HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 210 of 2025 Court No. - 45 HON'BLE LAKSHMI KANT SHUKLA, J. 1. Heard Mr. Raghuvansh Chandra, learned counsel for the revisionist, learned A.G.A. for the State and Mr. Atul Kumar Shahi, learned counsel for opposite party nos.2,3,4,5 and 6 and perused the record. 2. The present criminal revision has been preferred before this Court assailing the impugned order dated 10.10.2024 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 6, Meerut (hereinafter referred to as "the Trial Court") in Sessions Trial No.995 of 2014, State v. Anuj, whereby the application filed by the revisionist under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has been rejected. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the revisionist has preferred the present criminal revision, inter alia, on the grounds that the impugned order has been passed in a routine and mechanical manner without proper application of judicial mind. It is further submitted that the impugned order is arbitrary, illegal, and contrary to the settled principles of law. The order is also stated to be in derogation of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92. 4. Elaborating his submissions, learned counsel for the revisionist contended that at the time of the incident, the proposed accused nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were also present in the house where the deceased died under suspicious circumstances. Therefore, in view Versus Counsel for Revisionist(s) : Raghuvansh Chandra, Ram Jee Saxena Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Atul Kumar Shahi, G.A. Ankit Kumar .....Revisionist(s) State Of U.P. And 5 Others .....Opposite Party(s) of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden lies upon opposite party nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 to explain the circumstances in which the deceased died. It has further been submitted that the proposed accused persons were specifically named in the FIR with allegations that they used to misbehave with the deceased, which fact had been disclosed by the deceased herself to PW-1. Learned counsel submits that the said aspect ought to have been considered seriously by the Trial Court. 5. PW-1, Ankit Kumar has categorically supported the prosecution case in his testimony before the Court. It has also been argued that the cause of death of the deceased has been opined to be poisoning and, in the postmortem report, a contusion near the left clavicle bone on the chest of the deceased was found, which prima facie indicates that prior to administration of poison, the deceased had been subjected to physical harassment. However, the Trial Court failed to consider the aforesaid material facts and circumstances while rejecting the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 6. To buttress his submissions, learned counsel for the revisionist drew the attention of the Court towards paragraph 9 of the judgment of Apex Court in Mohammad Kaleem v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2026 INSC 251. It has been held in Paragraph 9 of Mohammad Kaleem (supra): "9. At the same time, the Court has highlighted certain limits to the Trial Court's discretion at Section 319 Cr.P.C. stage. Hardeep Singh (supra) clarified that the Court need not establish guilt or conduct a detailed credibility assessment at this stage, while Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. and others, 2026 AIR SC 41 held that pre-trial scrutiny should not resemble a mini trial. The Trial Court, in this regard appears to have misdirected itself. In evaluating minor contradictions between witnesses statements and plausibility issues such a s whether the complainant could have avoided injury, effectively applied a stricter standard than necessary." 7. The Trial Court in this regard appears to have mis-directed itself in evaluating minor contradictions in the statements of witnesses and by examining issues of plausibility such as whether the complainant could have avoided the injury, thereby applying a stricter standard than what is warranted at the present stage. It CRLR No. 210 of 2025 2 has thus been contended that the impugned order is liable to be set aside by this Court invoking its revisional jurisdiction. 8. Per contra, learned AGA as well as learned counsel appearing for opposite party nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 submitted that the legal position is well settled that, at the stage of framing of charge, the Court may proceed merely on the basis of suspicion; however, while exercising powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for summoning a proposed accused, the Court is required to record a higher degree of satisfaction than that required at the stage of framing of charge. It has been contended that, at this stage, there must be some cogent and credible evidence of such quality that, if the same remains unrebutted, it may lead to the possibility of conviction of the proposed accused persons. It has further been submitted that, according to the statement of the informant (PW- 1), the deceased had been married about ten years prior to the incident and two children were born out of the wedlock. Therefore, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act is not attracted against the accused persons and, as such, all the family members and relatives of the husband cannot be implicated merely by invoking the said presumption. Learned A.G.A. further submitted that although the deceased admittedly died in her matrimonial home and allegations regarding demand of dowry have been levelled in the statement of PW-1, the said allegations are conspicuously absent in the FIR. Rather, according to the FIR, the reason for assault (Marpeet) allegedly committed upon the deceased by her matrimonial relatives was entirely different. It has further been submitted that, as per the allegations made in the FIR, the matrimonial family members of the deceased used to taunt her by saying that, ever since she came into their house, she had ruined the family. According to the learned counsel, the said allegation is entirely different from an allegation relating to demand of dowry. 9. It has also been argued that, as per the FIR, on the date of the incident, the deceased had made a phone call to the informant stating that her matrimonial family members were assaulting her. The said phone call was allegedly made at about 3:30 p.m. However, the informant along with other persons reached the place of occurrence at about 10:00 p.m., i.e., after a delay of approximately six and a half hours, whereas according to the statement of PW-1, the distance between the two places was only CRLR No. 210 of 2025 3 about 37–38 kilometers. It has further been submitted that the presence of a solitary contusion on the body of the deceased indicates that she was not subjected to physical assault by several persons and, at the most, the said injury appears to have been caused by a single individual, for which the husband of the deceased is already facing trial. Learned counsel further argued that, according to the statement of PW-1, he was not a direct witness to the alleged phone conversation, inasmuch as the call was allegedly received by his mother and whatever grievance, if any, was expressed by the deceased was communicated to her mother. Thus, the statement regarding the alleged assault is based upon hearsay evidence and the same also lacks corroboration from the medical evidence available on record. It has been submitted that, in such circumstances, there is nothing on record to prima facie establish the involvement of opposite party nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the commission of the alleged offence. 10. It has also been contended that, according to PW-1, his sister had informed over the phone that she was being assaulted by her in-laws and that they were threatening to kill her. However, despite receiving such grave information, the informant took nearly six and a half hours to reach the residence of the deceased, although, as per his own statement, the distance was only about 37–38 kilometers. It is further submitted that PW-1 himself admitted that the FIR was lodged on the basis of information provided by co-villagers and police personnel, which materially weakens the credibility of his testimony. 11. In view of the aforesaid major contradictions and discrepancies in the statement of PW-1, the involvement of opposite party nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 cannot be believed. In the aforesaid conspectus, it has been argued that the Trial Court has rightly rejected the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and the impugned order suffers from no illegality or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Therefore, the present criminal revision, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. 12. When confronted with the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the revisionist could not satisfactorily overcome the same. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the record, this Court is of the considered view that the Trial CRLR No. 210 of 2025 4 Court rightly rejected the revisionist's application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. There is no sufficient material available on record to summon opposite party nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to face trial along with the accused already facing trial. 14. The present criminal revision, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. 15. It is, accordingly, dismissed. May 7, 2026 Brijesh Maurya CRLR No. 210 of 2025 5 (Lakshmi Kant Shukla,J.) Digitally signed by :- BRIJESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad