1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 965 of 2020 Keshav Yadav S/o Shri Set Kumar Yadav, Aged About 21 Years R/o Village Pond Gariyaband ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Panduka, District Gariyaband Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Uttam Kumar Pandey, Advocate with Ms. Pooja Sinha, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Ms. Isha Jajodiya, P. L. for the State. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 29/01/2025 1. This appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentenced dated 31.10.2020 passed by learned Special Judge, (Atrocities) Raipur in Special Criminal Case No.27 of 2019, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC : R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine VAIBHAV SINGH Digitally signed by VAIBHAV SINGH Date: 2025.03.04 14:40:56 +0530 2 amount further R.I. for 1 month. Under Section 6 of POCSO Act 2012. : R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine amount R.I. for one month. (All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.) 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 01.05.2019 the mother of the victim PW-3 has lodged a missing report to the police that her minor daughter is missing from the intervening night on 28-29 April 2019 and despite her search in her relatives house and nearby places, her whereabouts could not traced out. The missing report was recorded in Rojnamcha Sanha Ex.P/11 and thereafter, the FIR Ex.P/12 was registered for the offence under Section 363 of IPC against the unknown person. During the investigation the victim was recovered on 02.05.2019 from the possession of the appellant and recovery panchanama Ex.P/6 was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital Gariyaband, where she was being medically examined by PW-6 Dr. Rudramani Khesh who after her medical examination gave report Ex.P/22. During her medical examination doctor could not noticed any external injuries on her body and opined that the final opinion was given after forensic lab report for semen analysis. Two slides of vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed it over to the police for its chemical examination. The victim was also referred for X-ray examination for her age confirmation. With respect to the date of birth and age of the victim, the police has seized, the school register from Government Boys Middle School, Podh, District Gariyaband, vide seizure memo Ex. P/3 and after retaining the attested true copy of the 3 school register Ex.P/2-C, the original register was return back to the school. The underwear of the victim has been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/7 the mark-sheet of Class VIII of victim has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/10. Spot map Ex.P/13 was prepared by the police. With respect to the social status of the victim her social status certificate issued by Sub-Divisional Officer, Rajim has already been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/28 and the copy of the said social status certificate is Ex.P/5. The appellant was arrested on 03.05.2019 and he too was sent for his medical examination to Government Hospital, Panduka, where he was medically examined by the doctor who found him capable to perform sexual intercourse. Another school register from Government primary school Podh was also seized by the police vide seizure memo Ex.P/27 and the attested true copy of the said school register is Ex.P/24. The vaginal slides of the victim, her underwear and the underwear of the appellant were sent for its chemical examination to State FSL, Raipur from where report Ex.P/33 was received and according to the FSL report, the semen and sperms were present in the vaginal slides of the victim as well as underwear of the appellant however, no semen and sperm were found on the underwear of the victim. 3. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and the Statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. of the victim have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the learned trial Court for the offence under Sections 363, 366 & 376(2)(n) of I.P.C. and Section 6 of POCSO Act, and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. 4 4. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363, 366 & 376(2)(n) of I.P.C. and Section 6 of POCSO Act, and under Section 3(2)(v-a) of the SC/ST Act, the appellant denied his guilt and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove the charge against the appellant the prosecution has examined as many as 8 witnesses. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. has been recorded in which he denied the circumstances appears against him, plead innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. He did noting with the victim and he be released from the offence. 6. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial court has acquitted the appellant for the offence under Section 363, 366 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v-a) of the SC/ST Act, however, he has been convicted for the offence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act, and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment. Hence this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omission and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, which can not be made basis for holding the guilty of the appellant. He would further submit that there is no cogent and clinching evidence with respect to the age of the victim to prove that she was minor on the date of incident and less than 18 years of age. The School record produced by the prosecution has not been proved in accordance with law. There is no other evidence with respect to the age of the victim like kotwari register, birth certificate or ossification test 5 report. He would further submit that the victim being a major girl , having love affair with the appellant and she herself eloped with him and making physical relation with the appellant on her own free will consensually. She has not made any complaint and has not raised any alarm while she was allegedly subjected to forceful sexual intercourse by the appellant. There is no injuries found on the body of the victim and no sign of any protest appears on her body. Even she has not stated that she tried to save herself while she was being subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant by giving nail scratch mark or teeth bite on the body of the appellant. He would further submit that entire evidence reflects that the victim was consenting party in making physical relation with the appellant and the same does not comes under the definition of rape and the appellant is entitled for his acquittal. 8. On the other hand learned counsel for the State opposes and have submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. But for minor omission or contradictions, the evidence produced by the prosecution is reliable and sufficient for holding guilty of the appellant in the alleged offence. The victim was found to be minor on the date of incident and the school record has been duly proved by the prosecution. Since the victim was found to be minor and she could not gave her consent in making physical relation with the appellant, the act of the appellant amounts to rape upon the minor victim. Even if no injuries have been found on the body of the victim, the appellant cannot be benefited because in every case it is not necessary that the victim of rape must have received injuries on her body and it depends upon facts of the each case. The learned trial Court after appreciating 6 the entire facts and circumstances of the case as well as the evidence available on record convicted the appellant for the alleged offence which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and therefore appeal filed by the appellant is liable to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 10. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim as to whether she was minor on the date of incident or not. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register Ex.P/2-C & Ex.P/24, which are sought to be proved by PW-1, who is the headmaster of the school and PW-7 who is the Assistant teacher of the panchayat of the school. The PW-1 who is headmaster of the Government Middle School Chussra, have stated in his evidence that the police has seized the school register from him with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo Ex.P/3. After retaining attested true copy of the school register Ex.P/2-C, the original register was return back. In the school register Ex.P/2-C, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 12.12.2002. In cross-examination, he admitted that on what basis the date of birth of the victim is recorded in the school register he did not know. He also admitted that entries in the school register with respect to the date of birth of the victim has not been made by him. From the evidence of PW-1 it is quite clear that he neither the author of the school register Ex.P/2-C nor the basis on which the date of birth of the victim is recorded in the school register has been produced. 11. The another witness PW-7 who is the assistant teacher Panchayat and was posted at Government primary school, Kawarpara have stated in 7 his evidence that the police has seized the school register with respect to the date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo Ex.P/27 and after retaining the attested true copy of the school register Ex.P/25-C and affidavit register Ex.P/24-C the original register were return back to the school. In cross-examination she stated that since she was not posted in the school therefore, she could not state as to whether any correction in the serial No.56 of the register by applying whitener or not. A note has been made by the learned trial Court in the deposition sheet of this witness that in serial Nos. 54, 55, 56 & 57 of the affidavit register, whitener has been applied for correction of the name of the victim. But no correction in the date of birth recorded in it. She too have admitted that she is not the author of the said school register and the basis on which the said entries have been made in it is not mentioned in the register. 12. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register to prove the age of the victim has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 8 In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate cannot be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the 9 same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 13. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board 10 when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 14. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : 11 “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concernedly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore,the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3,the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year. 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) 12 (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 15. Reverting to the facts of the present case except the said school register, Ex.P/2-C, Ex.P/24 and Ex.P/25-C no other documentary evidence led by the prosecution to prove the age and date of birth of the victim. 16. The victim PW-2 have stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 12.12.2002, in cross-examination she admitted that she is disclosing her date of birth on the basis of her mark-sheet. She further admitted that she did not know her actual date of birth. 17. PW-3 the mother of the victim did not disclose her date of birth but have stated that the victim was about 16 years at the time of incident she stated that she could not remember her date of birth she further stated that since they have sent her school therefore, she could say that she might be of 16 years of age. In cross-examination she stated that she did not know the year of her own birth. She further stated that she also did not know about year of the birth of her daughter. She further admitted that the birth of the victim was got recorded in Kotwari Panji of the village. She further admitted that he is disclosing the age of the victim as 16 years on the basis of her date of birth recorded in the school record. She further admitted that her grandfather had gone to school for her admission and she did not know as to on what basis her 13 grandfather have got recorded her date of birth in the school. She further admitted that she did not know the date or year of her birth. 18. From the aforesaid evidence, it is very difficult to hold that the victim was less than 18 years of age on the date of incident as the victim as well as her mother have stated that they disclosed the date of birth of the victim on the basis of school record but the school record itself is not sufficient in absence of the examination of its author as well as in absence of any material on the basis on which the date of her birth is recorded in the school register. Therefore, in the facts and circumstance of the present case and also in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in aforesaid cases, this Court of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove that the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. 19. So far as the offence of rape is concerned, I again examined the evidence of victim PW-2. She stated in her evidence that when she had gone to the marriage ceremony of her friend, she met with the appellant where he proposed her that he is loving her. On the date of marriage itself he took her towards field and made physical relation with her. On the next day of the first incident, at about 8:00 pm he took her to his house and disclosed to his mother that he wanted to marry with her but her mother refused for the same and his mother has sent her to her own house but she stayed along with appellant for one day there and the appellant has made physical relation with her. Thereafter, she on her own will came back to her house. When the police persons came she was on her own house. In cross-examination she stated that she disclosed in her statement made before the Police as well as Magistrate that the appellant proposed her that he is loving her and 14 made forceful physical relation with her but if it is not there in her statements she could not tell the reason. She further admitted that she knew the appellant since last so many years. She also admitted that prior to the incident her family members were negotiating for her marriage and were in search of groom. She also admitted that she disclosed the appellant that the groom which was searched by her parents are not liking by her because the groom which was selected by her parents was of higher age. She further admitted that she requested the appellant that if she stayed in her own house, her parents would perform her marriage with that boy and for that reasons she requested the appellant to take her along with him somewhere else. thereafter the appellant took her with him. 20. She further admitted that the place where the appellant made physical relation with her is the adjoining place where the marriage function was going on and it was crowded place due to the marriage. She further admitted that she has not made any complaint and informed anyone about the first incident which was occurred nearby the place of marriage and even she has not disclosed the incident to her parents. The friendly relation with the appellant was not liking by her parents and they asked to remain away from him, because the appellant belongs to some other caste. She also admitted that when she disclosed her parents that the appellant took her to his house and informed his mother that he wanted to marry with her, her parents have scolded her. From the evidence of this witness, it is quite vivid that she on her own will had gone with the appellant and made physical relation with him firstly on the filed and thereafter they continuously made physical relation occasionally. She has not made any complaint and 15 engaged in making physical relation by the appellant with her. There is no external injuries found on her body and no sign of any protest. It clearly appears that she was consenting party in making physical relation with the appellant on her own will. 21. PW-3 the mother of the victim have stated that when the victim returned after about 2 days from the marriage place, she disclosed about the incident that the appellant has committed rape upon her. Since the victim was not returned from the marriage place therefore, they have lodged the missing report of her. In cross-examination she admitted that she did not know as to with whom victim had gone. She further admitted that she does not like the relation between the appellant and the victim. From these evidences it would not be safe to hold that the appellant is guilty for the offence of rape as it has been found hereinabove that the victim has engaged in making consensual physical relation with the appellant. 22. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cost some doubt in the mind of the Court on the veracity of the victim evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim . The law is well-settled that in a case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim . However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to being home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed in the instant case. This Court is conscious of the sensitivity with which heinous offence under Section 376 I.P.C. has to be 16 treated but in the present case the circumstances taken as a whole create doubt about the correctness of the prosecution version. 23. From the aforesaid discussions, I do not found any sufficient ground to uphold the conviction of the appellant as held by the learned trial Court. 24. In the result the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentences is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted from the alleged offences. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 04.05.2019, He be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 25. Keeping in view, the provisions of Section 481 of B.N.S.S., the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for sum of Rs.25,000/- with one reliable surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of 6 months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof she appeared before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 26. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) JUDGE Vaibhav