1 2025:CGHC:31237-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1510 of 2024 Ram Khadiya S/o Lal Sky Khadiya Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Jadatoli, P.S. Talsara, District Sundergarh (Orissa) ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Farsabahar, District Jashpur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 08.07.2025 1. Heard Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondent / State. 2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’) MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.07.09 10:50:16 +0530 2 is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.07.2024 passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Kunkuri, District- Jashpur (C.G.) in Session Trial No. 09/2020, whereby the appellant have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 06 months. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 16.07.2020 at 15:00 hrs., informant Shobhit Ram (PW-10), along with Pratap Say, Chowkidar, Budhiyar Say and Gopi Ram, appeared at Farasbahar police station and lodged a death intimation to the effect that on 16.07.2020, his father Gorso Ram, sister Manpati and brother-in- law Ram Khadia went to their field in the morning to sow saplings and after sowing, son-in-law Ram Khadia and sister Manpati came home first and Shobhit Ram and his father Gorso Ram came home after ploughing the other field and after some time they saw that informant's younger sister Manpati Bai was lying dead on the ground in a bloody condition, she had injuries on her head and face, there the informant's brother-in-law Ram Khadia was standing with a shovel in his hand, after seeing the incident, PW-10 Shobhit Ram asked brother-in-law Ram Khadiya why he kiiled Manpati, then he said that Manpati quarrelled with him saying that he is having illicit relationship with another lady and due to anger, he assaulted Manpati with fawda (shovel). 3 4. On the basis of above mentioned case information of informant Shobhit Ram (PW-10), Case Intimation (Ex.P-17) was registered at Farasbahar Police Station under Case No. 23/2020 Section 174 of the CrPC and on the basis of the case intimation, on 16.07.2020 at 15:10 hrs, Crime No. 27/2020 Under Section 302 IPC, First Information Report (Ex.P-18) was registered against accused Ram Khadiya and the case was taken up for investigation. During the investigation, the police got the post mortem of the dead body of the deceased done after completing the proceedings of Panchnama (Ex.P-2), prepared the Patwari site Map of the place of incident (Ex.P-4) and Patwari Panchnama (Ex.P-5), Memorandum Statement of the accused (Ex.P-11), Seizure Memorandum (Ex.P-13) and received the query report of the subject matter of crime and clothes etc. seized in the case. 5. In this case, accused Ram Khadiya was arrested in front of witnesses as per arrest slip (Ex.P-14) and information regarding arrest was given to the family members of accused (Ex.P-20). During investigation, statements of witnesses were recorded. After investigation, charge-sheet under section 302 IPC was presented against accused Ram Khadiya before the court of JMFC, Kunkuri. From where, the accused was found guilty of the crime punishable under section 302 IPC in the case. 6. When the charge for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC was framed, read out and explained to the accused Ram 4 Khadiya, the accused denied having committed the offence and wanted trial. 7. After the completion of prosecution evidence, the statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., accused Ram Khadya stated that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated and that he would not tender any evidence in his defence. 8. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses and exhibited 24 documents Exs.P-1 to P- 24. 9. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 06.07.2024, convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused / appellant. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offences under Section 302 of the IPC as there was no reason or any motive has been proved by the prosecution to do such type of crime. He further submits that in the present case, the case rest on circumstantial evidence which is so weak in nature that is insufficient to convict the appellant for the aforementioned offence. The learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that there is major contradiction and omission in the statement of the 5 informant Shobhit (PW-10), which cannot be relied upon. Further, the learned trial Court has erred in convicting the appellant only on the basis of testimony of interested witnesses. The prosecution has failed to establish any motive or intention of the appellant to commit murder of deceased, therefore impugned conviction of the appellant being unsustainable in law, deserves to be quashed. The prosecution has not adduced any cogent & reliable evidence to prove the guilt of murder against the appellant. Further, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court is baseless, perverse, erroneous and contrary to the material evidence available on record, therefore liable to be set-aside/quashed. The learned trial Court has failed to see that there is no eye witness and only the statement of PW-10 the appellant has been convicted which is very perverse and there is more possibility that the incident occurred in month of July 2020 which is rainy season and at the time of incident the deceased has fell down due to slip and she sustained injuries on face and head from said article fauda and it cannot be said that the accused has assaulted any injury / murder of his wife hence the conviction is liable to be set aside. There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, the appellant caused injuries to the deceased, which caused her death. Therefore, the case of the present appellants falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and the act of the appellants is culpable 6 homicide not amounting to murder and, therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. 11. On the other hand, Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the appellant has caused murder of deceased by deadly attacking her with Fauda due to which, he succumbed to his injuries, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and it is not a case where the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 13. The first question for consideration would be whether the deceased died under unnatural circumstances ? 14. With regard to this question, statement of Dr. Abhishek Gupta (PW-04), posted as Medical Officer at Community Health Center Farasbahar, is taken on record. 15. Dr. Abhishek Gupta (PW-04), posted as Medical Officer at Community Health Center Farasbahar had deposed that on 7 16.07.2020, a written complaint was sent to Community Health Center, Farasbahar for providing the result of postmortem of the dead body of deceased Manpati Bai. On 17.07.2020 at 11:20 am, when the dead body of the deceased was brought before him for postmortem by constable Ramsagar Nayak No. 681, she was already dead. She was wearing a green blouse and a light yellow colored saree, which had blood on it. 16. Dr. Abhishek Gupta (PW-04) further stated in his statement that while conducting the postmortem, the following injuries were found on the dead body- 01. There were blood stains on the face, the face was disfigured. There was an incised wound measuring 10 cm on the face, on the right mandible area, the bone inside it was dislocated and broken. 02. Puncture wound angle of mandible area was found measuring 5 cm. The bone inside was broken and displaced. 03. A scattered wound measuring 9x3x6cm was on the zygomatic temporal bone area of the right ear. There were multiple fractures and bone dislocations inside. The bone on the right side of the eye was also broken. 04. A 7x2x10 cm scattered incised wound was found on the right side of the head in the parietal occipital area. The bone inside was dislocated and broken. The brain was also ruptured. There was a lot of bleeding. 8 17. Dr. Abhishek Gupta (PW-04) further stated in his medical report that the nature of all the above injuries was serious and appeared to have occurred within 24 hours of examination. Apart from this, no other injury marks were found on the body. In the opinion of this witness, the cause of death of the deceased was due to head injury, which was caused by hitting forcefully with a hard, heavy and sharp object repeatedly and the nature of injury was fatal and the death of the deceased occurred within 24 hours, in this regard, the said medical witness has confirmed his signature on a part of the report Exhibit P-09 provided by him. 18. Thus, as per the judicial statement of above witnesses Dr. Abhishek Gupta (PW-04) and the opinion given in the PM report (Ex.P-9), it is proved that the death of the deceased was of homicidal nature. 19. As such, there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the medical witnesses Dr. Abhishek Gupta (PW-04), who conducted the postmortem of the deceased. Hence, the trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record particularly relying upon the statement of Dr. Abhishek Gupta (PW-04), and PM report (Ex.P-9) has come to the conclusion that the deceased died under unnatural circumstances. 20. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions advanced by them, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that the 9 deceased Manpati died under unnatural circumstances is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 21. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question? 22. Shobhit (PW-10), who is the elder brother of the deceased, deposed in his main examination that the accused is his brother- in-law. The said witness stated in paragraph No. 2 of his main examination that it has been almost 3 years since the incident, the incident took place during the rainy season. He and his father had gone to plough the field, his sister Manpati Bai was at home. When he came home after ploughing the field at about 10:00, he saw that the dead body of his sister Manpati Bai was lying inside the informant's house and she was in a bloody state and had an injury on her head. He further deposed in his main examination that after seeing the dead body of his sister, he went to the field to bring his father and after returning from the field, he informed the village sarpanch about the incident. He accepted in his cross- examination that when he reached home and saw his sister's dead body, Ram Khadiya/appellant herein was standing nearby with a shovel. Witness Shobhit has also accepted that Manpati Bai died due to the injury caused by her brother-in-law Ram Khadiya hitting her with a shovel. 10 23. Pusmani Bai (PW-2), who reached has deposed in her main examination that accused Ram Khadiya is her uncle and deceased Manpati Bai was her aunt and she has died. Her aunt Manpati was killed by accused Ram Khadiya by hitting her on the head and face with a shovel. The incident took place on 17.02.2020 at around 06:00 am, at that time she was grazing goats in the field. She voluntarily said that when she reached the spot, accused Ram Khadiya had killed her aunt Manpati and fled. On reaching the spot, she found that Manpati was lying on the cot, the accused had killed her and made her sleep on the cot and there was blood on the ground. Manpati had been stabbed very deeply. She further deposed that on 17.07.2020, memorandum statement of accused Ram Khadiya (Ex.P-11) was recorded in the presence of witnesses as per the statement of accused Ram Khadiya, a shovel with a wooden bent attached to it was seized in the presence of witnesses and seizure memo (Ex.P-13) was prepared. 24. Pratap Sai (PW-8) related to memorandum and seizure stated in his main trial that when the police interrogated the accused, he had told that he had killed his wife Manpati Bai by hitting her on the head with a shovel and that he had hidden the said blood- stained shovel in the garden of his father-in-law and that he would bring it out and present it and that accused Ram Khadiya had brought out the blood-stained shovel from the garden of the accused's father-in-law and presented it and that the police had 11 seized it in the presence of this witness on the basis of memorandum and seizure witness accepted it. 25. So far as possibility of causing the injuries is considered, in this regard, Investigating Officer Pradeep Kumar Sidar (PW-9), sated that in relation to querying the shovel seized in the case and providing a report, the complaint was sent to the Block Medical Officer, CHC, Farasbahar. 26. Dr. Abhishek Gupta (PW-4) deposed in his main examination that on 28.07.2020, a written complaint was received by the Medical Officer Community Health Center, Farasbahar regarding querying the seized shovel and informing the result. On 30.07.2020, at 10:15 am, a shovel in sealed condition was presented before him for query by constable Shobhit Pankra. On opening the seal, the shovel was found to be made of iron and wood. There was blood on the iron part. According to the opinion of this witness, the injuries that the deceased had received could have been caused by this weapon. 27. Thus, the above evidence confirms the fact that the injuries on the body of the deceased were caused by the shovel used in the incident, seized at the pointing out of the accused in the case. 28. On the basis of the above evidence and facts, the judicial statement of witness Pusmani Bai (PW-02) proves that there was a quarrel between the deceased and her husband (accused) at 12 the place of incident just before the incident, there is irrefutable evidence of the accused being seen holding the shovel used in the incident along with the dead body of the deceased at the place of incident immediately after the incident, the seizure of the shovel used in the incident was proved on the indication of the accused and the opinion given by doctor Abhishek Gupta (PW-04) after the postmortem examination regarding the injuries found on the body of the deceased being caused by the seized shovel in the case and the death being of homicidal nature due to the said injuries is proved. 29. Considering the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant-accused who has caused injuries over the body of the deceased due to which she died. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. 30. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ? 31. The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report of the deceased as already noticed was due to head injury, which was caused by hitting forcefully with a hard, heavy and sharp object. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is 13 its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu2 has made the following observations : “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 33. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act 1 (2012) 8 SCC 289 2 AIR 1956 SC 488 14 committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana3 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances 3 (2002) 3 SCC 327 15 of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 35. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : 4 (2009) 15 SCC 635 16 (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 17 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 36. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 37. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 5 (2012) 8 SCC 450 6 (2017) 3 SCC 247 18 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account 19 of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 38. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 39. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of 7 (2019) 6 SCC 122 20 passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 40. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left 21 chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an 22 offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but 23 without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of 24 the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or 25 injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 41. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of principles of 26 law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that on the date of incident i.e. on 16.07.2020 at 15:00 hrs when the appellant and deceased came back home after plaughing field, Manpati quarreled with the appellant saying that he is having illicit relationship with another lady and due to anger, he assaulted Manpati with fawda (shovel). Thus with the intention to cause death of deceased, the appellant caused such injuries and by doing so, he must have had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him would likely cause death of the deceased, as such, his case would falls within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of appellant herein completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 42. Considering the above-stated facts, further considering the evidence of Shobhit (PW-10), Pushmani Bai (PW-2) and Medical witness Dr. Abhishek Gupta (PW-04), taking into consideration the age of the appellant at present, also considering the postmortem report of the deceased (Ex.P-9) and the material available on record, it would meet the end of justice that if the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is altered/converted to 27 Section 304 Part-I of the IPC. 43. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part- I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years. 44. The appellant is stated to be in jail since 17.07.2020 being the date of arrest. He is directed to serve out the sentence as modified above. 45. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 46. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 47. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet