2025:JHHC:25467 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI S.A. No. 25 of 1996(R) 1. Mahli Sahu 2. Bandhna Sahu Both sons of Malar Sahu 3. Panna Lal Sahu S/o Bodhna Sahu All residents of village Guram P.S. Basia District Gumla … … Plaintiffs/Appellants/Appellants Versus 1. Ganduri @ Mainibati Devi w/o Sanichar Singh resident of village Belgaon P.S. and District Gumla (deleted vide order dated 06.02.2023) 2. Metwa Devi, W/o Santu Singh (died and expunged vide order dated 19.09.2008) 3. Ignes Kharia, son of Chuniya Kheria (deleted and substituted vide order dated 26.03.2019) 3(i) Aloishya Bilung W/o Late Ignes Kharia 3(ii) R.A.Subhas Bilung s/o Late Ignes Kharia 3(iii) Bikash Mani Bilung s/o Late Ignes Kharia 3(iv) Kiran Bilung 3(v) Pratima Miling Both daughters of Late Ignes Kharia All residents of village Ghora Bandha, P.O. Telco workers Works, P.S. Govindpur, District East Singhbhum. 4. Silas Kharia, son of Chuniya Kheria (deleted and substituted vide order dated 06.02.2023) 4(a) Jasinta Bilung, wife of Late Silas Kharia 4(b) Anil Bilung 4(c) Kalyan Bilung 4(d) Willson Bilung @ Fainta All sons of Late Silas Kharia 4(e) Binita Bilung 4(f) Rita Bilung 4(g) Asha Bilung All daughters of Late Silas Kharia All residents of Village- Guram, P.O.- Konbir, P.S.- Basia, District- Gumla. 5. Deputy Commissioner, Gumla 6. Santu Singh, S/o Kanta Singh (deleted and substituted vide order dated 17.02.1998) 6(a) Metwa Devi (deleted vide order dated 06.02.2023) 6(b) Sita Devi, W/o Late Santu Singh 6(c) Kusum Devi, D/o Late Santu Singh (died and substituted by her legal heirs vide order dated 28.11.2011) 6(c)(i) Janak Singh, husband of Kusum Devi 6(c)(ii) Nutan Kumari 6(c)(iii) Namita Kumari 6(c)(iv) Dibya Kumari 2025:JHHC:25467 2 6(c)(v) Ranthi Kumari 6(c)(vi) Karuna Kumari All Minor daughters of Late Kusum Devi represented by Janak Singh 6(d) Naw Kumar Singh, s/o Late Santu Singh 6(e) Bhakarwa Singh, S/o Late Santu Singh 7. Ugan Singh, S/o Dilip Singh (died and substituted by his legal heirs vide order dated 28.11.2011) 7(i) Sarshawati Devi, W/o Late Ugan Singh 7(ii) Laxmi Devi, D/o Late Ugan Singh 7(iii) Meena Devi, D/o Late Ugan Singh 7(iv) Rekha Singh Minor daughters of Late Ugan 7(v) Radha Singh Singh All residents of Village Sukunda, P.S. Basia, District- Gumla 8. Benedicta Toppo, W/o Gabrial Topno, R/o village Konbir Nawatoli, P.S. Basia, District Gumla [deleted v/o dated 02.02.2017 (died issueless)] 9. Edward Munda, S/o Late Naseph Munda, resident of village Guram P.S. Basia and District Gumla. … … Defendants/Respondents/Respondents 10. Dropati Devi 11. Manhodri Devi Both daughters of Malar Sahu resident of village Guram P.S. Basia and District Gumla … … Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents --- CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY --- For the Appellant : Mr. Kundan Kr. Ambastha, Advocate : Mr. Md. Abdul Wahab, Advocate : Mr. Sumit Kumar, Advocate : Mr. Anurag Chandra, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Sachi Nandan Das, Advocate : Mr. H.K. Mahto, Advocate : Mr. Om Prakash Singh, Advocate : Mr. Sunil Kumar, Advocate : Ms. Jyotsna Mahato, Advocate --- 35/27.08.2025 Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 05.12.1995 (decree signed on 12.12.1995) passed in Title Appeal No. 55 of 1991 by learned Additional District Judge, Gumla confirming the judgment and decree dated 24.08.1991 in Title Suit No. 140 of 1988/23 of 1984 passed by learned Munsif at Gumla. 2025:JHHC:25467 3 3. The suit was dismissed and the 1st appeal arising out of the suit was also dismissed. Consequently, the plaintiffs are the appellants before this Court. 4. This appeal was admitted for final hearing vide order dated 20.03.1997 by framing only one substantial question of law and it was also observed that any other substantial question of law may be raised at the time of hearing of the appeal. When the matter was taken up on 14.08.2025, two additional substantial questions of law were framed after hearing the parties. Consequently, altogether 3 substantial questions of law have been framed, which are as follows: (i) Whether the courts below had committed error of law in holding that in subsequent suits Shivnandan or his heirs were necessary party on the face of the fact that the predecessor of the plaintiffs had purchased the suit property in court sale and obtained possession long back and in that event the plaintiffs’ title can be ignored as colourable one? (ii) Whether the judgement passed by the learned 1st appellate court confirms to the requirement of law under order 41 rule 31 of C.P.C.? (iii) Whether the learned court was justified in giving the finding of adverse possession without satisfaction of foundational pleading with respect to adverse possession? 5. Learned counsel for the appellants, at the threshold, has submitted that if the 2nd substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellants, then the matter is required to be remanded to the learned 1st appellate court for passing appropriate judgment in accordance with Order XLI Rule 31 of Code of Civil Procedure (in short ‘CPC’) and in such circumstances, the other two substantial questions of law need not be answered and left to be answered by the 1st appellate court upon remand. 6. The learned counsel, while referring to the judgment passed by the learned 1st appellate court, has submitted that the judgment is running into 7 pages. The 1st paragraph deals with the submission of the appellants, the 2nd paragraph deals with the submission of the defendants and the issues framed by the learned trial court, the 3rd 2025:JHHC:25467 4 paragraph deals with the submission of the appellants assailing the judgment of the learned trial court, the 4th paragraph deals with the submission of the respondents supporting the judgment of the learned trial court and the 6th paragraph partly records certain findings and partly it contains submissions. Further, the learned 1st appellate court has recorded its findings in paragraph 7 of the impugned judgment. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that while deciding the point of adverse possession in paragraph 6, Zamindari M- form has been taken into consideration which was never exhibited before the court. The learned counsel has also submitted that there was no discussion of oral as well as documentary evidences which were exhibited before the learned trial court. He has submitted that the matter also related to adverse possession which required appreciation of pleadings of the respective parties and the evidences adduced in connection therewith, both oral and documentary. The learned counsel has also submitted that assertions and counter assertions were made on the basis of certain registered documents including one gift deed and one sale-deed. He has referred to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2022) 3 SCC 90 (Manjula and others Vs. Shyamsundar and others) and has in particular referred to paragraph 8 of the said judgment to submit that the 1st appeal has not been decided in accordance with Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC. 8. By referring to the aforesaid judgment passed in the case of Manjula (Supra), the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the 1st appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and the appellate court’s jurisdiction involves rehearing of appeal on questions of law as well as facts and the judgment of the appellate court must reflect conscious application of mind and must record findings supported by reasons on all issues put forth and pressed by the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in the present case, neither the learned 1st appellate court has pronounced on all the issues nor any point of determination was framed by the learned court nor 2025:JHHC:25467 5 the materials on record have been discussed and therefore, the mandate of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC has not been followed. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has then referred to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2021) 10 SCC 777 (K. Karuppuraj Vs. M. Ganesan) and has referred to paragraph 7 thereof to submit that the entire evidences on record are required to be considered even when the 1st appellate court has to arrive at concurrent findings. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants has accordingly submitted that the 2nd substantial question of law be answered in favour of the appellants and the matter be remanded to the learned court for fresh consideration and for passing fresh judgment on the basis of the materials already available on record and so far as the other two substantial questions of law are concerned, the same may be left open for consideration by the learned 1st appellate court as those will also involve appreciation of both fact and law, based on materials on record. 11. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the respondents has been called upon to respond to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants so far as the substantial question of law no. (ii) is concerned. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the length of the order will not decide its substance. He has submitted that the learned 1st appellate court has done the needful and once the trial court judgment is to be upheld, there is no requirement to deal with each and every aspect of the matter. The learned counsel has submitted that the very basis of the claim of the plaintiffs was not sustainable. He has also submitted that the finding of adverse possession has already been recorded by both the learned courts in favour of the defendants. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1967 SC 1124 : 1966 SCC OnLine SC 236 (Girijanandini Devi and Others Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary) and by referring to paragraph 13 of 2025:JHHC:25467 6 the said judgment, he submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in the said case that it was true that the high court did not enter upon a reappraisal of the evidence, but it generally approved of the reasons adduced by the trial court in support of its conclusion and therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was unable to hold that the learned judges of the high court did not consider the evidence. It has also been held that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court decision which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice. Paragraph 13 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: “13. The trial court, as we have already observed, on a consideration of the entire evidence and the subsequent conduct of the parties came to the conclusion that there was no severance of Bijendra Narain from his uncle Bidya Narain and with that view the High Court agreed. It is true that the High Court did not enter upon a reappraisal of the evidence, but it generally approved of the reasons adduced by the trial court in support of its conclusion. We are unable to hold that the learned Judges of the High Court did not, as is contended before us, consider the evidence. It is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice.” 14. However, during the course of argument, it is not in dispute that no point of determination has been framed by the learned 1st appellate court and the finding of adverse possession has been recorded primarily by referring to Zamindari M-form which was never exhibited. Findings of this Court 15. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that a suit was filed by the plaintiffs seeking declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land and for confirmation of their possession. In the alternative, it was prayed that if the plaintiffs are 2025:JHHC:25467 7 found not in possession, then a decree for delivery of possession be passed in their favour. 16. As per the plaint, it was the case of the plaintiffs that the suit land of Khata Nos. 1 and 2 of village Guram, P.S. Basia, district Gumla mentioned in schedule of the plaint, previously belonged to Madhusudan @ Maksudan, Repusudan and Shivnandan, who were recorded in R.S. record of right as landlords of village Guram. Subsequently, in execution of a decree by Budhu Sahu against Madhusudan @ Maksudan and others, the entire village Guram along with the lands mentioned in schedule of the plaint, were sold in auction and purchased by the decree holder Budhu Sahu in satisfaction of the decretal amount. The sale was confirmed on 18.05.1935 without any objection from any corner. 17. It was further case of the plaintiffs that after the aforesaid sale, Tetangu Sahu, s/o Budhu Sahu sold 8 annas share of the land to Modro Sahu. Thereafter, another son of Budhu Sahu namely, Jitu Sahu filed a partition suit bearing no. 79 of 1944 claiming his ½ share in the entire village. Final decree passed in the said partition suit was executed in Execution Case No. 8 of 1954. It was stated by the plaintiffs that consequently the suit land along with other lands fell in share of the Jitu Sahu who came in possession over the same and rent of the same was deducted from his compensation money. 18. It was further stated by the plaintiffs in their plaint that as Jitu Sahu was the sole owner and was also in exclusive possession of the suit land, he was competent enough to transfer the said land and therefore, Jitu Sahu transferred the suit land by virtue of deed of gift dated 23.06.1983 in favour of the plaintiffs and thus, the plaintiffs came in possession over the suit land and acquired right and title thereon. 19. It was further alleged that Shivnandan Singh got his name entered in Register-II in collusion with Halka Karmchari and got some rent receipts issued in his name without knowledge of Jitu Sahu, Tatangu or of the plaintiffs. It was the case of the plaintiffs that after death of said Shivnandan Singh, the defendant nos. 1 and 2 were 2025:JHHC:25467 8 claiming the suit land and defendant no. 3 was also claiming some lands on the basis of fake settlement deed, although they had no right, title and possession over the same. It was stated by the plaintiffs that as the defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3 were falsely claiming the suit lands and were illegally threatening the plaintiffs to disturb their peaceful possession, so a cloud over the right and title of the plaintiffs was cast. Consequently, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for their redress. 20. Written statement was filed by some of the defendants and the plaintiffs amended the plaint and got the name of Santu Singh, Ugan Singh, Benedict Topno and Edward Munda added as defendant nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8. 21. The defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3 filed a joint written statement and defendant nos. 5 and 6 filed another written statement jointly. Defendant nos. 7 and 8 also filed separate written statements. However, so far as defendant no. 4 i.e., Deputy Commissioner, Gumla is concerned, he was not represented. 22. The defendant nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 had denied the claim of the plaintiffs and raised a plea that the suit was not maintainable; it was barred by law of limitation, waiver, acquiescence, estoppel and adverse possession and it was bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties. The further case pleaded by the defendants is recorded in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the trial court’s judgment which are as under: “7. It is further pleaded that Shvinandan Singh the late father of defendant no. 1 and 2 was the real owner and possessor of the suit land during all material times except of plot nos. 185, and 188 and he was never made party to any Execution case or Partition suit and so his rights were never affected by such litigations as stated by the plaintiffs. It is further said that Shivnandan Singh was in possession over the suit land as a Rautis Khorposhdar excepts over plot nos. 185 and 188 and after abolition of Zamindari, the state of Bihar acknowledged him and as an occupancy raiyat, and assessed the rent in his name and he paid regularly the rent till he disposed of the same by sale in the year 1979 to Santu Singh and to Ugan Singh. It is said that on the basis of his sale deed Santu Singh and Ugan Singh got their name mutated in respect of the lands sold to them. It is said that Santu Singh has also sold some 2025:JHHC:25467 9 lands with Benedict Topno and with the plaintiff no. 2 Panna Lal Sahu in which the plaintiff no. 1 Malar Sahu (deceased) has figured as witness and they have also got their names mutated. 8. In respect of plot no. 185 and 188 it has been said that the defendant no. 3 Chuinya Samuelkharia acquired the land on the basis of raiyati settlement through Hukumnama from Tagent Sahu, who has also granted rent receipts in his favour, and after abolition of zamindari, the state of Bihar has recognized him as raiyat and he is paying rent and is in possession over the same and has acquired perfect title over the same. It is further alleged that the gift deed in question is a sham and a farzi transaction, and it does not confer any right upon the plaintiffs. In the written statements of the defendants no. 7 and 8 it has further been stated that in the year 1977 Shivnandan Singh sold plot no. 574 area 0.67 acres under Khata no. 1 by registered deed of sale to the defendant Daud Edward Knogari and in the year 1979 the said Sheonandan Singh sold some of the lands to Santu Singh s/o Kamata Pd. Singh from whom, the defendant Benedicta purchased the suit plot no. 551 area 1.01 acres and plot no. 579 area 0.30 acres under khata no. 1 in the year 1982. In the written statements of defendants no. 5 and 6 it has been specified that Jitu Sahu and his father never came in possession of the suit lands, and the same were in the possession of Shivnandan Singh as Rautia Khorphoshdar and he was the exclusive owner and so he legally and rightly sold on 5.2.79 the plot no. 771 area 0.90 acres and plot no. 770 area 0.69 acres to the defendant Ugan Singh and by virtue of the sale deed Ugan Singh came in possession over the said plots and got his name mutated. It is further said that Shivnandan Singh sold some lands under Khata No. 1-2 Plot nos. 551, 568, 569, 571, 572, 574, 579 area 1.01 acres , 1.20 acres, 0.35 acres, 0.25 acres, 0.85 acres, 1.05 acres 0.43 acres and 2.59 acres respectively Plot no. 776, area 0.32 acres and plot no. 773 area 0.93 acres under khata no. 2/1 and on the basis of sale deed he came in possession and got his name mutated. It is said that Santu Singh sold plot no. 551 and 579 in the year 1982. It is further pleaded that plaintiff no. 2 himself has purchased plot no. 570 and plot no. 571 from Santu Singh by virtue of sale deed executed on 4.5.81 in which plaintiff no. 1 has appeared as identifying witnesses.” 23. The learned trial court framed the following issues for consideration: “1. Is the suit as framed maintainable? 2025:JHHC:25467 10 2. Have the plaintiffs valid cause of action for the suit? 3. Has the suit property been properly valued? 4. Is the suit barred by law of limitation, adverse possession, acquiescence and estoppel? 5. Is the deed of gift executed by Jitu Sahu in favour of plaintiff Panna Lal Sahu and Malar Sahu in respect of the suit land genuine, legal and binding on the defendants? 6. Have the plaintiffs any right, title and possession over the suit land? 7. Are the plaintiffs entitled to the relief as claimed?” 24. Issue no. 3 was decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The issue no. 5 and 6 were taken up together. The plaintiffs examined altogether 9 witnesses and the defendants examined altogether 17 witnesses. Documentary evidences were also adduced on behalf of both the parties. 25. The learned trial court, while deciding issue nos. 5 and 6 also held that the deed of partition was between Tatengu Sahu and Bodhna Sahu and therefore, it was held to be not binding against the defendants. The learned trial court ultimately held in paragraph 24-A as under: “24A. From the evidence discussed above I have arrived at conclusion that Jitu Sahu was not in possession of the suit lands and so execution of deed of gift by him in favour of Panna Lal Sahu and Malar Sahu is apparently not genuine not legal and not binding upon the defendants. I have also arrived at conclusion that the plaintiffs are not in possession over the suit lands except the land mentioned in the deed bearing no. 1177 dated 4.5.81 and as they never came in possession on the basis of the deed of gift so they did not acquire any right and title on the basis of the deed of gift. But it has been admitted by the defendants Santu Singh that Panna Lal Sahu is in possession of R. S. Plot no. 570 area 0.35 decimals and R.S. Plot No. 571 area 30 decimals. No one has claimed the plot no. 566 of the suit lands, so the possession of the plaintiffs over the lands mentioned in ext. G and over plot no. 566 are hereby confirmed. On this view of the matter it is hereby declared that the plaintiffs have no right, title and possession over the suit lands except over above said plots. Accordingly, these two issues are decided in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.” 2025:JHHC:25467 11 26. Both the issues i.e., issue nos. 5 and 6 were decided against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants. 27. So far as issue no. 4 is concerned, the plea of adverse possession was decided in favour of the defendants vide paragraph 25 which is quoted as under: “25. Issue No. 4:- since it has been proved that much prior to the vesting of Zamindari Shiv Nandan Singh was in possession of the suit lands except of plot nos. 185 and 188 this plot no. 188 and 185 is coming in possession of Samuel Chuiya Oraon since 1954 and thereafter neither Jitu Sahu nor the defendants came in possession and thus even by remaining continuously in possession for more than 12 years right by adverse possession has been acquired by Shiv Nandan Singh and Samuel Chuiya Oraon u/s 65 of the Indian Limitation Act. The plaintiff Panna Lal Sahu has also purchased some suit land so now he is estopped from challenging the same. Thus from the said discussions I have arrived at conclusion that the suit is barred by law of limitation, adverse possession, acquiescence and estoppel. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.” 28. Ultimately, while deciding issue nos. 1, 2 and 7, the learned trial court held that the plaintiffs had no cause of action and dismissed the suit. 29. Before the learned 1st appellate court, the arguments of the parties as recorded, reveals that many points were raised both on question of fact and law. However, learned 1st appellate court recorded the finding partly in paragraph 6 and 7 as follows: “6. ……………………….… From the evidence discussed above, I find, that the defendants have not only proved long possession but have proved that they were in possession of the lands to the knowledge of the plaintiff because after the vesting of zamindari ‘M’ form was issued in their name and the lands were also mutated in their names and if the lands were in possession of the plaintiff he should have given declaration to the State of Bihar and ‘M’ form should not been issued in his name. But in the ‘M’ form and mutation, name of the defendants appear which proves that the defendants were in possession of the lands to the knowledge of the plaintiff and as such the finding of adverse possession has been proved by the defendants over the suit lands, and accordingly the decision reported in A.I.R. 1993 Delhi Page 90 relied upon by 2025:JHHC:25467 12 the appellant does not apply to this case. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants have further argued that the order of mutation only does not create right, title and interest in favour of the defendants and has relied on a decision reported in B.B.C.J. 1994 Page 515. It is true, that only mutation in favour of party does not create title in his favour but in the instant case there are sufficient evidence to show that the defendants were the original tenant in possession of the suit lands and after vesting of the Zamindari their name was mutated for the lands and they were paying rent of the lands and even a portion of the land was purchased by the plaintiffs from them and as such it is not applicable in the present case. 7. After hearing both the parties and after going through the evidences adduced by the parties, I find, that the learned trial court after considering the evidence adduced by both the parties and after considering the documents filed by them rightly came to a finding that Shivnandan Singh was in possession of the land much before the vesting of zamindari and in the year 1962-63 the mutation in respect of the suit land except plot no. 180 and 188 allotted in favour of Baraik Shivnandan Singh with respect to the suit lands. The finding of the learned trial court that the suit land bearing plot no. 185 and 188 is coming in possession of the defendant Chuinya Semual Kharia is also well founded because his name appears in the Hukumnama Ext. 1/1 and rent receipts have also been granted in his name and even draft Khatian has been prepared in his name and as such after going through the evidences, I agree with the finding of the learned Munsif that Jitu Sahu was not in possession of the suit land and accordingly the execution of deed of gift by him in favour of Panna Lal and Malar Sahu was not genuine and binding upon the defendants. Accordingly, I find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed on contest with cost.” 30. Order XLI Rule 31 of Code of Civil Procedure is quoted as under:- “Contents, date and signature of judgment- The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state- (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon: (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated 2025:JHHC:25467 13 by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.” 31. This aforesaid provision was subject matter of consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2022) 3 SCC 90 (Manjula and others Vs. Shyamsundar and others). It has been held that the appellate court has the jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court and it is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and the jurisdiction of the appellate court involves re-hearing of appeal on question of law as well as the fact and all the questions of fact and law are open for consideration. It has also been held that the judgment of the appellate court must reflect conscious application of mind and must record the court’s findings, supported by reasons, for its decision in respect of all the issues, along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties. It has been held that the first appellate court is required to comply with the requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 of Code of Civil Procedure and non-observance of these requirements amounts to the serious infirmity in the judgment. Paragraph 8 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: - “8. Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short “CPC”) provides for filing of an appeal from the decree passed by a court of original jurisdiction. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC provides the guidelines to the appellate court for deciding the appeal. This rule mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) points for determination; (b) the decision thereon: (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. Thus, the appellate court has the jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. The appellate court’s jurisdiction involves a rehearing of appeal on questions of law as well as fact. The first appeal is a valuable right, and at that stage, all questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for reconsideration. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect conscious application of mind and must record the court’s findings, supported by reasons for its decision in respect of all the issues, along with the contentions put forth and 2025:JHHC:25467 14 pressed by the parties. Needless to say, the first appellate court is required to comply with the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and non-observance of these requirements lead to infirmity in the judgment.” 32. Similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court earlier in the judgment reported in (2010) 13 SCC 530 (B. V. Nagesh and Another) wherein it has been held that without framing points for determination and considering both facts and law and without proper discussion and assigning reasons, the 1st appellate court’s judgment cannot be sustained. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under: - “4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram, SCC p. 758, para 5.) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.” 33. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2021) 10 SCC 777 (K. Karuppuraj Vs. M. Ganesan) it has been 2025:JHHC:25467 15 held in paragraph 7 that the entire evidences on record are required to be considered even when the 1st appellate court has to arrive at concurrent findings. Paragraph 7 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: “7. In the present case, the original plaintiff instituted a suit for specific performance of the contract. On appreciation of evidence, the learned trial court held the issue of readiness in favour of the plaintiff. However, refused to pass the decree for specific performance of the contract on the ground that the plaintiff was not willing to purchase the property with tenants. Therefore, the issue with respect to willingness was held against the plaintiff. In an appeal filed before the High Court under Section 96 read with Order 41 by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has allowed the said appeal and has quashed and set aside the decree passed by the learned trial court dismissing the suit and consequently has decreed the suit for specific performance. Having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it can be seen that there is a total non-compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. While disposing of the appeal, the High Court has not raised the points for determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. It also appears that the High Court being the first appellate court has not discussed the entire matter and the issues in detail and as such it does not reveal that the High Court has re-appreciated the evidence while disposing of the first appeal. It also appears that the High Court has disposed of the appeal preferred under Order 41 CPC read with Section 96 in a most casual and perfunctory manner. Apart from the fact that the High Court has not framed the points for determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC, it appears that even the High Court has not exercised the powers vested in it as a first appellate court. As observed above, the High Court has neither re-appreciated the entire evidence on record nor has given any specific findings on the issues which were even raised before the learned trial court.” 34. This Court finds that the learned 1st appellate court has not framed any point of determination for consideration. Further, the learned 1st appellate court has not considered the oral and many of the documentary evidences at all, which were placed on record by the parties. Moreover, it is not in dispute that the learned 1st appellate 2025:JHHC:25467 16 court has taken into consideration Zamindari M-form which has not been exhibited before the court. 35. This Court is of the considered view that the learned 1st appellate court being the final court of fact and law, every aspect of the matter and the materials on record were to be considered by the court in order to come to a definite finding. This Court is of the considered view that the judgment of the learned 1st appellate court cannot be said to be in conformity with the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC. 36. This Court is of the view that even if the learned 1st appellate court has to arrive at concurrent findings, still the relevant materials on record are required to be discussed and considered then the court has the jurisdiction to reaffirm or affirm the findings of the learned trial court and the judgement should reflect due application of mind to the materials available on record. However, such an exercise has not been undertaken by the learned 1st appellate court in the instant case. The fact also remains that while deciding the point of adverse possession, the pleadings of the parties along with the materials placed on record have to be carefully scrutinized and certainly such a finding would depend on both oral and documentary evidences placed on record, but even that exercise has not been done by the learned 1st appellate court while returning its finding. 37. In view of the fact that this Court has come to a conclusion that the learned 1st appellate court has not done the needful while exercising its jurisdiction under Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC, the 2nd substantial question of law is accordingly answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondents. 38. Accordingly, the impugned judgement and decree passed by the learned 1st appellate court are set-aside. The matter is remanded to the learned 1st appellate court for fresh consideration in accordance with Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC on the basis of the materials already available on record. 39. Since the substantial question of law no. (ii) is answered in favour of the appellants, this Court is not inclined to enter into the 2025:JHHC:25467 17 other two substantial questions of law which are also required to be considered by the learned 1st appellate court based on evidences placed on record. 40. The parties to appear before the concerned 1st appellate court or its successor court on 03rd November 2025 at 11:00 a.m. 41. Since the title suit is of the year 1984, parties are directed to cooperate for expeditious disposal of the 1st appeal. 42. This 2nd appeal is accordingly disposed of in aforesaid terms. 43. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is closed. 44. Let the records be sent back to the learned court concerned forthwith. 45. Let this judgement be communicated to the learned court through ‘e-mail/FAX’. (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Pankaj