2025:JHHC:10650 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(L) No. 204 of 2025 Rampreet Singh ….. Petitioner Versus The Managing Director, Tata Steel, Jamshedpur, East Singhhbhum ….. Respondent ----- CORAM HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Petitioner: Mr. Rahul Upadhyay For the Respondent: Mr. Manish Mishra ----- 03/07.04.2025 The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the award dated 29.08.2024 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in I.D. Case No. 21/2014 whereby the petitioner’s petition filed under Section 2A of the Industrial Dispute (Amendment) Act, 2010 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 2010’] seeking relief against his sudden separation from the service of the respondent-Tata Steel Company has been dismissed. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the contents of the present writ petition. 3. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur, on due consideration of the evidence available on record, has come to a finding that the petitioner- workman worked as ‘Sepoy’ in the respondent-Company on temporary basis for about six months since January, 1982. He however raised an industrial dispute in the year 2014 invoking Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 i.e. after about 32 years of his separation from employment of the said Company. Learned Labour Court has also given a finding that the petitioner does not come under the purview of the ‘workman’ under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and there is no relationship of employee and employer between him and the said Company. 4. I find no infirmity in the impugned award dated 29.08.2024 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur as the petitioner himself has 2025:JHHC:10650 2 admitted during the industrial adjudication that he worked as ‘Sepoy’ on temporary basis for about six months in the said Company in the year 1982 and thereafter he had been out of employment. The delay of about 32 years in raising an industrial dispute has also not been properly explained by the petitioner. Such a huge delay suggests serious laches on his part which is fatal in nature. 5. In the case of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Registrar, Sericulture Department & Anr. reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: ‘’44. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the “appropriate Government” to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words “at any time” used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry. 45. On the application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the High Court correctly decided the issue holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e. after fourteen years of termination without any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing dispute.’’ 6. Thus, even if there is no period of limitation prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for raising industrial dispute, very stale claim should not be generally encouraged or allowed, unless there is satisfactory explanation of delay. It is well settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. 2025:JHHC:10650 3 7. Under the said circumstance, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned award dated 29.08.2024 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur. 8. The present writ petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. Satish/- (RAJESH SHANKAR, J)