1 2025:CGHC:23500 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MA No. 3 of 2022 1 - Smt. Kusumlata Vaidhya D/o Late Y.S. Vaidhya Aged About 42 Years (Now 47 Years) R/o E.W.S. Colony 16/2014, Mathpurena, Raipur , Tahsil And District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - The Secretary Sewa Bharti Matrichaya, Choubey , Colony Raipur , Tahsil And District Raipur Chhattisgarh , Registered Address Office At Recreation Marg, Choubey Colony 18, College Road, Rathor Niwas Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Geneal Public To Whom It May Concern. 3 - Mala @ Shreya Aged About 15 Years (Minor) Through The Secretary, Sewa Bharti , Matrichaya , Choubey Colony Raipur , Tahsil And District Raipur Chhattisgarh. Registered Address Office At Recreation Marg, Choubey Colony 18, College Road, Rathor Niwas Raipur Chhattisgarh. (Presently Shreya Is In The Custody Of Res. No. 3 Hence Arrayed As Party) ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. N.K. Malviya, Adv. with appellant in person. For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Rakesh Tripathi, Adv. along with Mr. Rohit Dwivedi, Secretary of respondent No. 1. (Hon’ble Mr. Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi, J) Order on Board 12/06/2025 1. Heard on I.A. No. 1/2021, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing instant misc. appeal. 2. This misc. appeal under Section 47 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 has been preferred by the appellant challenging the order dated 23-6-2015 passed by the District Judge, Raipur in Guardian and Wards Digitally signed by AVANISH KUMAR PATHAK Date: 2025.06.16 17:12:17 +0530 2 case No. 84/2014, whereby adoption of child (changed name Shreya) (henceforth, referred to as ‘child’) was granted in favour of appellant under Section 9(4) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (henceforth, referred to as ‘the Act of 1956’) read with Section 41 (6) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that, the order under challenge was passed on 23-6-2015, thereafter, appellant took the child in her custody under the said adoption. Thereafter, the child remained with the appellant for about one year. After about one year, on 10-6-2016, 10 – 12 persons of respondent No. 1/Sewa Bharti Matrichhaya, came in the house of appellant for inquiring about the adopted child and they took the child from the possession of the appellant. Thereafter, she is residing with respondent No. 1 in their custody. Learned counsel for appellant would further submit that, various cases were instituted by the appellant and respondent No. 1 against each other & because of aforesaid legal activitie and due to passing of 2 years in Covid 19 effect, the appellant could not take recourse to law, hence delay of 1,642 days occurred in filing instant appeal. Hence, he prayed that delay in filing instant appeal may be condoned. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 would submit that, after completion of process of adoption of child, she was handed over to the appellant and she (appellant) kept the child in her custody for about one year. When employees of respondent No. 1/ Sewa Bharati Matrichhaya visited the house of appellant, then they found that, the child was not being kept by the appellant properly, rather, she 3 was found maltreated, therefore, report was made to the Women and Child Development officer concerned, then, officials of that department also found the same thing. In such circumstance, they brought the child and handed over her to respondent No. 1 in the year 2016. Thereafter, child is residing with them. Learned counsel further submits that, since process of adoption was completed and it was valid adoption, therefore, the impugned order dated 23-6-2015 cannot be challenged by the appellant. Even otherwise, instant appeal is barred by huge delay of 1,642 days, which has not been properly explained, hence the delay may not be condoned and the appeal may be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Undisputedly, the child was adopted by appellant Smt. Kusumlata Vaidhya, thereafter, she kept her for about one year in her custody. 7. As per provisions of section 15 of the Act of 1956, “No adoption which has been validly made, can be cancelled by the adoptive father or mother or any other person, nor can the adopted child renounce his or her status as such and return to the family of his or her birth.” Thus, perusal of aforesaid provision specifically provides that, once adoption is made, status of child, as has been contemplated in the Act of 1956, cannot be changed. Further, appellant was beneficiary of the impugned order dated 23-6-2015 (Annexure A-1), by which, she adopted the child and she kept the child with her for about one year, therefore, she cannot be permitted to challenge the impugned order, that too, by filing appeal, which itself is barred by 1,642 days. No proper and sufficient reason has been shown by the appellant to condone the delay, 4 particularly when, as has been stated above, she was beneficiary of the impugned order. Hence, filing instant appeal after huge delay cannot be said to be bonafide. 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 has held in paragraphs 21.9(ix) and 21.10(x) as under:- “21.9.(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance or justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10.(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.” 9. In another case, the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685 in paragraphs 25 and 26 has observed as under: “25. We may state that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to 5 and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 10. In instant case, as has been stated in preceding paragraphs that, the appellant was beneficiary of impugned order and after said order, she kept the child in her custody for about one year, thereafter, she is raising grievance with regard to technicality / validity of the impugned order. In such situation, it is found that, the appellant has not been able to make out a strong case for grant of condonation of inordinate delay of 1,642 days in filing instant appeal, as satisfactory and plausible explanation have not been given by the appellant. 11. In view of above discussion, I do not feel inclined to allow I.A. No. 1/2021, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence, the same is rejected. As a result, instant misc. appeal is also dismissed. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Pathak/-