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2025 DAILYLAW 3233 (GAU)

Sh. B. Hmangaihsanga v. The State of Mizoram r/b the Chief Secy. to the Govt. of Mizoram and 4 Ors.

WP(C)/93/2025 · 2026-05-20

Kaushik Goswami

Writ Petition (Civil)body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

Page No.# 1/11 GAHC030005212025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/93/2025 Sh. B. Hmangaihsanga S/o B. Huliana R/o Leisang Veng, Serchhip, Mizoram. VERSUS The State of Mizoram r/b the Chief Secy. to the Govt. of Mizoram and 4 Ors. Aizawl, Mizoram. 2:The Principal Secretary Finance Dept. Govt. of Mizoram 3:The Home Secretary Home Dept. Govt. of Mizoram 4:The Commandant 2nd IR Battalion 5:Asst. Inspector General of Police (Legal Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. Saihmingthanga Sailo Advocate for the Respondent : Addl. AG/GA, Mizoram for R1-5 Page No.# 2/11 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI ORDER Date : 21.05.2026 Heard Ms. Ramengmawii, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. Caroline K. Lungawipuii, learned Govt. Advocate for the State respondents. 2. By way of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner calls in question the Order dated 28.07.2025 issued by the respondent No. 4, whereby the claim of the petitioner for grant of compassionate allowance came to be rejected. 3. The foundational facts, shorn of unnecessary details, are that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the Indian Reserve Battalion vide Order dated 14.07.1994. After rendering approximately twelve years of service, the petitioner was deputed to undergo pre-induction training at the CIJW School, Vairengte. During the course of such training, the petitioner applied for casual leave for two days on account of personal reasons. According to the petitioner, such request was not considered, following which the petitioner left for Khawzawl without authorization. It appears that, at the relevant point of time, 28 constables of the 2nd IR Battalion undergoing the said training had similarly left the training camp area and were treated as deserters, the petitioner being one amongst them. Subsequently, the petitioner along with 28 other constables was reinstated into service with effect from 16.01.2009. However, thereafter, vide Order dated 27.08.2009, the petitioner was removed from service. 4. The case of the petitioner is that despite removal from service, no compassionate allowance as contemplated under the applicable pension rules Page No.# 3/11 was granted. After a considerable lapse of time, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 25.01.2025 claiming compassionate allowance. The said claim came to be rejected vide communication dated 04.02.2025. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted another representation dated 28.02.2025 seeking reconsideration. As no decision was taken thereupon, the petitioner approached this Court earlier by filing WP(C) No. 71/2025. This Court, without entering into the merits of the controversy, disposed of the said writ petition at the motion stage by directing the competent authority to consider and dispose of the petitioner’s representation dated 28.02.2025 in accordance with law. Pursuant thereto, the respondent authorities passed the impugned order dated 28.07.2025 rejecting the claim once again, primarily on the premise that the claim had been raised after approximately sixteen years from the date of removal and was, therefore, not entertainable under Rule 41 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules of 2021”). The operative portion of the impugned communication reads as follows: “According to CCS (Pension Rule) 1972, Rule 41(1) (2) (4) & (5), where an order of dismissal or removal from service was issued after the date of commencement of Central Civil Service (Pension) Rule 1972, authority shall take a decision and make sanction in this regard within three months… Therefore, as you have made claim for compassionate allowance only after a lapse of 16 years from the date of dismissal and after your claim have been carefully examined by the concerned authority of PHQ, you are again informed that your claim of compassionate allowance cannot be sustained.” 5. Assailing the aforesaid decision, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that compassionate allowance under Rule 41 of the Rules of 2021 is intended to Page No.# 4/11 mitigate hardship in deserving cases where a dismissed or removed employee would otherwise stand deprived of pensionary benefits. It is contended that merely because the petitioner was not granted such benefit contemporaneously with the order of removal, the same would not extinguish the claim altogether. It is further submitted that once this Court had directed reconsideration of the petitioner’s representation, the respondent authorities were obligated to examine the petitioner’s entitlement in accordance with the governing statutory framework and could not mechanically reject the claim solely on the ground of delay. 6. Per contra, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents submits that compassionate allowance is not a matter of right but an exceptional concession extended only in deserving cases warranting special consideration. It is contended that Rule 41 of the Rules of 2021 envisages a statutory mechanism requiring consideration within the prescribed period and the petitioner, having remained completely inactive for nearly sixteen years, cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to resurrect a stale claim. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s service record and the nature of misconduct leading to removal do not warrant exercise of such discretionary power in his favour. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the materials brought on record, the following questions arise for consideration: (i) Whether Rule 41 of the Rules of 2021 creates an absolute statutory bar against consideration of a claim for compassionate allowance merely because such claim was not raised within three months from the date of dismissal/removal? (ii) Whether, in the facts of the present case, the petitioner has made out a Page No.# 5/11 case warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction? 8. Since the controversy centers around the interpretation of Rule 41 of the Rules of 2021, the relevant provision is reproduced hereunder: “41. Compassionate allowance (1) A Government servant who is dismissed or removed from service shall forfeit his pension and gratuity: Provided that the authority competent to dismiss or remove him from service may, if the case is deserving of special consideration, sanction a compassionate allowance not exceeding two-thirds of pension or gratuity or both which would have been admissible to him if he had retired on superannuation pension. (2) The competent authority shall, either on its own or after taking into consideration the representation of the Government servant, if any, examine whether any compassionate allowance is to be granted and take a decision in this regard in accordance with the proviso to sub-rule (1) not later than three months after the date of issue of the order imposing the penalty of dismissal or removal from service. (3) The competent authority shall consider,- (a) each case of dismissal and removal from service on its merit to decide whether the case deserves special consideration and, if so, the quantum thereof; (b) the actual misconduct which occasioned the penalty of dismissal or removal from service and the kind of service rendered by the Government servant; (c) in exceptional circumstances, factors like family members dependent on the Government servant along with other relevant factors. (4) Where an order imposing the penalty of dismissal or removal from service was issued before the date of commencement of these rules and Page No.# 6/11 the competent authority, at that time, did not examine or decide whether or not any compassionate allowance was to be granted in that case, that authority shall take a decision in this regard not later than six months from the date of commencement of these rules. (5) No compassionate allowance shall be sanctioned after the expiry of the aforesaid period of six months, to a Government servant on whom a penalty of dismissal or removal from service was imposed before the date of commencement of these rules.” 9. A careful reading of the above provision would show that compassionate allowance is not a pensionary benefit available as a matter of course. The general rule is forfeiture of pension and gratuity upon dismissal or removal. The proviso to Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 2021 carves out a narrowly tailored exception, enabling the competent authority, in cases deserving of special consideration, to extend compassionate allowance. The statutory scheme therefore unmistakably indicates that the benefit is exceptional in nature and dependent upon the satisfaction of the competent authority on relevant considerations. 10. However, the question that arises is whether Rule 41 of the Rules of 2021 creates an absolute statutory prohibition against consideration of a claim merely because no representation was made within three months from the date of dismissal or removal. 11. In the considered opinion of this Court, such a construction would not emerge from the plain language of the Rule. 12. Rule 41(2) of the Rules of 2021 obligates the competent authority to examine the question of compassionate allowance either suo motu or upon considering the representation of the government servant and to take a decision Page No.# 7/11 within the stipulated period. The provision appears to regulate the timeline within which the authority is expected to act while dealing with the matter contemporaneously with the order of dismissal or removal. Significantly, unlike Rule 41(5) of the Rules of 2021, which expressly creates a prohibition in respect of cases covered by Rule 41(4) of the Rules of 2021, Rule 41(2) of the Rules of 2021 does not enact an explicit statutory bar declaring that no claim whatsoever can be considered beyond the said period. Where the rule-making authority intended to create an express prohibition, it has done so in clear terms. The absence of similarly prohibitory language in Rule 41(2) of the Rules of 2021 cannot be ignored while interpreting the provision. 13. Consequently, the reasoning reflected in the impugned order, insofar as it proceeds on the premise that the petitioner’s claim was legally non-maintainable solely because it was raised after sixteen years, does not appear to be entirely in consonance with the plain statutory framework. However, that by itself does not conclude the matter in favour of the petitioner. 14. It is trite that an erroneous reason assigned by an administrative authority does not automatically compel issuance of relief in writ jurisdiction if, on the admitted facts and the governing legal framework, no enforceable right is otherwise made out. Equally, the writ court while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not bound to grant relief merely because some infirmity is found in the reasoning adopted by the authority, particularly where the ultimate relief claimed is itself discretionary in character. 15. The issue, therefore, is whether notwithstanding the above, the petitioner has made out a case warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The answer, in the considered opinion of this Court, has to be in the negative. Page No.# 8/11 16. Compassionate allowance under Rule 41 of the Rules of 2021 is not a vested statutory entitlement capable of being claimed as of right. The use of the expression “may” in the proviso to Rule 41(1) of the Rules of 2021, read with the requirement that the case must be one “deserving of special consideration”, unmistakably indicates that the provision confers a discretionary and exceptional power upon the competent authority. Rule 41(3) of the Rules of 2021 further reinforces this position by mandating consideration of the nature of misconduct leading to dismissal or removal, the quality of service rendered by the government servant, and in exceptional cases, the condition of dependent family members along with other relevant factors. Thus, compassionate allowance is not conceived as a deferred pensionary benefit claimable upon demand, but as an exceptional equitable concession to alleviate hardship in rare deserving circumstances. 17. It is equally well settled that extraordinary writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and does not ordinarily lend itself to revival of stale claims, particularly where no continuing legal right is shown to subsist. 18. In the present case, the petitioner was removed from service on 27.08.2009. Admittedly, no representation seeking compassionate allowance was made within any proximate period thereafter. The first representation came to be submitted only in January, 2025, nearly sixteen years later. No cogent explanation worth the name has been placed before this Court to explain such extraordinary inaction. Even assuming that Rule 41 of the Rules of 2021 does not create an absolute statutory prohibition in the manner suggested by the respondents, that would not mean that an employee may, at any point of time of his choosing, seek revival of a discretionary equitable benefit after sleeping over the matter for well over a decade and then seek a writ compelling Page No.# 9/11 consideration as though an enforceable accrued right subsists. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that once this Court in the earlier writ petition directed reconsideration of the petitioner’s representation, the respondents were duty-bound to examine the claim afresh on merits. This submission cannot be accepted in the broad form canvassed. A direction to consider a representation does not amount to judicial recognition of entitlement, nor does it foreclose examination of maintainability, delay, or the substantive merits of the claim. Such direction merely obligates the authority to take a lawful decision in accordance with the governing framework. 20. Be that as it may, the materials placed before this Court indicate that the respondents have also taken the stand that the petitioner’s case was not considered deserving of special consideration having regard to the misconduct which led to the order of removal as well as the petitioner’s service antecedents. Rule 41(3) of the Rules of 2021 expressly mandates that while considering grant of compassionate allowance, the competent authority shall take into account the actual misconduct occasioning dismissal or removal, the kind of service rendered by the government servant, and, in exceptional circumstances, other relevant factors including dependency-related hardship. The assessment as to whether a case warrants such exceptional treatment lies primarily within the domain of thecompetent authority, subject of course to judicial review on settled parameters. 21. In the present case, no case of manifest arbitrariness, perversity, or consideration of wholly extraneous material has been demonstrated so as to justify judicial interference with such assessment. More importantly, the petitioner seeks invocation of discretionary writ jurisdiction after an extraordinary lapse of nearly sixteen years without furnishing any cogent Page No.# 10/11 explanation for such prolonged inaction. 22. In such circumstances, remanding the matter merely because the impugned order appears to have placed undue emphasis on the perceived statutory bar under Rule 41 of the Rules of 2021 would, in the considered opinion of this Court, serve no meaningful purpose. 23. The admitted factual position remains that: I) the petitioner approached after an extraordinary and unexplained delay; ii) compassionate allowance is an exceptional discretionary concession and not a vested entitlement; iii) no subsisting enforceable legal right has been shown; iv) the competent authority’s assessment on deservingness is not shown to be vitiated on recognized grounds of judicial review. 24. Accordingly, this Court does not consider this to be a fit case for directing reconsideration. 25. Before parting, it requires to be observed that the rejection of the petitioner’s claim solely on the premise that Rule 41 of the Rules of 2021 creates an absolute statutory bar after the lapse of the period mentioned therein may not be a wholly accurate reading of the provision. However, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is ultimately concerned not merely with the correctness of every reason assigned, but with whether the petitioner has established a case warranting grant of relief. 26. In the facts of the present case, this Court is unable to persuade itself that Page No.# 11/11 such a case has been made out. 27. The claim pertains to compassionate allowance an exceptional discretionary benefit intended for cases deserving special consideration and not a pensionary entitlement flowing as of right. The petitioner remained completely inactive for nearly sixteen years after removal from service and has approached this Court only after raising a representation in the year 2025. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished for such extraordinary delay. 28. Even otherwise, the respondents have placed on record their stand that having regard to the misconduct leading to removal and the petitioner’s service antecedents, the case was not considered deserving of compassionate treatment under Rule 41(3) of the Rules of 2021. 29. This Court does not find the case to be one where exercise of writ jurisdiction is warranted to compel reconsideration of such a stale discretionary claim. 30. The limited infirmity, if any, in the precise reasoning adopted in the impugned order does not, in the peculiar facts of the present case, justify interference, particularly when no substantive enforceable right in favour of the petitioner is demonstrated and remand would serve no useful purpose. 31. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. 32. No order as to costs. JUDGE Comparing Assistant