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2025 DAILYLAW 32419 (HP)

RAJVEER YOGI v. STATE OF HP

CRMPM/2296/2025 · 2025-10-16

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025

Judgment text

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2025:HHC:35073 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 2296 of 2025 Reserved on: 09.10.2025 Date of Decision: 16.10.2025. Rajveer Yogi Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Jeevan Kumar, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 30/2023, dated 23.12.2023, registered at Police Station Cyber Crime Northern Range Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 66-D of the Information Technology Act (IT Act). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:35073 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested for the commission of offences punishable under Section 420 of the IPC and Section 66-D of the IT Act. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner is not guilty of the commission of the offences alleged against him. The petitioner is a victim of cybercrime, as his mobile number and account number were hacked and misused to commit fraud with others by cyber fraudsters. The police proceeded to arrest the petitioner without arresting the main culprit. The petitioner belongs to a respectable family. He would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a reply asserting that Reena Ginwala made a complaint to the police that she had fallen victim to a highly organised cyber-enabled financial fraud. She was misled and intimidated into transferring an amount of ₹78,67,000/- to unknown persons who had posed themselves as law enforcement officials and threatened to implicate her in a case of Aadhaar misuse. The informant received a call on 10.12.2023 informing her that her mobile No. XXXX5070 would be deactivated due to its involvement in illegal activities. She was directed to speak to a person, who identified himself as a TRAI 3 2025:HHC:35073 official. He told the informant that her Aadhaar No. XXXX3888 was used for activating the mobile number involved in various criminal activities. The individuals claiming to be from MIDC, Andheri Police Station, Mumbai, convinced the informant that she was a suspect in an ongoing CBI-level investigation. She was induced to transfer money to various supervision accounts and assured that the amount would be returned to her within 72 hours. The person subsequently stopped responding to the informant’s calls and messages. The police traced ₹18,37,000/- to one account of Yogi Soft Drinks and Rajveer Yogi (the present petitioner). This money was transferred by the informant to this account on 13.12.2023. This account remained active for a short period of one month, and a total amount of ₹3,75,34,148/- was deposited through multiple high-value transactions. The PAN of the petitioner was used to open the account. The accused is a part of a larger cyber fraud network with links to fraudsters operating from abroad through virtual and proxy networks. The petitioner would leave the country if released on bail. The charge sheet has been filed against the petitioner, and the other accused are yet to be traced. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4 2025:HHC:35073 4. I have heard Mr Jeevan Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Jeevan Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated based on the deposit of the money in the account stated to have been opened by the petitioner. The petitioner is a victim of cyber fraud, and his documents were used to open the account and transfer the money. The police have arrested the petitioner instead of arresting the main accused. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is a part of the large cyber fraud network involved in cheating and intimidating the innocent person. An amount of ₹3,75,34,148/- was transferred to the petitioner’s account within one month, including ₹18,37,000 involved in the present FIR. The transaction of such a huge amount within a period of one month shows the 5 2025:HHC:35073 involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: - (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborat- ing on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also perti- nent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant juris- diction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the 6 2025:HHC:35073 process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habitu- als, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail dis- cretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be ex- tracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the cir- cumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the ac- cused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the wit- nesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the pub- lic or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion 7 2025:HHC:35073 in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judi- cious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Need- less to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the mat- ter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, how- ever, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (em- phasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application can- not undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with re- gard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or reject- 8 2025:HHC:35073 ing bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic princi- ples laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an applica- tion for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of convic- tion; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if re- leased on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being in- fluenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of ap- plication of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the ac- cused is  Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an in- dividual is an invaluable right, at the same time while con- sidering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused 9 2025:HHC:35073 and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexa- tious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be sup- ported by reasons and must be arrived at after having re- gard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the na- ture of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an ac- cused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The petitioner claims that he is the victim of cyber fraud and that he had never opened any account. However, he has not denied that the PAN used to open the account belongs to him. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner’s version that he had not opened the account and that he was the victim of cyber fraud cannot be accepted. 11. It was submitted that the mobile numbers xxxx904 and xxxx578 belong to some other person, and not to the petitioner, which shows that the petitioner has no role in the commission of the crime. This submission is only to be rejected. No instruction of the RBI was brought to the notice of this Court, 10 2025:HHC:35073 which provides that only the mobile number of the depositor has to be supplied. Thus, the mere fact that the mobile number did not belong to the petitioner does not show his innocence. 12. A huge amount of ₹3,78,34,148/- was transferred to the petitioner’s account within the period of one month. It was not a stray transfer which could have been made mistakenly. No explanation has been provided for the deposit of such a huge amount. The amount of ₹18,37,000/- was also transferred to the petitioner’s account, which prima facie shows his involvement in the commission of the crime. 13. The co-accused impersonated themselves as a law enforcement official and threatened the victim to transfer the money to prevent her arrest. Such offences are increasing, and it is not possible to take a lenient view in the matter. Considering the gravity of the offence, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail. 14. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. 11 2025:HHC:35073 15. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th October, 2025. (Nikita)