Page No.# 1/16 GAHC030002372025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : RSA/4/2025 1. Mrs. Lalchhuani Wife of- Noduma(L) Resident of- Dinthar, Aizawl, Mizoram 2. Mr. Lalrohminga Son of- Noduma(L) Resident of- Dinthar, Aizawl, Mizoram 3. Mr. Lalbiakngura H/o- Janet Lalparmawii Resident of- Dinthar, Aizawl, Mizoram 4. Mr. Johny Lalsanga H/o- P.C. Lalremtluangi Resident of- Dinthar, Aizawl, Mizoram …Appellants VERSUS 1. Shri. Vanlalduha S/o- Noduma (L) Represented by his LR Master Lalremruata Page No.# 2/16 Through his natural guardian and next friend Smt. Lalhlimawmi W/o- Vanlalduha (L) R/o- Dinthar, Aizawl, Mizoram .…Respondent Advocate for the Appellants : Mrs. H Lalmalsawmi Advocate for the Respondent : Mr. T Lalnunsiama BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NELSON SAILO Date of hearing : 18.05.2026 Date of Judgment : 18.05.2026 JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL) Heard Ms. H. Lalmalsawmi, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. T. Lalnunsiama, learned counsel for the respondent. [2.] This is an appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) against the order dated 10.02.2025, passed by the Court of Addl. District and Sessions Judge-I, Aizawl in CMA No.708/2024, arising out of RFA No.22/2024, by which the learned First Appellate Court declined to condone the delay of 499 days in filing the Regular First Appeal. The Regular First Appeal Page No.# 3/16 was filed challenging the judgment and order dated 02.03.2023, passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge-II (Senior Division), Aizawl in Title Suit No.4/2015, by which the suit filed by the plaintiff, who is the original respondent in the instant appeal was allowed and a decree drawn in his favour. [3.] For the purpose of considering the instant appeal, a brief background of the case may be helpful. The original respondent in the instant appeal initiated Title Suit No.4/2015, praying for a declaration that he is the legal and rightful owner of the landed property covered by LSC No.103903/01/182 of 2023 and the building standing thereon. The appellants herein were also arrayed as defendants in the suit and they contested the suit by filing their written statements. Consequently, after the parties were given due opportunity to lead their evidence, the learned Trial Court vide judgment and order dated 02.03.2023, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff/original respondent in the instant appeal. [4.] Aggrieved, the defendants/appellants in the instant appeal filed RFA No.19/2023, before this Court on 05.06.2023, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay seeking condonation of delay of 5 days which was registered as I.A(Civil)/65/2023. The delay was condoned vide order dated 29.08.2023. Subsequently, upon noticing that there was an amendment Page No.# 4/16 enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge, the appellants withdrew the appeal on 26.03.2024 with liberty to approach the competent forum. [5.] The appellants then filed RFA No.11/2024, before the Court of District Judge, Aizawl on 16.04.2024. However, citing technical reasons, the appeal was withdrawn vide order dated 08.08.2024, with liberty to file afresh despite the objection of the respondent/plaintiff. The appellants then re-filed the appeal on 11.08.2024 and the same was registered as RFA No.22/2024. The appeal was accompanied by CMA No.707/2024, which was for adducing additional evidence and also by CMA No.708/2024, which was for condoning the delay of 499 days. The respondent/plaintiff filed his objection to the application for condonation of delay and thereafter, the First Appellate Court upon hearing the parties vide the impugned order dated 10.02.2025, dismissed the application. Accordingly, the Regular First Appeal also came to be disposed of in view of the refusal of the Court to condone the delay. Aggrieved, the instant appeal is filed by the appellants. [6.] This Court vide order dated 26.06.2025, while admitting the appeal formulated the following substantial questions of law: “i) Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the application for Page No.# 5/16 Condonation of delay of 499 days without construing the sufficient cause liberally and consequently dismissed the appeal without entering into the merits? ii) Whether the Ld. First Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the Appeal without considering that a delay was occurred due to approaching the wrong forum?” [7.] Ms. H. Lalmalsawmi, learned counsel for the appellants by referring to the substantial question of law formulated, submits that the learned First Appellate Court failed to consider the fact that the appellants had earlier approached this Court by filing RFA No.19/2023. However, during the pendency of the appeal, upon realizing that the appropriate forum would be the Court of the District Judge, the appellants withdrew the appeal with liberty to file appropriate appeal before the appropriate forum on 26.03.2024. She submits that since the appellants had approached the wrong forum, the period spent in the said forum can be excluded in terms of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act). She therefore submits that this aspect of the matter was not properly considered by the First Appellant Court and it refused to condone the delay in filing the appeal. She submits that the appellants after withdrawing the appeal with liberty to file afresh before the appropriate forum vide order dated 26.03.2024, filed an appeal before the District Judge, Aizawl on 16.04.2024 and the same was registered and numbered as RFA No.11/2024. However, due to some technical errors, the appeal had to be withdrawn with Page No.# 6/16 liberty to file afresh and the same was permitted vide order dated 08.08.2024. Following the withdrawal, the appellants again filed the appeal just after 3(three) days i.e., on 11.08.2024, along with an application for condonation of delay. Therefore, the action of the appellants goes to show that they were prompt in pursuing the matter and as there was sufficient cause shown by them, the First Appellate Court could not have refused to condone the delay. She submits that it is a settled principle of law that the Court while considering condonation of delay has to have a liberal and justice oriented approach and if sufficient cause is shown, delay should be condoned. She submits that it is not the length of the delay but the reasons for such delay which is relevant for consideration of the Court. Therefore, in the instant case, the First Appellate Court ought to have considered the fact that the appellants had approached the wrong forum initially but realising the same, they took corrective measures without there being any lapses on their part. Such being the case, the delay ought to have been condoned. Since the same was not done, this Court may interfere with the impugned order and condone the delay in filing the Regular First Appeal so that the entire matter can be considered on merits. In support of her submission, Ms. H. Lalmalsawmi, learned counsel has relied upon the following authorities: (i) Purni Devi and Another Vs. Babu Ram and Another(2024) SCC Page No.# 7/16 OnLine SC 482; (ii) Mool Chandra Vs. Union of India and Another 2025 1 SCC 625; (iii) Raheem Shah and Another Vs. Govind Singh and Ors. 2023 18 SCC 764 and (iv) S. Ganesharaju and Another Vs. Narasamma and Ors 2013 11 SCC 341. [8.] Mr. T. Lalnunsiama, learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand submits that the instant second appeal is not maintainable on the ground that there is no substantial questions of law involved to be considered by this Court. He submits that the appellants while proposing the substantial question of law have suggested that the First Appellate Court was not justified in dismissing the application for condonation of delay which ultimately led to dismissal of the appeal without entering into the merits. He submits that while considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court is not required to enter into the merits of the case but only required to see as to whether there are sufficient reasons for condoning the delay. He submits that the First Appellate Court in passing the impugned order had indeed appreciated as to whether there was sufficient cause to condone the delay or not. While doing so, the Court observed that the appellants had not been prompt in pursuing their Page No.# 8/16 case in view of the fact that even after withdrawal of the First Appeal which they had filed before this Court, they could not file their appeal before the Court of District Judge promptly. Instead, they had made some excuses which were not substantiated by sufficient materials in order to persuade the First Appellate Court in condoning the delay. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court after making such observation as was required had concluded that the appellants had not pursued their appeal with due diligence and thus refused to condone the delay. The learned counsel therefore submits that the impugned order dated 10.02.2025, was passed by the First Appellate Court after due consideration and therefore, the same should be upheld. [9.] Mr. T. Lalnunsiama, learned counsel further submits that the appellants in approaching this Court through their appeal which was registered as RFA No. 19 of 2023 and which was ultimately withdrawn on 26.03.2024, have only resorted to delay tactics in view of the fact that the appeal was filed on 05.06.2023 and they sought to withdraw the same only on 26.03.2024, on the pretext that they were not aware of the amendment of the Mizoram Civil Court Act, 2005, by which the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain the appeal had been enhanced. [10.] He further submits that the appellants after withdrawing the appeal Page No.# 9/16 with liberty had filed RFA No.11/2024, before the Court of District Judge, Aizawl without any application for condonation of delay. Realizing the same, they withdrew the appeal on 08.08.2024, despite the objection of the respondent/plaintiff with liberty to file afresh. He submits that it is a common knowledge to everyone that there is a period of limitation prescribed for filing appeal and the appellants ought to have known such requirement while filing RFA No.11/2024. Even if the said appeal was filed without an application for condonation of delay, the same could easily have been filed without withdrawing the appeal itself. Therefore, their action only goes to show that they have resorted to delaying the matter for reasons other than bonafide. He submits that even otherwise on merit, the respondent/plaintiff has a good case since the property in question was acquired by the original respondent/plaintiff during his life time from his own income and that the appellants have no right over the said property. The learned counsel submits that under the facts and circumstances of the case, the instant appeal does not involve any substantial question of law to be considered and decided by this Court and therefore, the appeal being without merit, should be rejected and dismissed. [11.] In support of his submission, he has relied upon the following decisions:- Page No.# 10/16 (i) Amalendu Kumar Bera and others –vs- State of West Bengal, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 52; (ii) State of Rajasthan –vs- Santosh Savita, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 663; and (iii) State Bank of India and others –vs- S.N. Goyal, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 92. [12.] I have heard the submissions made by the learned counsel for the rival parties and have perused the materials available on record. [13.] The instant appeal being a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the same is to be entertained and considered on the basis of the substantial question of law involved. Based on the proposal submitted by the appellants, this Court on 26.06.2025, have formulated two substantial questions of law as already abstracted above. While considering the same as well as the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered view that the two substantial questions of law already framed are more or less the same and therefore, can be re-formulated into one substantial question of law as below:- “Whether the first appellate Court could have dismissed the application for condonation of delay having regard to the explanations and justifications given by the appellants and also in view of the provision for exclusion of time spent Page No.# 11/16 before the wrong forum as provided by Section 14 of the Limitation Act.” [14.] The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that in view of the re-formulation of the substantial question of law, Court should give the parties an opportunity to hear them. However, what can be noticed from the original substantial question of law formulated and what has been reformulated, there is no difference. It is just that both the substantial questions of law formulated earlier has been combined into one. [15.] We shall accordingly proceed to consider the instant appeal on the basis of the aforementioned substantial question of law re-formulated. After the judgment and order was rendered by the Court of Civil Judge-II, Aizawl in Title Suit No.04/2015 on 02.03.2023, the appellants preferred RFA No.119/2023 before this Court by filing the same on 05.06.2023 and by which time, there was a delay of five days. However, the delay of five days was condoned vide order dated 29.08.2023 passed in IA(Civil) No.65/2023. The appellants thereafter on 26.03.2024 withdrew the appeal with liberty to approach the appropriate forum on account of the amendment of the Mizoram Civil Court Act, 2005, by which the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge was enhanced. [16.] After the appeal was allowed to be withdrawn vide order dated 26.03.2024, the appellants on 16.04.2024 preferred RFA No.11/2024. Again, the Page No.# 12/16 said appeal was withdrawn by them on the ground that there was some technical defect. The respondent/plaintiff had raised objection to the prayer for withdrawal, but the Appellate Court thought it appropriate to allow the prayer for withdrawal in the interest of justice and accordingly permitted the same with liberty to file afresh. [17.] Thereafter, on 11.08.2024, the appellants filed RFA No.22/2024 along with application for condonation of delay, which was registered as CMA No.708/2024. In the application for condonation of delay, although the appellants have not stated in many words about the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, but they have divulged the fact that they have approached the High Court by filing appeal, but later on withdrew the same. Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides that the time taken in prosecuting the case with due diligence, but due to the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature, the time taken in such proceeding before the wrong forum should be excluded. [18.] The appellants as already stated, upon realising that the appeal is to be filed before the Court of District Judge, withdrew the appeal by seeking liberty to approach the said Court and which was permitted. While withdrawal was permitted on 26.03.2024, the appeal was filed by them on 16.04.2024, and which was again withdrawn on account of certain technical defect. Withdrawal Page No.# 13/16 was accordingly permitted on 08.08.2024. Thereafter, the appellants had filed the appeal on 11.08.2024 and by which time, there was altogether a delay of 499 days. The appeal was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, which was however, refused to be condoned through the impugned order dated 10.02.2025. [19.] The learned First Appellate Court has taken the view that despite the appellants having withdrawn their appeal on 26.03.2024, they were not prompt enough to take necessary steps in approaching the First Appellate Court having the jurisdiction. However, seeing the list of dates as to when the appeal was withdrawn and when it was re-filed, it cannot be said that there was inaction on the part of the appellants and that they did not act promptly. The first Appellate Court in other words, while observing that an application for condonation of delay should receive liberal construction, so as to advance substantial justice, had otherwise taken a view that the appellants had not been prompt enough to take necessary steps in filing their appeal. The same in the considered view of this Court is not justified having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly, in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. [20.] The Apex Court in S. Ganesharaju and another (supra), in the Page No.# 14/16 given facts of that case held that the general principles and object for condonation of delay is that limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the rights of parties, but they are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek a remedy promptly. Further, the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to be liberally construed, so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the objectors are able to show that there was mala-fide on the part of the party seeking condonation of delay in not approaching the Court within the period of limitation, delay should be condoned as a normal rule general. [21.] The Apex Court in Raheem Shah and another (supra) in the given facts and circumstances of the case also held that the Court has justice-oriented approach rather than an iron cast technical approach, so that the substantial rights of the parties can be decided. [22.] The Apex Court in Mool Chandra (Supra) in the given facts and circumstance of the case also held that it is not the length of delay but the cause for delay which is relevant for consideration of an application for condonation of delay. In the present case it may be seen that although the delay sought to be condoned was 499 days but the fact remains that the considerable time has been spent by the appellants in approaching this Court instead of the Court of District Judge. Therefore, having regard to the fact that Page No.# 15/16 the appellants who were permitted to withdraw their appeal with liberty to file afresh by this Court as well as by the Lower First Appellate Court, the Lower Appellate Court ought to have considered this aspect while passing the impugned order. [23.] Mr. T. Lalnunsiama, learned counsel for the respondent has also submitted that the Lower Appellate Court at paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 of the impugned order has already considered the stand of the appellants that they have spent a considerable time in the wrong forum and therefore, the appellants cannot say that the same has not been considered by the Lower Appellate Court. Although the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that no substantial question of law therefore remains for consideration by this Court but the fact remains that the Lower Appellate Court has failed to consider the fact that the appellants have been pursuing their case before the wrong forum and there was no materials to show that there was malafide intention on their part in not filing the appeal before the Court of District Judge at the first instance. Further, upon withdrawing their appeal from the High Court they had taken steps to file their appeal before the competent Court. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the Lower Appellate Court in the considered view of this Court is only hypertechnical and resulting in wrongful deprivation of the right to be heard on merit. Page No.# 16/16 [24.] Under the given facts and circumstances, I find merit in the appeal and accordingly, the impugned Order dated 10.02.2025 is set aside and the delay in filing the Regular First Appeal i.e., 499 days requires to be condoned and is accordingly condoned. The substantial question of law formulated stands answered in favour of the appellants. [25.] Since the parties are represented before this Court they are directed to appear before the Addl. District and Sessions Judge-I, Aizawl on 09.06.2026 whereafter, the Lower First Appellate Court shall proceed with the appeal and make an endeavour to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. JUDGE Comparing Assistant