- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.8910 OF 2013(MV-I) BETWEEN: SRI. J. B. RANGASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, S/O BOPPANNA, RESIDING AT NO.653, 7TH CROSS, MUNESHWAWRA EXTENSION, LAGGERE, BANGALORE. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. S.G.HEGDE., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SHRI. MAHESH B, S/O JUNJANNA, MAJOR, R/AT NO.110, 8TH CROSS, 17TH MAIN, FF COLONY, LAGGERE MAIN ROAD, KURUBARAHALLI, BANGALORE - 560 058. 2. M/S. ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE CO.LTD., ZENITH HOUSE, KESHAV RAO, KHADE MARG, OPPOSITE RACE COURSE, MAHALAKSHMI, MUMBAI - 400 034. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. A.N.KRISHNA SWAMY, ADVOCATE FOR R2; R1 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 173(1) OF MV ACT AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 12.4.2013 PASSED IN MVC Digitally signed by MEGHA MOHAN Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 NO.3916/2011 ON THE FILE OF THE III ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, MEMBER, MACT, BANGALORE, DISMISSING THE CLAIM PETITION FOR COMPENSATION. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI ORAL JUDGMENT Aggrieved by the dismissal of the judgment and award passed in M.V.C.No.3916/2011 dated 12.04.2013 by the III Additional Senior Civil Judge and M.A.C.T, Bangalore, claimant is before this Court. 2. The claim petition is filed seeking compensation of an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- for the injuries sustained by the claimant in the road traffic accident. The facts of the case are that on 04.08.2010 at about 10.30 a.m., when the claimant was going on a motorcycle as a pillion rider, the rider of the motorcycle rode the same with high speed in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the motorcycle on which the claimant was travelling. Due to which, the claimant has fell down and has sustained simple as well as grievous injuries and he had suffered pain and agony and financial loss. - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 3. The Tribunal by order impugned had dismissed the petition filed by the claimant seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. So, coming to such a conclusion, the findings of the Tribunal are that on behalf of the claimant, he had examined PWs.1 to 4. Exs.P.1 to P.22 were marked. On behalf of the respondents, RW.1 was examined and Exs.R.1 to R.6 were marked. In discharge summary, it is recorded that the claimant had fell from a two wheeler after being knocked down by a four wheeler. It is the observation of the Tribunal that when his own document says that a four wheeler is involved in the accident and that there is a delay of three days in giving the complaint, shows that this vehicle is implicated in the case for the purpose of claiming the compensation. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the claimant had failed to prove that the accident had happened because of the involvement of the offending vehicle as stated in the petition, which is a two-wheeler. The vehicle involved as per the medical records is a four-wheeler and accordingly dismissed the petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant- claimant submits that the Ex.P16 is the initial document, which - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 does not speak about or refer to any four wheeler. It is only about fall from two wheeler after being knocked down and after that all the other documents, it is shown about the involvement of a four wheeler. He submits that in fact the police have registered a crime against the offending vehicle, the driver and the insurer and after conducting the full-fledged investigation, the charge sheet is also filed. It is the contention of the learned counsel that in claims of this nature where application is filed seeking compensation, the burden of proof is on the preponderance of probability, but not beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that when the Insurance Company is asserting a particular aspect, the burden lies on the Insurance Company to prove the same. He relied on the judgments wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed that reversing the said finding by the High Court was erroneous. He had relied on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mangla ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Others1, Sunita and others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others2 and Janabai and others v. ICICI 1 (2018) 5 SCC 656 2 (2020) 13 SCC 486 - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 Lombard General Ins. Co. Ltd3 and the judgment of the Madras High Court in Vahida Banu and others v. Parveen Travels(P) Ltd. and another4. He relied on paragraph numbers 21, 22, 25, 27 and 28 in Sunita's case (supra) which reads as under: "21. We have no hesitation in observing that such a hyper technical and trivial approach of the High Court cannot be sustained in a case for compensation under the Act, in connection with a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of a family member. Recently, in Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819] (to which one of us, Khanwilkar, J. was a party), this Court has restated the position as to the approach to be adopted in accident claim cases. In that case, the Court was dealing with a case of an accident between a motorcycle and a jeep, where the Tribunal had relied upon the FIR and charge- sheet, as well as the accompanying statements of the complainant and witnesses, to opine that the police records confirmed the occurrence of an accident and also the identity of the offending jeep but the High Court had overturned [Pratap Singh v. Mangla Ram, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3765] that finding inter alia on the ground that the oral evidence supporting such a finding had been discarded by the Tribunal itself and that reliance solely on the document forming part of the police record was insufficient to arrive at such a finding. Disapproving that approach, this Court, after adverting to multitude of cases under the Act, noted as follows: (Mangla Ram case [Mangla Ram 3 2022 ACJ 2003. 4 2023 ACJ 661 - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819] , SCC pp. 667-71, paras 22-25) “22. The question is: Whether this approach of the High Court can be sustained in law? While dealing with a similar situation, this Court in Bimla Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] noted the defence of the driver and conductor of the bus which inter alia was to cast a doubt on the police record indicating that the person standing at the rear side of the bus, suffered head injury when the bus was being reversed without blowing any horn. This Court observed that while dealing with the claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, its function is to determine the amount of fair compensation. In paras 11-15, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 533-34) ‘11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimant's predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post-mortem report vis-à-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 12. The deceased was a constable. Death took place near a police station. The post- mortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of the constable had taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus-stand and near a police station. In such an event, the court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate Respondents 2 and 3. The claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the first information report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. 14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying the burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by Respondents 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties.’ (emphasis supplied) The Court restated the legal position that the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases. Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set aside. 23. Following the enunciation in Bimla Devi case [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] ,this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand [Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 605] noted that when filing of the complaint was not disputed, the decision of the Tribunal ought not to have been reversed by the High Court [Amir Chand v. Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302] on the ground that nobody came from the office of the SSP to prove the complaint. The Court appreciated the testimony of the eyewitnesses in paras 12 & 13 and observed thus: (Parmeshwari case [Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 605] , SCC p. 638) ‘12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed [Amir Chand v. Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302] the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor's chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitised enough to appreciate the plight of the victim. 13. The other so-called reason in the High Court's order was that as the claim petition was filed after four months of the accident, the same is ‘a device to grab money from the insurance company’. This finding in the absence of any material is certainly perverse. The High Court appears to be not cognizant of the principle that in a road accident claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are not attracted. …’ 22. It is thus well settled that in motor accident claim cases, once the foundational fact, namely, the actual occurrence of the accident, has been established, then the Tribunal's role would be to calculate the quantum of just compensation if the accident had taken place by reason of negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle and, while doing so, the Tribunal would not be strictly bound by the pleadings of the parties. Notably, while deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of preponderance of probability and not the strict standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt which is followed in criminal cases. 25. The Tribunal had justly accepted the appellants' contention that the respondents did not challenge the propriety of the said FIR No. 247 of 2011 (Ext. 1) and charge-sheet (Ext. 2) before any - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 authority. The only defence raised by the respondents to this plea was that the said FIR No. 247 of 2011 was based on wrong facts and was filed in connivance between the appellant complainants and the police, against which the respondents complained to the in-charge of the police station and the District Superintendent of Police but to no avail. Apart from this bald assertion, no evidence was produced by the respondents before the Tribunal to prove this point. The filing of the FIR was followed by the filing of the charge-sheet against Respondent 2 for offences under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC and Sections 134/187 of the Act, which, again, reinforces the allegations in the said FIR insofar as the occurrence of the accident was concerned and the role of Respondent 2 in causing such accident. Be that as it may, the High Court has not even made a mention, let alone record a finding, of any impropriety against FIR No. 247/2011 (Ext. 1) or charge-sheet (Ext. 2) or the conclusion reached by the Tribunal in that regard. Yet, the FIR and charge-sheet has been found to be deficient by the High Court. 27. The Tribunal's reliance upon FIR No. 247/2011 (Ext. 1) and charge-sheet (Ext. 2) also cannot be faulted as these documents indicate the complicity of Respondent 2. The FIR and charge- sheet, coupled with the other evidence on record, inarguably establishes the occurrence of the fatal accident and also point towards the negligence of Respondent 2 in causing the said accident. Even if the final outcome of the criminal proceedings against Respondent 2 is unknown, the same would make no difference at least for the purposes of deciding the claim petition under the Act. This Court in Mangla Ram [Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819] , noted that the nature of proof required to establish culpability under criminal law is far higher than the standard required under the law of torts to create liability. - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 28. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in upholding the finding recorded by the Tribunal that there was an accident on 28-10-2011 at around 7 a.m. between the motorcycle driven by Sitaram bearing Registration No. RJ 25 SA 6923 and a bus belonging to Respondent 1 (the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation) bearing Registration No. RJ 26/PA 0042 coming from the opposite direction and being driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2, which resulted in the death of Sitaram. Relying on these judgments, learned counsel for the claimant submits that the Tribunal failed to consider the evidence in its proper perspective and in fact, the Tribunal has fastened the burden on the claimant for proving the things which are asserted by the Insurance Company. It is submitted that if the matter is remanded and an opportunity is given to the claimant, he would examine the witnesses in support of his case. He submits that the dismissal of the claim petition by the Tribunal is contrary to law and contrary to the evidence on record. As such, the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal needs to be set aside and the matter may be remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent - Insurance Company submits that the Tribunal had rightly dismissed the petition. It is submitted that when the claim - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 petition is filed under Section 166 of the M.V.Act, the burden lies on the claimant, which the claimant has failed to discharge and there are no grounds to interfere with the well considered judgment passed by the Tribunal. 6. Having heard the learned counsels on either side, perused the material on record. The claim petition is filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act. The accident had taken place on 04.08.2010. The complaint was given on 07.08.2010 after three days from the date of accident. The medical records plays a significant role in these claims. As immediately after the accident, the claimant must have been taken to the hospital and the MLC register and other documents will show as to how the accident had taken place. Except Ex.P16, all the documents show that the motor cycle was hit by a four wheeler. The Tribunal had considered those documents which are filed by the claimant. If the complaint is given on the same day, the things would have been altogether different. But in this case, the complaint is given after three days and now the vehicle that is involved in the accident is a two wheeler, there is a discrepancy between the medical and the police records. As the claimant had placed before the Court all those documents, he cannot ask - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 the Court to rely on those documents partly. Once the document is marked, the Court has to consider the entire document. Now, in this case, the burden lies on the claimant, in the light of the documents produced by him that there is a discrepancy in the medical documents and he should have examined somebody to elicit the truth or otherwise of the said document. Admittedly, he has not examined anyone. 7. Then coming to whether it is preponderance of probability or beyond reasonable doubt. There is no dispute on the proposition that in these matters, the burden of proof is on the testimony of preponderance of probability. But in a case where basing on the documents that are placed by the claimant himself, the claimant cannot say that the burden lies on the Insurance Company to prove. In those circumstances, the Tribunal had rightly held that claimant had failed to prove the accident and in the facts and circumstances of this nature, complaint that is given three days after the accident assumes significance. In each and every case, giving a complaint belatedly would not be affect the case, but it depends upon the fact and circumstance of each case. In this case, under these facts and circumstances, it will have an impact and it will affect - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:14631 MFA No. 8910 of 2013 the case of the claimant and the Tribunal had rightly considered all these aspects. 8. Then coming to the submission of the learned counsel with regard to remand of this matter. The accident had happened on 04.08.2010 and for the purpose of examining the doctor or the medical records or anybody and remanding the matter in 2025 will not serve any useful purpose and this Court finds no reasons to remanding the matter back to the Tribunal. i) Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. ii) Registry is directed to return the Trial Court Records to the Tribunal, along with certified copy of the judgment passed by this Court forthwith without any delay. iii) Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. SD/- (LALITHA KANNEGANTI) JUDGE KA, ct: BHK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 5