1 2025:CGHC:38382-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 263 of 2015 1 - Sonsai Mandavi S/o Dhan Singh Mandavi Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Themgaon, Patelpara, Police Station - Makdi, District Kondagaon C.G. , Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh through Station House Officer, Police Station - Makdi, District Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. S.P. Sannat, Advocate. For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, Panel Lawyer. Division Bench Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. & Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. Judgment on Board (4.8.2025) Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 1. The present criminal appeal under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellant herein calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.12.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kondagaon, District-Kondagaon, in Sessions Trial No. 71/2013, by which, the appellant herein has been convicted as under:- Conviction Sentence U/s 302 of Indian Penal Code Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine amount, additional R.I. for three months separately. U/s 201 of Indian Penal Code Rigorous imprisonment for 7 years with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine amount, additional R.I. for three months separately. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution, is that the deceased, Kumari Amrawati, daughter of Gagru, aged about 25 years, was residing in Village Bhiragaon. On 30.04.2013, Gagru was informed by Dhan Singh and Mani Ram of Village Themgaon that his daughter Amrawati had died. On receiving this information, he, along with others, went to Village Demgaon, but no one was found at the house of Shivalal, and the villagers informed that the body was near 3 Godadihi. Upon reaching the spot, they found body of Amrawati in a seated position on the ground near a bush of Girchi, with a brown towel tied around her neck, one end fastened to the branch of the bush. There were visible marks indicating that the body had been dragged, and her feet were covered with leaves, giving the impression that she had been murdered and her body was dragged to the spot to stage it as a case of suicide by hanging. Upon receiving this information, Gagru Markam (PW-1) reported the matter to Police Station Makdi, where a Merg Intimation vide Ex P/8 was registered, the inquest report vide Ex.P/2 was conducted, and the dead body was sent for medical examination. During the merg inquiry, it was revealed that the accused had strangulated the deceased to death and thereafter attempted to project the incident as suicide by hanging. The dead body of the decased was sent for postmortem and as per postmortem report (Ex.P/7), proved by Dr. G.S. Sumar (PW-10), cause of death of the deceased was coma, and the nature of death homicidal. Thereafter, appellant-accused was arrested (Ex.P/12). 3. After completion of investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences before the jurisdictional Criminal Court, which was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, the 4 appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 13 documents and exhibited four documents (Exs. D/1, D/2, D/3 and D/4). Statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, pleaded innocence and false implication. 5. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant / accused for the offences as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant, while assailing the findings of the learned Court below, submits that the entire prosecution case is based upon a very weak form of circumstantial evidence, namely the alleged extra-judicial confession. However, such a piece of evidence has neither been established beyond reasonable doubt nor has it been corroborated by any other independent circumstance. It is further submitted that even the 5 other circumstances sought to be relied upon by the prosecution have not been proved in accordance with law. He further submits that in the Merg as well as in the First Information Report, the assailant has been described as an “unknown person,” which clearly indicates that there was no direct evidence available at the initial stage. He further submits that the so-called extra- judicial confession is stated to have been made before Gagru Markam (PW-1) and Harish Markam (PW-4), but both of these witnesses have categorically deposed that the said confession was made in the presence of the police, thereby rendering it involuntary in nature. It is a settled principle of law that any confession made under the influence, pressure or presence of the police loses its voluntary character and cannot be relied upon for conviction. Learned counsel further submits that the chain of circumstances, which is a sine qua non for proving the guilt of the accused in cases based on circumstantial evidence, is completely lacking in the present case. In the absence of a complete and unbroken chain pointing conclusively to the guilt of the appellant, no conviction could have been legally recorded. Accordingly, it is argued that the impugned judgment is perverse, erroneous, and contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, and hence the conviction of the appellant deserves to be set aside. He has placed reliance upon the 6 judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dev Kanya Tiwari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2018) 5 SCC 734. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State, while opposing the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, submits that the trial Court, after a threadbare appreciation of the entire evidence available on record, has rightly arrived at the conclusion of guilt against the appellant. He further submits that the trial Court has taken into consideration every relevant aspect of the matter and has meticulously analyzed the chain of circumstances which, when taken cumulatively, unerringly point towards the guilt of the appellant. Learned counsel further submits that the circumstances proved against the appellant stand firmly established and are consistent only with the hypothesis of his guilt, thereby excluding every other possibility. The so-called weaknesses pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant are without any substance and have already been duly dealt with and repelled by the trial Court with cogent reasons. It is therefore argued that the impugned judgment is well-reasoned, based on proper appreciation of evidence, and does not suffer from any perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Hon’ble Court. Accordingly, the conviction 7 recorded against the appellant deserves to be upheld and the appeal is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature which has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem reports (Ex.P-7) proved by PW-10 Dr. G.S. Suman, which is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 10. So far as the involvement of the appellant in the alleged crime is concerned, a careful perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly reveals that, at the initial stage, neither the name nor the identity of the appellant surfaced in connection with the incident. It is an admitted position that both the First Information Report (FIR) as well as the Marg intimation were lodged against an unknown person, which itself demonstrates that there was no direct evidence or immediate suspicion against the appellant. However, it is only at a much later stage, on the basis of an alleged extra-judicial confession, that the appellant has been implicated in the present case. Such a subsequent 8 development, resting merely on the weak and uncorroborated piece of evidence in the form of an alleged extra-judicial confession, does not inspire confidence and casts serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution story. 11. Gagru Markam (PW-1), who is the father of the deceased Amravati, has categorically stated that during the course of investigation, when the police interrogated the appellant, the appellant admitted before the police that he had strangulated the deceased Amravati and thereafter tied her dead body to a tree. In his cross-examination, this witness has specifically denied the suggestion that he had earlier stated before the police that the deceased Amravati had gone to the house of the appellant and had stayed there for two days. He further clarified that it is for the first time in the present proceedings that he is disclosing the fact of the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant. 12. Ghanshyam (PW-2), in his examination-in-chief, has also deposed that the appellant had made an extra-judicial confession before the police. However, when subjected to cross- examination, he categorically denied the fact that any such extra-judicial confession was ever made by the appellant, thereby creating a material contradiction in his testimony. 13. Pilaram (PW-3), has deposed that the dead body of the deceased was found in a condition where it had been 9 deliberately covered with dry leaves, evidently with an intent to conceal it. He has further stated that during the course of post- mortem examination it was revealed that the deceased was carrying a fetus at the time of her death. However, in his cross- examination, he has specifically denied the suggestion that the accused had ever made any confession in his presence. He has also denied the suggestion that before the police he had given any statement regarding the alleged extra-judicial confession said to have been made by the accused. 14. Harish Markam (PW-4) has been examined as a prosecution witness, and he has specifically deposed regarding the extra- judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant before the police. His testimony is relied upon by the prosecution to establish the involvement of the appellant in the crime, as he has categorically stated that the appellant, during the course of investigation, confessed before him as well as before the police authorities about the commission of the offence. Thus, PW-4 stands as a witness to the said extra-judicial confession attributed to the appellant. 15. Shivlal (PW-5), when examined before the Court, has categorically stated that he did not make any statement before the police authorities with regard to the present incident. He further deposed that he has not disclosed any fact pertaining to 10 the occurrence to the police at any point of time. Since his testimony did not support the case of the prosecution and he resiled from his earlier version recorded during the course of investigation, the prosecution prayed for and the Court accordingly declared him as a hostile witness. 16. Mohan Singh (PW-6), has also been declared hostile by the prosecution, as he has failed to support the case put forth by the prosecution and has not corroborated the evidence relied upon in the present matter. 17. Sonau (PW-7) has deposed that, during her interaction with the police, she had indicated that it was possible that the deceased, Amravati, had not committed suicide. However, she clarified that this particular statement was not recorded in the official police statement. She further admitted before the Court that she does not possess any personal knowledge regarding the circumstances leading to the death of the deceased and is unaware of the cause or manner in which the deceased met her demise. 18. Dr. G.S. Suman (PW-10), who is a qualified medical practitioner, conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased. During her examination, she meticulously observed and recorded the injuries and other relevant medical findings. Based on her professional evaluation, Dr. Suman has opined that the cause of 11 death of the deceased was due to strangulation by hanging. Furthermore, after a thorough analysis of the circumstances, the nature and pattern of injuries, and other pertinent factors, she has concluded that the death was homicidal in nature, indicating that it was a result of deliberate human intervention rather than accidental or natural causes. 19. Sitaram Dhruv (PW-11), has testified that he is the official who recorded both the Merg and the First Information Report (FIR) in the present case. In the course of his examination, he candidly admitted that he undertook the investigation personally, meticulously gathering evidence and recording statements pertinent to the case. He further stated that, upon completion of the investigation, he compiled the findings and formally submitted a charge sheet before the competent jurisdiction, in accordance with the procedural requirements of law. His testimony establishes the procedural compliance and due diligence followed in the investigative process leading up to the filing of the charge sheet. 20. From a careful and comprehensive perusal of the evidence brought on record, it becomes manifestly clear that the dead body of the deceased was discovered in a hanging condition in the vicinity of a nearby jungle. It is noteworthy that both the initial report of the incident recorded in the First Information Report 12 (FIR) as well as the Merg report did not name any individual as being responsible for the occurrence. The case, therefore, primarily hinges upon the alleged extra-judicial confession purportedly made by the appellant before the concerned witnesses, which forms the cornerstone of the prosecution’s narrative. This aspect of the evidence assumes critical significance, as the entire incriminating material against the appellant appears to rest predominantly on this confession, in the absence of any direct identification of the accused in the initial reports or other contemporaneous documents. 21. The legal principles governing extra-judicial confessions are well-settled and have been consistently recognized by courts. It is a fundamental requirement that any such confession must be made voluntarily, in a free and unconstrained manner, without the application of any undue influence, coercion, or pressure of any kind. The law emphasizes that the integrity of such confessions is contingent upon the absence of any external force or inducement. At the same time, it is widely acknowledged that an extra-judicial confession constitutes a form of weak or fragile evidence. Consequently, while it may have probative value, it cannot, by itself, serve as a conclusive basis for conviction unless corroborated by other independent and reliable 13 evidence that supports the circumstances surrounding the alleged offence. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ramu Appa Mahapatar vs. State of Maharashtra (2025) 3 SCC 565 has observed as under:- “20. In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180, this Court explained the concept of extra-judicial confession. Confession may be divided into two classes i.e. judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before a Magistrate or a court in the course of judicial proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or a court. Extra- judicial confessions are generally those that are made by a party before a private individual who may be a judicial officer also in his private capacity. As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions arise firstly, whether they are made voluntarily and secondly, are they true? If the court is of the opinion that the confession was not made voluntarily but was a result of an inducement, threat or promise, it would not be acted upon. It follows that a confession would be voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit state of mind and if it is not caused by 14 any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against him proceeding from a person in authority. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case judged in the light of Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (briefly "the Evidence Act" hereinafter). The law is clear that a confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the court is satisfied that it was voluntary. At that stage, the question whether it is true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity and voluntariness of the confession, the court may refuse to act upon the confession even if it is admissible in evidence The question whether a confession is voluntary or not is always a question of fact. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt. 21. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession witt have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession like any other evidence depends upon the reliability of 15 the witness to whom it is made and who gives the evidence. Extra-judicial confession can be relied upon and conviction can be based thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from a witness who appears to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. The words spoken by the witness should be clear, unambiguous and unmistakenly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and that nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-Judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility. 22. If the evidence relating to extra-judicial confession is found credible after being tested on the touchstone of credibility and acceptability, it can solely form the basis of conviction. The requirement of corroboration is a matter of prudence and not an invariable rule of law. 23. In Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan, this Court accepted the admissibility of extra-judicial confession 16 and held that there is no absolute rule that an extra- judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material. 24.Evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession was again examined in detail by this Court in Sahadevan v. State of T.N. That was also a case where conviction was based on extra-judicial confession. This Court held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of the accused. That apart, in case of circumstantial evidence where the prosecution relles upon an extra- judicial confession, the court has to examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. An extra- judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind can be relied upon by the court. However, the confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession like any other evidence depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. 25. This Court acknowledged that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the 17 court intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If the extra-judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent Improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent, such evidence should not be considered. This Court held as follows: (Sahadevan case, SCC p. 410, para 14)” 14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra-judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution version, it may be difficult for the court to base a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances, the court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration." 26. Upon an indepth analysis of judicial precedents, this Court in Sahadevan summed up the principles which 18 would make an extra-judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused: (SCC pp. 412-13, para 16). 16. (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution. (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful. (iii) It should inspire confidence. (iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law." 23. Now, the other circumstantial evidence which is required to be considered in the present case is regarding recovery of blood stained article is concerned. The law in this respect is well established that the prosecution has to prove it then only conviction can be made. 19 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Naykar vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2024) 3 SCC 481 has held as under:- “It can thus be seen that, the only circumstance that may be of some assistance to the prosecution case is the recovery of dagger at the instance of the present appellant. However, as already stated hereinabove, the said recovery is also from an open place accessible to one and all. In any case, the blood found on the dagger does not match with the blood group of the deceased. In Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthans, this Court held that sole circumstance of recovery of bloodstained weapon cannot form the basis of conviction unless the same was connected with the murder of the deceased by the accused. Thus, we find that only on the basis of sole circumstance of recovery of bloodstained weapon, it cannot be said that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt.” 25. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Thakore Umedsing Nathusing vs. State of Gujarat 2024 SCC OnLine SC 320 has dealt with the recovery and blood stains not found to be that of the deceased and the relevant para reads as under:- “35. We have gone through the evidence of the concerned police officials associated with the recoveries and find their testimonies to be highly doubtful. The knife which was recovered at the 20 instance of A3 was found from a nala which is a place open and accessible to all. The knife attributed to A4 was presented by one Shobhnaben wife of Kanji Chhara and thus it cannot be linked to A4. Thus, these recoveries in no manner can be treated to be incriminating in nature. In the case of Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 724, this Court held that the solitary circumstance of recovery of blood-stained weapons cannot constitute such evidence which can be considered sufficient to convict an accused for the charge of murder. We thus find the recoveries to be highly doubtful and tainted. Even if it is assumed for a moment that such recoveries were effected, the same did not lead to any conclusive circumstance in form of Serological report establishing the presence of the same blood group as that of the deceased and hence they do not further the cause of prosecution. In addition thereto, we find that the prosecution failed to lead the link evidence mandatorily required to establish the factum of safe keeping of the muddamal articles and hence, the recoveries became irrelevant.” 26. In the matter of Debapriya Pal vs. State of West Bengal (2017) 11 SCC 31, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held with the issue that even if blood stain was found, the blood group of accused or deceased was not ascertained. The relevant para reads as under:- 21 “For the sake of argument, we are presuming that they were present at the time when the appellant brought bloodstained clothes from his house and gave the same to the police. What is material is the reliance on these bloodstained clothes for the culpability of the appellant herein. As per the prosecution, the blood group on these bloodstained clothes matched with the blood on the bedsheet on which the body of one of the deceased persons was found. The record reveals that though blood of both the deceased persons was drawn and sent for examination, it is not known as to what was the report thereupon and what was the blood group of the deceased persons. No such blood report has been produced. So much so, blood group of the accused persons was also not ascertained. Even if we presume that the blood on the bedsheet was that of the deceased, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the same blood group as of the appellant-accused thereof. Therefore, mere matching of the blood group on the bloodstained clothes, which was even on the bedsheet, would not lead to the conclusion that it is the appellant who had committed the crime.” 27. In the matter of Shantabai and others vs. State of Maharashtra (2008) 16 SCC 354, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “25. In support of the fifth circumstance, the prosecution has examined Dr. Hanumant, who 22 performed post-mortem on the dead body of the deceased Gunwant on 15-8-1993. The doctor noticed as many as thirteen injuries on the body of the deceased as described in the post-mortem report (Ext. 41). According to the opinion of the doctor, the cause of death was because of shock due to cardio- respiratory failure caused by injury to brain and brain haemorrhage. The chemical analyser's report would reveal that ethyl alcohol was found in the viscera contents of the deceased. 26. We may point out that the investigating officer has not cared to collect the fingerprints appeared on the stones and axe, the alleged weapons of offence, at the time of seizure of the articles nor had he taken the fingerprints of the appellants for comparison with the fingerprints, if any, detected on the alleged weapons of offence. The articles collected by the investigating officer from the spot were found lying in the open place which was accessible to all and sundry. The prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that axe, which was the alleged weapon of offence, found on spot in the open place belonged to A-1, A-2 and A- 3. Thus, the prosecution has not established beyond reasonable doubt that A-1, A-2 and A-3 had used the recovered weapons of offence in the commission of the crime. 28. The chemical analyser's report (Ext. 72) reveals that human blood of Group 'B' was detected on the clothes, which were seized by the police, allegedly belonging to the appellants. The blood group on those clothes did not tally with the blood of Group 'O', which was found on the clothes of the deceased and on the sample of soil, axe, stones, handles, etc, which were taken from the spot by the investigating officer. The investigating officer has categorically stated that when he along with A-1 and panch witnesses had gone in search of the clothes of the appellants, the lock to the door of the house of the appellants was kept with the Police Patil which was opened by them later on. In this 23 view of the matter, the prosecution has not proved that d the clothes, which were allegedly seized by the police at the instance of A-1 and lying in the open place, were stained with Blood Group 'O' of the deceased found on the deceased's clothes and on the articles which were seized by the investigating officer from the place of occurrence. These circumstances are not proved by the prosecution by lending cogent, satisfactory and convincing evidence to hold A-1, A-2 and A-3 guilty of the offence.” 28. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dhananjay Shanker Shetty vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 596 has held as under:- “9. Another circumstance which was alleged against the appellant was that bloodstained clothes and weapon were recovered from his house, but the trial court as well as the High Court did not place any reliance upon this circumstance in view of the fact that according to the report of the chemical examiner, the blood group found thereon did not tally with that of the deceased.” 29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that such failure materially affects the evidentiary value of the alleged recoveries. In Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 480, the Court held: “Unless the blood stains found on the clothes or weapons are proved to be that of the deceased, the discovery cannot be said to incriminate the accused beyond doubt.” 24 30. Similarly, in Sattatiya @ Satish Rajanna Kartalla v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210, it was observed: “In the absence of a serological report confirming that the blood on the clothes or weapon belonged to the deceased, the recovery is of no substantial help to the prosecution.” 31. Again, in Vijay Shankar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 10 SCC 353, the Apex Court reiterated: “The prosecution’s failure to establish, through scientific evidence, that the blood found on the weapon or clothes matched that of the deceased creates a serious doubt about the veracity of the recovery and the guilt of the accused.” 32. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must establish the chain of circumstances with cogent and reliable evidence, particularly in cases based on circumstantial evidence. 33. It is profitable here to note following five golden principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra 1 which constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and same read as under: “153.…. (1) the circumstances from which the 1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 25 conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 34. Considering the aforesaid circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution and accepted by the trial Court, in order to establish the veracity of an extra-judicial confession, it is 26 imperative that further corroborative evidence be produced, as such confessions, by their very nature, constitute a weak form of evidence. A conviction cannot be predicated solely on the basis of an extra-judicial confession unless it is supported by independent, reliable, and corroborative material that substantiates the claims made therein. In the absence of such corroboration, the circumstances alleged cannot be deemed conclusively proved, and reliance solely on the confession would render any conviction unsustainable. Therefore, without additional corroborative evidence, the court cannot maintain a conviction merely on the strength of an extra-judicial confession. Thus, from every perspective, the prosecution has utterly failed to discharge its burden of proof. All the circumstances when they are taken into consideration could not establish suit of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts. There are missing link of chain. Consequently, this Court finds no hesitation in setting aside the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court. 35. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.12.2014 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kondagaon, District- Kondagaon, in Sessions Trial No. 71/2013 is hereby set- aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under under Section 27 302 of Indian Penal Code and under Section 201 of Indian Penal Code and shall be released forthwith unless wanted in any other case. 36. In compliance with Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond of Rs. 25,000/- with two sureties of the like amount before the concerned court. The bond shall be effective for six months and include an undertaking that in case of filing a Special Leave Petition or grant of leave against this judgment, the appellant will appear before the Supreme Court upon receipt of notice. 37. Registry is directed to transmit the lower court record along with a copy of this judgment to the trial court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Raghu Jat