2025:HHC:41151 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 793 of 2025 Reserved on: 13.11.2025 Date of Decision: 02.12.2025 Ramesh Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & another. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Petitioner : M/s Sarthak Karol and Vaibhav Singh Chauhan, Advocates. For the respondents : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State Mr. Yudhveer Singh Thakur, Advocate, Legal Aid Counsel for respondent No.2/victim. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No.21 of 2023, dated 08.11.2023, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n) and 313 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Women Police Station, Shimla, District Shimla and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. 2 2025:HHC:41151 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police, asserting that she was asked to join at Shimla. Her house was at a distance from Shimla, so she resigned; however, the company did not accept her resignation and transferred her to Panchkula. The petitioner was employed in the same company in which the informant was working. The informant had no place to stay. The petitioner asked her to stay in the official guest house of the company. She arranged a room at Manimajra. She requested the Head of the Department to increase her salary, but he declined and asked her to shift to Shimla. She refused but was compelled to go to Shimla. She contacted the petitioner and asked him to arrange a room in Shimla. The petitioner sent the photograph of a two-room set. She went to Shimla and saw that one room had a double bed and the other room was empty. The petitioner was present in the room. He told her that one bed belonged to her and the other bed belonged to him. The petitioner was intoxicated after fifteen days. He touched the informant inappropriately. The informant protested. He promised to marry her. They had sexual relations thereafter. The informant went to attend her brother’s marriage. A lockdown was imposed 3 2025:HHC:41151 in the meantime. The petitioner took the informant to his sister’s house, where she remained for 27 days. The informant became pregnant. The petitioner forced the informant to abort the fetus. The petitioner continued to maintain sexual relations with the informant. She again became pregnant. The petitioner administered some drugs to her. The petitioner got engaged in the meantime. The informant narrated the incident to her superior officer, who promised that the petitioner would break off the engagement and marry her. However, the petitioner got married. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The police arrested the petitioner and seized the mobile phones of the petitioner and the informant. The petitioner had entered into a sexual relationship with the informant on the pretext of marriage, but he married somewhere else. The result from FSL has been received. No semen was detected in the samples except the semen sample of the petitioner. No DNA profiling was conducted. The petitioner is capable of performing sexual intercourse, and the possibility of recent sexual assault upon the victim could not be ruled out, as per the report of the Medical Officer. The chat was found present in the mobile phone (Exhibit X1). The obscene images of 4 2025:HHC:41151 the victim were also detected in the data extracted from the mobile phone; however, these were not found to have been circulated to any person. The chat and audio were found in the mobile phone (Ext. 2). The police filed the charge-sheet before the police after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R. and the proceedings before the learned Trial Court, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition asserting that the allegations made by the informant are wholly misconceived, belated and devoid of substance. The relationship between the parties was consensual and spanned over a considerable period. The petitioner never exercised any force, coercion or deception upon the informant to engage her in physical intimacy with him. The pregnancy was terminated by the informant herself without any influence from the petitioner. A charge sheet was filed before the Court on 22.12.2023. The victim was examined. A comparison of her testimony in the Court, statement recorded under Section 164 of CrPC and the initial complaint discloses material inconsistencies, which go to the root of the prosecution’s case. The F.I.R. and other subsequent proceedings are, in essence, converting the breakdown of a relationship into 5 2025:HHC:41151 a criminal prosecution. The allegations in the F.I.R. and the subsequent proceedings failed to establish a prima facie case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC. The relationship between the parties was consensual, and the petitioner never exercised any force upon the informant. The informant cohabited with the petitioner in Shimla and Panchkula. She shared domestic responsibility, and introduced the petitioner as her partner. The F.I.R. and subsequent statements do not show any protest on the informant’s part. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. There was no false promise of marriage. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R., and the consequential proceedings arising out of the F.I.R., be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a status report reproducing the contents of the F.I.R. and charge-sheet. It was asserted that the matter is pending before the POSCO Court at Shimla. Statements of fourteen witnesses have been recorded. Hence, the status report. 6 2025:HHC:41151 5. The victim also filed a separate reply making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. It was asserted that the F.I.R. and the subsequent investigation disclosed a serious offence of sexual exploitation and cheating by false promise of marriage. The statement of the victim is sufficient to make out a prima facie case for the commission of offences punishable under Section 376 and 417 of the IPC. The informant resided alone, but she was compelled to share the accommodation with the petitioner. The consent obtained under a false promise of marriage is no consent. The accused had made forcible relations with the victim despite her refusal. The petitioner forcibly procured an abortion at Cloudnine Hospital and through the medicines without the informant’s consent. The petitioner had promised to marry the informant, but he got engaged to another woman without disclosing this fact to the informant. The informant discovered the petitioner’s marriage from the photographs shared on social media. The false promise of marriage was reiterated from time to time, and lastly on 14.10.2023. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7 2025:HHC:41151 6. I have heard M/s Sarthak Karol and Vaibhav Singh Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and Mr Yudhveer Singh Thakur, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the informant. 7. Mr Sarthak Karol, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the victim’s conduct before and after the alleged act proved that she had an active understanding of the consequences of her action. The petitioner and the informant were in a consensual live-in relationship. They stayed together as husband and wife. The prosecution failed to establish that the consent was obtained before the sexual relationship. The F.I.R. is an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. be quashed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:-  Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi 2024 INSC 879;  Rajnish Kumar Biswakarma vs State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. passed in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 5290 of 2024, dated 21.11.2024;  Muskan vs. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and others 2025:INSC 1287; 8 2025:HHC:41151  Nitin Rao vs. State of H.P. & another 2025:HHC22616;  Ravish Singh Rana vs State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC Online SC1055;  Mahesh Damu Khare vs State of Maharashtra 2024 SCC Online SC3471;  Nitin B. Nikhare vs. State of Maharashtra, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s). 1889/2024, order dated 21.01.2025;  Parmod Suryabhan Pawar vs State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608;  Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675; and  Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. SLP(Crl.) No.11642 dated 09.09.2025. 8. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petition has been filed belatedly. The trial is continuing. The prosecution has examined seventeen witnesses. The petitioner never challenged the order framing the charges, and this Court should not exercise the jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. at this stage. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr Yudhveer Singh Thakur, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the informant, submitted that the adjudication of the disputed facts is involved in the present petition. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should 9 2025:HHC:41151 not exercise the inherent jurisdiction at this belated stage. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 11. An attempt was made to demonstrate the various contradictions in the statements of the informant to submit that her testimony is not reliable. This is impermissible. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan (supra) that the High Court cannot quash the F.I.R. based on the improvements made in the statements. It was observed: - 17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal proceedings against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR and whether the same would not amount to conducting a ‘mini trial’ which is clearly prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. xxxx 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini- trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient 10 2025:HHC:41151 material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons. In the present case, from the conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it can be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints that were filed by the appellant did not mention the specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the appellant as she was not coming back to her matrimonial home. This approach adopted by the High Court, in our considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini trial.” 12. Thus, it is impermissible for this Court to compare the statements to find out the contradictions and hold that the informant is not a credible witness. 13. Note submitted by the petitioner mentions that out of forty witnesses, seventeen witnesses have been examined. The charge-sheet was filed on 22.12.2023, and the supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 30.08.2024. There is nothing in the petition as to why the petitioner has approached 11 2025:HHC:41151 this Court after the lapse of two years from the date of filing of the charge-sheet. The petition is also silent as to why the order of framing charge was not challenged by the petitioner and why the prosecution was permitted to examine the prosecution’s witnesses. The jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Sanyam Bhushan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4545, that the Court should not entertain the belated petitions for quashing the FIR. It was observed: “43. At the outset, I find merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the Complainant that the present set of petitions is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as also for the failure of the petitioners to avail of their alternate efficacious remedy in the form of Revision Petitions under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C. 44. It need not be emphasised that powers under Section 482 of the Cr. PCs are discretionary in nature, and though there may not be a total ban on the exercise of such power where the situation so warrants, at the same time, there are limitations of self-restraint that are recognised and followed by the Courts in exercising this jurisdiction. One such limitation is where the petitioner had an alternate efficacious remedy; however, they did not avail of the same within the period of limitation and thereafter filed the petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to overcome the objection of limitation. Similarly, the Courts have refused to entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., where it is filed with unexplained delay and laches and in the meantime, the trial has proceeded.” 12 2025:HHC:41151 14. In the present case, the petitioner has a remedy of challenging the order framing charge, but he did not do so within the limitation. He filed the present petition to circumvent the period of limitation prescribed for challenging the order of framing the charges. 15. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the aggrieved person may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed on page 145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such 13 2025:HHC:41151 a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. In the present case, the trial has sufficiently progressed. Statements of seventeen witnesses have been recorded. Since the petitioner has approached this Court belatedly, therefore, this Court declines to exercise the inherent jurisdiction and relegates the petitioner to avail the remedies in the ongoing trial. It is not necessary to discuss the judgments cited at Bar and to comment whether the F.I.R. and subsequent proceedings disclose the commission of an offence or not. 17. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 18. It is expressly made clear that any observation made by this Court hereinabove will not affect the ongoing trial before the learned Trial Court. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 02nd November, 2025 (ravinder)