is immaterial. The condonation of delay is a discretionary power. Exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of cause shown and the degree   of its acceptability thereof. The expression “sufficient cause” is to be duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on 6 its part (Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81). 10. The Court must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer a judgment reported as Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v. Union of India and Another, 2023 (10) SCC 531. The relevant extract of the same are as under: “…...Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.” 7 11. “Want of Diligence” or inaction can be attributed to a litigant when something is required to be done by him is not done. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer to Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, (2009) 11 SCC 183 :- “Want of ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent.” 12. The present applicant in the case at hand has submitted that appeal could not be filed within time on account of an ongoing financial crunch. The aforesaid reasons cited when examined in the context of the reply furnished by the non- applicants/respondents, wherein it has been categorically demonstrated that in the appeal preferred by the non- applicants/respondents against the impugned judgment dated 09.06.2022, the applicant had actively participated. Post- dismissal of the appeal so preferred in the review proceedings initiated at the behest of the non-applicants/respondents also the applicant had participated actively. Subsequent to the death of the counsel engaged in the appeal preferred by the non-applicants/respondents, notices had been sent to the present applicant for engaging the services of the new counsel. From the aforesaid, it is evident that since March 2023, the applicant had been appearing in the appeal, review and the 8 restored Regular Second Appeal preferred by the non- applicants. 13. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, it is evident that the cause proffered by the present applicant is nothing, but an excuse and therefore, cannot be construed to be sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Even otherwise, no reason is forthcoming, as to why appeal in the case at hand could not be preferred within the period of limitation. The conduct of the applicant reflects complete lack of diligence. 14. Much time has elapsed since the decision of the First Appellate Court. Issues settled and decided by Courts should not be sought to be disturbed after passage of sufficient time as parties must be allowed live in peace and certainty 15. In view of the aforesaid, the application is dismissed being devoid of merits. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 15th December, 2025 (Gaurav Rawat)