- 1 - IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF APRIL, 2025 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR. N.V. ANJARIA, CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN WRIT APPEAL NO.1123 OF 2023 (SC-ST) BETWEEN: 1 . SRI KRISHNAPPA AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS S/O. LATE PAPAIAH 2 . SRI GOPAL AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS S/O. LATE PAPAIAH BOTH (1) & (2) ARE RESIDING AT: MARANAGERE VILLAGE KASABA HOBLI, TIPTURU TALUK TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 577 201 ... APPELLANTS (BY SRI SREEDHAR N.G, ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . SRI D.M. MANJUNATH AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS S/O. LATE MAHADEVAIAH R/AT MARANAGERE VILLAGE KASABA HOBLI, TIPTURU TALUK TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 577 201 2 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY - 2 - REVENUE DEPARTMENT M.S. BUILDING DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BENGALURU - 560 001 3 . THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER TUMAKURU DISTRICT TUMAKURU - 577 202 4 . THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER TUMKUR SUB-DIVISION TUMAKURU - 577 202 ... RESPONDENTS (SRI RAJENDRA M.S., ADVOCATE FOR SRI S.V. PRAKASH, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT No.1 SRI K.S. HARISH, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NOS.2 TO 4) --- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT AND FINAL ORDER DATED 19.07.2023 IN W.P.NO.16766/2022 (SC-ST) PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON'BLE HIGH COURT, AND CONSEQUENTIALLY BE PLEASED TO PASS AN ORDER DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION IN W.P. NO.16766/2022 (SC- ST) FILED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT PERTAINING TO THE AGRICULTURAL LAND MEASURING 3 ACRES IN SY.NO.285 (OLD NO.234) OF MARANAGERE VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, TIPATUR TALUK, TUMAKURU DISTRICT AND ETC. THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY, CHIEF JUSTICE DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: - 3 - CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN CAV JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N. V. ANJARIA) Heard learned advocate Mr. Sreedhar N.G. for the appellants, learned advocate Mr. M.S. Rajendra for learned advocate Mr. S.V. Prakash for respondent No.1 and learned Government Advocate Mr. K.S. Harish for respondent Nos.2 to 4. 2. The present appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 19.07.2023 passed by learned Single Judge, whereby the petition of the original petitioner-respondent No.1 herein came to be allowed. The appellants are original respondent Nos.4 and 5. 3. Noticing the facts, the original petitioner prayed to set aside order dated 10.08.2022 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Tumakuru, whereby order dated 26.08.2019 passed by the Assistant Commissioner-respondent No.4 herein came to be confirmed. The authorities had declared the sale transaction dated 03.04.1987 in respect of land admeasuring 3 Acres in Survey No.285 (old No.234) of Maranagere Village, Kasaba Hobli, Tiptur - 4 - Taluka, Tumakuru District, as null and void under the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. 3.1 The petitioner was the owner of 2 Acres and 33 Guntas exclusive of 7 Guntas of kharab land in the said survey number having purchased from one Papaiah-father of the appellants by registered Sale Deed dated 03.04.1987. Khata was mutated in the name of the petitioner-purchaser in the revenue records and RTC was done. It is to be stated that the said land admeasuring 3 Acres including the kharab land was granted to said late Papaiah by order dated 20.03.1972. It was on a condition that the alienation of the land will not be permitted for 15 years. 3.2 It was on 06.06.2014, after passage of 27 years from the date of the sale, that the appellants herein approached respondent No.3-Assistant Commissioner seeking to declare the sale deed dated 03.04.1987 to be in violation of Section 4(2) of the Act of 1978. The Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner accepted the plea. The petitioner-purchaser filed a writ petition which was allowed, which order is now challenged by the appellants-original respondent Nos.4 and 5. - 5 - 3.3 Learned Single Judge while allowing the petition and setting aside the orders of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner noticed that there was a delay of 27 years, after which the legal heirs of the original grantee invoked the provisions of the Act to approach the authorities seeking restoration of the land. Learned Single Judge relied on Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) as well as referred to Amarendra Prathap Singh (supra) to finally hold that the authorities committed a serious error of law in permitting restoration of the land in favour of the heirs of the original grantee after almost three decades. 3.4 Learned Single Judge observed in para 9, "In the present case on hand, there is delay of 27 years. Diligence is found to be woefully lacking. The grantee who sold the land in question in contravention of the provisions of the PTCL Act has not questioned the alienations by invoking the provisions of the PTCL Act during his life time. This Court has been examining the restoration proceedings initiated by the legal heirs of the original grantee. If the original grantee during his life time has not chosen to challenge the sale deeds on the ground that alienations are in contravention of the PTCL Act, I am unable to understand as to how the legal heirs of original grantee who do not have pre-existing right can maintain restoration proceedings, more particularly, when there is delay of more than 27 years. Therefore, I am more than satisfied that the law laid down by the Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi .vs. State of Karnataka and another and Vivek M. Hinduja .vs. M. Aswatha - 6 - and the latest judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Satyan are squarely applicable to the present case on hand." 3.4.1 It was further observed in the same paragraph, "Dehors that, if the alienations are found to be after the commencement of the PTCL Act, the doctrine of reasonable period is also applicable and needs and deserves to be applied bearing in mind the right of the purchaser who has acquired a defective title for valuable sale consideration. After passage of time, the rights of the purchaser have stood crystallized and therefore, legal heirs of the grantee cannot be permitted to take away those settled rights on account of laxness on the part of legal heirs of original grantee." 4. Learned advocate for the appellants assailed the impugned judgment and order of learned Single Judge by raising the following contentions, (i) The Act is a beneficial piece of social legislation. In that view the principle of reasonable time may not be applied against the beneficiary and the case of the beneficiary may not be rejected on the ground of delay of laches. Seeking to support this proposition, decision of the Supreme Court in Amarendra Prathap Singh Vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and others [(2004) 10 SCC 65] was relied on. Two other decisions of this High Court in Muniswamy Vs. Deputy Commissioner [ILR 1993 KAR 2108 (DB)] and in - 7 - Bhadrappa Chanappa Vs. The State of Karnataka and others [2011 (3) AIR KAR R 315 (DB)] were pressed into service. (ii) There can be no estoppel or waiver against the statutory rights and remedies since it would violate the fundamental rights. Statutory rights in the beneficial legislation cannot be surrendered to the doctrine of estoppel. The decision of the Supreme Court in Basheshar Nath Vs. CIT, Delhi and Another (AIR 1959 SC 149) was referred to. (iii) The sale deed in favour of respondent No.1 was in violation of Section 4(2) of the Act of 1978 and was intended to defeat the object of the Act. (iv) The sale deed was in the nature of contract which was against the purpose envisaged in Section 4(2) of the Act. (v) For the above reasons, the question of delay and laches would not arise. 4.1 On the other hand, learned advocate for respondent No.1 submitted that delay was a decisive factor on account of which the grantee of the land was not entitled to seek restoration of the land. He relied on various judgments including Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka [(2020) 14 SCC 232] also the decision of - 8 - the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. M. Manjula and others Vs. the Deputy Commissioner and others which was Writ Appeal No.210 of 2023 decided on 25.11.2024 and also in Vivek M. Hinduja and others Vs. M. Ashwatha and others [(2019) 1 KLJ 819 (SC)]. 5. The issue whether the application for restoration under the Act of 1978 could have been made after inordinate delay and laches on part of the applicants, is no longer res integra. 5.1 In Smt. M. Manjula (supra) followed in umpteen number of judgments, it was held that the application under Section 5 of the Act of 1978 cannot be made after lapse of unreasonable time. 5.2 Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the aforesaid judgment contain the discussion and proposition of law in respect of the controversy and in relation to the issue involved, which are incorporated herein below as paragraphs 6 to 7.3 to be the part of reasoning for the present order. 6. The legal provisions and development of law in the subject deserve to be noticed. While ‘granted land’ is defined in Section 3(b) of the Act, Section 4 of the Act deals with the prohibition of transfer of granted lands, to provide that notwithstanding anything - 9 - in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or commencement of the Act, in terms of the contravention of the grant or in contravention of the law in that regard or in breach of sub-Section (2) of Section 4, such transfer shall be treated as null and void, not to give any right, title or interest in favour of the person to whom the land is transferred. 6.1 As per sub-Section (2), no person shall after commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. Under sub-Section (3), the provisions in sub-Sections (1) and (2) are made applicable to the sale of any land in execution of any decree or award, etc., of the Court. Section 5 of the Act deals with the resumption and restitution of granted lands. 6.2 Section 5 as it stood originally, reads as under, "5. Resumption and restitution of granted lands- (1) Where, on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo-motu, and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under Sub-section (1) of Section 4, he may,- (a) by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in - 10 - possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard; (b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir; such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free form all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of land. (1-A) After an enquiry referred to in Sub-section (1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an order accordingly. (2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5-А, any order passed under sub-sections (1) and (1-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. (3) For the purposes of this Section, where any granted land is in the possession of a person, other then the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4." - 11 - 6.3 It would be noticed from the aforesaid provision that there is no prescription of time limit for resumption or restitution of the land which is null and void under Section 4(1) of the Act. However, various judicial decisions, prominent amongst is Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) which was in the very context of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. It was held therein that the application made for restitution of the land after delay of 25 years, was not liable to be acceptable in law, as it was after unreasonable delay. It was held that there was no annulment of transfer could be allowed. 6.3.1 It was observed and held in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), “However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav & Ors., [2017 (6) Scale 459] and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Deputy Commissioner & Ors. [C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011] reiterated a settled position in law that whether statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time.’’ (para 8) - 12 - 6.3.2 It was further stated, “An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. ……” 6.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside of transfer could not be granted after unreasonably long period and the applications made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a person could not be acted upon in favour of such person on the ground of delay, the legislature intervened to proceed to amend Section 5 by virtue Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette Notification dated 27.07.2023. Thereby sub-clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely, - 13 - “(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” 6.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment does not travel anything on merit of the said validity proceedings. 6.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), vis-à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the coordinate bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29.07.2024. 6.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the Division Bench observed thus, in para 3(d), "The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication - 14 - happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity." 6.6.2 It was observed that Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the Division Bench then held as per para 3(f), "It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate." - 15 - 6.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the Division Bench highlighted the nice distinction between ‘delay and laches’, as against ‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and laches’ has a different connotation to operate. 6.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground of laches, the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is marred by laches. 7. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan (supra), explained the word ‘laches’ thus, "The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the - 16 - other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." (para 21) 7.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the remedy for which the party knocks the doors of the Court may not be provided to him on equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from laches, "Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy." (para 22) 7.2 Though the principles governing the delay and laches has the facet in equity. Delay is the genus to which the laches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, laches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in the statutory provision. Limitation binds the - 17 - litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law. 7.3 In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 27 years. The question of laches would come into play. 27 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner-appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void. 8. Learned advocate for the appellants submitted that there was an amendment to Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c) and (d) to sub-section (1) of Section 5, whereby the aspect of limitation was taken away and therefore, the limitation of delay would not have any play. 9. The said amendment is under challenge before learned Single Judge. This court, while dismissing the appeal and upholding the dismissal of the writ petition, has only rested on the ground of inordinate delay of 33 years which is in the nature of - 18 - laches and indolence on part of the applicants-appellants and has not expressed any opinion on the validity of the amendment. This was observed in Smt. Manjula (supra) itself. 9.1 It is to be further noted that the concept of delay is distinct from the idea of laches. Laches is a personal attribute which is an indolence on part of the litigant who remains negligent in asserting his rights. It has nothing to do with limitation or delay. 9.2 The distinction between 'delay and laches' on one hand and 'limitation' on the other hand was specially brought out in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan which was relied on by the court in Smt. Manjula (supra). 10. In the aforesaid view, learned Single Judge was eminently justified in law in setting aside the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner to allow the petition. No case is made out for interference in the said judgment and order. 11. The appeal is meritless and is hereby dismissed. - 19 - In view of dismissal of the appeal, the interlocutory application, as may be pending, would not survive and it stands accordingly disposed of. Sd/- (N.V. ANJARIA) CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/- (M.I.ARUN) JUDGE AHB