JUDGMENT : Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J. 1. A group of modest traders, displaced from a prior market and subsequently rehabilitated within the precincts of B.C. Roy Market, have now sought intervention of this Court through the present writ petition, with an earnest appeal for an order restraining the respondents from interfering with their peaceful possession of the premises and/or places from which they are currently running their respective businesses, and further, seeking a directive to the respondents for the grant of a permanent lease of said premises and/or places in their favour. 2. Prior to venturing to delve into the contentious issue involved in the writ petition, it would be apt to allude the key facts, as projected in the writ petition, which are as follows: a) The case has a chequered history. In 1975, the State Government launched a program known as the 'Clean Calcutta Campaign.' Pursuant to the objectives of this initiative, the petitioners, along with other hawkers, were evicted from Hemanta Basu Market and several adjacent markets situated in the heart of the city. This action sparked widespread commotion and protests from the hawkers, small traders, and a section of the general public, which ultimately compelled the Government to take steps for their rehabilitation. b) To effectively address the grievances and inconveniences faced by the displaced hawkers (the petitioners herein), a Hawker’s Association and a Co-ordination Committee of that Association were formed. Subsequently, the Co-ordination Committee received an affiliation from the TUCC. c) After thorough scrutiny, a list of 70 hawkers was compiled and submitted to the State Government. Both the State Government and the Ministry of Defense, Government of India, sympathetically considered the grievances of the hawkers displaced from their previous places of business and extended their cooperation. d) Seeking an effective resolution to the issue, a writ petition, vide. no.139 of 1975 was moved before this Court, in which the Court called for an affidavit-in-opposition from the respondents. In response, the State Government filed an affidavit, which, inter alia, stated that as an initial measure, 47 stalls were constructed within the precincts of Dr. B.C. Roy Market to accommodate a portion of the hawkers displaced by the campaign. The writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 15 th June, 1975. However, an intra-court appeal, Appeal No. 228 of 1975, was filed challenging the order dated 15 th June, 1975. B.C. Roy Market to accommodate a portion of the hawkers displaced by the campaign. The writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 15 th June, 1975. However, an intra-court appeal, Appeal No. 228 of 1975, was filed challenging the order dated 15 th June, 1975. This appeal was subsequently dismissed on 1 st August, 1975. e) Meanwhile, the then Minister-in-charge constituted a committee comprising various political leaders to address the issue. However, a list was compiled that included several individuals who were not displaced hawkers like the petitioners and this list was submitted to the Government. Based on this list, the Government began allotting stalls to these individuals as well. f) This action led to the filing of several writ petitions in this Court. One such writ petition resulted in the issuance of a Rule, which was registered as C.R. 1897 (W) of 1997. Another writ petition, C.O. No. 23139 (W) of 1977, was also filed on this issue. Additionally, 14 allottees filed a separate writ petition, C.R. No. 2067 (W) of 1977. In yet another writ petition, C.R. 1997 (W) of 1977, 22 persons were added as parties. However, all of these writ petitions, except C.R. 1897 (W) of 1997, were dismissed for being prematurely presented.g) The Rule, C.R. 1897 (W) of 1997, was disposed of by an order dated24 th June, 1997. By that order, the State Government was directed to reconsider the petitioners’ case afresh. The order further indicates that, as the petitioners did not wish to proceed with the matter any further, the Rule was ultimately discharged. However, an intra-court appeal, Appeal No. 84 of 1978, was filed against the order dated 24 th June, 1997. This appeal was heard together with another appeal, and by an order dated 4 th September, 1978, both appeals were disposed of. One of the appellants in Appeal No. 84 of 1978 subsequently filed a Special Leave Petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed. h) Meanwhile, on 19th September 1970, a notification was published by the then Calcutta Municipal Corporation recognizing most of the petitioners herein as bona fide hawkers. Things proceeded in this manner until 1980, when an attempt was made to allot certain stalls to individuals who were not displaced hawkers. This attempt led to the filing of a writ petition. h) Meanwhile, on 19th September 1970, a notification was published by the then Calcutta Municipal Corporation recognizing most of the petitioners herein as bona fide hawkers. Things proceeded in this manner until 1980, when an attempt was made to allot certain stalls to individuals who were not displaced hawkers. This attempt led to the filing of a writ petition. An interim order was passed in that writ petition, restraining the respondents from making such allotments. However, despite being aware of this interim order, certain stalls were still allotted. As a result, a contempt proceeding was initiated, which ultimately led to the punishment of the then Minister-in- charge. Eventually, those allotments were cancelled. i) Simultaneously, the allotments of stalls which were made in 1980 led to certain other writ petitions and intra-court appeals. In an appeal, a Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court clarified that interim stay which was granted was confined to those stalls which were allotted prior to November 26, 1980. It came on record that though the appellants in FMAT no. 2152 of 1988 and FMAT 2191 of 1988 were not displaced hawkers, they were allotted stalls. j) Ultimately, the then Hon’ble Chief Minister intervened into the matter. As reported, taking permission of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 400 stalls were constructed on the land in and around Dr. B.C. Roy Market. k) The petitioners were ultimately settled in 70 stalls allotted in their favour in the precincts of Dr. B.C. Roy Market, Esplanade (now, renamed as Dharmatala), Kolkata, where they continue to run their respective businesses from the stalls allotted to them. The concerned department has been providing electricity to these stalls upon receipt of electricity charges from the petitioners. To distinguish the hawkers, individual identity cards were issued on 25 th February, 2011, initially valid for one year with a provision for renewal, subject to certain conditions. These conditions included the provision that, in the event of any misconduct being reported and proven against any identity card holder, renewal for any further period would not be granted. l) Petitioner No. 1, on behalf of the Association, submitted a representation to the Minister-in-charge, PWD, on 11 th June, 1999, which was subsequently forwarded to the concerned official of the department. l) Petitioner No. 1, on behalf of the Association, submitted a representation to the Minister-in-charge, PWD, on 11 th June, 1999, which was subsequently forwarded to the concerned official of the department. The petitioners claimed that a communication from the Superintending Engineer, Circle-I, PWD, to the Chief Engineer, PWD, dated 19 th August, 1997, reveals that the department assured the stall owners of Hemanta Basu Market that they would be granted permanent stalls at Dr. B.C. Roy Market. However, this assurance has not been fulfilled to date. m) Pursuant to the order dated 24 th June, 1977 passed in C.R. 1897 (W)of 1997, the State Government is at liberty to proceed afresh to consider the case of the petitioners. In view of the order dated 4.9.1978 passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in Appeal no. 84 of 1978, any person aggrieved by any action of the State Government would be at liberty to take appropriate action. n) Thus, as the petitioners’ representation for renewal of their identity cards have not been responded and left unaddressed, the petitioners have been constrained to prefer this writ petition. 3. Upon arriving at a conclusion that the present writ petition should be decided after exchange of affidavits by the parties, this Court invited affidavit-in- opposition from the respondents and liberty was granted to the petitioners to respond that affidavit. 4. In response, the respondent no. 2 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition. The specific averment made in the affidavit is that Dr. B. C. Roy Market was constructed in 1954, and 400 stalls were allotted to various individuals under an agreement. In 2011, the present writ petitioners, 70 in number, were granted 'temporary rehabilitation' from Hemanta Basu Market to B.C. Roy Market. Each petitioner was issued an identity card which clearly stated that the holder was ‘temporarily rehabilitated’ to carry out business as part of a special arrangement. The card also indicated that it was issued on a temporary basis and was subject to annual renewal. However, such renewal could be cancelled if any misconduct by the cardholder was reported and proven. 5. The affidavit stated that the rehabilitation of the writ petitioners was carried out as a temporary measure, based solely on humanitarian grounds. The petitioners were not allocated space in any shop area, but were instead accommodated in corridors and alleys meant for pedestrian or common use. 5. The affidavit stated that the rehabilitation of the writ petitioners was carried out as a temporary measure, based solely on humanitarian grounds. The petitioners were not allocated space in any shop area, but were instead accommodated in corridors and alleys meant for pedestrian or common use. The petitioners were provided with these spaces without any claim for charges related to water, electricity, or other utilities. Additionally, it was clarified that there is no record in the office of the Public Works Department (in short, PWD) indicating that PWD has received or accepted, or is receiving or accepting, any user fees, rent, or other charges from the writ petitioners. 6. The affidavit clearly states that, at present, the PWD has no plans to evict the petitioners on humanitarian grounds, as their livelihood is tied to their current occupancies. The petitioners have been receiving electricity without any charges for water or electricity. Furthermore, the petitioners are not the owners of the spaces they occupy. In paragraph 10 of the affidavit, it is explicitly stated that the government has no intention of evicting the writ petitioners from their current occupancies in Dr. B.C. Roy Market. 7. Despite direction, no affidavit-in-reply has been filed. 8. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned senior advocate representing the petitioners, drew my attention to the order dated 24 th June, 1997 passed in C.R. 1897 (W) of 1977 and argued that the Court had specifically observed that the petitioners had derived substantial rights in the Maidan market. Inviting my attention to a certain portion of the order dated 24.06.1997 where the Bench observed that there was no concluded contract between the parties, he argued that the order of the Court did not refer to the petitioners as parties to a concluded contract, but rather to a third party. 9. Drawing my attention to a portion of the order passed by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in Civil No. 9062 (W) of 1986, Mr. Bhattacharya contended that the respondents have shown disregard for this Court and its order. Referring to page 199 of the writ petition, he argued that electricity connections were provided to the petitioners' stalls, and they are currently receiving electricity upon payment of charges. He further submitted that, if directed by this Court, the petitioners could construct their respective stalls on the spaces allotted to them. Referring to page 199 of the writ petition, he argued that electricity connections were provided to the petitioners' stalls, and they are currently receiving electricity upon payment of charges. He further submitted that, if directed by this Court, the petitioners could construct their respective stalls on the spaces allotted to them. He submitted that a direction be given upon the respondents to grant permanent lease of the space and/or stalls in favour of the petitioners. 10. Mr. Pinaki Dhole, learned advocate representing the respondents, responding to Mr. Bhattacharya’s submission, argued that the petitioners' request for permission to construct stalls itself indicates that no stalls have been formally allotted to them. He asserted that, in reality, the petitioners are occupying certain spaces in the corridor. He emphasized that the petitioners were settled in these spaces purely on a temporary basis, and for humanitarian reasons. However, he stated that the respondents currently have no intention to evict the petitioners from their present occupancies. He categorically clarified that no policy decision has been made to grant a permanent lease for the space or any stall(s) in favour of the petitioners by the State. 11. Therefore, it has become clear that the petitioners, who are displaced hawkers from Hemanta Basu Market, were rehabilitated in the corridor and/or alley of Dr. B.C. Roy Market. Necessary amenities, including electricity, were provided to facilitate the operation of their businesses. In his affidavit-in-opposition, Respondent No. 2 has stated that the petitioners were rehabilitated only in 2011. However, Mr. Bhattacharya has argued that by virtue of the order passed in C.R. 1897 of 1977, the petitioners have acquired a substantive right concerning the stalls or spaces allotted to them. While it remains unclear whether the present petitioners were parties to the C.R. 1897 of 1977, it is noteworthy that an intra-court appeal (Appeal No. 84 of 1978) was filed challenging the order in C.R. 1897 of 1977. This appeal was disposed of by an order dated 4 th September, 1978. 12. The order dated 4 th September, 1978 reveals that the Hon'ble Division Bench clarified that the learned Single Judge did not adjudicate the Civil Rule on its merits. The Hon’ble Bench observed that the rights of the parties had not been determined by the learned Single Bench. However, the parties were granted the liberty to proceed further in accordance with the law. The Hon’ble Bench observed that the rights of the parties had not been determined by the learned Single Bench. However, the parties were granted the liberty to proceed further in accordance with the law. Additionally, the Hon’ble Bench observed that any person aggrieved by an order or action of the State Government would have the right to seek appropriate redress under the law. Needless to state that the order passed in C.R. 1897 of 1977 was merged with the order passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench in Appeal No. 84 of 1978. 13. Although there have been a series of litigations between the parties hereto regarding the rehabilitation of the displaced traders and/or hawkers from Hemanta Basu Market within the precincts of Dr. B.C. Roy Market over the decades, there has been no judicial determination of their substantive right or any other legal right over the spaces and/or stalls allocated to them. While this writ petition mentions that the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, granted permission to set up certain stalls in and around Dr. B.C. Roy Market, the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, has not been made a party to this writ petition. 14. Therefore, in the absence of any substantive and/or legally enforceable rights having accrued in favour of the petitioners, it is difficult to direct the respondents to grant a permanent lease for the spaces and/or stalls (if any) in favour of the petitioners. Additionally, it remains unclear whether the respondents have the authority to make such a decision independently, or if they are required to seek permission from the Ministry of Defence, Government of India. 15. Whether a stall or space would be granted on lease or allocated under any terms is a policy decision of the State. When a decision is taken in relation to some individual in particular, it constitutes an administrative decision, when a decision is taken as an enterprise or on a broader scale, it constitutes a policy decision. An administrative decision is an incident, whereas a policy decision is an event. For example, a decision to remove an employee from a post is an administrative decision, while a decision to set up or close an existing department is a policy decision. 16. An administrative decision is an incident, whereas a policy decision is an event. For example, a decision to remove an employee from a post is an administrative decision, while a decision to set up or close an existing department is a policy decision. 16. Therefore, the decision of whether to grant a permanent lease for certain spaces and/or a specific number of stalls to a group of hawkers and/or modest traders in a market located in the heart of the city is a matter of policy. In the absence of any vested rights having accrued in favour of the petitioners, it is unfeasible to compel the respondents to grant a permanent lease for those spaces or stalls to the petitioners. 17. In this context, I may usefully refer to the celebrated decision reported at (2002) 2 SCC 507 (State of Haryana vs. State of Punjab), wherein it was observed that a policy decision reflects the political philosophy of the party in power, which is considered the will of the people and a matter of governance for the State. The State may formulate or reformulate its policies to attain its obligations of governance or to achieve its objectives. A reference can also be made to another celebrated decision, reported at (2012) 6 SCC 502 (Brij Mohan Lal vs. Union of India), wherein it was ruled that the scope of judicial review of State policy matters is limited. Unless a policy is found to be flawed on grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, unfairness, or if it contradicts any statute or the Constitution, or is made beyond the powers granted, there is little scope for judicial interference in such policy decisions. 18. Therefore, if reiteration is excused, it can be stated that, in the absence of any vested, substantive, or legal right, it is unfeasible to compel the respondents to grant a permanent lease for the spaces and/or stalls (if any) from which the petitioners are operating their respective businesses. 19. However, in the affidavit duly affirmed by the respondent no. 2 on behalf of the respondents, it is explicitly stated that the government has currently no intention of evicting the writ petitioners from their present occupancies in Dr. B.C. Roy Market. 19. However, in the affidavit duly affirmed by the respondent no. 2 on behalf of the respondents, it is explicitly stated that the government has currently no intention of evicting the writ petitioners from their present occupancies in Dr. B.C. Roy Market. Thus, based on this statement made before this Court on oath, there is no requirement to pass any direction restraining the respondents from creating any disturbance to the petitioners’ peaceful possession over the spaces and/or stalls (if any) wherefrom they are currently operating their respective businesses. 20. Therefore, based on the discussions in the preceding paragraphs, the writ petition is disposed of; however, without any order. 21. However, it is clarified that this order is not intended to prevent the respondents from granting a permanent lease for the spaces and/or stalls if they decide to do so in the future. Furthermore, it is made clear that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with any action or decision made by the respondents, they shall have the right to pursue the legal remedy or remedies that may be available to them. 22. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. There shall be no order as to the costs.