1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.1518/2023 BETWEEN: 1. BINOD KUMAR CHOUDARY, S/O LATE MAHAVEER PRASAD CHOUDARY, AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, DIRECTOR, GIMPEX HOUSE, NO.282 (OLD NO.181), LINGICHETTI ROAD, CHENNAI - 600 001. 2. T.R. SESHADRI, S/O T.S. RAMASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, CIMPEX HOUSE, NO.282 (OLD NO.181), LINGICHETTI ROAD, CHENNAI - 600 001. … PETITIONERS (BY SRI. MURTHY D. NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. MAHENDRA G., ADVOCATE PETITIONER NO.1; SRI. SUMANTH M. HEGDE, ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONER NO.2) AND: STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE, CITY DIVISION, BENGALURU-01. … RESPONDENT (BY SRI. B.S.PRASAD, SPECIAL COUNSEL) 2 THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 397 R/W 401 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO ALLOW THE ABOVE CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION AND DISCHARGE THE PETITIONERS IN SPL.C.C.NO.41/2016 FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 379, 409 AND 420 R/W 120B OF IPC, 1860 AND SECTIONS 21 AND 23 R/W 4(1) AND 4(1A) OF MMDR ACT, 1957 AND RULE 165 R/W 144 OF KARNATAKA FOREST RULE, 1969. THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 06.02.2025, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH CAV ORDER This revision petition is filed by accused Nos.2 and 3 against the rejection of discharge application passed in Spl.C.C.No.41/2016 dated 02.03.2023. 2. The factual matrix of the case of the prosecution is that in pursuance to the order passed by the Apex Court on I.A.No.189 filed in W.P.No.562/2009 vide order dated 16.09.2013 with regard to illegal mining and export of iron ore from Belikere Port from 01.01.2009 to 31.05.2010 by various companies, the CBI on investigation had filed a preliminary enquiry report based on which the Apex Court had directed in its order dated 16.09.2013 that any iron ore which was exported from Belikere Port area by any company within the check period 3 of 01.01.2009 to 31.05.2010 in which if the export is less than 50,000 metric ton by any company/persons as against which an enquiry to be conducted by the CBI who in turn had directed the Karnataka State Government to conduct an enquiry and permitted the CBI to register criminal case against those exporters who were enquired into the preliminary enquiry and who had exported iron ore of more than 50,000/- MT without valid permits and as recommended by the Central Empowered Committee in its report dated 05.09.2012 and certain directions were given. As per the order of the Apex Court, the State Government vide order dated 22.11.2013 bearing No.CI/282/ MM011(P) had directed the complainant/respondent herein to conduct an enquiry and vide order dated 24.01.2014 bearing No.CRCE 10 Soloyu 2014, Bengaluru had directed for establishing a Special Investigation Team (SIT) and vide order dated 29.05.2014 bearing No.HD/129/POP/2014 had directed the SIT to be constructed as a police station. 3. It was alleged against these petitioners that they had conducted trading of iron ore between the check period of 01.01.2009 and 31.02.2010 from Bellary and Chitradurga District and was exported through Belikere port to an extent of 4 1,04,070 metric ton was exported and out of which 21,585.210 metric tons of iron ore was dispatched without obtaining Mineral Dispatch permit from the Forest Department or the Department of Mines and Geology. Hence, the petitioners were arrayed as accused since the export of iron ore without obtaining mineral dispatch permit had caused loss to the State exchequer. It is also alleged that the petitioners had involved with the officials and by conducting theft of iron ore had caused loss to the State exchequer. Based on the same, a crime was registered in Crime No.5/2014 dated 11.07.2014 and investigation was completed and charge-sheet was filed for the offences punishable under Sections 379, 409, 420 read with Section 120B of IPC and Sections 21 and 23 read with 4(1) and 4(1)(a) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (‘MMDR Act’ for short) and Rule 165 read with 144 of the Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969. It is also contended that the primary allegation as against the petitioners is that the company had purchased iron ore and the said purchase was done without the permit from the Department of Mines and Geology and caused loss to the State exchequer. Hence, charge-sheet was filed and an application 5 was filed before the Trial Court for discharge and the same was rejected. 4. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present revision petition is filed contending that the respondent is alleging that the accused which is a company is vicariously liable for the offences committed by its Director, which is incorrect and holding the petitioners responsible for the alleged offences, who was challenged before the Trial Court by way of discharge application. It is contended that the petitioners are not a lease holder or mine owners and have not even involved in transporting of the mineral, but have only traded with the mineral. The charge-sheet does not indicate committing of any such offence. The very definition of theft would indicate that with an intention of dishonestly moving out or taking possession of a movable property without another person’s consent would amount to theft. The learned counsel brought to the notice of this Court the ingredients of Section 409 of IPC with regard to the criminal breach of trust and also Section 405 of IPC. It is contended that none of the ingredients attracts against the petitioners. The petitioners are only traders who had traded in the minerals which originated from a mine head and was 6 extracted from the mine head with a valid lease. The learned counsel contend that the offences under Section 420 of IPC not attracts against the petitioners. The ingredients of the offence of cheating is also not forthcoming. It is contended that the allegation as against the petitioners is that the ore was illegally transported without payment of royalty. The question of payment of royalty would arise at the time when a mineral dispatch permit is sought for, processed and issued. The learned counsel contend that in order to invoke Section 120B of IPC, there must be criminal conspiracy to commit the offence and the ingredients of Section 120B of IPC does not attract against the petitioners. It is contended that the offences invoked under the MMDR Act also does not attract against the petitioners. It is contended that the charge-sheet had indicated that it was M/s. Shalini Impex, which had sold the mineral to this accused and the said mineral was transported by RY Logistics from the stockyard of M/s. Shanthalakshmi Jayaram storage premises to Belikere Port. If the provisions of the MMDR Act which are attributed to the petitioners is seen, the said provisions of law can be attributed only as against accused No.4 i.e., M/s. Shanthalakshmi Jayaram, since the allegation by the respondent 7 is that it was accused No.4 who transported the mineral. The Trial Court fails to take note of this fact into consideration while rejecting the application and failed to consider the entire material placed by the prosecution against the petitioners to frame the charges at the behest of the prosecution and hence prayed this Court to set aside the impugned order. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that these petitioners are the Director and the Deputy General Manager and they are in no way connected to the day- to-day affairs of the company. The learned counsel contend that the offences under the MMDR Act was invoked and cannot file charge-sheet, since there is a clear bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act. The very approach of the Trial Court is erroneous and even framing of points for consideration is erroneous. The Trial Court while passing the order in one breath says Managing Director, but the reasons are contrary and not Managing Director. In support of his arguments the learned counsel would contend that no vicarious liability can be invoked in criminal law in case of company. 8 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SANJAY DUTT AND OTHERS v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER reported in 2025 SCC ONLINE SC 32 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.11 to 13, wherein discussion was made with regard to vicarious liability. There must exist something to show that such actions of the director stemmed from their personal involvement and arose from actions or conduct falling outside the scope of its routine corporate duties. Thus, where the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.13, wherein discussion was made with regard to the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, if the statute provides for such liability and if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. 9 7. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION reported in (2015) 4 SCC 609 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.42 to 44, wherein discussion was made with regard to the circumstances when Director/person in charge of the affairs of the company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an accused person. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court the discussion made in paragraph No.45.1. 8. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of RAVINDRANATHA BAJPE v. MANGALORE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE LIMITED AND OTHERS reported in (2022) 15 SCC 430 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.8.2, 8.3 and 9, wherein discussion was made with regard to the summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Merely because they are Chairman, Managing Director and other office bearers, without any specific role attributed and the role played by them in their capacity, they cannot be arrayed as an accused, more particularly they cannot be held vicariously liable for the offences committed. 10 9. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of NARENDRA KUMAR A. BALDOTA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1880 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.26 and 27, wherein discussion was made with regard to arraying of the accused as Chairman and Deputy General Manager and in the absence of specific allegations and the specific role attributed to them, the learned Magistrate was not justified in issuing process against them and discussion was made in paragraph No.28 with regard to the judgment in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL. 10. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court the judgment in the case of STANDARD CHARTERED BANK AND OTHERS v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT AND OTHERS reported in (2005) 4 SCC 530 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.30 to 32, wherein also discussion was made with regard to as the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, the Court has to resort to punishment of imposition of fine which is also a prescribed punishment. As the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, the Court cannot impose that punishment, but 11 when imprisonment and fine is the prescribed punishment, the Court can impose the punishment of fine which could be enforced against the company. An observation is also made that we do not think that there is a blanket immunity for any company from any prosecution for serious offences merely because the prosecution would ultimately entail a sentence of mandatory imprisonment. 11. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER reported in (2021) 5 SCC 435 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.16, 17, 18 and 23, wherein also discussion was made that the Trial Courts have the power to not merely decide on acquittal or conviction of the accused person after the trial, but also the duty to nip frivolous litigations in the bud even before they reach the stage of trial by discharging the accused in fit cases. 12. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of RAM PRAKASH CHADHA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 12 1709 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.22, wherein discussion was made with regard to when an application is filed for discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C, it is an irrecusable duty and obligation of the Court to apply its mind and answer to it regarding the existence of or otherwise, of ground for proceeding against the accused, by confining such consideration based only on the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. 13. The learned counsel referring these judgments would contend that the Trial Court committed an error in not considering the material on record as there was no such material. 14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that accused No.4 had earlier approached this Court on similar ground by filing a criminal petition and the same was dismissed, so also accused No.5 approached the Court and this Court dismissed the same. These petitioners have indulged in trading of the mines without licence and specific allegations are made against these petitioners since one is the Director for 13 permanent and the Deputy General Manager accused No.3 is also looking after the business of the company of trading of mines. The learned counsel contend that Section 23 attracts against both the petitioners. The learned counsel contend that the Trial Court has given the reasons while rejecting the application and also taken note of the material collected by the Investigating Officer and dismissed the application and hence it does not require interference. 15. The learned counsel in support of his arguments would contend that whatever grounds which have been urged is a matter of trial and these defences cannot be addressed at the time of consideration of discharge application. The learned counsel brought to the notice of this Court the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of PRADEEP S. WODEYAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (2021) 19 SCC 62, wherein the Apex Court held that if failure of justice, then only the Court can exercise the powers. The learned counsel brought to the notice of this Court the vicarious liability of the Directors, if prima facie case is found, it is sufficient to arraign him as an accused and question whether he was responsible and he was in charge of the affairs of the company during the commission of the alleged 14 offence as required under Section 23(1) proviso of the MMDR Act is a matter for trial. The Court has to take note of the combined reading of Section 22 and 4 and these grounds cannot be urged at the time of discharge application. The learned counsel contend that this Court already dismissed Crl.P.No.3212/2014 vide order dated 18.11.2020, wherein similar grounds were urged before this Court and in elaborate discussed the same. 16. In reply to the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent, the learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that not stated anything about petitioner No.2 and he was not the Managing Director and unnecessarily he is prosecuted by filing a false case. 17. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent, the points that arise for the consideration of this Court are: (i) Whether the Trial Court committed an error in dismissing the discharge application and whether it requires interference of this Court? (ii) What order? 15 Point No.(i): 18. Having considered the grounds urged in the petition as well as the oral submission of the respective learned counsel, the Court has to take note of the accusations made against these petitioners. It has to be noted that accused No.1 is the Company M./s. Gimpex Limited. No doubt, it is shown that the company is represented by its Managing Director and these petitioners are accused Nos.2 and 3 i.e., Director and Deputy General Manager of the very same Company. It is important to note that the allegations made against them in the charge-sheet is that they have transported 9090.200 MT of iron ore without mineral dispatch permit and hence they are liable to pay Rs.1,35,61,106/- to the Government. As per the charge-sheet allegations, out of 12 transportations, 7 are in order and remaining 4 are not forthcoming. The offences alleged in the charge-sheet are under Sections 379, 409, 415 and 120B of IPC and also under MMDR Act. An application is filed for discharge on the ground that these petitioners have not played any role. The said application is resisted by the respondent contending that accused Nos.1 to 3 in criminal conspiracy with accused Nos.6, 7 and 15, without obtaining the valid permit and payment 16 of royalty and other charges transported the iron ore in the particular period. It is the contention of the petitioners that they have not committed any such offence and the prosecution has not considered the accused are only purchasers of the mineral from the lease holders and when transporting the same from mine head to the port, the lease holders have paid the royalty to the iron ore and hence the charges cannot be attributed against the accused. But the prosecution mainly relies upon the statement of witnesses C.Ws.29 and 30 and also statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. so also statement of witnesses C.Ws.36, 37 and 38 and specific allegations are made that accused No.7 purchased the iron ore and accused Nos.8 to 10 have transported the same from Belikere port and sold to accused Nos.1 to 3 and caused loss to the State exchequer. 19. The Trial Court while considering the allegations against these petitioners, no doubt, formulated the points for consideration together since accused Nos.1 to 5, 7, 10, 11 to 14 have filed similar application for discharge. It is important to note that though common order was passed, the Trial Court in paragraph Nos.7(a) and 15(a) taken note of that the documents collected during the investigation prima facie show that accused 17 No.1 company has exported 11,290 MT of iron ore, but it had no mining licence. According to the prosecution case, the company had purchased 4,124 MT or iron ore from M/s. Shalini Impex, transported from Kallahalli mining yard and the said stock was illegally mined, stored and transported. The company had purchased 3,426 MT of iron ore from accused No.7 – M/s. Mahesh Babu Nayaka and the said iron ore was illegally stored and transported and 1,539 MT from M/s Chunduru Associates. M/s. Chunduru Associates had purchased the said iron ore from the accused No.11 M/s. Sai Krishna Mineral Pvt. Ltd. 20. It is important to note that the Trial Court culled out the allegation made against the company in paragraph No.7(a) that M/s. Gimpex Ltd., Chennai during the period 01.01.2009 to 31.05.2010 had transported iron ore from Bellary, Chitradurga and other places to Belikere port and exported the same. It is important to note that the Trial Court also taken note of the statement of the witnesses, particularly C.Ws.3, 5, 6, 7 and 9. It is important to note that specific allegations are made that the accused not obtained any licence and permit from the concerned Department and in violation of law they had transported iron ore to Belikere port and caused loss of Crores of rupees to the State 18 exchequer. It is important to note that a specific allegation is made that they conspired with each other and conspired to illegally, extract, store, transport and export 9090 MT of iron ore without obtaining the permission from the concerned Department. 21. It is observed in paragraph No.18 that accused Nos.1 to 3 being the traders have contended that they are not involved in purchase and sale of iron ore and therefore, they were not required to obtain permit or to pay royalty to the Government. The earlier order passed in Crl.P.No.572/2017 dated 19.11.2020 was taken note, wherein this Court has observed that the allegations made against the accused squarely attracts Section 4(1-A) of MMDR Act. It is observed in paragraph No.22 that criminal conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is not possible to place direct evidence of the common intention of the accused. Therefore, conspiracy can be inferred from the circumstances and it is a matter of trial. In the case on hand, accused No.1 being the company and accused Nos.2 and 3 being the Director and Deputy General Manager had exported the iron ore and specific allegation are made in the charge-sheet against these two petitioners. The fact that accused No.2 is the Director 19 and accused No.3 is the Deputy General Manager is not in dispute. A specific allegation is made against them that they are in the helm of affairs of transporting the same and exporting the iron ore. When such specific material is collected against the petitioners, it is rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that it is a matter of trial. 22. It is important to note that the Apex Court in the judgment in the case of Pradeep S. Wodeyar (supra), held that whether accused No.1 was in charge of and responsible for the affairs of the company during the commission of the alleged offence as required under Section 23(1) proviso of MMDR Act is a matter for trial. It is important to note that the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon several judgments, wherein also discussion was made with regard to the principles laid down with regard to the vicarious liability is concerned. The allegation against these petitioners is not with regard to the vicarious liability is concerned, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. The Apex Court in the judgment in the cases of Sanjay Dutt, Sunil Bharti Mittal and Ravindranatha Bajpe (supra), has discussed whether they have played active role in the said act. In the absence of no 20 such role, they cannot be prosecuted and also an observation is made that facing of criminal trial is a serious issue. It is important to note that in the case of Krishna Lal Chawla (supra), the Apex Court held that the Trial Courts have the power to not merely decide on acquittal or conviction of the accused person after the trial, but also the duty to nip frivolous litigations in the bud even before they reach the stage of trial by discharging the accused in fit cases. 23. The principles laid down in this judgments referred supra is not in dispute. If no such material before the Court, then the Court can discharge and only at the time of discharging the accused, the Court has to look into the material collected by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation. Specific allegations and charges are made against these petitioners that accused No.2 is the permanent Director of the company and accused No.3 is the Deputy General Manager. Specific statements are also made against them by the witnesses, which have been relied upon. In the judgment in the case of Ram Prakash Chadha (supra), the Apex Court in paragraph No.22 discussed with regard to when an application is filed for discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C, it is an 21 irrecusable duty and obligation of the Court to apply its mind and answer to it regarding the existence of or otherwise, of ground for proceeding against the accused, by confining such consideration based only on the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. There is no dispute with regard to this principle and while considering the discharge application, the defence cannot be considered and only material collected by the Investigating Officer to be taken note of. In the case on hand, specific allegations are made against these two petitioners that both of them are in helm of affairs of the company and have actively involved in trading of iron ore without any permit or licence. When such allegations are made, the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. It is settled law that there cannot be vicarious liability if company is an accused and the same also to be considered at the time of trial and not at the stage of discharge application. It is not in dispute that earlier other accused approached this Court and it was held that the matter requires trial. 22 24. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Court cannot take cognizance in respect of MMDR offence. There is a force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that law is settled that unless a private complaint is filed, the Court cannot take cognizance in respect of MMDR offence. There is a bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act and no Court shall take any cognizance. In the case on hand, no doubt, the charge-sheet is filed for IPC offences and MMDR Act is also invoked. The learned counsel for the respondent also brought to the notice of this Court by producing the order sheet as well as the certified copy of the private complaint and already filed the private complaint before the very same Court and also endorsement made on the complaint by the P.O. is placed on record dated 23.12.2015. Hence, it is clear that when the charge-sheet was filed, for both the IPC offences and MMDR offences separate complaint is filed before the very same Court and there is an endorsement. But on perusal of the order sheet dated 23.12.2015, there is no any order passed on the private complaint and the documents clearly discloses that the same was filed before the very same Court. Having perused the order sheet, not found anything about passing of order on 23 the private complaint. When already private complaint was filed before the Trial Court for the MMDR offence, the Trial Court ought to have taken the decision and if not taken any decision on the private complaint, the Trial Court is directed to take decision on the private complaint filed by the respondent, since there is a specific bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act and no Court can take cognizance on the police report and on the private complaint the Court can take cognizance. This Court as well as the Apex Court in several judgments have held that private complaint needs to be filed by an authorized person and the Court can take cognizance and when both the private complaint and the police report are filed before a Special Court, the Trial Court has to act upon the private complaint and deal with the matter in accordance with law and on the police report, the Court cannot take cognizance and the Court can take cognizance on the private complaint since there is a bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act. On that ground, the Court cannot discharge the accused that MMDR offence was invoked and cannot proceed with the case and the very same Court is having power to deal with the matter when the private complaint is filed invoking the offences under the special enactment. I have 24 already pointed out that having perused the entire order sheet, nothing is found with regard to the private complaint is concerned, but there is an endorsement on the private complaint “seen on 23.12.2015” and also complaint is signed by the Superintendent of SIT, Karnataka Lokayuktha and the same is also signed on 14.12.2015. Hence, it is only a curable defect and the same can be cured by passing appropriate order by the concerned Court and on that ground also cannot be discharged. 25. Having considered the material on record, the very contention that these two petitioners are in no way connected to the day-to-day activities of the company cannot be accepted when specific allegations are made and statement of witnesses have been recorded and the same is placed on record. The very contention of the petitioners that point for consideration is erroneous cannot be accepted and the same is considered only for consideration of discharge, since all of them have filed the application for discharge. No doubt, there is an error in mentioning that one of the accused is the Managing Director. But accused is not the Managing Director and he is a permanent Director and another accused is the Deputy General Manager and specific allegations are made that they are in helm of affairs 25 of the company. To that effect, the documents are also placed before the Court. Under the circumstances, the contention of the petitioners cannot be accepted and hence I do not find any error in the order of the Trial Court in rejecting the application. The Trial Court also rightly discussed with regard to the conspiracy is concerned and the same requires trial and the same also to be proved only inferring the circumstances and in order to come to such a conclusion, unless the witnesses have been examined and also with regard to the involvement of the petitioners in trading of iron ore without the licence or permit also to be considered during the course of trial. The defence cannot be considered at the time of considering the discharge application. The Court has to look into the material collected by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation. When ample material is available before the Court, the question of discharge does not arise. Hence, I answer point No.(i) in the negative. Point No.(ii): 26. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: 26 ORDER The criminal revision petition is dismissed. The Trial Court is directed to pass appropriate order on the private complaint filed by the respondent in accordance with law. Sd/- (H.P. SANDESH) JUDGE MD