1 CRA No.461 of 2016 2025:CGHC:43635 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 461 of 2016 Khem Singh Netam S/o Shashiram Netam Aged About 18 Years R/o Village Dangimacha, Police Station Rudri, Civil And Revenue District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Rudri, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Yogendra Chaturvedi, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Ms. Isha Jajodia, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 28/08/2025 1. This criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C is against impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.01.2016 passed in Special Criminal Case No. 31/2015 by the learned Upper Sessions Judge (F.T.C.) Dhamtari, District Dhamtari C.G. whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:- JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2025.08.30 12:34:20 +0530 2 CRA No.461 of 2016 Conviction Sentence U/s 363 of IPC R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine amount further RI for 1 month U/s 366 of IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default of payment of fine amount further R.I. for 2 months U/s 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 Rigorous imprisonment for 07 years and fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default of payment of fine amount further R.I. for 6 months. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution in brief is that on 05.08.2015, the father of the prosecutrix lodged a missing person report that his daughter is missing since 27.07.2015 and he tried to search with regard to her whereabouts but could not found her. On the said report the Police Station Rudri lodged a missing person report and during the course of investigation the prosecutrix was recovered from Village Kade and she was medically examined by the doctor. 3. During investigation, Spot Map was prepared. Statement of the Victim and the Statements of witnesses were recorded, appellant was arrested and subsequently after completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted before the Court. 4. After framing the charges against the accused/appellant, the charges were read out and explained to the appellant, he denied committing the crime and demanded trial. 3 CRA No.461 of 2016 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined 12 witnesses in its support. Statement of the accused/appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C was recorded, wherein he has pleaded his innocence and false implication in the matter. 6. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 28.01.2016 convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in paragraph one of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court are unsustainable in law. He further submits that the prosecutrix went along with the accused with her consent. He further submits that the medical report also does not support the case of the prosecution. It is further argued that the prosecution has failed to establish the age of the prosecutrix by producing any reliable documentary evidence. Attention has also been drawn to the major contradictions between the case diary statements and the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. It is thus contended that there is no cogent evidence on record to prove that the appellant outraged the modesty of the prosecutrix, and therefore, the conviction and sentence as awarded by the learned Court below are liable to be set aside. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant and submits that the 4 CRA No.461 of 2016 conviction of the appellant is well merited which does not call for any interference. There is clear evidence regarding age of the prosecutrix, therefore, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question arises before this Court whether the victim was minor on the date of incident or not? 11. The Victim (PW/1) in her deposition has stated that her age is 17 years and she is studying in Class 9th and also stated that her date of birth is 16.10.1997. Father of the victim (PW-6) has stated that his daughter age is 17 years and he don't know the date of birth. 12. Further, PW-4 namely Mahadev Sahu stated that the date of birth of the victim mentioned in the Dakhil-khariz (EX.P- 8C) register is 16.10.1997. In cross-examination this witness has accepted the suggestion that he has not made the entry regarding the date of birth of the victim in the dahil-khariz register and do not know who made the entry and on what basis the entry was made. 13. Further, the X-ray report Ex.P-17 states that the age of the victim is above 15 years and below 17 years which is proved by PW-9. 14. In the matter of Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Jammu & Kashmir and others1, the Supreme Court has held that a 1 AIR 1982 SC 1297 5 CRA No.461 of 2016 judicial notice can be taken that the margin of error in age ascertained by Radiological examination is two years on either side. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “9. Detenu was arrested and detained on Oct. 18, 1981. The report by the expert is dated May 3, 1982, that is nearly seven months after the date of detention. Growing in age day by day is an involuntary process and the anatomical changes in the structure of the body continuously occur. Even on normal calculation, if seven months are deducted from the approximate age opined by the expert, in Oct., 1981 detenu was around 17 years of age, consequently the statement made in the petition turns out to be wholly true. However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side. Undoubtedly, therefore, the detenu was a young school going boy. It equally appears that there was some upheavel in the educational institutions. This young school going boy may be enthusiastic about the students’ rights and on two different dates he marginally crossed the bounds of law. It passes comprehension to believe that he can be visited with drastic measure of preventive detention. One cannot treat young people, may be immature, may be even slightly misdirected, may be a little more enthusiastic, with a sledge hammer. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this case the detention order was wholly unwarranted and deserved to be quashed.” 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of 6 CRA No.461 of 2016 its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the 7 CRA No.461 of 2016 documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being 8 CRA No.461 of 2016 represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 16. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall 9 CRA No.461 of 2016 be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the 10 CRA No.461 of 2016 same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 17. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" 11 CRA No.461 of 2016 or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the 12 CRA No.461 of 2016 absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 18. Very recently in the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The 13 CRA No.461 of 2016 State Of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at 14 CRA No.461 of 2016 the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub-Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these 15 CRA No.461 of 2016 circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.” 19. Thus on the basis of the settled law the prosecutrix cannot be held minor on the date of incident. 20. The next question for consideration would be whether the appellant has tried to outrage the modesty of the victim? 21. PW/1 victim in her statement has stated that she was acquainted with the accused Khemsingh Netam since about a year prior to the incident. She further stated that about 5–6 months before the report, while going to her friend Kaushalya’s house at village 16 CRA No.461 of 2016 KhidkitoIa, she met the accused near the canal bridge. The accused persuaded her to accompany him to his house, where she stayed for some time and thereafter accompanied him to different places, including his grandmother’s house at Tikerapara and subsequently to his maternal aunt’s house at village Mulle. The prosecutrix has further stated that at village Mulle, she stayed with the accused for about 8 days. During this period, the accused, on the pretext of marrying her, forcibly subjected her to sexual intercourse on two occasions in the room when his aunt was not present. The prosecutrix further stated that thereafter, when she was recovered and sent for medical examination at Government Hospital, Dhamtari, she came to know that she was about three months pregnant. Further in her cross examination she has revealed that she was acquainted with the accused Khemsingh Netam for about one year prior to the incident, having first met him at Gangrel fair (मेला). Thereafter, they developed a relationship, were in regular contact over mobile phone, and even exchanged gifts. She has admitted that she liked the accused, both of them were in love, and they used to converse and fix meetings through mobile communication. She has further admitted that on 29.07.2015, she voluntarily went to the house of the accused and later to his grandmother’s house at Tikrapara, where she stayed overnight. She has also admitted that during bus travel and stay at different 17 CRA No.461 of 2016 places, including the house of the maternal aunt of the accused at village Mulle, she did not raise any objection or lodge any complaint to anyone that she was being taken forcibly. She remained at the aunt’s house for about 8 days, during which period she did not complain to the aunt regarding any sexual assault. Most importantly, the prosecutrix has admitted that prior to the alleged incident she had already established physical relations with the accused 15–20 times, including on occasions in the forest near KhidkitoIa. She has clearly stated that the physical relations between them lasted for several minutes on each occasion and no injuries were sustained. 22. PW-5 Dr. Madhuri stated that she had been serving as a Lady Doctor in the Government Hospital, Dhamtari, for the last 10 years. On 10.08.2015 at about 1.00 p.m., the prosecutrix, aged about 17 years, resident of village Sorum, was brought before her for medical examination. She stated that at the time of examination, the prosecutrix was fully conscious. On examination no external injuries were found on her body. On internal examination, she observed that pubic hair was present, the hymen was old and torn, and two fingers could be easily admitted into the vagina. No injuries were found on the private parts. The uterus was bulky, corresponding to 6–8 weeks of gestation. She therefore referred the prosecutrix to the Sonologist at Medical College Hospital, Raipur, to confirm pregnancy, and also to the 18 CRA No.461 of 2016 Radiologist for determination of age. 23. Having carefully considered the statement of the victim (PW-1), where her own deposition indicates that she was a willing participant in the relationship, and her conduct throughout shows voluntary company with the accused to different places, further absence of resistance or complaint, and repeated physical intimacy over a long period, clearly demonstrates that she was a consenting party to the acts. 24. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, as also the evidence on record, it would not be safe for this Court to hold that the appellant has committed rape upon her, rather it reflects from the evidence that the victim herself had made consented sexual intercourse with the appellant. It is also clear from the statements of the prosecution witnesses that the physical relation they made was consensual in nature, thus, it cannot be said that the appellant committed the offence. 25. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the 19 CRA No.461 of 2016 appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 26. For the foregoing reasons, the prosecution has not proved that the appellant had forcefully taken away the Victim, and from the evidence of the victim the same creates doubt and also the fact that since, it has also not proved that at the time of incident the Victim was minor, therefore, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be acquitted. 27. The accused is acquitted of the charges for which he was tried. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from the charge leveled against him. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the bonds shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of Section 481 of the BNSS. Accordingly, the Criminal appeal is allowed. 28. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti