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2025 DAILYLAW 32198 (CHH)

JAIBHAGWAN AGRAWAL v. GAYTRI PATEL

WP227/625/2025 · 2025-07-08

Shri Rakesh Mohan Pandey

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:31592 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 625 of 2025  Jaibhagwan Agrawal S/o Mohan Lal Agrawal Aged About 55 Years R/o Bramhpara, Ambikapur District - Surguja (C.G.) (Plaintiff) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. Gaytri Patel W/o Vijay Patel Aged About 50 Years R/o Near Anand Nagar, Railway Station Block No.- 45, Village Ghoraji Tahsil Ghoraji District - Rajkot (Gujrat) 2. Sanjay Sahu S/o Kailash Sahu Aged About 42 Years R/o Darripara Ambikapur District - Surguja (C.G.) 3. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Surguja Ambikapur District - Surguja (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Anurag Singh, Advocate For State : Mr. Vedant Shadangi, P.L. Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order On Board 09-07-2025 1) Petitioner has filed this petition assailing the order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Ambikapur, District – Sarguja, in Misc. Civil Suit No. 122-A/2024, dated 05.05.2025 whereby the application moved by the petitioner under Section 24 of CPC for consolidation of two suits, has been rejected. 2) Facts of the present case are that the petitioner [plaintiff] and Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.07.10 14:01:42 +0530 2 respondent No. 1 [defendant No. 1] entered into an agreement to sell on 09.09.2011 with respect to land bearing Khasra No. 146/26 ad-measuring 0.057 hectares situated at Ambikapur, District Sarguja. The petitioner filed Civil Suit No. 235-A/2024, whose valuation is Rs. 4,50,000/- for the specific performance of contract against respondents No. 1 and 2 inter-alia on the ground that despite several requests, respondent No. 1 failed to execute the registered sale-deed though the entire consideration was paid. On the basis of pecuniary jurisdiction, the suit is pending adjudication before the learned First Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ambikapur, District – Sarguja. It is further the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 1 also entered into an agreement with respondent No. 2 [defendant No. 2] with respect to the same suit property on 07.01.2020. Respondent No. 2 filed a suit for the specific performance of contract against respondent No. 1 and it was registered as Civil Suit No. 10-A/2023 whose valuation is Rs. 18,20,000/- and as per the pecuniary jurisdiction, it is pending adjudication before the learned Third Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, District – Sarguja. An application under Section 24 of CPC was moved by the petitioner before the learned Principal District Judge, Ambikapur, District – Sarguja for the transfer of suit [Civil Suit No. 235-A/2024] filed by him to the learned Third Additional District Judge, Ambikapur as in both cases, the subject property is the same. 3 Learned Principal District Judge, Ambikapur vide order dated 05.05.2025 rejected the application on the ground that both suits are pending before two different courts having different pecuniary jurisdiction. 3) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has arrayed respondent No. 2 in his civil suit since its inception whereas respondent No. 2 in his civil suit has arrayed the petitioner at a later stage. He further submits that both suits i.e. Civil Suit No. 235-A/2024 and Civil Suit No. 10-A/2023 involve the same subject property and they remain pending within the jurisdiction of the learned Principal District Judge, Ambikapur, District – Sarguja. He contends that the parties of both suits are similar and almost all issues involved in both suits are the same, therefore, the learned Principal District Judge, Ambikapur ought to have allowed the application moved under Section 24 of CPC. He has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chitivalasa Jute Mills Versus Jaypee Rewa Cement1; the judgment passed by the High Court of Delhi in the matter of Shriram Pistons & Rings Ltd. Versus Mrs. Manju Awasthy2 and the judgment passed by the High Court of Kerala in the matter of Yadhu Mohan Versus Rajesh Kumar P.R. & Anr.3 4) On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that both suits are pending before different courts having different pecuniary 1. (2004) 3 SCC 85 2. 1997 SCC OnLine Del 444 3. 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 3386 4 jurisdiction. He contends that though the subject property is the same, parties are different and the cause of action arose on different dates, therefore, the learned Court below rightly rejected the application. 5) Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on the record. 6) For a consolidated hearing of two civil suits, the relevant factors would be:- (i) commonality of the subject matter; (ii) similar issues; (iii) common parties; (iv) same date of cause of action and (v) complexity of issues involved in both cases. 7) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chitivalasa Jute Mills (supra) has held that two suits ought not to be tried separately and the trial Court may frame consolidated issues and such order can be passed exercising the power under Section 151 of CPC, unless specifically prohibited. Relevant para 12 is as under:- 12. The two suits ought not to be tried separately. Once the suit at Rewa has reached the Court at Visakhapatnam, the two suits shall be consolidated for the purpose of trial and decision. The Trial Court may frame consolidated issues. The Code of Civil Procedure does not specifically speak of consolidation of suits but the same can be done under the inherent powers of the Court flowing from Section 151 of the CPC. Unless specifically 5 prohibited, the Civil Court has inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Consolidation of suits is ordered for meeting the ends of justice as it saves the parties from multiplicity of proceedings, delay and expenses. Complete or even substantial and sufficient similarity of the issues arising for decision in two suits enables the two suits being consolidated for trial and decision. The parties are relieved of the need of adducing the same or similar documentary and oral evidence twice over in the two suits at two different trials. The evidence having been recorded, common arguments need be addressed followed by one common judgment. However, as the suits are two, the Court may, based on the common judgment, draw two different decrees or one common decree to be placed on the record of the two suits. This is how the Trial Court at Visakhapatnam shall proceed consequent upon this order of transfer of suit from Rewa to the Court at Visakhapatnam. It was a case where there was a business transaction between both parties and one party filed a suit at Visakhapatnam (A. P.) whereas another party filed a suit at Rewa (M.P.), thus the facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts of the cited case. 8) In the matter of Mrs. Manju Awasthy (supra), the High Court of Delhi has held that while passing the order of consolidation of two suits, Section 15 would not come in the way. Paras 8, 9 and 19 are reproduced herein below:- 8. Coming to the objection raised by Mr. Endlaw that the transfer of the suit from the Court of the Civil Judge to the Court of the Additional District 6 Judge violated Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which enjoined the filing of the suit in the lowest grade competent to try it which was being Court of the Civil Judge. This question had come up for consideration before the Division Bench in Dronavajjula Vidyamba v. Vallabhajosyula Kakshmi Venkayamma (AIR 1958 A.P.218). A suit had been transferred under Section 24, Civil Procedure Code from the District Munsif's Court to that of the Subordinate Judge. The decree passed by the Subordinate Judge was assailed as null and void on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit having regard to the provisions of Section 15, CPC. The Court observed that it cannot be held that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to try the suit. What Section 15 provides is that every suit shall-be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Competency contemplated by the section is only pecuniary competency. It has been held by the Madras High Court in Augustine v. Medlycot (ILR 15 Madras 241(B), that there was no lack of jurisdiction for the superior Court to try the suit. The Court reviewed the case law and noted with approval the above interpretation of Section 15, CPC. Gaurachandra Patnaikudu v. Vikramadeo, reported at Ilr 23 Madras 367 held Section 15 to be a rule of procedure and not of jurisdiction, a direction to the suitor and not an absolute rule binding on the Court. The Court held that Section 15 lays down a rule of procedure and not of jurisdiction and there is no ouster of the jurisdiction of the superior Court in such cases. Following the above decisions, it is held that the transfer of ejectment suit from the Court of Civil Judge to the District Judge will not be on account of non-compliance with Section 15, CPC. The Additional District Judge, whose pecuniary jurisdiction is higher will have the jurisdiction and competency to try the suit. 9. At this stage, reference may also be made to another decision relied on by the petitioner 7 reported in Syndicate Bank v. K. Gangadhar and Ors. . In this decision, suits for enforcement of mortgage by sale of immovable properties filed in the Court at Puttur were ordered to be transferred and tried alongwith a recovery suit between the parties pending before the Civil Judge, Chikmagalur. The transfer had been sought by the defendants on the ground that parties in both the suits were the same and defense and evidence would be the same. The Court held that the suit for enforcement of mortgage by sale of immovable properties was directly governed by Section 16-C, Civil Procedure Code and the suit had been transferred to the Court in Chikmagalur, which did not have territorial jurisdiction to try the subject matter of the suit. The High Court permitted the re-transfer of the suit to the Court in Puttur. Learned Counsel for the petitioner had, therefore, urged that in terms of Section 24(1)(b)(ii), Civil Procedure Code the intention of the Legislature was that the Court to which suit or pleadings are transferred must be competent to try or dispose of the case. He relied on the observation that the transferee Court must be competent to try or dispose of the case in the sense that in addition to pecuniary jurisdiction, it should have territorial jurisdiction. The aforesaid decision would not advance the petitioner's case. The present case is not one where the matter is beyond the territorial and pecuniary limits of the transferee/superior Court. It is only a departure from Section 15, CPC, a rule of procedure of the suit not being tried by the Court of the lowest competent grade. 19. The transfer from the Court of the Civil Judge to the Court of the District Judge of the suit for ejectment would sub serve the ends of justice, the parties arc the same, evidence on most of the issues is common. There is also no embargo or impediment to the transfer. As already discussed in paras 8 and 9, Section 15, CPC cannot come in the way of transferring a 8 suit to a superior Court whose pecuniary jurisdiction is higher. Revision petition has no merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. It was a case where a suit was filed for eviction against the petitioner whereas another suit was filed for the recovery of mesne profits and both suits were the outcome of tenancy, thus facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts of the cited case. 9) In the matter of Yadhu Mohan (supra), the High Court of Kerala had placed reliance on Chitivalasa Jute Mills (supra), which has already been discussed. Therefore, in my opinion, the cases cited do not help the petitioner. 10) Now coming to the facts of the present case, an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 on 09.09.2011, thus the cause of action arose on that date or thereafter whereas the agreement between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 was entered into on 07.01.2020, therefore, it can be presumed that the cause of action arose on different dates in both cases. Further, the amount of consideration is also different in both cases. 11) Further, there is a possibility that in the suit filed by the petitioner, the respondents may raise the issue of limitation as an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 on 09.09.2011 and the suit was filed after 13 years in the year 2024. Plaintiffs of both suits have to prove their respective cases by leading evidence according to provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 9 1963 against the respective defendants. 12) Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts, in the opinion of this Court, the learned Principal District Judge, Ambikapur, District – Sarguja has not committed any error of law while rejecting the application under Section 24 of CPC moved by the petitioner for consolidation of two suits. 13) Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Ajinkya