Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No.845 of 2003 [Against the Judgment of conviction and Order of sentence dated 19.06.2003 and 20.06.2003 respectively passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-III, Dhanbad in SC Case No.06 of 2001/210 of 2002 arising out of Sarawan P.S. Case No.50 of 2010] ------ 1. Prasadi Das, son of Sri Tejo Das 2. Karu Das, son of Sri Tejo Das 3. Arjun Das, Son of Sri Tejo Das 4. Sabita Devi, wife of Sri Karu Das 5. Urmila Devi, wife of Sri Arjun Das 6. Parwati Devi, wife of Sri Prasadi Das All residents of village-Charghara, P.S.-Sarwan, Sub-Division and District-Deoghar .... .... …. Appellants Versus The State of Jharkhand .... .... .... Respondent With Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No.1138 of 2003 ------ Chhote Lal Das, son of Sri Tejo Das, resident of Village- Charghara, P.S.-Sarwan, Sub-Division & District-Deoghar .... .... …. Appellant Versus The State of Jharkhand .... .... .... Respondent ------ For the Appellant s : Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha, Advocate Mr. Jagdish, Advocate Mr. Abhishek Sharan, Advocate For the Resp. State : Mr. Kumari Rashmi, A.P.P. PRESENT HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA JUDGMENT ------ CAV On 19/08/2025 Pronounce On 22 /09/2025 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 2 Per- Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J. 1. Both the appeals arising out of common judgement, hence heard together and are being disposed of by common judgment. 2. Originally Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No.845 of 2003 was preferred by 8 appellants, out of them, appellant No.1, Tejo Das and appellant No.2, Radhika Devi have died and their appeal have been abated vide order dated 30.07.2025. The names of surviving appellants, namely, Prasadi Das, Karu Das, Arjun Das, Sabita Devi, Urmila Devi and Parwati Devi have been renumbered and the appeal is heard on behalf of the aforesaid alive appellants along with appeal of Chhote Lal Das, who has preferred Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No.1138 of 2003. 3. Above appeals are directed against the judgment of conviction dated 19.06.2003 and order of sentence dated 20.06.2003 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.III, Deoghar in S.C. No.6 of 2001/210 of 2002 arising out of Sarwan P.S. Case No.54 of 2000, whereby and whereunder the appellants have been held guilty for the offences under sections 304 B read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo R.I. for life for the offence under section 304 B read with section 34 of IPC. Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 3 4. We have already heard the arguments of Mr. Anand Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants and Mrs. Kumari Rashmi, learned A.P.P. for the State. Factual Matrix:- 5. The factual matrix giving rise to this appeal in narrow campus is that the informant’s sister, Chinta Devi (since deceased) was married with Chottelal Das (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1138 of 2003) in the year 1995. It is alleged that after marriage, when the informant’s sister went to her sasural, she was being ill-treated and tortured at the hands of her husband, in-laws along with other family members in connection with demand of dowry. Although, the informant, Narsingh Das had given dowry as per his capacity but the accused persons were demanding additional dowry in the shape of T.V. and golden ring. Due to non-fulfillment of the same, the informant’s sister was subjected to torture and harassment and she was not provided even proper food and drink. It is further alleged that once the informant’s sister was sent to her parental home with direction that unless T.V. or cash is given, he will not get Bidai of the informant’s sister. It is further alleged that for the aforesaid reasons, a Panchyat was convened on 07.05.1999 at the house of the informant wherein Chhotelal Das, his brothers, Karu Das, Arjun Das and Biro Das also participated and it was undertaken by the accused persons that the Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 4 informant’s sister will not be harassed or subjected to torture at the hands of them, thereafter, the informant’s sister again went to her Sasural. It is further alleged that on 25.05.2000 in the evening at about 4:00 pm, the appellant, Chhotelal Das came to the house of informant and told that his wife, Chinta Devi is missing from the house and he is searching for her. The informant along with his brother-in-law and 10 to 12 other persons came to village, Charghara on 26.05.2000 at about 8:00 am and saw that except mother-in-law and father-in-law of his sister, none was present there. The informant also came to know that a dead body is lying into a well, then he went there and saw the dead body of his sister floating in the well. There were marks of injuries on her face, which appeared that his sister was killed and was thrown into the well by the accused persons. On the basis of written report of the informant, FIR was registered for the offence under section 304B and 34 of IPC against nine accused persons. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted for the offence under section 306/34 of IPC. 6. Learned Trial Court, after hearing on the point of charge, framed charge against all the accused persons for the offence under section 306/34 of IPC and an alternative charge under section 304B /34 of IPC. The accused persons denied from the Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 5 charges and claimed to be tried. After conclusion of trial, impugned judgment of conviction and order sentence of the appellants was passed as stated above. 7. In the course of trial, altogether 10 witnesses were examined by the prosecution namely: P.W.1- Ashok Das, P.W.2. Radha Devi P.W.3-Bimli Debiya P.W.4-Ishwari Prasad Das P.W.5-Jayanti Devi P.W.-6 Narsingh Das(Informant) P.W.7-Rekha Devi P.W. 8-Dr. Anant Kumar Jain P.W.9-Manoj Kumar P.W.10-Balkrishna Yadav (Formal witness) 8. Apart from oral testimony of the witnesses, following documentary evidence has also been adduced by the prosecution:- Ext.1-Written report Ext.2- Post-mortem report Ext.1/1- Endorsement on written report Ext.3- Para 1 to 41 of case diary Ext.4 Formal FIR Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 6 9. On the other hand, the defence has also examined as many as 4 witnesses:- D.W. 1-Paran Pd. Das D.W.2-Biro Das D.W.3-Baleshwar Das D.W.4-Satrughan Singh 10. Apart from testimony of oral witnesses following documentary evidence has been adduced by the defence:- Ext. A to A/7- Medical papers of the deceased, Chinta Devi Submissions on behalf of appellants:- 11. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that original appellant Nos.1 and 2, namely, Tejo Das and Radhika Devi respectively have been died and the surviving appellants, who are brothers-in-laws and sisters-in-laws of the deceased, have been falsely implicated in this case on the basis of general and omnibus allegation. They were having no concern with the family affairs of the deceased and her husband. It is further submitted that in the entire prosecution evidence, no specific overt act has been attributed against these appellants in connection with any demand of dowry and consequent torture meted out with the deceased at the instance of the above named accused persons. None of the witnesses of facts, who happen to be close relatives to the deceased, have asserted Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 7 anything against these appellants except the husband of the deceased regarding any additional demand of dowry and consequent torture meted with the deceased. No Panchyat was entered into with these appellants in connection with any demand of dowry or consequent torture. The deceased was living separately with her husband. Therefore, learned trial court has miserably failed to appreciate that the ingredients of offence under section 304-B of IPC has not been proved against the these appellants at all, as such no presumption under section 113 B of Indian Evidence Act can be raised against the appellants. Learned trial court has committed serious error of law in arriving at conclusion of guilt of the appellants. 12. So far as the appellant, Chhotelal Das is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is no doubt that the deceased has died unnatural death by drowning into a well, which was probably accidental and not homicidal death of the deceased. It is further submitted that the allegation of demand of T.V. and golden ring is false and fabricated story. Even at the time of panchyat dated 07.05.1999, no such matter was agitated and no such complaint was ever made by the deceased before any competent authority. It is further submitted that during course of the investigation, the Investigating Officer did not find any case of demand of dowry, hence, charge-sheet was submitted for the offence Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 8 under section 306/34 of IPC. There was some matrimonial dispute and discord between the appellant, Chhotelal Das and his wife(since deceased) in the shape of ordinary wear and tear in the matrimonial life. Learned trial court has also framed charge against the appellant, Chhotelal Das for the offence under section 306/34 of IPC but finding no such evidence of abetment to commit suicide by the deceased has acquitted the appellant from the aforesaid charge. So far the conviction of the appellant for the offence under section 304B of IPC is concerned, the very essential ingredient that “soon before her death such women was subjected to cruelty and harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry” is absolutely lacking in this case. It is further submitted that in FIR itself, the informant has specifically stated that there was some matrimonial dispute, therefore, the informant’s sister went to her parental home and after panchyat dated 07.05.1999, she returned to her matrimonial home. It has further been alleged that on 25.05.2000 at about 4:00 pm, the present appellant came to the house of the informant and told that his wife is missing and he is searching for her. There is no whisper at all either in the FIR or in the evidence of witnesses that just after panchyat dated 07.05.1999 to 25.05.2000, there was any demand of dowry from the deceased or any ill-treatment or torture was meted with her at the instance of the appellant and his Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 9 relatives. Therefore, it cannot be said that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty in connection with any demand of dowry. As such the very foundational fact constituting the offence under section 304-B of IPC is missing, which has been ignored by the learned trial court. It has further been submitted that during trial, the present appellant, Chhotelal Das has already undergone more than three years custody. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellant, Chhotelal Das suffers from serious error of law and liable to be set aside. The appellants deserve acquittal from the charges levelled against them. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon following reported judgments: (i) Karan Singh Vs. State of Haryana, MANU/SC/0132/2025 (ii) Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab& Ors. reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207 (iii) Sham Lal Vs. State of Haryana reported in (1997) 9 SCC 759 Submissions on behalf of the State 14. On the other hand, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State has submitted that the witnesses examined by the prosecution have consistently proved the ingredients of offence under section 304-B of IPC against all the appellants. Learned trial court has rightly disbelieved the defence evidence to be not reliable and convincing. It is further submitted that the points Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 10 of argument raised on behalf of the appellants has no leg to stand and merely based on bald assertion. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellants does not suffer from illegality or infirmity, calling for any interference. There is no legal substance in the grounds raised on behalf of the appellants. This appeal is devoid of merits and therefore liable to be dismissed. 15. We have gone through the record along with the impugned judgment in the light of rival contentions of the parties. 16. The sole point for determination in these appeals is “as to whether the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellants suffers from any error of law and based beyond the weight of evidence available on record, which requires any interference in this appeal?” Analysis, reasons and decision: 17. Before imparting our verdict on above point, it would be appropriate to extract the relevant provisions of law applicable in this case which are reproduced hereinbelow: “304B. Dowry death. -- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 11 Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” “113B. Presumption as to dowry death. -- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, dowry death shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty-Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means- (a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.] 18. In view of the above provisions, in order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304(B) of the IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied:- Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 12 (i) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband; (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, demand for dowry. When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. 19. The provision of section 304-B of IPC as regards cause of death does not categorize death as homicidal, suicidal or accidental rather any death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” may attract the provision of section 304-B of IPC, if other ingredients are fulfilled. 20. In the instant case, the post-mortem report of the deceased proved by Dr. Anand Kumar Jain(P.W.8) disclosing the cause of death of the deceased asphyxia due to drowning. The prosecution witnesses have also proved that after coming to know about the missing of the deceased, they went to her Sasural and found her dead body floating into a well, which was brought out by the villages in absence of police. Therefore, it is established beyond doubt that the death of the deceased Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 13 has occurred “otherwise than under normal circumstances” and first ingredient of offence under section 304 B of IPC is proved. 21. So far the second ingredient is concerned, it is admitted fact that the marriage of the deceased was solemnized with the appellant, Chhotelal Das in the year 1995 and the deceased died in her matrimonial home on 26.05.2000. Therefore, she died within seven years of her marriage. Accordingly, the second ingredient is also proved. 22. So far 3rd and 4th conditions are concerned, it is specifically stated in the FIR that there was demand of color T.V. and golden ring as dowry just after one year of the marriage from the deceased by present appellants, which could not be fulfilled then the deceased was being harassed and tortured and subjected to cruelty by all the accused persons both mentally and physically. Thereafter, the victim lady was brought to her parental home where she was residing for one and half months. Meanwhile, the husband and brothers-in- laws, namely, Karu Das, Arjun Das and Biro Das of the deceased arrived at her parental home and a Panchyat was convened, wherein it was undertaken by the husband of the deceased that he would not demand anything in future and keep his wife with all dignity and honor. Therefore, the victim lady was sent to her matrimonial home along with her Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 14 husband and brothers-in-laws on 07.05.1999. This fact is also reiterated by P.W.6, Narshingh Das, the informant of the case in his evidence during trial and also finds corroboration from the evidence of P.W.1-Ashok Das, cousin brother of the deceased. 23. From the evidence of aforesaid ocular witnesses, it also transpires that after panchyat dated 07.05.1999, the deceased was sent to her matrimonial home upon undertaking of the husband that henceforth, no demands shall be made and the victim will be treated with all dignity and honor and till her death on 26.05.2000, there is no evidence of repetition of the said demand of dowry or any kind of physical or mental torture meted with the deceased at the hands of her husband, in-laws or any other family members. It also appears that about one year has been lapsed from the date of panchyat and alleged unnatural death of the deceased. 24. In the above context, it is vehemently argued on behalf of the appellants that there is no iota of evidence led by the prosecution to prove that “soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty for or in connection with any demand of dowry” as required to establish the offence under section 304B of IPC and attract the presumption of law propounded under section 113 B of Indian Evidence Act. Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 15 25. In this connection reliance has been placed upon reported judgment in Sham Lal Vs. State of Haryana reported in (1997) 9 SCC 759 , wherein at paras 11 to 13, it is observed as under:- “11. It is imperative, for invoking the aforesaid legal presumption, to prove that “soon before her death” she was subjected to such cruelty or harassment. Here, what the prosecution achieved in proving at the most was that there was persisting dispute between the two sides regarding the dowry paid or to be paid, both in kind and in cash, and on account of the failure to meet the demand for dowry, Neelam Rani was taken by her parents to their house about one and a half years before her death. Further evidence is that an attempt was made to patch up between the two sides for which a panchayat was held in which it was resolved that she would go back to the nuptial home pursuant to which she was taken by the husband to his house. This happened about ten to fifteen days prior to the occurrence in this case. There is nothing on record to show that she was either treated with cruelty or harassed with the demand for dowry during the period between her having been taken to the parental home and her tragic end. 12. In the absence of any such evidence it is not permissible to take recourse to the legal presumption envisaged in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. That rule of evidence is prescribed in law to obviate the prosecution of the difficulty to further prove that the offence was perpetrated by the husband, as then it would be the burden of the accused to rebut the presumption. 13. The corollary of the aforesaid finding is that the appellant cannot be convicted of the offence under Section 304-B IPC. But this would not save him from the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC for which there is overwhelming evidence, particularly of PW 3, Bhagwan Dass, who heard from his daughter, which evidence is admissible under Section 32 of Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 16 the Evidence Act, besides his own direct dialogue with the appellant and his father. As the trial court and the High Court found his evidence reliable, we hold that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the offence under Section 498-A of IPC.” 26. In the case of Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207, it has been held as under:- “15…….. “soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term “immediately before” and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon before death” if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough. Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 17 16. No presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act would be drawn against the accused if it is shown that after the alleged demand, cruelty or harassment the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of cruelty and harassment thereafter. Mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the woman……….” 27. In the instant case, the factual backgrounds as propounded by the prosecution as dealt above clearly indicates that at initial stage of the marriage just after six months to one year, the demand of T.V. and golden ring as additional dowry was raised and due to non-fulfillment of the same, the deceased complained about ill-treatment and torture meted with her at the hands of the appellants at her matrimonial home. The prosecution further admits that due to tense relationship between the deceased and her husband, in-laws and other relatives, she was sent to her parental home where she lived about one and half months. It is also admitted fact that the bidai of the deceased took place on 07.05.1999 upon undertaking at the panchyat held at the village of the informant that the husband, Chhotelal Das would keep his wife with all dignity and honor and shall not subject her to any ill-treatment or torture either mental or physical. Thereafter, one year lapsed and in the evening of 25.05.2000, the husband, Chhotelal Das came to the house of the informant and told Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 18 about missing of his wife and in the next day morning, the dead body was recovered from a well. In between the date of panchyat and alleged death of the deceased, there is no iota of evidence showing that the said earlier demand of dowry in the shape of T.V. and golden ring was repeated by the appellants. There is also no evidence that the victim lady was subjected to cruelty or harassment in between the aforesaid period. Therefore, there remains no casual connection and any live link between the demand of dowry, consequent torture and death of the deceased. 28. In the instant case, it cannot be held that “soon before her death” the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry. This ingredient has been misconstrued by the learned trial court on the basis of evidence available on record. 29. The principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab& Ors. and Sham Lal Vs. State of Haryana as discussed above are clearly applicable in this case. Therefore, the ingredients of dowry death Nos.(III) and (IV) are absolutely lacking in this case. As such no presumption of section 113-B of Evidence Act can be raised in this case. Accordingly, conviction and sentence of the appellants for the offences under section 304-B of IPC is not sustainable under law. Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:JHHC:29273-DB ) Cr. A (D.B.) Nos.845 & 1138/ 2003 19 30. In view of forgoing discussion and reasons, we are of the firm view that prosecution has miserably failed to establish the foundational ingredients of offence under section 304-B of IPC against the appellants, which has not been properly considered by learned trial court. As such learned trial court has committed serious error of law in holding the appellants guilty for the offence under section 304/34 of IPC. 31. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellants for the offence under section 304B of IPC is, hereby, set aside and both the appeal is allowed. 32. In the result, above appellants are acquitted from the charges levelled against them and set at liberty forthwith. 33. The appellants are on bail, hence, they are discharged from liability of bail bonds. The sureties are also discharged. 34. Pending I.A(s), if any, is also disposed of accordingly. 35. Let a copy of this judgment along with Trial Court Records be sent back to the court concerned for information and needful. (Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Jharkhand High Court, at Ranchi Date: 22/09 /2025 Pappu/- A.F.R.