[2025:RJ-JP:10005] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Restoration Application No. 1276/2024 in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 318/2014 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Collector, Bharatpur 2. General Manager, District Industries Center, Bharatpur. 3. Deputy District Collector, Bharatpur. ----Petitioners Versus M/s Kisan Oil Mill Mohanpura, Kumher Through Proprietor Bhola Singh S/o Ram Prasad, R/o Belarakalan, Tehsil Kumher District Bharatpur. ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Devansh Sharma, Dy. GC For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN Order 05/03/2025 1. Instant restoration application is preferred by applicant- appellants to restore S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 318/2014 dismissed for non-prosecution on 05.09.2023. Office has pointed out a delay of 390 days in filing instant restoration application. 2. An application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application on the ground that the Officers of the State Department came to know about dismissal of civil second appeal at belated stage and after change of counsel, the restoration application was filed. 3. Learned counsel appearing for applicant submits that the reason is bona fide and they are entitled for condonation of delay. He submits that in case restoration application is not restored to [2025:RJ-JP:10005] (2 of 6) [CRES-1276/2024] its original number then they have to suffer adversely and the interest of State will suffer. 4. Heard learned counsel for applicant and perused the material placed on record. 5. Aggrieved from dismissal of civil regular appeal No. 170/2003 by learned Additional District Judge No.2, Bharatpur on 07.10.2013, S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 318/2014 was filed by the appellants. When this matter was taken-up on 29.08.2023, no one has appeared on behalf of appellants, thereafter on 05.09.2023, no one has appeared and the matter was dismissed for non-prosecution. 6. In brief the facts of the case are that respondent-plaintiff has filed a civil suit No. 190/1999 before learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bharatpur for declaration and permanent injunction and same was decreed on 03.11.2003. The first appeal preferred by present applicants was also dismissed, thus there is a concurrent finding of a fact. 7. The application under Section 5 of Limitation Act indicate that after knowledge at belated stage and change of counsel, the restoration application is filed. Herein, the applicants have failed to show the reasons of delay, particularly when they have come to know about dismissal of civil second appeal and also steps taken by them. No reason was mentioned about non-appearance on 29.08.2023. A perusal of order passed in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 318/2014 indicate that either the counsel remained absent or adjournment was sought by appellants-defendants. 8. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed [2025:RJ-JP:10005] (3 of 6) [CRES-1276/2024] period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. 9. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 10. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment [2025:RJ-JP:10005] (4 of 6) [CRES-1276/2024] in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay. 11. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not [2025:RJ-JP:10005] (5 of 6) [CRES-1276/2024] properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds. 12. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; [2025:RJ-JP:10005] (6 of 6) [CRES-1276/2024] (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision. 13. Very recently in case of H. Guru Swamy and Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by LRs 2025 INSC 53 Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering application for condonation of delay has observed that the question of limitation is not merely on technical consideration. The Rules of limitation are based on the principle of public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the sword of damocles hanging over the head of litigant for an indefinite period of time. 14. In view of aforesaid, no case is made out for condonation of delay as the applicants have failed to explain delay of 390 days in filing present restoration application. 15. As regards to merits is concerned, sufficient opportunity was already granted to represent the case to appellant and counsel for appellant remained absent on both dates i.e. 29.08.2023 and 05.09.2023. No sufficient ground for absence was shown, therefore, there exists no ground on merits for restoration. 16. In view of aforesaid, application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is hereby dismissed and consequently resulting into dismissal of civil restoration application on ground of delay and also on merits. 17. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J MONU /50