1 2025:CGHC:26819 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6031 of 2019 1 - Surendra Shrivastava S/o Late Shri Vikram Lal Shrivastava Aged About 57 Years Traffic Incharge, Bhilai 3 Tahsil And Distt. Durg Chhattisgarh, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Govt. Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home Department Ministry, Atal Nagar, Capital Complex, Mahanadi Bhavan, Police Station Rakhi, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Director General Of Police Police Head Quarter, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Inspector General Of Police Durg Range, Durg, 31 Bunglow, Bhilai. Chhattisgarh, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, Adv. For Respondents : Mr. Rajeev Bharat, Govt. Adv. (Hon’ble Shri Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi, J) Order on Board 18/06/2025 1. The petitioner has preferred this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs :- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash impugned Appellate order dated 16-05-2019 of Director General of Police, Raipur endorsed by Inspector General of Police on 20-05-2019 to I.G. Durg Division and Superintendant of Police Durg Digitally signed by AVANISH KUMAR PATHAK Date: 2025.06.23 17:24:36 +0530 2 Annexure P-1 and order dated 03-05-2018 Annexure P-2 of Inspector General of Police, Durg Division may kindly be held as illegal. 10.2 That cost of litigation and any other relief which the Hon'ble Court deems fit may kindly also be awarded.” 2. Brief facts of the case are that, on 18-7-2015 at about 22.59 hours in night, one Santosh Chandrakar was murdered in Durg, for which Crime No. 291/2015 for offence under Section 302/34 was registered at PS Mohannagar. The petitioner was Investigating Officer of the case. In trial, the accused persons were acquitted of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC by the learned Session Judge, Durg/ trial Court, giving them benefit of doubt. Departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner on the charge that “थाना प्रभारी जैसे महत्वपूर्ण एवं जिजम्मेदार पद पर रहते हुये थाना मोहन नगर के अपराध क्रमांक-291/15 धारा 302, 34 भादविव की लापरवाही पूवक विववेचना कर आरोविपयों को दोषमुवि* का अवसर प्रदान कर अपने कतव्य के प्रतित उदासीनता प्रदर्शि/त कर पुलिलस रेगुले/न के पैरा-64 के उप पैरा (02) का उल्लंघन करना।" In the departmental enquiry, the charge against the petitioner was found proved by the Inquiring officer, on the basis of which, the Disciplinary Authority/Inspector General of Police, Durg Range, Durg, imposed penalty of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect vide Annexure P-2 dated 3-5-2018. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 3-5-2018 was also rejected by the respondent No. 2/ Director General of Police, Raipur 3 (CG), vide order (Anneure P-1) dated 16-5-2019 against which, instant petition has been filed. 3. The respondents/State have filed return pleading inter alias that, when the petitioner was In-charge of the Police Station Mohannagar, he committed irregularities and misconduct while investigating the Crime No. 294/2015 (correct no. is 291/2015) for offence under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, therefore a departmental enquiry was instituted against him and after completion of the enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted its report before the Disciplinary Authority and the Disciplinary Authority i.e. respondent No. 3/Inspector General of Police, Durg Range, Durg, passed punishment order of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect. It has been further pleaded that the procedure pertaining to departmental enquiry has been complied with and adequate opportunity of hearing has been extended to the petitioner including issuance of charge sheet, supply of list of witnesses and documents, opportunity of cross-examination of witnesses etc. and no fault is found in the order of punishment imposed upon the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, the petitioner has been penalized with withholding one increment with cumulative effect without any proper evidence. The appellate authority also did not consider the evidence, which is not supportive to the department. It is further submitted that in the said ST No. 128/2015, accused persons have been acquitted by the trial Court, as witnesses have turned hostile, despite that, the petitioner has been held guilty of negligence in 4 enquiry, which is perverse and illegal. Hence, this petition may be allowed and the orders under challenge may be set aside. 5. Per contra, learned State Counsel would submit that the petitioner was Investigating Officer of Crime No. 291/2015 registered at PS Mohannagar, Durg for the offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC. In that case, he was found negligent in collecting relevant evidence, as he did not collect circumstantial evidence, also the statement of family members of the deceased was not recorded, matching and cross- cheque of blood samples found in incriminating articles were not got done in the FSL, therefore, after due departmental enquiry, he has been penalized by withholding one increment with cumulative effect. He further submits that, it is settled preposition of law that, in departmental enquiry proceeding, High Court ought not interfere under writ jurisdiction as appellate authority, unless, there is gross violation of principles of natural justice, which does not transpire in this case. Therefore, this petition may be dismissed. He relied on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India Vs. K.S. Viswanath [(2022) 15 SCC 190. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. The grounds, which have been raised by the petitioner, to assail the impugned orders show that neither they are technical nor have alleged any technical flaw in conducting the departmental enquiry. The grounds which have been raised by the petitioner to assail the 5 impugned orders are that, the petitioner properly investigated the crime in question, he followed the direction of his superior authorities, evidence has not been properly considered by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority, and the accused have been acquitted in criminal case under Section 302/34 of IPC because the witnesses have turned hostile. Meaning thereby, the petitioner is challenging the merits of the departmental enquiry on the basis of non- appreciation of evidence in proper manner, but, appreciation of evidence by Writ Court is not permissible in view of the settled principles of law by the Apex Court. In catena of judgments, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in departmental enquiry proceedings, High Court has limited scope of judicial review and High Court cannot sit as appellate authority over the finding of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority. 8. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and re-assess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiry. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether Enquiry Officer / Disciplinary Authority acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or 6 finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. 9. In the case of S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 19, 20 & 21 have held as under :- “ 19. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay & Ors. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1182, this Court held that various parameters of the court’s power of judicial review of administrative or executive action on which the court can interfere had been well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions. The Court further held: “It is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach, or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the court would be justified in interfering with the same.” 20. The court can exercise the power of judicial review if there is a manifest error in the exercise of power or the exercise of power is manifestly arbitrary or if the power is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous. Such exercise of power would stand vitiated. The court may be justified in exercising the power of judicial review if the impugned order suffers from mala fide, dishonest 7 or corrupt practices, for the reason, that the order had been passed by the authority beyond the limits conferred upon the authority by the legislature. Thus, the court has to be satisfied that the order had been passed by the authority only on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety before it interferes. The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. Therefore, the court itself may be fallible and interfering with the order of the authority may impose heavy administrative burden on the State or may lead to unbudgeted expenditure. (Vide: Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11; People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors ., AIR 2004 SC 456; and State of N.C.T. of Delhi & Anr. v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo, AIR 2005 SC 2080). 21. In Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 801, this Court explaining the scope of judicial review held that the court must act with great caution and should exercise such power only in furtherance to public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court must always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not.” 10. The Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 1783 and also in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. Bodupalli Gopalaswami, (2011) 13 SCC 553, has in a very categorical terms held that in departmental enquiry proceedings the scope of Court's are very limited. It has been reiterated by the Supreme Court that in a disciplinary proceeding matters, the Court cannot substitute its own finding and thus by replacing the finding arrived at by the 8 authority, that too, after detailed appreciation of the evidence brought on record. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that under Article 226 of Constitution , the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority. It has also been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that the High Court under Article 226 would not reappreciate the entire evidence and come to a different and independent finding. 11. A similar view also has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, For ready reference paragraph 12 & 13 of the said judgment reproduced hereinunder :- "12. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations 9 extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence." "13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. 10 (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI v. K.S. Vishwanath, (2022) 15 SCC 190 has held in para 18 as under :- “18. Recently in N. Gangaraj [State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 : (2020) 1 SCC (L&S) 547] after considering other decisions of this Court on judicial review and the power of the High Court in a departmental enquiry and interference with the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry, it is observed and held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is further observed and held that the High Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. It is further observed that if there is some evidence, that the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to review/reappreciate the 11 evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 13. Perusal of the law enunciated by the Apex Court, shows that, unless there is a ground of perversity or finding being contrary to the evidence on record or there being technical flaw in conducting of departmental enquiry or any other grounds, as has been settled by the Apex Court in afore-cited cases, the Court should be slow in interfering with such finding, which are based on evidence brought on record. 14. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand, in instant case, the appellant has not alleged and not brought any material facts on the record that Enquiry Officer while conducting enquiry has not afforded due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner or any other ground as has been settled by the Apex Court to be entertained by the High Court in exercising the power of judicial review. Rather, the enquiry was initiated because of mistake committed by the petitioner in investigation, due to which, the accused have been acquitted in a criminal case. Hence, the same is not liable to be interfered with by the writ court. 15. It is also pertinent to mention here that in a departmental enquiry, the standard of proof, required to prove the charges is that of preponderance of probability. Unlike in a criminal case, where charges has to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, the findings 12 of the Enquiry Officer can be on the subjective satisfaction of the authority based on evidence and material brought on record before the Enquiry Officer. 16. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court do not find any infirmity or illegality in the order (Annexure P-2) dated 3-5-2018 passed by the respondent No. 3 and order (Annexure P-1) dated 16- 5-2019 passed by the respondent no. 2 in appeal imposing penalty of withholding one increment with cumulative effect, against the petitioner. The instant writ petition being devoid of substance, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 17. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge pathak/-